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Responsibility Where We Find It

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There is more responsibility on heaven and earth than dreamt of in most philosophy. This dissertation explores three debates in three sub-fields of philosophy, highlighting in each responsibilities agents find themselves with whether they like it or not. In the chapter Trust Logic, Not Tortoises, I propose an answer to Wright’s Justification Question – to what extent are we justified in our knowledge of logic? – arguing early knowledge of logic is a species of know-how underwritten by dispositions to infer that are themselves often refined into more sophisticated dispositions to infer as we develop. Given how foundational such know-how is to our understanding of the world, we find ourselves responsible for cultivating more sophisticated reasoning, whatever its provenance. In the chapter Ties that Undermine, I argue attributions to an agent of moral responsibility are largely influenced by the perceived rareness of that agent's ability to provide aid or prevent harm, degree of aid provided or harm prevented, and cost to that agent in providing aid or preventing harm. Voluntary adoption of such moral responsibility is not necessary for an agent to be morally responsible. I generalize this result to the epistemic domain in the chapter Speak No Evil: Understanding Hermeneutical (In)justice, arguing attributions to an agent of epistemic responsibility are also influenced by the perceived rareness of that agent's ability to generate true beliefs in themselves and others, extent of benefit provided and harm prevented by having such true beliefs, and cost to that agent in generating such true beliefs. Here, we see voluntary adoption of such epistemic responsibility is not necessary for an agent to be epistemically responsible. By exploring the relevance of such responsibility to three distinct debates in three distinct sub-fields of philosophy, this dissertation highlights how pervasive responsibility is to the lives of agents, and the work of philosophers.

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