Analytic jurisprudence is the field organized around the “What is law?” question. When most scholars approach the “What is law?” question, they suppose that the goal of such inquiry is to discover, or to accurately represent, the true nature of law. Consequently, these scholars reject the notion that the goal of such inquiry is to develop a definition of law in order to serve a set of practical interests. The first view, which claims that the field should aim at accurate description, is what I call representationalist jurisprudence. The second view is what I call pragmatist jurisprudence. This dissertation argues that pragmatist jurisprudence is the better approach for two reasons. First, given the state of our knowledge, we cannot give a very detailed answer about the true nature of law; thus, if we are to continue talking about the nature of law, we ought to select a definition of law that suits our practical interests. Second, several of the most prominent jurisprudence scholars have been miscategorized as representationalists when they are, in fact, pragmatists; thus, if we want to carry on their projects, we, too, should adopt pragmatist jurisprudence.

Last modified

• 01/29/2019

Creator

• Raff Donelson

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/N2D98C

Keyword

• Philosophy

Date created

• 2017-01-01

Resource type

• Dissertation

Rights statement

• In Copyright