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The Path to Preemption:

The Politics of Indonesian Student Movements during the Regime Transition (1998–99)

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Abstract

This study aims to explain variations in student movement successes and failures during regime transitions. Examining the 1998–99 Indonesian student movement that helped ending the Suharto regime, this study argues that the degree of state repression influences the degree of coordination and assistance from opposition groups and actors to students, which then determines the nature and extent of student movement success. This study argues that apart from complete failure (collapse), there are three forms of student movement success: preemption, cooptation, and full response. The 1998–99 student movement is an example of preemption, which refers to the adoption of some of the student demands by the Habibie's government without the inclusion of students themselves into the Indonesian state. This limited form of success was achieved because the students' capacity to achieve greater change was weakened because of the heavy state repression of their movement partners, opposition groups, and actors. Students should be understood as the initiators of change rather than societal transformers. They are most effective when testing regime strength, revealing weaknesses, and damaging legitimacy and defenses. To achieve maximum levels of success, students are highly dependent on opposition groups and actors to increase their impact during transitions. Such strong coordination and assistance from the regime's political opponents were not forthcoming in the Indonesian case, with the result that only preemption was achieved. This study compares the experience of Indonesia to the student movements in the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution. The Iranian students followed the cooptation path (like preemption, a partial form of success), while the Guatemalan students followed the more successful full response path.

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stumble upon and read this study in your own unfortunate time, I want to congratulate you on

surviving the crisis. You are excelling, and you will continue to excel as you move on to

tomorrow. If you trip, do not worry, we all do. If there are any life lessons from my Ph.D.

educational journey, they are humility and perseverance. I hope you also move forward with

these two qualities to guide you in your beautiful life.

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List of Acronyms

ABIM: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia)

AIOC: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

AEU: the Association of University Students (Guatemala)

AKPM: Akademi Keuangan dan Perbankan Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Academy of Finance and Banking)

Banser: Barisan Anshor Serbaguna (the Multipurpose Ansor Front).

BB: Bandung Bergerak (Bandung Moves)

BO: Budi Oetomo (Noble Endeavour)

BPN: Badan Pertanahan Nasional (the National Council for Land Affairs)

BPPT: Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (the Research and Technology Implementation Board)

BTI: Barisan Tani Indonesia (the Indonesian Peasants' Front)

Bulog: Badan Urusan Logistik (the State Logistics Agency)

BUN: Bank Umum Nasional (the General National Bank)

CEC: the Congressional Education Commission

CGMI: Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (the Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements)

DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Islamiyah Indonesia the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication)

Dema: Dewan Mahasiswa (Students' Council)

DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (the House of Representatives)

FAK: Front Anti-Korupsi (Anti-Corruption Front)

Famred: Front Mahasiswa untuk Demokrasi (the Student Action Front for Democracy)

FDR: Front Demokrasi Rakyat (the People's Democratic Front)

FE: Fakultas Ekonomi (Fakultas of Economics)

FPL: Frente Popular Libertador (the Popular Liberation Front)

FISIP: Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (the Fakultas of Social and Political Science)

FIK: Fakultas Ilmu Keperawatan (Fakultas of Nursing)

FK: Fakultas Kedokteran (Fakultas of Medicine)

FKGMNU: Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda Nahdlatul Ulama (the Young Generation of Nahdlatul Ulama)

FKMC: Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Ciputat (the Communication Forum for Ciputat Students)

FKSMJ: Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (the Communication Forum of the Jakarta Student Senate)

FMIPA: Fakultas Matematika dan Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam (Fakultas of Mathematics and Natural Sciences)

Fomara: Forum Mahasiswa dan Rakyat (the Students and People Forum)

Forkot: Forum Kota (the City Forum)

Formaci: Forum Mahasiswa Ciputat (the Ciputat's Student Forum)

Forsal: Forum Salemba (the Salemba Forum)

FPI: Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defender Front)

FPsi: Fakultas Psikologi (Fakultas of Psychology)

FS: Fakultas Sastra (Fakultas of Literature)

FSI: Forum Studi Islam (Islamic Study Forum)

FT: Fakultas Tehnik (Fakultas of Engineering)

GAPI: Gaboengan Politik Indonesia (the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties)

GBHN: Garis-Garis Besar Halauan Negara (the State Policy Guidelines)

Gerindo: *Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia* (the Indonesian People's Movement)

Gerwani: Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (the Indonesian Women's Movement)

GMNI: Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (the National Indonesian Student Movement)

Golkar: Golongan Karya (the Functional Groups)

GPII: Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement)

GPK: Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (the Security Disruption Movement)

Hammas: Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim antar Kampus (the Inter-Campus Islamic Muslim Student Groups Association)

HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (the Muslim Students Association)

HMI Dipo: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Diponegoro (the Muslim Students Association Diponegoro)

HMI MPO: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (the Assembly to Save the Organization of Muslim Students Association)

HMI: Hayat-ha-ye Mo'ta-lefe-ye Islami (The Coalition Councils)

IAIN: Institut Agama Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah (Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta)

ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)

IIFSO: the International Islamic Federation of Student Organization

IISIP: Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (Institute of Social Science and Political Science)

Ikamasus: Ikatan Madrasah Aliyah Program Khusus (the Association of the Islamic High Schools Special Program)

IKIP Jakarta: Institut Keguruan and Ilmu Pendidikan Jakarta (Jakarta State Institute of Teacher Training and Education)

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IMM: Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (the Muhammadiyah Student Association)

INFIGHT: the Indonesian Front for the Defense of Human Rights

ISDV: Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging (the Indies Social Democratic Association)

ISTN: Institut Sains dan Teknologi Nasional (National Institute of Science and Technology)

ITB: Institut Teknologi Bandung (the Bandung Technology Institute)

JAKKER: Jaringan Kesenian Rakyat (the People's Cultural Network)

JT: Jemaah Tarbiyah (Tarbiyah Movement)

KAK: Komite Anti Korupsi (the Anti-Corruption Committee)

KAMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (the Indonesian Student Action Union)

KAMMI: *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* (the Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students)

KAPPI: Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia (the Indonesian Young Students' Association)

KAPPI: Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar-pelajar Indonesia (the Indonesian Students' Action Front)

KBUI: Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia (the Big Family of University of Indonesia)

KIPP: Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (the Independent Election Monitoring Committee)

KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World)

KMI: Komunitas Mubaligh Indonesia (the Indonesian Lay-Preachers Corps)

KM ITB: Keluarga Mahasiswa Institut Teknologi Bandung (the Student Family of Bandung Technology Institute)

KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (the Central Indonesian National Committee)

KNPD: Komite Nasional untuk Perjuangan Demokrasi (the National Committee for Democratic Struggle)

Kodam: Komando Daerah Militer (the Regional Military Command)

Kodim: Komando Distrik Militer (the District Military Command)

Koramil: Komando Rayon Militer (the Subdistrict Military Command).

Kokarmendagri: Korps Karyawan Kementerian Dalam Negeri (the Corps of Functionaries of Ministry of Home Affairs)

KOMNAS HAM: Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (the National Commission on Human Rights)

Komrad: Komite Mahasiswa dan Rakyat untuk Demokrasi (the Student and People Committee for Democracy)

Kopkamtib: Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)

KOSTRAD: Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (the Army Strategic Reserves Command)

KPKKP: Komisi Penilai Kinerja Kabinet Pembangunan (the Assessing Commission of the Development Cabinet's Performance)

KPP-PRD: Komite Pimpinan Pusat-Partai Rakyat Demokratik (the Central Leadership Committee of the Democratic People's Party)

KRI: Komite Rakyat Indonesia (the Indonesian People's Committee)

KSBH: Kelompok Studi Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Study Group)

KSKPKO: Komite Solidaritas Korban Pembangunan Kedung Ombo (Victims of Kedung Ombo Project)

KST: Kelompok Studi Trisakti (the Trisakti Study Group)

LDK: Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (the Campus Da'wa Institute)

LDMI: Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Indonesia (the Indonesian Student Da'wa Institut)

LSADI: Lingkar Studi Aksi untuk Demokrasi (the Action Study Circle for Democracy)

MAPK: Madrasah Aliyah Program Khusus (the Islamic High Schools Special Program)

Masjumi: Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations)

Malari: Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari (Fifteenth January Catastrophe)

MARI: Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (the Indonesian People's Assembly)

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MEK: Mojahedin-e Khalq (the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran)

MIAI: Majlis Islam A'la Indonesia (the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia)

MI: Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Moslems)

MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the People's Consultative Assembly)

Murba: Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (the Proletarian Party)

NII: Negara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic State)

NIOC: the National Iranian Oil Company

NU: Nahdlatul Ulama

Pam Swakarsa: Pengamanan Swa Karsa (the Civilian Volunteer Militia)

PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party)

PAR: Partido de Acción Revolucionaria (the Revolutionary Action Party)

Parindra: Partai Indonesia Raya (the Great Indonesian Party)

Parkindo: Partai Kristen Indonesia (the Indonesian Christian Party)

Parmusi: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Moslem Party)

PBI: Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia (the Union of Indonesian Nation)

PBI: Partai Buruh Indonesia (the Indonesian Labor Party)

PDI: Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia (the Indonesian Democrat Youth)

PDI: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the Indonesian Democratic Party)

PDI-P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle)

Perhimi: Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (the Indonesian Students' Association)

Permesta: Perjuangan Semesta (Total Struggle)

Permi: Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Union)

Perti: Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (the Islamic Tarbiyah Movement)

Pesindo: Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Youth)

PETA: Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland)

PII: Partai Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Party)

PK: Partai Keadilan (the Justice Party)

PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the National Awakening Party)

PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party)

PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement)

PMKRI: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (the Indonesian Republic Catholic

Students Movement)

PNDI: Pengkajian Nilai Dasar Islam (Islamic Basic Values Learning)

PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party)

PNR: Partido Nacional Renovador (the National Renovation Party).

Poetra: Poesat Tenaga Rakyat (Centre of People's Strength)

PP: Persatuan Perjuangan (the United Struggle)

PPBI: Pusat Perjuangan Buruh (the Indonesia Indonesian Center for Labor Struggle)

PPKI: Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence)

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party)

PPPP: Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan (the Realization and Enactment of Pancasila Pancasila)

PRD: Partai Rakyat Demokratik (the People's Democratic Party)

PRRI: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)

PSI: Partai Sosialis Indonesia (the Indonesian Socialist Party)

PSII: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Union Party)

RII: Republik Islam Indonesia (the Islamic Republic of Indonesia)

RIS: Republik Indonesia Serikat (the United States of Indonesia)

Rohis: Rohani Keislaman (Islamic Spirituality Lectures)

RPKAD: Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (the Army Para-Commando Regiment)

Semar: Serikat Mahasiswa Rawamangun (the Rawamangun Students Union)

SI: Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Union)

SIP: Suara Ibu Peduli (the Voice of Concerned Mothers)

SKEPHI: Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia (Secretariat of the Indonesian Forest Conservation Network)

SMF: Senat Mahasiswa Fakultas (the Fakultas Student Senate)

SMJ: Senat Mahasiswa Jurusan (the Department Student Senate)

SMID: Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi (the Indonesian Students in Solidarity for Democracy)

SMPT: Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi (University Student Senate)

SMPT-IAIN: Syarif Hidayatullah Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi-IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah (the University Student Senate of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah)

SMPT-IKIP Jakarta: Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi IKIP Jakarta (the University Student Senate of IKIP Jakarta)

SMPT-UI: Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi Universitas Indonesia (the University Student Senate of University of Indonesia)

SMPT-UT: Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi-Universitas Trisakti (the University Student Senate of Trisakti University)

SMTI: Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Industri (the College of Industrial Management)

SOBSI: Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (the Central All-Indonesian Workers Organization)

SRDJ: Serikat Rakyat Djakarta (the Jakarta People's Union)

SRI: Serikat Rakyat Indonesia (the Indonesian People's Union),

SRS: Serikat Rakyat Solo (the Solo People's Union)

SSP: Serikat Sekerja Pendidikan (the Education Workers' Union)

STN: Serikat Tani Nasional (the National Peasant' Union)

Supersemar: Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (the Eleventh March Command Letter)

Supersemar: Suara Perjuangan Reformasi 11 Maret 1998 (the March 11 Reform Struggle Voice)

Tritura: Tiga Tuntutan Rakyat (the Three People's Demands)

UI: Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)

UKI: Universitas Kristen Indonesia (Indonesia Christian University)

UGM: Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)

UKM: Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa (Students' Activities Unit)

UMJ: Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta (Jakarta Muhammadiyah University)

Unair: Universitas Airlangga (the Airlangga University)

Unfrel: the University Network for Free and Fair Election

UNILA: Universitas Lampung (the Lampung University)

UNS: Universitas Sebelas Maret (the Eleven March University)

US: the United States

USSR: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UT: Universitas Trisakti (the University of Trisakti)

VSTP: Vereniging van Spoor en Tramweg Personeel (Union of Train and Tramway Personnel)

Walhi: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (the Indonesian Forum for Environment)

YLBHI: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (the Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation).

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Chapter One

The Varieties of Student Movement Successes

The Puzzle

After three days of occupying the House of Representatives (May 18-21, 1998), Indonesian students witnessed an army-backed autocrat, Suharto, step down. They rejoiced, celebrating the moment by plunging into a large pond in the National Parliament compound. Some other students celebrated by chanting, "Allah is the greatest" (*takbir*). The students were aware that Suharto's resignation was not the end of their struggle. Suharto was only an intermediary target for fundamental changes in the future. The students had presented six demands to the National Parliament, and they wanted to see them carried out: prosecuting Suharto and his cronies, amending the 1945 Constitution, eliminating the dual function of the armed forces, implementing regional autonomy, establishing the rule of law, and inaugurating a government free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism. These were popularly known as the Six Reform Demands. Different student groups held varying interpretations of the demands, depending on their groups' political stances.

However, the student's continued mobilizations to achieve the six demands did not go smoothly in the months following Suharto's fall. The first obstacle was the rise of Vice President Habibie as Suharto's replacement. Immediately after announcing his resignation, during the same ceremony, Suharto intelligently appointed Habibie as his successor. During that same ceremony, Commander of the Armed Forces General Wiranto pledged his loyalty to Habibie and vowed to protect Suharto and his family. At this point, the rise of Habibie divided students into two camps: those who protested his inauguration and those who supported Habibie. For instance,

the Big Family of the University of Indonesia (*Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia*; KBUI), an

informal student group from the University of Indonesia (*Universitas Indonesia*; UI), kept up its

demand for a "just and clean government".[1] KBUI did not see Habibie as a person who could

realize such an objective. In contrast, students from the Muslim Students Association (*Himpunan*

Mahasiswa Islam; HMI) supported Habibie. HMI argued that Habibie deserved a chance to

prove himself.[2] Friction between Indonesian students started appearing.

The moment of truth finally arrived when the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis*

Permusyawaratan Rakyat; MPR)[3] held a Special Session in 1998 from November 10-13 in the

National Parliament building, Jakarta.[4] By this point, the number of students involved in the

struggle for deep changes had declined. Furthermore, while the students had seemed to unite

momentarily during the occupation of the House, a sharp division was visible during the session.

Student groups, such as HMI and the Tarbiyah group (*Jemaah Tarbiyah*; JT), favored Habibie's

rise because he represented a patron for Islamic groups in the post-Suharto era.[5] These groups

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[1] Emf, et. al. (May 22, 1998). Students Jubilant, But Not Satisfied. *Jakarta Post,* p. 1

[2] Ibid.

[3] The People's Consultative Assembly is the highest decision-making institution in Indonesia. Before the installment of a democratic regime in 1999, the assembly had the power to select the president and vice president and change the constitution. The members of the assembly are the members of the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*; DPR). DPR members have offices in the national parliament building.

[4] The People's Consultative Assembly discussed several old state decrees during the Special Session. They came up with significant decisions such as the reduction of the armed forces' seats in the parliament; the gradual elimination of the military's dual function (*dwi-fungsi*) as a state apparatus and a political force; the eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism; the implementation of regional autonomy; the enforcement of human right principles; the legal possibility to amend the constitution; term-limits for the president and vice president; and a relaxation of the requirement that the Five Pillars (*Pancasila*) be the ideology of every organization.

[5] The support from Islamic student groups for Habibie's presidency was a result of historical ties between the New Order regime and Islamic forces. In the early 1990s, the regime built a closer relationship to Islamic forces due to frictions within the army. The regime aimed for new support from Islamic groups as a counterbalance to the army. See Liddle, 1996.

did not oppose the Special Session. In contrast, students associated with the City Forum (*Forum Kota*; Forkot), a student group that used physically confrontational tactics, refused Habibie's presidency because they viewed him as merely Suharto's protégé and therefore contaminated by the New Order. Forkot opposed the special session. The consequence of this division between the student groups was devastating. The contra-Habibie students still fielded a protest during the Special Session, but their mobilizations were not nearly as massive as those in May 1998. In downtown Jakarta, they marched from different directions, creating a base at Atmajaya Catholic University, a private university located near the National Parliament. Meanwhile, the pro-Habibie students did not join the mobilizations during those three days. The November 10-13 mobilizations were not strong enough to force the MPR to bow to students' demands. The army and police clamped down on the protests during those three days by taking coercive measures. They shot at the protestors, a group of not only students but also other civilians who had joined the protest. By the end of the third day, 17 people had died, 4 of them students. Hundreds of more protestors were injured.[6]

The division between the students became stronger during the Special Session. The students associated with the Communication Forum of Jakarta Student Senates (*Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta*; FKSMJ) opted to trust Amien Rais, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X as the representation of the pro-reform groups.[7] The students organized and gathered for these four national figures who

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[6] Lestari, S. (2018). Kasus Penembakan Mahasiswa Trisakti, Semanggi 1, Semanggi 2, Belum Selesai Setelah 20 Tahun Reformasi. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-43940189 on September 29, 2019, 8:22 AM.

[7] Amien Rais was the chief of Muhammadiyah, the largest modernist Islamic organization. Sukarnoputri was the chief of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Abdurrahman Wahid was the chief of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest traditionalist Islamic organization. Hamengkubuwono X was and still is the King of the Yogyakarta Sultanate.

were, at the time, the leaders of prominent social organizations. On November 10, 1998, the

students and these four leaders met to demand the regime conduct a general election in 1999;

abolish the military's dual function doctrine; eradicate corruption, collusion, and nepotism; and

dismiss the Civilian Volunteer Militia (*Pengamanan Swa Karsa*; Pam Swakarsa). In contrast,

students from Forkot, arguably the most radical component of the student coalition that helped

bring down Suharto, kept pushing the idea of forming an Indonesian People's Committee

(*Komite Rakyat Indonesia*; KRI). Forkot conceptualized KRI as being comprised of prominent

pro-reform figures, who would manage the transition to a democratic government. Forkot did not

believe that Habibie, as Suharto's protégé and his longest-serving cabinet minister, would lead

Indonesia towards democracy. Despite their different proposed solutions, students from all the

competing groups decided that entrusting the transition process to the four figures chosen by

FKSMJ was the best option. Once they did this, the four leaders excluded the students from state

leadership and undermined their direct influence over the direction and extent of reforms and

change.

      After the Special Session, the students were forced to accept that the regime would fulfill

only some of their original six demands. The transition regime led by Habibie gradually applied

political reforms, including amending the 1945 Constitution, eliminating the dual function of the

armed forces, and implementing regional autonomy. The other demands were ignored. Suharto

was never punished.[8] His cronies also remained unpunished and smoothly re-inserted themselves

in the new democratic polity. They even managed to become key political players in the post-

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[8] The subsequent regimes did try to prosecute Suharto. The People's Consultative Assembly, for instance, issued Decree 4 11/1998 to prosecute Suharto and his cronies. Nevertheless, they failed as Suharto was deemed too sick to undergo prosecution. He was found guilty in absentia and was ordered by the court to return IDR 4.4 trillion to the state. The effort to recover the assets has been ongoing since the first attempt in 2007.

Suharto era, shaping the direction of democratic reforms for their own survival.[9] The

implementation of the rule of law to subdue political elites' predatory interests was another

unattained goal.[10] A democratic regime marred by corruption, collusion, and nepotism has been a

consistent feature of Indonesian politics and governance since the students attempted their

eradication at the end of the 1990s.[11]

The Indonesian student movements in the 1998–99 period presents a paradox. On the one

hand, they managed to exploit the momentum of the Asian financial crisis to press for Suharto's

resignation. On the other hand, after Suharto's resignation, the Indonesian students did not seem

able to continue to apply the same amount of pressure. The students managed to get some of

their demands realized, but they also seemed to lose the same power that had previously ousted

Suharto. The drastic decline of the students' power suggests that the students failed to continue

to exert the power they had accumulated.

With the decline of student power in mind, assessing student success can be measured in

two ways. One way is by ascertaining how much of their agenda, in this case the Six Demands,

was adopted. On this score, the success of the Indonesian students was partial. A second way

would be by asking whether or not students were included as coalition members in the new

constellation of official state power that arose after Suharto's fall. Such inclusion would have

allowed the student movement to continue pressing for major reforms from *within* the new power

structure. This did not happen.

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[9] Hadiz and Robison, 2004.
[10] Davidson, 2009.
[11] Indonesia has been a democratic regime with a Corruption Perception Index average of 35.1 out of 100 in the seven years since 2012. International, T. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/IDN# on August 10, 2019, 1:25 PM

It is reasonable to expect that when a regime partially fulfills student demands, but deliberately excludes them from state power, that pattern would likely be repeated in other contexts. Following Gamson's typology, this study labels the Indonesian student movements' path *preemption*.[12] Preemption refers to the inability of Indonesian students to systematically seize a political position inside the Indonesian state, even though they witnessed the adoption of some of their demands. A preemption is a form of success that is partial or limited. The regime materializes some of the students' demands to temper their attempts at applying further pressure towards having more control over the decision-making and furthering new advantages. The Indonesian student movement, however, was just one path among many others. For instance, in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, although the students managed to oust the Shah and infiltrate the state, infighting among students intensified, resulting in the exclusion of leftist opposition groups and students from the revolutionary coalition. The conflict even ruined the hallmark of the revolution, civil liberty, as the pro-Khomeini groups banished the leftist opposition groups. The path the Iranian revolution took, which is also partial and limited, is called *cooptation*. A third path was evident in Guatemala after the 1944 Revolution, when students became state politicians able to push for educational reforms from within the state. Because they were able to achieve this, the Guatemalan case is labeled a full response, as opposed to a partial *response* in the cases of cooptation and preemption. Guatemala and Iran show that, after students initially take on the role of initiator of regime transition by organizing the earliest protests against a regime, the student organizers may then take paths which have a different trajectory from that of the Indonesian students. This study does not focus on collapse, as collapse occurs when students fail

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[12] Gamson, 1975, p. 29.

to oust a regime. Instead, this study focuses on the variety of student movement successes that come *after* the fall of regimes.

Table 1. The Types of Student Movement Successes

Acceptance

		Full	None
New Advantages	Many	Full Response (Guatemala 1944)	Preemption (Indonesia 1998)
	None	Cooptation (Iran 1979)	Collapse

Source: Gamson (1975)

Reflecting on these different paths of student movements, this study begins with the assumption that students have the potential to be the initiators of change during regime transitions, as exemplified by the cases of Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran. Nevertheless, for students to go beyond their initial role, they cannot rely solely on their own power. They need to forge alliances with other opposition groups to escalate their power to infiltrate the state. These are other groups that oppose the regime but are not students. Further, the degree of state repression shapes the extent to which opposition groups could coordinate and assist students in infiltrating the state.

The three varieties of success in student movements, full response, cooptation, and preemption, are all the result of the alliances made between students and opposition groups. A full response is the most successful scenario for the students, while cooptation is the second-best outcome because gaining a political position within the state creates the potential to gain long-term advantages, although that does not always happen. Of the three, preemption is the weakest type of success because, without a political position inside the state, any changes would be vulnerable as the new regime could swiftly cancel them. This study's objective is to explain these variations in student movement success during regime transitions.

This dissertation focuses on the case study of the Indonesian student movement during the 1998-99 regime transition and how the students achieved a preemption outcome, in which they realized some of their demands but were not able to attain positions in the state as officials and politicians. This study utilizes the comparative cases of the student movements in Iran and Guatemala to investigate the different factors which consequently set the courses of these two cases toward different outcomes. These other cases serve as a yardstick with which to compare the Indonesian example and examine the relevance of this study's argument. Nevertheless, this study focuses overwhelmingly on the Indonesian case, and this study treats the other two cases as shadow comparisons.

Significance

Answering the question of why variations occur in student movement success helps to fill some important theoretical gaps in our understanding of popular movements in post-colonial contexts. In the literature on student movements during regime transitions, the two dominant

approaches are the *state-centric* and the *organizational*.[13] The state-centric approach emphasizes

the role of the state and argues that state factors, such as state economic policy and state

repression, are decisive in determining student movement successes. The organizational

approach emphasizes the role of student organization and argues that factors such as ideas, trusts,

and networks, are more significant in explaining student movement successes. These

perspectives have led to some important theoretical works explaining student movement

successes. Nevertheless, these existing approaches have left some significant gaps. First, the

literature on student movements during regime transitions does not explicitly focus on a period

of transition, understood as "the interval between one political regime and another."[14] The

existing studies have emphasized regime transitions but without a clear limitation on what they

mean by "transitions." Their explanations usually start with outlining the conditions that then

become precursors to the mobilization of students. When the regime weakens, then students rise

up and attempt to initiate a movement against the regime. Subsequently, students oust the regime

and a new regime emerges. Although such an explanation helps us to understand the process of

student mobilizations, it neither tracks nor systematically explains what students do throughout a

transition period. After the fall of a regime, there is a moment of transition in which students can

play various roles, as the Indonesian, Guatemalan, and Iranian cases will demonstrate. Such a

transition moment is significant because during that brief period, political actors, including

students, compete to realize their agendas. The outcome of their competition often becomes the

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[13] See, for instance, Aspinall, 2005; Barbosa, 2006; Boudreau, 2004; Choe, 1985; Douglas, 1963; Greenberg, 2014; Guthrie, 1995; Ingavata, 1981; Jackson, 2005; Kraince, 2003; Lee, 1993; Rives, 2014; Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2014; Sanders, 2011; Sastramidjaja, 2015; Vrana, 2017; Wright, 2001; Zewde, 2014; Zheng, 2004

[14] O'Donnell et. al., 1986, p. 6.

basis for the consolidation of the new regime.[15] By analyzing the period after the fall of a regime, it is possible to assess whether students have contributed to providing a solid ground for regime consolidation in the future.

Second, both approaches treat the term "success" vaguely and imprecisely. They define student movement success only in passing. The two approaches do not provide clear indicators of how we can, for instance, gauge success for a short- or long-term period. These approaches also fail to supply clear indicators of various levels or areas of success (e.g., organizational, institutional, societal). This lack of indicators hampers comparative work on the politics of student movements during regime transitions. By breaking our understanding of success into two main components – namely, acceptance and realization – the goal is to push the discussion further by operationalizing the concept in a specific manner. Clearer criteria for evaluating success and failure allows us to engage in a more nuanced analysis of student movements during regime transitions in single case or cross-case studies.

Third, existing approaches have left important gaps in their explanations. The state-centric approach tends to treat student movement outcomes as reducible to state factors such as economic development policies, state legitimation, and conflict among political elites.[16] Although this approach emphasizes the contexts for explaining student movement success, it does so at the cost of eliding the agency-level analysis from the explanation. It simplifies the situation as if such structural factors have sufficient explanatory power to determine students' actions and their likelihood of success. Meanwhile, the organizational approach successfully excavates factors such as political ideas, trust, and networks as important for influencing student

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[15] Munck and Leff, 1997, p. 344.
[16] See, for instance, Boudreau, op. cit.; Choe, op. cit.; Douglas, op. cit.; Ingavata, op. cit.; Rivetti and Cavatorta, op. cit.; Sanders, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.; Zheng, op. cit.

movement successes.[17] Through these factors, we are able to see meso- and micro-level dynamics that the state-centric approach is unable to reveal in analyzing student movements and the variety of their success. However, the organizational approach is flawed in that it omits the state and important structural considerations from its framework. These gaps in the two approaches are significant and need to be addressed.

Fourth, this study is relevant to understanding the extent to which students can continue their role as the initiator of change. Students often exert great pressure on a regime when a crisis strikes, shaking the regime. They protest and make demands that represent the broader interests of society. Nevertheless, after the regime falls, the students often disappear from the political process. They cease to apply pressure, and their role as the initiator of change suddenly ends. Although this pattern of rising and falling is seen in other social movements,[18] understanding this pattern within student movements is important because it would explain how the initiator of change disappears prematurely, without continuing their role by overseeing the realization of their demands. This rapid rise and fall pattern also allow us to understand the nature of power projected by student movements. Considering other patterns in Guatemala and Iran, this study is significant as it seeks to explain the different capabilities of student movements to continue their role as the initiator of change.

Fifth, and finally, there is a temporal dimension to achieving success in social and political change. Some aspects of success are immediately visible, such as when a movement's demands are clearly declared and adopted in the months, or perhaps years, that follow a major

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[17] See, for instance, Aspinall, op. cit.; Barbosa, op. cit.; Greenberg, op. cit.; Guthrie, op. cit.; Ingavata, op. cit.; Jackson, op. cit.; Kraince, op. cit.; Lee, op. cit.; Rives, op. cit.; Sastramidjaja, op. cit.; Vrana, op. cit.; Zheng, op. cit.; Zewde, op. cit.

[18] See, for instance, Della Porta and Tarrow, 1986; Tarrow, 1993; Tarrow 1998

political rupture. But sometimes changes are achieved over several years or even decades –

changes which can only be traced back to a turning point produced by a movement.

Understanding variations in student movement success presents an opportunity to theorize the

foundations of long-term agenda attainments. Long-term success rests on short-term success.

Thus, investigating the variety of student movement successes provides us with a solid base to

understand why long-term agendas (e.g., eradication of corruption or inequality) have or have

not been realized after a certain period of time. Furthermore, understanding variations in student

movement success also tempers the hopes and expectations for success, during or immediately

following regime transitions. People often lament the fact that regime transitions are not

successful in delivering their promises. This study opines that understanding the nature and

variety of short-term successes permits us to design a more realistic theory of change based on

the success that political actors such as students obtain during regime transitions.

Existing Explanations

The two major approaches for explaining variations in student movement success during

regime transitions are state-centric and organizational. These two approaches echo some key

approaches in the literature of social movement success and failure.[19] In general, this study

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[19] There are at least three major approaches in the literature on social movement success and failure. The three approaches are structural, organizational, and state-centric. The structural approach emphasizes the influence of durable and large social processes in conditioning the successes and failures of social movements. The structural approach underscores factors such as the tradition of strong leftist parties and proportional representation system (Redding and Viterna, 1999); influential allies and elite divisions (Schock, 1999); class and gender structure (Einwohner, 1999); the local electoral rewards (Luders, 2005); political opportunity structure (Trevizo, 2006); and economic incentive structure (Luders, 2006). The organizational approach stresses organizational elements in shaping the propensity of social movement success and failure. Those elements include, for instance, organizational threats (Steedly and Foley, 1979); organizational beliefs and goals (Mirowsky and Ross, 1981); leadership and formal structure of a movement organization (Staggenborg, 1988; Corbett, 1998); organizational networks (Diani, 1997); the capacity of a movement organization to manage conflicts (Disney and Gelb, 2000); activists' perception (Bernstein, 2003); collective action frame (Franceschet, 2004; Trevizo, 2006); involvement of members in organizational processes (Dugan and Reger, 2006); organizational strategies of using resources

argues that both approaches have insufficiencies for explaining the dependent variable in their studies. Although they have a similar concern in explaining the roles of students during regime transition, they do not offer a specific dependent variable to be studied. Some scholars focus on student mobilizations approaching regime transitions,[20] their division after regime transitions,[21] and their failures to topple the regime.[22] These variables refer to different moments during regime transitions. The inability to specifically differentiate these terms constrains comparative work on student movements. Although some studies have attempted to compare student movements across contexts,[23] the vague definition of student movement success does not provide a stable ground for comparing them. Furthermore, the failed consensus on what to explain when studying regime transitions undermines the possibility of building a theory of student movement success. Defining success in the transition period would be difficult since success could mean: the success of students in igniting a large protest after a long period of absence; the success of ousting the regime; or the success of building a collective identity among students. This study proposes a specific definition of success, which would give a comparative study of student movement success better ground for comparison.

(Martin, 2008); organizational templates and unionism (Almeida, 2008); small defeat or victory experienced by a movement organization (Gupta, 2009), submerged networks (Staggenborg and Lecomte, 2009); organizational positioning in an issue (Chiarello, 2013); within-movement conflict (McCammon et. al., 2015); sit-in tactics (Biggs and Andrews, 2015); and strategic cultural interactions with targets (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2015). Meanwhile, the state-centric approach highlights state variables in determining social movement success and failure. State variables include state money (Burk III and Lubeck; 1987); state threats (Fang Deng, 1997); and state actors (Stearns and Almeida, 2004).

[20] Choe, op. cit.

[21] Douglas, op cit.

[22] Ingavata, op. cit.; Zheng, op. cit.

[23] See, for instances, Choe, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.

It is useful to explore some of the limitations in explaining student movement success in greater detail. The state-centric approach focuses on key factors such as state economic policy[24] and repression.[25] States shape student movements through economic policies by fostering the development of the new middle class, in which students often reside.[26] The students' economic situation triggers their opposition to the regime when a crisis strikes and deteriorates students' life. Meanwhile, state repression influences student movements by raising the cost for students to act collectively and forcing students to alter their tactics.[27] State repression threatens students trying to forge a movement and forces students to adopt covert tactics, such as mobilizing friendship networks, that in turn determine student movement success.

Both state factors have played an important role as the drivers of various successes of student movements. Each of them, however, suffer from weaknesses. Focusing on state economic policies may be useful in locating where students emerge from and how economic background shapes the trajectory of students during regime transitions. Nevertheless, relying only on state economic policies is insufficient as state economic policies cannot comprehensively explain the meso-level stories of student movement success. At the meso-level of explanation, there are factors, such as the relations between students and other social groups or the relations between students and universities, that could shape the student movement success. Prioritizing only the linkage between state economic policies and student movements leads to an incomprehensive framework for explaining student movement success, since such a theoretical work positions students as isolated political actors, as if the state shapes students but does not

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[24] Choe, op. cit.
[25] Sanders, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.
[26] Choe, op. cit.
[27] Boudreau, op. cit.; Sanders, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.

shape other actors, such as opposition groups and actors. Furthermore, including the impact of state policies, especially state repression, on opposition groups and students is crucial to explicating student movement success.

Although the emphasis on state repression is helpful in highlighting the impact of state repression on student successes,[28] at least in the student movement literature, the existing studies suffer from a simplification of the variation of state repression targets. State repression does not have the same effect on different political actors, because the state often is faced with a network of political actors with different kinds of power and different functions. When state repression undermines only the weakest actors in the network, it does not collapse the whole network. Instead, when state repression targets and successfully eliminates the core group of the network, the whole network can potentially crumble. Such a criticism fits with this study's core argument that students are not able to make an impact during regime transitions alone. They are more likely to act as the first group that attempts to break the regime's defenses, but they need to rely significantly on opposition groups to guide them after the fall of a regime.

Without making a distinction between state repression which targets students and state repression which targets opposition groups, it is easy to assume that there is no distinction in the effects of these two types of state repression. This study takes a different view by arguing that the variation of state targets matters in determining the effect of state repression. When state repression targets only student mobilizations, there is a high probability that student uprisings will still emerge in the future. In contrast, when state repression targets the opposition groups as the provider of student movements' infrastructure, there is a lower probability that student

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[28] See, for instance, Boudreau, op. cit.; Rivetti and Cavatorta, op. cit.; Sander, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.

uprisings will emerge in the future because the repression deeply weakens the capacity for mobilization. What the state decides to target influences the potential impact students can have on regime transitions.

Identifying the different roles played by opposition groups in building student group's infrastructure helps to clarify the possible successes students' mobilizations can have. Understanding these roles also facilitates meso-level explanations (i.e., the relation between opposition groups and students) of the effect of state repression on the variety of student movement successes.

To summarize, prioritizing the state and its actions is an approach that provides important insights into student movement success. But there are also significant weaknesses. One is the vague definition of student movement success. This approach does not seem to convey a clear and operational definition of what is meant by student movement success. Since regime transitions contain varied phases, future scholars would be helped by a clearer definition of student movement success. Moreover, as to independent variables, the state-centric approach has proposed economic policy and state repression as important variables. State economic policy, however, does not explain much about the group dynamics of student movements. However, as an independent variable, state repression might clarify the differences among various targets.

The organizational approach compensates for some of the weaknesses seen in the state-centric approach, particularly some of its overall structural characteristics. For instance, the organizational approach suggests that factors such as students' political ideas are potentially influential during regime transitions.[29] Political ideas are significant since they can guide actors,

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[29] See, for instance, Greenberg, op. cit.; Ingavata, op. cit.; Jackson, op. cit.; Kraince, op. cit.; Sastramidjaja, op. cit.; Zheng, op. cit.; Zewde, op. cit.

especially during uncertain times, such as regime transitions.[30] The insistence on the role of

political ideas, however, invites three criticisms. First, ideas can only work with a strong social

base. Ideas only have a significant impact when the ideas are rooted in organizational factors,

such as resources, structures, or leadership. For instance, the transitory nature of students

combined with a lack of organizational structure means that political ideas can be divisive,[31] as

no hierarchy exists to structure peaceful interactions between students with competing ideas. The

result is the potential rise of conflicts between students that then undermines their ability to

produce significant outcomes.

Second, stressing political ideas does not explain how political ideas first emerge or how

students select a particular political idea to be the template for their actions. In addition, there is

also the question of what the population of ideas is available to students. In this matter, the state

plays an important role as a gatekeeper, which allows, encourages, restricts, or suppresses the

growth of an idea in society. No political divisions based on political ideas persist without the

role of the state in nurturing such a division. Accordingly, eliminating the state from analysis

creates an incomprehensive picture of structure and agency, meaning the elision of the origin of

political ideas adopted by students.[32] Third, political ideas are not functional without a strong

political position in society. Ideas need legs to be decisive, including strengthening students'

capacity to produce outcomes. To elaborate, relying on an analysis of ideas adopted by students

is insufficient. In addition, it is important to note how students reside politically in society. The

position of students in society can only be explained by linking students' political ideas to the

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[30] Blyth, 2002.
[31] Altbach., op. cit.
[32] Goodwin, 2001.

position of related social groups (i.e., opposition groups), determined by state repression, as further demonstrated by this study's argument.

Under the organizational approach, other scholars have attempted to break the isolationist image of students (i.e., students as the only influential actor during regime transitions). They emphasize that students' relationships with other social groups should be the center of the analysis of student movement outcomes. These scholars, for instance, mention factors including the linkage to opposition groups,[33] "ordinary citizens,"[34] workers,[35] and political parties[36] as influential in increasing students' strength in challenging a regime. The linkage of students with opposition groups suggests that although students often play an important role as the initiator of regime changes, students still need other groups to elevate their power. The necessity of joining forces with opposition groups comes from the fact that students often advocate for things that are in a society's long-term best interest, such as abolishing inequality, promoting democracy, and erecting the rule of law. These agendas require a long time to be manifested while the status of being a student are temporary. Therefore, students would only be able to push these issues when they align with opposition groups with more durable power. The organizational approach has aided in highlighting the importance of this alignment and, theoretically, in underscoring the meso-level mechanisms (i.e., group coordination, group conflict) that can have various consequences for student movements in regime transitions.

There are, however, some problems with this line of argument. First, although opposition groups can assist the development of students' capacity when the state constrains the students,

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[33] Aspinall, op. cit.
[34] Guthrie, op. cit.
[35] Lee, op. cit.; Rives, op. cit.
[36] Barbosa, op. cit.; Vrana, op. cit.

their assistance could then dry up due to the coercive limitation to garner resources imposed by the state. Conversely, when the state supports or allows the growth of opposition groups, they can potentially help the growth of student movements. Thus, by emphasizing the existence of a link to opposition groups and not looking at how that link works, the organizational approach cannot clearly explain the weight of opposition groups' assistance to students without inserting the state as an actor that conditions opposition groups' capacity to assist students. Consequently, without including the state in the calculation of opposition groups' power, it is not possible to understand student success, as they are closely related. Second, the insistence on the existence of the ties to opposition groups overlooks the strength or weakness of those ties. Students' connections to opposition groups influence their ability to achieve success during regime transitions. Nevertheless, without delving further in order to analyze the degree of coordination and assistance between opposition groups and students, it is not possible to perceive the source of their power in attaining success during regime transitions. The degrees of coordination and assistance between opposition groups and students are the missing variables, which intervene in the interactions between the two groups and lead to the variety of successes throughout regime transitions. Once again, the role of the state could not be more important for highlighting the degree of coordination and assistance. The state shapes the configuration of opposition groups and, in turn, shapes students through state policies. This study further argues that focusing on state repression would emphasize more clearly the coordination and assistance between opposition groups and students because state repression can impact directly on these two factors.

To summarize, the proposed factors, especially ideas and linkage to opposition groups, suffer from several limitations. Although ideas can give students a roadmap during regime transitions, without a strong organizational base, the same ideas would not function properly.

The roadmap to navigate the transitions might exist, but without a strong organizational base, students would not be able to increase their impact in the moment of transition from breaking the regime's defense to overthrowing the regime. Meanwhile, although examining the links to opposition groups brings a more comprehensive look at students and their relationships to social forces in a society, the strength or weakness of those links remain unexplored. This study argues that only by incorporating insights from the state-centric approach, can we better emphasize the importance of the link between opposition groups and students.

Definitions

Before presenting the main argument, this study explains briefly some of the key concepts. This study focuses on defining four variables: state repression; coordination between opposition groups and students; assistance to students; and success.

State repression. This study adopts Christian Davenport's definition of state repression as "a wide variety of coercive efforts employed by political authorities to influence those within their territorial jurisdiction: over and cover; violent and non-violent; state, state-sponsored (e.g., militias), and state-affiliated (e.g., death squads; successful and unsuccessful)."[37] State repression ranges from strong to weak. Strong state repression means state repression that successfully eliminates not only public oppositions (e.g., street protests, public petitions), but also the organizational structure of opposition groups, completely undermining their capacity to bounce back from state repression. The capacity to bounce back is the opposition groups' ability to reorganize themselves after experiencing state repression. Strong state repression, for instance, cuts down the opposition groups' access to resources or blocks coordination meetings so that

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[37] Davenport, 2007, p. 3.

opposition groups cannot reorganize themselves and launch counter-mobilizations against the state.[38] The result of state repression is the absence of strong opposition groups that can form connections with students. Strong state repression diminishes the opposition groups' ability to mobilize students to forge an alliance in anticipation of possible opportunities for change. For instance, when the New Order regime crushed youth and student organizations related to PKI, such as CGMI, leftist students did not bounce back until the mid-1980s.

Moderate state repression refers to repression that is successful in eliminating organizational structures and power of opposition groups, although the repression does not impact the majority of opposition groups. This means that there are opposition groups that continue to exist, while others demobilize due to moderate state repression. Thus, moderate state repression causes unequal power relationships among opposition groups. On the one hand, there are opposition groups that are still intact and have the capacity to form networks with students. On the other hand, there are opposition groups that succumb to state repression, undermining their chance to build networks with students. Moderate state repression occurs because states do not always have the capacity to launch a full-fledged state repression impacting all opposition groups. States often select their targets based on this information, and the state gradually adds more targets later.

Weak state repression refers to repression that is successful in clamping down public opposition but does not target or undermine the organizational structure of opposition groups. Weak repression permits opposition groups to recover from state repression and to further expand their organizational structure, including giving support to students. Weak repression, for

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[38] Sullivan, 2016.

instance, allows opposition groups to drill deeper into the pools of resources they can utilize to devise plans, mobilize, and counter-mobilize against state repression. Weak repression enables the durability and expansion of opposition groups, while strong repression negates them. Weak state repression also promotes a balance of power among opposition groups. The key factor is the depth of damage that repression inflicts on the capacities of opposition groups and students to organize, mobilize, resist, and protest.

The degree and form of state repression affect the fragmentation inside opposition groups and, by extension, among students. Strong and weak repression can cause fragmentation in different ways. State discrimination usually follows state repression in that it eliminates opposition groups. The discrimination often divides the opposition groups by positioning an already repressed opposition group as the enemy of the state and different opposition groups. Moderate state repression triggers fragmentation inside both opposition groups and students by allowing for the development of a dominant opposition group. The rise of a dominant group can divide opposition groups and students, because of the dominant group's tendency to direct the transition process based on its own interest. Weak state repression reduces the potential of fragmentation. Weak state repression allows for opposition groups to develop and form trust between themselves. Trust is not a commodity that can emerge in the short-term or with limited space. Thus, the time and space provided by weak state repression assist opposition groups to develop trust that, in turn, lowers fragmentation among the opposition groups. Following Kristin M. Bakke et al.'s work on movement fragmentation, important considerations include the number of organizations, the degree of institutionalization, and the distribution of power between

them.[39] The number of organizations refers to the total number of organizations that exist to coordinate collective actions. When a movement does not have an organization acting as an umbrella for all the other movement organizations, the movement tends to fragment. The degree of institutionalization refers to the rules and procedures governing the interactions in a movement. Institutionalization refers to the existence of organizational structures, rules, and procedures that manage interactions between different parts within the structure. Institutionalization could include, for instance, the distribution of authority between the leaders and the members of the movement. A strong level of institutionalization indicates a less fragmented movement, because leaders and members adhere to the same rules and procedures to manage their interactions. A weak level of institutionalization leads to a fragmented movement because leaders and members coordinate their actions through different rules and procedures. This motivates leaders and members to create their own rules and procedures, which, in turn, provokes fragmentation. Lastly, power distribution refers to the degree of concentration of resources (e.g., money, formal positions, informal positions) held by a movement. The concentration of power across many factions in a movement reduces fragmentation, while the dispersal of resources between competing factions tends to divide a movement. This study employs these criteria to dissect the fragmentation on two levels: opposition groups and students.

   Opposition groups. The relationships between opposition groups and students are typically unequal. Students have specific kinds of power and resources, which enables them to operate as the initiator for regime breakdown. But without additional support, this power ends up being limited. Opposition groups supply this additional support to students. Opposition groups

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[39] Bakke et. al., 2012, pp. 265-266.

provide students with augmented resources, skills, and networks so that they can move beyond

their traditional role as the initiator of change. Thus, opposition groups are necessary partners

and vital to students because they encourage, nurture, and assist students in defeating a regime.[40]

Opposition groups are non-student groups with members drawn from both inside and

outside the state government. Opposition groups seek to maneuver under the state's radar to gain

influence in society. To build their power, they penetrate communities, including universities, to

deepen and expand their networks. Infiltrating communities is necessary for these groups for two

reasons. First, deeper networks provide opposition groups with resources. Opposition groups

without deep and strong anchors to communities tend to be easily eliminated by external shocks

like state repression. Second, living under dangerous authoritarian regimes, such as Suharto's

New Order, forces opposition groups to hide and protect themselves in these communities.[41]

While waiting for state repression to subside, opposition groups develop their networks, garner

support, and prepare for exploiting future opportunities. Furthermore, opposition groups compete

with one another at the societal level. Under authoritarian states, the competition may be more

intense, since their resources and space to maneuver are limited. This intense competition is also

present when opposition groups delve into communities. Especially in communities like

universities, where certain resources are abundant (e.g., potential recruits, freer space of public

engagement), competition can be fierce.[42] Moreover, cultivating support from students tends to

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[40] The unequal relation between the opposition groups and students is similar to the popular conceptualization of "mobilizing structures" as "those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action." This study treats opposition groups as mobilizing structures for student mobilizations. For the conceptualization of mobilizing structures see McAdam et. al., 1996, p. 3.

[41] Nepstad, 2008; Whittier, 1995.

[42] The abundant resources at universities do not mean that students can play a transformative role during regime transitions without opposition groups. The function of these resources is limited to elevating students to their role as the initiator. For instance, the numbers of students and the freer space in

be an uphill struggle for opposition groups in an authoritarian setting, because the state extends its influence on universities to counter efforts to build opposition there. The success of the states' efforts to nullify the opposition groups' influence in universities highly depends on the regimes' capacity to lengthen its reach into these universities versus the opposition groups' capacity to infiltrate. For instance, prior to a large student protest in 1989 in Taiwan, the regime actively deployed state agents to monitor students' political activity by employing an "Officer in Education" (*Jiao Guan*).[43] Their presence prevented the infiltration of opposition groups on campuses, hindering the merger of these groups with the students. In contrast, the New Order regime began restricting political activities at universities in 1978, but there were no consistent efforts made by state agents to monitor students. This paved the way in the 1980s for Islamic groups, such as the Campus Dakwah Institute (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*; LDK), to infiltrate public universities and garner support from lower- and middle-class Indonesian Muslim students. Although regimes have strategies to oppress opposition groups, the competition to cultivate support at the community level does not always favor the regime.

The connection between students and opposition groups is important in determining the success of student activism and student movements. This study distinguishes between opposition groups that want to take over the state and opposition groups that try to work with those already in power. For the first type of opposition group, gaining state power is their main goal. They identify the state as an arena in which resources are plentiful (e.g., state budgets, networks of state apparatuses). Using these resources could elevate the possibility of achieving their goals.

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universities permits students to interact and build a movement in a short time. Nevertheless, the success of students during regime transitions is not reducible to these types of resources. The numbers of students and freer public space in universities cannot help students to elevate their role as the initiator of regime changes.

[43] Wright, op. cit.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the People's Mujahidin Organization of Iran are examples of

opposition groups that see seizing the state as their main objective. In contrast, the second type of

opposition group does not want to take over the state. These opposition groups prefer to work

outside state institutions, although they may later demand the resignation of a regime during

regime transitions. They do not aim to control the state themselves but rather push the state to

enact the changes they desire. For example, opposition groups that assisted the Indonesian

student movements in 1998, such as the Voice of Concerned Mothers (*Suara Ibu Peduli*; SIP),

did not have a political orientation to grab state power. A strong connection to such a group

would likely push students away from the goal of claiming the state as their arena of power

struggle. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, these two types of opposition groups compete to

gain influence and support from community members, which includes students. Power struggles

for student support between opposition groups are inevitable, as these groups try to expand their

influence on universities. Consequently, the competition can potentially divide students as their

loyalties go to different opposition groups.

     Student movements. The definition of student movements in this study follows Jungyun

Gill and James DeFronzo. They understand student movements as organized actions by students

to stimulate or prevent changes in policies, institutional personnel, social structures, or cultural

aspects of society.[44] This definition by Gill and DeFronzo can be considered narrow since they

understand student movements only as "organized actions by students." Gill and De Fronzo also

categorize different orientations of student movements. Students do not always oppose regimes;

they can also support them. This argument is important for framing various camps within the

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[44] Gill and DeFronzo, 2009, p. 208.

student movements, especially during regime transitions. Lastly, their definition opens up the possibility of focusing on various types of success after the fall of a regime as my dependent variable.

This definition by Gill and DeFronzo remedies some weaknesses seen in other definitions of student movements, for instance, when compared to a classic definition by Philip G. Altbach.[45] Altbach defines student movements as an association of students that aims to achieve an objective determined by their specific ideological doctrine.[46] Altbach understands student movements as though they are coherent movements. Like other movements, student movements can be marred with internal conflicts. Especially during regime transitions when political actors are attempting to maximize their interests, student movements can also experience conflicts that lead to different objectives. The definition by Gill and DeFronzo allows for the possibility of delving into and inspecting the conflicting interests among students. In their definition, students can have different orientations (e.g., to oppose or support a regime).

Their definition also fills a gap in the definition by Meredith L. Weiss and Edward Aspinall, who define student movements as a collective action by university students, directed towards and often against the ruling regime.[47] Their insistence on regimes as the main target of students overlooks the fact that students also compete amongst themselves. Thus, the target is not solely regimes but also how to beat other students in the competition to gain influence during regime transitions. As will be evident below, students also undermine their own colleagues as a consequence of the long-term impact of state repression.

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[45] Altbach, 1966, p. 180.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Weiss, et. al., 2012, p. 2.

Coordination. The coordination between opposition groups and students should be understood as collective actions between two actors to achieve a collective goal. This coordination can be strong, unequal, and weak. Shared objectives and shared resources are two indicators of strong coordination between opposition groups and students. Unequal coordination is when only certain elements of opposition groups coordinate with students. A lack of shared objectives and shared resources are two signs of weak coordination. It is also important to pay attention to the timing of the coordination between opposition groups and students, as the most successful coordination starts well before the regime transition starts. A lack of sufficient time for coordination leads to weak assistance from opposition groups to students. Coordinating late in the regime transition undermines the potential of an alliance between opposition groups and students to infiltrate the state.

Assistance to infiltrate the state. Assistance to infiltrate the state refers to when opposition groups assist student movements to go from being just the initiator of change to a group that decides to infiltrate the state. There are three types of assistance: strong, moderate, and weak. Strong assistance refers to a clear plan and resources given by opposition groups to students to ensure that the students will join an alliance to infiltrate the state. Moderate assistance occurs when a segment of the opposition group aids some student groups but not to others. Weak assistance refers to the failure of opposition groups to provide a clear plan and resource to students to ensure they join an alliance to infiltrate the state. Whereas coordination involves a fairly long lead time, the assistance in question is most relevant during regime transitions. The moment of regime transition is a crucial time in which political actors reorganize their interests and power. The capacity to join forces at this moment is vital because doing so provides the base for political actors to gain the upper hand after the transition is over.

Success. Previous scholarship has not clearly explained the choice of dependent variables in analyzing student movements. In this dissertation, the dependent variable is the variation in student movement success. William A. Gamson focuses on two elements of movement success: the acceptance of the movement and the distribution of new advantages.[48] Applying Gamson's definition to student movements, acceptance would mean that students are acknowledged as spokespersons and also, that they eventually hold a position inside the state. Holding a position inside the state expands the number of opportunities for students to implement their agenda. As the previous discussion on the coordination between opposition groups and students made clear, if students gained a position within the state, they would not be doing so alone. Instead, they would be assisted by the presence of the opposition groups. This change in roles means that students would transition away from being active members of student groups. Upon becoming state politicians, they would need to change their roles. Opposition groups can assist students in doing that. At the same time, obtaining new advantages means that success for student movements gives them the possible ability to achieve the implementation of their agenda. This is possible because the new regime installs formal institutions as a commitment to adopting the demands of opposition groups and students. Thus, the focus is on immediate success, since long-term success would result from the intervention of multiple factors. The variables in this study would not be able to explain such long-term successes.

There are several reasons why this definition is superior to other previous definitions. For instance, Edwin Amenta and Michael P. Young argue that social movements achieve success when they generate collective goods (i.e., producing benefits to others than the movement's core

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[48] Gamson, op. cit.

constituents).[49] The problem with this definition is temporal. Social movements may indeed push for and achieve collective goods after an extended period of time. But during this time frame, multiple factors can intervene, and students might not be the ones actually responsible for the delivery of the collective goods.

The Argument

In an effort to provide a more sophisticated lens for evaluating the impact of student movements, this study starts from the assumption that students alone have an important role during regime transitions as the initiator of change. During regime transitions, students often are the first social force that mobilizes to challenge the regime. While other social forces such as workers or peasants delay mobilizations, students are often already organizing and initiating the demand for change.[50] The students initiate protests in the street to test the tolerance of the regime in accepting their demands. Moreover, during their protests, students catalyze other social forces and inspire others to join them, creating a larger movement that forces the regime to bow to the movement's demands.

To understand this role, it is important to discuss the nature of students.[51] Students usually live in close proximity (e.g., in dormitories). Such a spatial configuration provides

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[49] Amenta and Young, 1999.
[50] See, for instance, Altbach, 1970, p. 156; Parsa, 2000, p. 94; Wasserstrom, 1991, p. 19.
[51] The nature of students cannot be compared to other social forces. For instance, students are not equal to workers. Workers exist in the confined space of a factory that resembles universities. Workers are also often clustered into different unit of works in their factory. Nevertheless, students and workers are different: students have more time to consume and discuss social and political issues that politicize them. Workers can have a political education, transmitted usually by other social forces such as political parties, but they spend most of their time working in the factory on work that often has nothing to do with social and political issues. Peasants also spend most of their time together on the fields. They could get a political education from other actors that in turn would politicize them, but political education is not the part of their work. Just like workers, the political education of peasants often comes from other political actors such as political parties or rebels. While workers and peasants often are often touted as the agents of change, they rarely become the initiators of change during regime transitions.

students the space to gather and communicate amongst themselves, facilitating their

mobilizations.[52] During regime transitions that require intense periods of communication for

coordination, living closely benefits students. The students would find it easy, for instance, to

arrange meetings as they live in close proximity. The spatial configuration of the university also

promotes interaction among students.[53] Students spend most of their time at the university,

taking classes and interacting with a high concentration of other students. This high

concentration of students allows them to easily coordinate amongst themselves when they need

to. During crises or critical moments such as regime transitions, universities become a hotbed of

student activism as the students discuss, plan, and mobilize against the regime. Another

important point about the nature of students, which enables them to be the initiator of change, is

the amount of free time that they have.[54] Students are committed to various activities such as

attending classes, participating in extracurriculars, and working on homework. Nevertheless,

outside of these activities, students have free time to digest, discuss, and expose themselves to

social and political issues. This is especially true for students who study subjects such as social

sciences or the law and consume social and political issues regularly, allowing them to be

politicized more easily than students studying other subjects. During regime transitions, already

politicized students have a well of knowledge from which to analyze and plan their mobilizations

based on their understanding of the transition situation. Lastly, students often formulate demands

which do not benefit them directly. During normal times, students can protest against the rise of

tuition or the decline of the facilities in their dormitories. Nevertheless, during regime transitions,

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[52] Altbach, op. cit., p. 177.
[53] Wasserstrom, op. cit., p. 136.
[54] Altbach, 1989, p. 99.

students often push for demands related to the broader concern of society.[55] These demands do not necessarily relate to their life, such as asking for the resignation of the current regime or the transformation of the oppressive economic system.

Although students have all of these characteristics, the status of students is transitory.[56] The status of a student lasts only from four to five years, after which they graduate and find jobs and continue their life. Thus, the transitory status of students impacts the longevity of student movements.[57] Student movements cannot last long, because students have to think about their future after they challenge a regime. The transitory status of students poses a dilemma for students because their demands during regime transitions are often unrelated to their needs. As previously mentioned, student movements during regime transitions usually formulate demands reflecting their society's interest. The problem with the gap between the longevity of student movements and the agenda of student movements is students often find it difficult to realize their agenda if the regime during the transition does not concede to the pressure of the students. Students then have to pass the leadership of the movement to the younger students who may have different connections and experiences in leading a movement. Consequently, the rapid turnover of the student movement leadership obstructs the movement's ability to maintain the pressure to realize the movement's demands.

The nature of students means they are capable of releasing their destabilizing power during regime transitions. Destabilizing power is the capacity to disrupt the rhythms of routine,

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[55] Altbach, 1984, p. 637.
[56] Altbach, op. cit.
[57] The transitory status of students is different compared to other social forces. For instance, status as a worker does not change as fast as that of a student. After an episode of challenging a regime, a worker stays a worker while students have the pressure to graduate and continue their life with another status (e.g., worker, company owner).

day to day life, especially as related to the capacity of a regime to govern. The destabilizing

power of students is related to their objective to test the extent to which the regime would

accommodate their demands. When students test the regime's tolerance, it is often so that the

students can disrupt the routine of the regime's capacity to govern and provide social order. The

disruption occurs in several ways. First, students bring the grievances of other social groups to

the regime's attention. During regime transitions, students voice the grievances caused by the

crisis. Second, students force the regime to pay attention to them, especially when protests

persist for weeks or months. Furthermore, students introduce a sense of crisis that becomes more

apparent when the regime cannot accommodate the students' demands. The sense of normalcy

then changes into a crisis, which spreads to people in other social groups. Students push the idea

that something must be done to fix the crisis. Third, students produce a polarized situation that

encourages other social forces to oppose the regime.[58] When students introduce the idea that the

crisis is happening, students blame the regime as the actor that caused the crisis. This move

polarizes the regime's supporters and those who oppose the regime. The continuation of such

polarization often draws other social groups to join the students to pressure the regime.

      The students' role as the initiator of change, however, is contextual. By contextual, this

study means that the role of the initiator of change can only emerge when a crisis comes. A crisis

can take the form of an economic crisis or a political crisis that undermines the capacity of a

regime to monitor and tame students at their university. The crisis often undermines the regime's

capacity to monitor students and keep their activity confined to their university. As the regime's

capacity to restraint students declines, the nature of students allows them to release their

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[58] Huntington, 1968, p. 213.

destabilizing power. During the crisis, the students who live in close proximity can coordinate and discuss mobilization plans easily in anticipation of rapid change. During a crisis, students often utilize the university as their base for mobilizing their fellow students. The students also rely on social ties embedded in the university structure (e.g., friendships, memberships in student clubs, departments) to mobilize their fellow students in response to what the regime does during the crisis. Having free time also allows students to initiate change because, before the crisis, they have more time to study and be exposed to the deficiencies of the regime. When the crisis comes, it gives students the opportunity to put their knowledge into practice.

However, the students' role as the initiator of change is limited. When the crisis returns to a normal situation, students tend to lose their destabilizing power. The limit of this destabilizing power comes when the students' demands (or at least some of them) are realized by the regime. When the regime accepts the students' demands, and those demands are then institutionalized, the destabilizing power of the students loses relevance. Students may then ask, "Why should we continue to apply pressure when the regime has already accepted some of our demands?" Nobody wants the unstable situation of a regime transitions to continue. Especially under a regime transition leading into democracy, when the rules of the game have already been agreed to between the regime and the reformers, the requirement to participate in politics changes. Democratic institutions like elections become the mechanisms by which power is circulated after the fall of a regime and the installation of democracy. Protests on the street lose their significance and are replaced by discussions and political bargains inside formal democratic institutions.[59] Participating in these formal democratic institutions requires less of the students'

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[59] Greenberg, op. cit. pp. 4-5.

destabilizing power. For instance, elections follow specific rules which rest on the principle of competition for free votes. What is required in an election is the organizational power to mobilize voters that is beyond the capacity of students, whose experience is limited to mobilizing students at their university.

Transforming destabilizing power into the kind of power necessary to compete in elections is difficult for students. It is unrealistic and ahistorical to expect student movements to operate on their own as agents of transformation, especially when the crisis gradually returns to a stable period. Students are not prepared to navigate formal democratic institutions like elections. During stable times at their university, students may be learning skills or gaining knowledge in politics through their experience in student organizations or campus politics (e.g., student senate elections). Nevertheless, to transform such an experience into the ability to navigate politics at the state level would be difficult for most students. Politics at the state level is a different experience than politics at the campus level. For instance, the mobilization needed to win a student senate election does not require students to go outside their campus, but elections under a democratic regime require a vast network able to reach and mobilize a larger number of people. Politics at the state level often demands political actors understand the procedures necessary to run democratic institutions. For instance, political actors need to understand how to manage the state budget, execute state programs, and monitor state programs. Although students might have similar experiences in organizing programs for student organizations, there is a stark difference in the scale. Because of this gap, students often face difficulty in transforming their destabilizing power into the ability to seize and control the state. According to Samuel P. Huntington, "There

are numerous cases of student and religious demonstrations, riots, and revolts, but none of

student governments and few religious ones."[60]

Students are not well-trained for seizing and controlling power, and they need guidance

from and partnerships with opposition groups and actors to achieve success. This study defines

opposition groups as non-student groups, inside and outside the state, that challenge regimes.

The literature on regime transition consistently points to the existence of opposition groups,

comprised of soft-liners and potential reformers.[61] These groups consist of political actors such

as NGO activists, politicians, and even army officers. They share a common characteristic in that

they are not satisfied with the current regime, and they aim to empower and ride the wave of

regime change.

The relationship of students to opposition groups must be specific. Only a strong

relationship with state-oriented opposition groups can elevate students' power to enable them to

achieve different types of success. However, a strong relationship with society-oriented

opposition groups can distract students because the struggle at the societal level does not

necessarily create a significant impact. All opposition groups do not have the same objectives.

Some opposition groups see the state as a source of power to push through a transformative

agenda, while others believe that an agenda could be pushed through from outside the state.

Students are in a better position when they coordinate with state-oriented opposition groups, as

opposed to society-oriented opposition groups, during regime transitions. Coordinating with

society-oriented opposition groups would not help students gain power within the state. Society-

oriented groups prefer to give control over the transition to other groups, rather than directly

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[60] Huntington, op. cit., p. 239.
[61] O'Donnell et. al., op. cit.

controlling the transition themselves from inside the state. Meanwhile, state-oriented opposition groups aim to seize the state from the beginning. They understand that pushing their agenda from outside the state would not be very successful, as the resources needed to achieve that agenda still rests with whoever controls the state. State-oriented opposition groups would be dissatisfied with just ousting a regime. State-oriented opposition groups could take students to the political struggle within the state, which would be helpful as the state contains resources both opposition groups and students need to achieve their agenda.

Many factors can facilitate or undermine the formation of close and cooperative relationships between student movements and key opposition groups. This study argues that one of the most important of these factors is the level of state repression. State repression determines the degree of assistance given by the opposition groups to students during regime transitions. The degree of opposition groups' assistance then leads to one of the three types of success: preemption, cooptation, or full response.[62] This study has chosen not to include collapse here because it is a failure of students to achieve either acceptance or new advantages. Collapse occurs when a crisis and pressures from students do not bring a regime down. The regime stays and students do not get an acceptance or new advantages. The failure of student movements in Thailand (1973–74) and Burma (1988) exhibit collapse. In these cases, students initiated mass protests, but the regimes persisted. Students gained nothing from their opposition to the regimes. The students were completely crushed, and none of their demands ever materialized. However, Indonesia is different as the regime conceded to some of the students' demands.

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[62] These outcomes are adapted from Gamson, op. cit.

Figure 1. Path to Preemption.

| Strong state repression | → | The absence of strong opposition groups | → | Weak coordination between opposition groups and students | → | Weak assistance from opposition groups to students | → | Preemption |

Preemption occurs when the level of state repression is strong, causing the absence of strong

opposition groups. The absence of strong opposition groups does not mean that there are no

opposition groups attempting to coordinate with students. The opposition groups may still exist,

but they have fewer opportunities to coordinate with students. Strong state repression limits the

opposition groups' space and time, limiting their ability for strong coordination with students.

State repression often divides opposition groups, which, in turn, causes fragmentation among the

students as well. Subsequently, weak coordination creates a situation in which only the students

can challenge the regime. Facing a collapsing regime, students are still able to play their role as

the catalyst and pace-setter of transitions by igniting early protests against the regime. When the

regime falls, however, the impact of weak coordination with the opposition groups becomes

clear. Weak coordination means weak assistance from opposition groups to students during

regime transitions and it opens the door for status quo groups and actors to reassert their

influence over the agenda once they recover from the shock of a regime collapse. Even if the

students form links during the height of the regime transition, it is usually too late to be effective.

Therefore, the new regime is more likely to grant only some of the students' demands and to

resist incorporating the students into the state. The new regime might decide that the students are

not strong enough to be the new regime's social base in the long term. Without inclusion in the

state, students will only achieve part of their agenda.

Figure 2. Path to Cooptation.

| Moderate state repression | → | Unequal power relation among opposition groups | → | Moderate coordination between opposition groups and students | → | Moderate assistance from opposition groups to students | → | Cooptation |

A second outcome under the conditions of moderate state repression is cooptation. Moderate state repression allows for the growth of one dominant opposition group over others because only some groups are demobilized by the state repression. For those repressed opposition groups, state repression inhibits their efforts to coordinate with students. The repressed opposition groups cannot provide strong assistance to students during regime transitions. Meanwhile, moderate state repression fails to eliminate or affect other opposition groups. These opposition groups can grow and develop coordination with the students. During regime transitions, they are able to supply strong assistance to students. The presence of both the repressed opposition groups and intact opposition groups creates an unequal power relationship among opposition groups. The unequal power relationship persists past the moment of coordination and assistance to students. Both groups may cooperate in ousting the regime. Nevertheless, after the fall of the regime, the intact and stronger opposition groups will have few reasons to share the state with the weaker groups. If they can seize and control the state on their own, why would they want to share the power that they gain? The intact and stronger opposition groups will also have fewer reasons to see the weak opposition groups as a threat to their new power. The view of the stronger opposition groups is that if, the weaker opposition groups do not get what they ask for, they would not have any power to challenge it. The result of this situation is that the stronger opposition groups only include groups affiliated with them while excluding

weaker opposition groups from the state. This is mirrored in the treatment of student groups—some student groups will be incorporated into the state while others will not be included.

Figure 4. Path to Full Response.

Full response occurs when the degree of state repression is weak, allowing stronger coordination between opposition groups and students. Weak state repression permits opposition groups and students to weave political networks and coordinate with each other. Furthermore, under weak state repression, opposition groups have the time and space to develop their organizational capacities. This includes the capability to expand their networks to universities, establishing strong coordination with students. Strong coordination prepares opposition groups and students to be in a better position to shape and, especially, control regime transitions. Under weak state repression, opposition groups tend to have a relatively balanced power relationship between them since they have had similar amounts of time and space to develop their power. When the transition starts, a key consideration is whether opposition groups and students are well-positioned to infiltrate the state after the fall of the previous regime. On the negative side, the new leadership finds it much harder to exclude opposition groups and students if they have formed a strong and effective alliance and a balanced power relationship. The risk is that the agitation and activism that destabilized the authoritarian regime could soon be turned against the incoming government. On the positive side, the new government has an incentive to welcome the opposition groups and students as potentially valuable assets. Their ability to achieve strong

coordination during the struggle against the old regime demonstrates the capacity and influence that could be attractive to the new regime. This constellation of factors favors granting the demands of the opposition groups and students and incorporating them into the state, rather than risk excluding them. A balanced power relationship avoids the path towards cooptation. When the opposition groups are relatively equal in power, due to weak state repression, the fall of a regime does not cause the same problem of betrayal between opposition groups and students as can occur with cooptation. When all the opposition groups have a balance of power, attempting to eliminate any groups can incur unnecessary costs since all the groups have power and each group can retaliate unpredictably. Therefore, keeping the alliance intact is the best option for all groups. This strategy accounts for the inclusion of students in the state.

Methods

This study employs a qualitative approach centered on a single case study: the Indonesian student movement during the 1998–99 regime transition. The research objective is to build a novel explanation of the path of preemption exemplified by the Indonesian case. This study relies mostly on interviews and archival studies.

A qualitative approach suggests a within-case research design,[63] which relies on a small number of cases to unpack causal links.[64] The main goal is to draw theoretical inferences based on the case and to possibly compare those inferences with other cases. This objective is fulfilled by juxtaposing the Indonesian case with shadow comparisons of student movements in Guatemala and Iran.

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[63] Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, p. 10.
[64] Ibid., p. 88.

This study positions the Indonesian student movement in 1998–99 as the unit of analysis. This study examines the trajectory of several Indonesian student movements, from Indonesian Independence in 1945 to the transition after the Suharto regime in 1999. Most of this study's analysis rests on the Indonesian student movement in Jakarta, the capital city. The student mobilizations in 1998–99 fit within the broader cases of student mobilizations in regime transitions for several reasons. First, the Indonesian case reveals students as one of the leading political actors during the transition. Indonesian students played the part of the initiator or "pacesetter" of the transition,[65] similar to the roles played by Guatemalan students in 1944 and Iranian students in 1979. Students took the initiative to demand the resignation of the regime and broke out from the political restrictions imposed by the states on their universities. They organized street protests and successfully pushed regime leaders to step down.

Second, Indonesia shares another similarity with these two cases, challenging authoritarian regimes. The Indonesian student movement challenged Suharto's authoritarian regime. The student movements in Guatemala and Iran fought against authoritarian regimes as well. In Guatemala, students opposed the dictatorship of Ubico. In Iran, students protested the authoritarian government of the Shah. Third, all three represent successful efforts at toppling a regime. The cases are all examples of how students played a successful role in mounting pressure and ousting regimes. They all had similar demands: that the regimes step down, and that the citizens' basic political, economic, and cultural rights be restored. The postscripts to these movements, however, were different. Indonesia is an example of preemption, Guatemala is a

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[65] Aspinall., op. cit. p. 225.

case of inclusion, and Iran is an example of cooptation. A deep study of the Indonesian case

provides an analytical opportunity and window into understanding all three outcomes.

This study presents a novel explanation of the variations in student movement success

during regime transitions. Relying mainly on the Indonesian case, this study aims to unpack

factors contributing to the preemption outcome. Thus, the study design is a theory-building

study,[66] limited in the number of examined cases. Indonesia offers an excellent context for

exploring the relevance of state repression, the importance of coordination between opposition

groups and students, the vital role of the assistance of opposition groups during regime

transitions, and how these factors combine to produce a preemption outcome. Student movement

outcomes in Guatemala and Iran provide an excellent opportunity to test and refine this

argument.

This study is a retrospective study in which the cases require the collection of data related

to a past phenomenon. Therefore, although the main objective is to explain the success of

Indonesian student mobilizations in 1998–99, this study traces the process back to the

independence era, with the focus on the impact of state repression on the coordination between

opposition groups and students, and the degree of assistance given by opposition groups to

students in 1998–99. This study attempts to explicate the success in 1998–99 as the impact of

those variables.

This study relies on scholarly studies and state archives, especially in explaining the work

of those variables in three time periods: 1945–67, 1967–90, and 1990–99. To explain the 1945–

67 and 1967–90 periods, this study examines the literature on how state repression impacted the

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[66] Thomas, 2011.

coordination between opposition groups and students. The analysis of those periods reveals the legacy of state repression on the coordination between opposition groups and students in the 1990s. To continue the analysis of the 1990s, interviews were done with forty-three former student activists. The student activists occupied important positions during 1998–99, including the head of the student senate and field operator of student mobilizations. The activists also represented competing student groups before the rise of the students in early 1998. Their various roles allow this study to demonstrate the impact of state repression on weak coordination between opposition groups and students, which then affects the degree of assistance given by opposition groups to students. The activists' roles also aided me in illustrating the further impact of state repression on the rivalry between the students. This study also utilizes scholarly studies, newspapers, and archives from student organizations.

The archives comprise documents from student press organizations at four universities: the University of Indonesia (*Universitas Indonesia*; UI), the Jakarta State Institute of Teacher Training and Education (*Institut Keguruan and Ilmu Pendidikan*; IKIP), Trisakti University (*Universitas Trisakti*; UT), and the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic Institute (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah*; IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah). This archive mining at these four universities reflects their key role in contributing to student mobilizations in Jakarta. During the transition, the four universities were among the largest universities in Jakarta. They also represented centers of student mobilizations in East, South, and West Jakarta. IKIP Jakarta epitomized student mobilizations in East Jakarta. UI and IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah represented student mobilizations in South Jakarta. UT represented student mobilizations in Central and West Jakarta. The student mobilizations in these campuses also best reflect how the Indonesian

state repression shaped the division between opposition groups and students, and between students themselves.

The Plan of the Dissertation

Chapter Two examines the impact of state repression on the development of Indonesian opposition groups in 1945–67. This chapter also looks at how the opposition groups-students relation developed under different degrees of state repression during the same period. Although Indonesia had a rich variation of opposition groups, this study primarily focuses on three groups: the nationalist, the Islamist, and the left. They were the legacy groups from the colonial era, which then played various roles in the Indonesian independence. The emphasis here is on how the three different groups experienced different degrees of state repression from 1945–67.

Chapter Three focuses on explaining the impact of state repression on the opposition groups and students in the period between1967–90. This chapter starts by narrating the growing power of the New Order's repression machine in the 1970s. Then the focus shifts to explain the work of the New Order's repression machine in the 1970s in taming opposition groups and its relationship to students. Chapter Three also explains the power of the New Order's repression machine in the 1980-90 period. The periods were chosen to explicate the continuation of the Indonesian state repression in that period by describing the impact of state repression on the coordination between opposition groups and students.

Chapter Four emphasizes the legacy of state repression on the coordination between opposition groups and students in the 1990s. This study highlights the impact of state repression on the weak coordination between opposition groups and students. This study further underscores the impact of state repression on the fragmentation among students approaching the

transition in 1998–99. The focus on this period is on how the fragmentation among students impacted the fragmentation at the universities and during the city-level mobilization, as well as the continuing fragmentation after the fall of Suharto on May 21, 1998. The narrative aims to show the impact of weak coordination between opposition groups and students, causing weak assistance to students by opposition groups during the regime transition. This narrative also illustrates how state repression in the past led to the preemption outcome.

Chapter Five focuses on the comparison between the Indonesian student movements and the 1944 Guatemalan and 1979 Iranian student movements. The main objective is to explain why Indonesia produced preemption while Guatemala and Iran were full-response and cooptation types of success. This chapter pays attention to the impact of a low degree of state repression on the high degree of coordination and assistance given by opposition groups to students in Guatemala and Iran. Chapter Five also explains how these factors led to specific types of success in these two countries.

Finally, in conclusion, the emphasis is on the theoretical implications of my study for the literature on student movements during regime transitions, especially the state and organizational approaches. Another important takeaway, in conclusion, is a possible agenda for future research.

Chapter Two

The Early Development of Opposition Groups and Student Activism

(1945–67)

Introduction

After declaring independence in 1945, Indonesia found itself with three emerging

political forces (the nationalists, the Islamists, and the left) that had been politically active

against the Dutch colonizers since the early twentieth century. Independence opened up the

opportunity to grab state power, increasing the competition among these forces that arose in

opposition to the Dutch and had been relatively unified by their common enemy. International

and domestic factors intertwined, shaping the rising competition among those forces. The first

two decades of independence were politically unstable as this competition intensified. The

winners of the competition tended to reach for dominance over the Indonesian state, and in doing

so, they excluded or repressed the losers. The losers became the opposition groups, which

focused on attempting to delegitimize those in government. This context of high-stakes

competition strongly influenced the Indonesian student movement during the 1945–67 period.

This chapter examines the rivalry between these political forces in seizing the Indonesian

state and how they applied state repression once they took control of the state. The rivalry

centered on three groups: the nationalists, the Islamists, and the left.[67] The emphasis is on how

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[67] This study simplifies the categorizations by Feith and Castle. They argue that during the 1945–65
period there were five political orientations in Indonesia: radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism,
Islam, democratic socialism, and communism. This study groups radical nationalism and Javanese
traditionalism together in the same group, as the nationalists. Islam with its internal variation stands as the
Islamists. While democratic socialism and communism are categorized together as the left. The
nationalists refer to those who employ the political jargon of the superiority of their nation over others.
The Islamists are those who attempt to assert Islam as the dominant ideology of the state. The leftists are

actors dominating the government exercised state power to repress the opposition groups and the resulting impact on their coordination with students. Three episodes are significant for explaining the process: the repression of the extreme left (1945-1949), the repression of the Islamists (1950-1959), and the dissolution of the left (1960-1967). For each of these episodes, the emphasis is on the repression of opposition groups and the consequences on the early formation of Indonesian student movements.

The central argument of this chapter is that state repression shaped the development of Indonesian opposition groups and, in turn, Indonesian student movements. Among the three groups, the nationalists, the Islamists, and the left, there was an imbalance in how state repression was experienced. In the period between 1945–49, state repression did not effectively undermine the opposition groups. Exemplifying this argument is the case of state repression used in handling the rebellion by the PKI in 1948. Although state repression successfully ended the rebellion, it did not destroy the organizational capacity of the PKI. The repression also did not affect the nationalists and Islamists. The 1950–59 period witnessed the failure of the Indonesian state to completely banish Islam from Indonesian politics. The Indonesian Islamic State movement (*Negara Islam Indonesia*; NII, also known as Darul Islam or DI) survived state repression with its organizational capacity intact. State repression during 1960-67 included the massacre and mass incarceration of the PKI leaders and their followers, shattering the party's organizational power so severely that it was unable to recover even after nearly six decades. This

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those who aim for the radical redistribution of economic resources. The distinction between the nationalists, Islamists, and the left does not mean the absence of the variety within each ideological camp. For instance, the nationalists such as Sukarno also believed in Islam as their religion. Nevertheless, their political expression tended to take the nationalist stance instead of aiming for installing Islam as the dominant ideology of the Indonesian state. For the distinction between the five political ideologies see Feith and Castle, 1970, pp. 12-24.

marked an escalation in the violence used in state repression. For the left, the massacre

diminished their mobilizational capacity in the 1980s and 1990s, including their ability to

coordinate with students. Without the party's network of contacts placed in social organizations

like student groups, the left had to start rebuilding their network from scratch, which was

challenging under the authoritarian regime. The massacre left only the nationalists and Islamists

as the legitimate opposition to the New Order authoritarian regime. While the massacre might

not have affected the nationalists and the Islamists directly, it paved the way for the rise of the

authoritarian regime that gradually curbed the opposition groups in the 1970–90s

The Colonial Legacy

One of the legacies of Dutch colonialism (1816-1949) and the Japanese Occupation

(1942–45) was the emergence of the nationalists, Islamists, and the left as the key political

players in the first years following independence. These groups were significant, as they were the

main candidates for steering the Indonesian state, due to their roles in mobilizing native

Indonesians in pushing for independence.

The Nationalists. The colony's native elites initiated the nationalist movement. As the

children of native bureaucrats and aristocrats, the rising nationalists participated in the Dutch

education system. After they graduated, these elites worked under the Dutch as the colonial

state's civil servants or maintained their gentry status. Their political views glorified cultural

romanticism and unification between people and the state.[68] Some of the nationalist social

organizations were those that developed in the early 1910–20s. They were ethnic-based and

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[68] In the literature on Indonesian political thought, the proponents of the idea are well known as integralists. In Latin America, the organic state is the term for such an idea. For an exposition of the history of integralism in Indonesia, see Bourchier, 2014.

populated mostly by native elites. Youth social organizations such as Noble Endeavour (*Budi Oetomo*, 1908), Young Java (*Jong Java*, 1915), Sumatran Youths (*Jong Sumatranen Bond*, 1917), Celebes Youths Association (*Jong Celebes*, 1918), Minahassa Youths (*Jong Minahassa*, 1918), Association for Cooperation and Friendship (*Sekar Roekoen*, 1919), and Bataks Youths Association (*Jong Bataks Bond*, 1925) represented the early development of nationalist groups.[69]

The best political representation of the nationalist organization was the Great Indonesian Party (*Partai Indonesia Raya*; Parindra). Native colonial civil servants and aristocrats framed the party as a reincarnation of Budi Oetomo and the Union of Indonesian Nation (*Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia*; PBI). After these two organizations merged to form Parindra, the newly formed organization managed to garner a great deal of support in the colony, reaching 11,000 members in 1939.[70] Ideologically, the leaders of Parindra envisioned an organic integration of the state and society, underpinned by Javanese culture.[71] Competition from leftist groups (e.g., the PKI) and Islamic groups (e.g., NU and Muhammadiyah) also drove the growth of Parindra.[72] The nationalist agenda of Parindra continued when it joined the Dutch-backed People's Council (*Volksraad*) in 1930.[73] Many who joined *Volksraad* aimed for the independence of the colony. This included members of Parindra, who were hardcore supporters of the far-right ideology that

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[69] Foulcher, 2000, p. 378.
[70] Bourchier, op. cit., p. 32.
[71] Bourchier, op. cit., p. 32.
[72] Bourchier, op. cit., p. 32.
[73] The Dutch established *Volksraad* in 1916 to show their sympathy for the citizens of the Dutch East Indies. After criticism from liberal politicians in the Netherlands and in the colony, the colonial government decided to establish *Volksraad* to placate the political aspirations in the colony. Its function, however, was only to advise the colonial government. It did not have the power to veto the colonial state's policies.

resembled fascism in Europe.[74] Although Parindra joined *Volksraad*, the party refused to accept

Dutch rule. The party believed that the Dutch East Indies must be an independent nation-state.

Under the WWII Japanese Occupation (1942–45), most of the nationalists worked closely

with the Japanese due to their close ideological association, but also as a strategy for gaining

power. For instance, Mohamad Hoesni Thamrin, a Parindra leader, provided intelligence to the

Japanese before they landed in 1942. The Japanese quickly utilized the nationalists' assistance to

entrench their influence in the Dutch East Indies. One of the Japanese goals was to mobilize

support for the Japanese war campaign in Asia. The Japanese formed organizations such as the

Triple A Movement (*Pergerakan Tiga A*),[75] the Centre of People's Strength (*Poetra*),[76] the

Young Men's Association (*Seinendan*),[77] the Vigilance Corps (*Keibodan*),[78] Army auxiliaries

(*Heiho*),[79] the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*;

Masjumi),[80] the Java Service Association (*Djawa Hokokai*),[81] and the Defenders of the

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[74] Lengkeek, Y. (2019). Parindra's Loyal Cadres. Fascism and Anticolonial Nationalism in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1935-1942. Retrieved from https://www.iias.asia/the-newsletter/article/parindras-loyal-cadres-fascism-and-anticolonial-nationalism-late-colonial on October 25, 2019, 10:33 AM.
[75] The organization was a Japanese-made united front supporting Japan's imperialist slogan "Japan the Light of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia, Japan the Leader of Asia." Bourchier, op. cit., p. 52.
[76] It had a similar purpose to the Triple A Movement: mobilizing support from various organizations in Java and Madura to back Japan's programs in the colony. Bourchier, op. cit., p. 52.
[77] It was a military organization for training youths between 14 and 25 years of age as a reserve army for Japan. Bourchier, op. cit., p. 52.
[78] It was a military organization for training people between the age of 25 and 35 as a reserve army for Japan. Their main tasks revolved around gathering intelligence and repelling air strikes. Bourchier, op. cit., p. 53.
[79] It was formed to help the Japanese army and navy. Bourchier, op. cit., p. 53.
[80] The organization was established to garner support from Islamic groups to Japan. It then became one of the influential organizations that represented Islam in the post-independence era. Bourchier, op. cit., p. 53.
[81] The organization replaced Poetra when Japan sensed the tide of the war was going against it in 1944. The main purpose was rather similar to Poetra (i.e., to mobilize support for Japan's war in Asia). The difference, however, was that *Djawa Hokokai* was more comprehensive in incorporating political groups in the colony, ultimately including the nationalists and the Islamists. For instance, the leadership of the organization was in the hands of Sukarno (a nationalist) and Hasjim Asjari (an Islamist). Bourchier, op. cit. p. 53.

Homeland (*Pembela Tanah Air*, PETA).[82] Among these organizations, the last two were the most

significant. *Djawa Hokokai* was an institution through which the Japanese state incorporated

significant political forces in the colony. Inside *Djawa Hokokai*, the nationalists successfully

seized their opportunity to build a good rapport with the Japanese administration.[83] Because the

structure of Djawa Hokakai's leadership consisted of mostly old nationalists with very few

Islamist politicians, younger politicians were unsatisfied and condemned the establishment

leadership as collaborationists.[84]

    The young politicians expressed a similar sentiment when the Japanese accelerated the

mock preparations for Indonesian independence[85] by forming the Committee for the Preparation

of Indonesian Independence (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*; PPKI) on August 7,

1945. The formation of the Committee once again cemented the influence of the older nationalist

politicians who worked with the Japanese Occupation. The establishment of PPKI also implicitly

conveyed the marginalization of Islamic groups and youths by the lack of their representatives in

the Committee. Few politicians represented Islamic groups, and none served as the voice of the

youth.[86] Nonetheless, due to their dominance on the eve of the Indonesian independence, the

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[82] This was a Japanese-initiated support army that became the largest military unit made by Japan, with 66,000 members in 1943. The formation of PETA was intended to launch a guerilla war if the Allies came into the colony. Bourchier, op. cit., p. 54.

[83] Anderson, 2006, p. 50.

[84] Ibid., p. 53.

[85] Ibid., p. 61.

[86] The reasons for the exclusion of these groups was due mostly to Japan's tactics to maintain its influence in Southeast Asia through its political project, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Indonesia and Burma were a part of the project, and Japan aimed to ensure having political elites that favored the Japanese interest during and after World War Two. The nationalist politicians fit the bill since they were already close to the Japanese and they had authority with the public and international connections. The Islamists youths, by comparison, lacked these assets. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

nationalists occupied central positions in government in the early formation of the Indonesian state.

   The Islamists. Before independence, the Islamists never held a strategic political position, whether under the Dutch or the Japanese. The Dutch permitted Muslims to engage in social activities, but they restricted them from expressing their political views.[87] These twin strategies kept waves of Islamic rebellions from occurring in the colony, particularly on the eve of the twentieth century. Furthermore, Muslims in the colony channeled their political aspirations along two lines: the modernist and traditionalist Islamic groups.[88] One of the earliest organizations was the Islamic Union (*Sarekat Islam*; SI). SI's main agenda was to protect the economic interests of Muslim traders. Founded in 1911, the organization was a response from batik traders, mostly residing in Solo (Central Java), against fierce competition from ethnic Chinese traders and from suppression by the Javanese nobility.[89] The organization turned more political when in 1917, it declared the Declaration of Principles and Action Programs, which contained explicit principles such as the advocacy of human rights in the colony, non-interference in religious matters, and a rejection of racial domination.[90] SI also sent its delegates, Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto and

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[87] Benda, 1958, pp. 342-343.

[88] Modernist Muslims believed that Islam should be freed from practices not taught in the Koran and hadiths. They were considered modernists (or reformists) in the sense that they aimed to alter traditional religious practices that relied mostly on the assimilation between Islamic and traditional values and practices. There was no precise time when the modernist wave came, but estimates are that the foundation was built in West Sumatra during the early twentieth century. Meanwhile, traditionalist Muslims believed Islam can and should adapt to traditional practices and values. For them, Islam was not in opposition to traditional practices and values, as preached by their modernist competitors. Historically, there is no consensus on the exact time when traditionalist Islam emerged. Nevertheless, there were some points when modernist Islam became notably prominent, such as in the early 1910s when the traditionalists established the Union of Adat of the Minangkabau World (*Sarikat Adat Alam Minangkabau*) to dam the growing influence of the modernists in West Sumatra. Consequently, Nahdlatul Ulama emerged in 1926 to counter the modernists in East Java as well as to negotiate with Ibnu Saud, the new ruler of Saudi Arabia, to continue and recognize traditional practices in the Dutch East Indies. See Noer, 1973.

[89] Benda, op. cit., p. 102.

[90] Benda, op. cit., p. 113.

Abdul Moeis, to the *Volksraad* to voice its agenda in forming a real representative body in the colony.[91] The culmination point was in 1923 when SI announced a migration policy (*hijrah*), indicating a move from a cooperative stance to a non-cooperative stance in the *Volksraad*. They further rejected participating in *Volksraad's* decision making.

Another example is Muhammadiyah, which emerged on November 18, 1912. It was an initiative of Ahmad Dahlan, the son of an Islamic preacher in Yogyakarta. He studied and traveled to Mecca on a series of pilgrimages between 1890 and 1903. Once he settled in the colony, he altered the traditional understanding of Islam by correcting traditional Islamic practices and values, such as facing West to Mecca for prayers.[92] He also joined Budi Oetomo, the Javanese nationalist organization, in order to spread his teachings. His involvement in Budi Oetomo opened his eyes to the reality that to survive, modernist Islam had to have an organizational backup and must not center on the figure of the Islamic Javanese cleric (*kyai*) as their traditionalist rivals often did.[93] In the 1920s, Muhammadiyah spread its influence to East Java and Sumatra, thanks to a network of Muslim traders.[94] As a result, it had 852 branches and 898 groups with a total membership of about 250,000, making it one of the biggest organizations in the colony.

SI and Muhammadiyah were not the only modernist Islamic organizations that arose before independence. The Indonesian Muslim Union (*Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia*; Permi) was another Islamic organization that voiced its political grievances to the colonial state. Based on its educational activities, it transformed into a political party in 1930 and blended Islam and

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[91] Benda, op. cit., p. 116.
[92] He also initiated voluntary work to clean ditches and streets. Noer, op. cit., p. 74.
[93] Noer, op. cit., p. 75.
[94] Noer, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

nationalism as its core ideology. The party expanded its branches into areas like Central Sumatra, Bengkulu, Tapanuli, East Sumatra, and Aceh, making it the main outlet of Islamic political aspiration in the colony, especially after the decline of SI.[95] Another modernist Islamic political organization was the Indonesian Islamic Party (*Partai Islam Indonesia*; PII). It was SI's splinter organization that disagreed with SI's leadership regarding the *hijrah* policy.[96] The party grew rapidly, establishing branches in Java, Sumatera, and Kalimantan.[97] It also pushed political agendas such as the establishment of a unitary state, the Indonesianization of the bureaucracy, and the expansion of the political and civil rights of the natives.[98] Despite this rapid growth, the colonial state's coercion impeded its expansion. The ban on meetings of political party leaders forced Permi to disband in 1926. Meanwhile, the arrest of three of PII's influential leaders, Ahmad Kasat, Hadji Faried Ma'ruf, and Hadji Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, on accusations that they were Japanese collaborators, debilitated the party.[99] Any future cooperation of the party with the Great Islamic Council of Indonesia (*Majlis Islam A'la Indonesia*; MIAI) and the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties (*Gaboengan Politik Indonesia*; GAPI) ended in futility.

Modernist Islam was not the only Islamic social force during the colonial period. In the same era, the Dutch also kept a close eye on traditionalist Islam. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is the primary example of traditionalist Islamic organizations. Established on January 31, 1926, by Kyai Haji Hasyim Asy'ari, in its early years, NU was not confrontational with the Dutch. NU focused solely on social and religious activities as well as the economic empowerment of the

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[95] Noer, op. cit., p. 156.
[96] Noer, op. cit., p. 158.
[97] Noer, op. cit., p. 160.
[98] Noer, op. cit., p. 160.
[99] Noer, op. cit., p. 160.

lower class.[100] Such a stance, however, was a perfect cover for its political activities. For instance, its Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) were a fortress to protect and preserve traditional Islamic values against the Western values promoted by the Dutch.[101] Also, in order to keep its autonomy *vis a vis* the Dutch colonial state, NU rejected financial assistance from the Dutch and participation in *Volksraad*.[102] Furthermore, under the Japanese Occupation, NU altered its stance by joining Japanese-sponsored political institutions. Hasjim Asjari and his son Wahid Hasjim consecutively led NU to participate in *Djawa Hokokai* and PPKI. Nevertheless, unlike Sukarno and his nationalist associates, neither could bring Islam closer to the Japanese.

Although the Islamists attempted to represent the majority in the colony, they rarely played an important role, unlike their right-wing nationalist fellows. The Dutch consistently suppressed them due to the potential of igniting resistance against the colonial state. The Islamists also did not have significant representatives under the Japanese. Nevertheless, although the Japanese moderated their influence through *Djawa Hokokai* and PPKI, the Japanese assisted in the unification of Islamic groups. The Japanese initiative to establish Masjumi in 1945 produced such an unintended consequence. Set up as an institution to incorporate and mobilize Islam in the colony for Japan's war in Asia, Masjumi persisted and became one of the key opposition groups in the post-independence era, until its dissolution in 1960. Relatively unified Islamic groups whose agenda was to Islamicize the Indonesian state and society was a legacy of the Japanese administration to the newly independent Indonesian state in 1945.

The Left. While the nationalists acquired access to education through privileged social positions, and the Islamists centered education in *pesantren*, some of their leftist counterparts

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[100] Khuluq, 1997, p. 61.
[101] Ibid., p. 63.
[102] Ibid., p. 76.

became acquainted with political ideas through contacts with Dutch leftist activists residing in

the colony. Their coming to the colony was triggered by their dissatisfaction with the natives'

misery. Instead of concentrating their protests in their homeland, the Dutch leftist activists opted

to come to the colony and spark resistance against the Dutch Colonial Government. This is how

the PKI was initiated and developed. A young Dutchman, Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie

Sneevliet, who was unemployed back in the Netherlands, docked in the Dutch East Indies in

1913. A communist, he tried to find ways to instigate revolutionary zeal in the colony. On May

9, 1914, he and a group of 60 locals and the Dutch founded the Indies Social Democratic

Association (*Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging*; ISDV).[103] Due to its Dutch-dominated

membership, however, ISDV did not gain strong political traction in the colony. Its ability to

weave connections with the marginalized native population, mostly in Java, was weak,

exacerbated by a repressive colonial state. By 1919, the Dutch colonial regime launched

repressive measures to undermine ISDV. The repression demobilized ISDV, and ultimately the

Dutch members of the organization were deported back to the Netherlands, leaving the

organization leaderless.

Had ISDV depended only on its Dutch members, it would have disappeared from the

colony's political map. However, because of young cadres, such as Semaun, a former worker

organizer of the Union of Train and Tramway Personnel (*Vereniging van Spoor en Tramweg

Personeel*; VSTP) and Darsono, an aristocrat turned communist, ISDV could persist. Its biggest

accomplishment was managing to infiltrate SI and split it into two factions: Red SI and White SI.

By controlling the Red SI, the Indonesian communists had access to the masses disgruntled with

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[103] McVey, 2006, p. 14.

the colonial state. The culmination of the massive growth of their social bases was the

establishment of the PKI on May 23, 1920. Although the left in the colony managed to establish

the PKI, its ultimate goal of overthrowing the colonial state was never successful. After the

PKI's failed rebellion in 1926, the colonial state formally disbanded the party on May 3, 1926,

forcing it to operate underground.[104]

Despite the failed rebellion, the PKI's political influences did not completely wane. Some

native youths who had ties to the PKI carried on the vision of liberating the colony through

underground movements. They continued their political work under the Japanese Occupation.

One of the carriers of the PKI's political vision was the Indonesian People's Movement

(*Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia*; Gerindo), a left-wing underground political party that sheltered PKI-

linked people.[105] Its members resided primarily in urban areas and utilized student residences as

places for coordinating and mobilizing people.[106] Gerindo's voice never reached formal

institutions such as *Djawa Hokokai* and PPKI. Nor did the Japanese see them as capable of

running state-like institutions. Furthermore, none of these leftist youths had close connections to

the Japanese, compared to nationalist politicians such as Sukarno.

Although the left did not hold a strategic position during the negotiations for

independence, they remained important because they accelerated the process towards

independence. For instance, Wikana, Chairul Saleh, and Sukarni had close ties to leftist groups

such as the PKI and the Proletarian Party (*Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak*; Murba), the PKI's

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[104] Ibid., p. 326.
[105] Anderson, op. cit., p. 37.
[106] Anderson, op. cit., p. 39.

splinter party.[107] Wikana, Chairul Saleh, and Sukarni were part of the youths who kidnapped[108]

Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, proclaimers of the Indonesian independence, and forced them to

immediately declare independence after Japan's defeat. Some leftist figures such as Wikana and

Chairul Saleh also occupied important formal political positions after independence. Wikana, for

instance, became the Minister of Youth Affairs under Sjahrir while Chairul Saleh was a close

Sukarno adviser, and Sukarni led the Murba Party until his death. The survival of these leftist

figures opened the space for the Indonesian left to gain influence after independence,

establishing themselves as a prominent political force.

Three days after Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945, the native politicians announced

Indonesia's independence. The nationalists, Islamists, and the left entered a new political arena

in which they competed to control the state. For those groups, the departure of the Dutch and the

Japanese left the state up for grabs and removed one of the few unifying factors in their

relationship. This condition also promoted competition among these groups. The competition

involved the usage of state repression by groups who controlled the state as a response to the

political pressure launched by the groups outside of the state. This argument was true, especially

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[107] Wikana became one of the leaders of PKI while Chairul Saleh and Sukarni, due to their close relations to Tan Malaka, established the Murba Party. Both were left-leaning political parties, but they had deep strategic differences, particularly regarding the decision to support the communist uprising in 1948. While Murba opposed the uprising, the PKI supported it.

[108] The kidnapping occurred after the news of Japan's surrender in World War II spread in the colony. The old politicians such as Sukarno and Hatta did not want to rush independence due to a fear of Japanese retaliation to an independence proclamation. On the other hand, young politicians such as Wikana, Aidit, and Chairul Saleh argued that the time for the independence proclamation had already come. The young politicians took the initiative on August 16, 1945 to kidnap Sukarno and Hatta, moving them from Jakarta to Rengasdengklok, Karawang (now Karawang District, West Java). In Rengasdengklok, the young politicians urged Sukarno and Hatta to proclaim independence immediately. After an intense debate, both parties agreed to formulate the text of the declaration of independence. Sukarno and Hatta read the text and proclaimed independence on August 17, 1945 at Sukarno's house in Central Jakarta.

when there was an absence of a mechanism to circulate power such as during 1945–49 and the 1959–65.

The Repression of the Far Left (1945–49)

After independence was declared on August 17, 1945, Indonesian political elites did not inherit strong state institutions as their means to govern. The military scattered into militia groups, and the upper levels of the bureaucracy were almost empty, due to the flight of the Dutch. Thus, the Indonesian political elites had to focus on building state institutions that could govern throughout the archipelago. As a consequence of the absence of strong state institutions, the political elites and the masses did not have an institution that regularly facilitated or mediated their relations. A key institutional mechanism to connect elites and masses, elections, were repeatedly delayed until 1955. Consequently, without an election, the ability to mobilize the population could not determine the circulation of political elites in office. Shadowed by the Dutch military aggressions trying to regain authority over Indonesia, the circulation of political elites was determined by the competition among them without involving the masses.

In the 1945–49, the moderate-left controlled the Indonesian state. Sutan Sjahrir from the Indonesian Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*; PSI) became the prime minister. During Sjahrir's first and second cabinets (November 1945-March 1946), the PSI became the party with the largest share in the cabinet. During this period, the PSI gained seven seats and six seats of the cabinet seats in Sjahrir's first and second cabinets, respectively. In Sjahrir's second cabinet (March-October 1946), Masjumi raised its influence from controlling four seats of Sjahrir's

cabinet seats to 8 seats, while the PNI gained one seat.[109] The nationalists' strong position under

the Japanese did not automatically give them a strong grip on the state. The Indonesian National

Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*; PNI), the main political party representing the nationalists,

won only one seat in Sjahrir's second cabinet.

The rise of the moderate-left signaled the weaknesses of the nationalists. First, the

nationalists could not cleanse their image as Japanese collaborators in *Djawa Hokokai* and PPKI.

Even after the news of Japan's loss to the Allies spread, the nationalists' unwillingness to swiftly

announce the country's independence only tainted their image. Second, the nationalists' initiative

to transform the Central Indonesian National Committee (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*;

KNIP)[110] into a single party only sealed the bad reputation of the nationalists as the advocates of

an authoritarian regime. Sjahrir and his colleagues strongly opposed the nationalists' effort to

build KNIP. Third, the nationalists could not oppose Sjahrir's leadership as they had a common

interest in overcoming the threat posed by an extreme leftist group, the United Struggle

(*Persatuan Perjuangan*; PP).[111] In the first two years after independence, the PP actively

opposed Sjahrir's government due to his soft diplomatic stance against the Dutch.[112]

While Sjahrir could deal with the nationalists, the PP presented a greater threat to his

tenure. Not only did they mobilize Indonesians to protest against Sjahrir's soft stance in the

negotiation with the Dutch, the PP also chose extreme action by kidnapping Sjahrir and his

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[109] See Appendix.

[110] It was a body established on August 29, 1945. Its main task was to perform legislative functions of the Indonesian state such as setting up basic state institutions as well as writing rules to govern them.

[111] The PP was a coalition of about 132 political parties, social organizations, and militia groups. The coalition formally established the PP on January 16, 1946.

[112] In their famous demands to the government, they asked for the Indonesian state to negotiate: 1) "a hundred percent Indonesian independence," 2) the people's government, 3) the people's army, 4) the dismantling of the Japanese army, 5) taking care of the European prisoners, 6) the takeover of the enemy's Dutch agriculture, and 7) the takeover of enemy's [Dutch] industries.

friends on June 26, 1946. The PP forced Sukarno to dissolve Sjahrir's cabinet on July 3, 1946.[113]

Fed up and threatened by the PP's demands, Sjahrir and Sukarno, the representative of the

nationalists, agreed to dissolve the PP. The dissolution of the PP, however, did not weaken its

organizational capacity, as the regime was able to detain only some of the PP leaders.

Meanwhile, the political parties which constituted the PP avoided the state repression and

continued their pressure on Sjahrir.

Although Sjahrir and the nationalists successfully neutralized political pressure from the

PP, the nationalists did not miss the opportunity to oppose him when Sjahrir made a costly

agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the Linggarjati Agreement.[114] After

accepting wide criticism, Sjahrir lost his influence, forcing him to include the PNI and Masjumi

to maintain his government's legitimacy. In Sjahrir's third cabinet, Masjumi, the representation

of Islam, became the party with the highest seat allocation in the cabinet (eight seats), followed

by the PSI (six seats), and the PNI (four seats). The inclusion of the Islamists and the nationalists

in Sjahrir's last cabinet signaled the decline of the moderate-left. Keeping the nationalists at bay

was an impossible strategy because of its previous support to Sjahrir in dealing with the PP. The

inclusion of the nationalists was a reward for its support during a hard time. Regardless of the

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[113] PP also demanded the government to 1) relinquish the economic, political, and social leadership to a council, 2) inaugurate the council's membership, all of PP's favored people, and 3) induct 13 ministers proposed by PP.

[114] On November 11–13, 1946, Indonesia and the Dutch met to discuss how to resolve military conflicts between them. On the next day, both parties agreed that 1) the Dutch would acknowledge the Indonesian territory of Java, Sumatra, and Madura, 2) the Dutch had to leave Indonesia, on January 1, 1949 at the latest, 3) the establishment of the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*; RIS), covering Indonesian territory, Kalimantan, and the eastern Island of Indonesia (e.g., Papua) before January 1, 1949, and 4) as the United States of Indonesia, Indonesia had to join the Commonwealth and pay its financial debt to the Dutch. The agreement costed Indonesia, as Indonesia had to release some islands such as Kalimantan and Sulawesi, as well as pay the Dutch.

inclusion, Sjahrir's cabinet had to resign due to irreparable damage caused by the Linggarjati Agreement.

As Sjahrir's replacement, Amir Sjarifuddin consolidated his power by giving seven cabinet seats to each party, including the PNI and the PSI, his own party.[115] He also surrounded himself with members of the PP such as the PKI, the Indonesian Labor Party (*Partai Buruh Indonesia*; PBI), the Indonesian Peasants' Front (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*; BTI), and the Youth Congress Body (*Badan Kongres Pemuda*), giving each a seat in his cabinet. By accommodating these small parties, Sjarifuddin drove the regime farther to the left.

The inauguration of Sjarifuddin, however, invited enmity from the nationalists as well as Islamists. His previous policies during his tenure as Sjahrir's minister of defense fomented opposition from both groups.[116] Consequently, Sjarifuddin's extreme left stance cost him, as he had to reshuffle his cabinet due to the withdrawal of the PNI and the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (*Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*; PSII). The withdrawal of these parties forced Sjarifuddin to form his second government in the span of five months (July 1947–November 1947). His second government conceded to the demands of the nationalists and Islamists as the PNI held its dominance with seven cabinet seats, and Masjumi gained six cabinet seats, rising from its previous one cabinet seat. In January 1948, Sjarifuddin had to face international pressure regarding whether or not to accept the Renville Agreement.[117] When Sjarifuddin accepted the

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[115] See Appendix.

[116] For instance, Sjarifuddin inserted leftist-leaning military officers as the embryo for the formation of the Indonesian military. His move provoked PETA, a Japanese educated military group, because they had a different political orientation. While PETA was dominated by right-wing and Muslim officers, Sjarifuddin's army group aimed to be a revolutionary army, modeled after the USSR's Red Army.

[117] The Renville Agreement discussed unresolved issues from the Linggarjati Agreement. Mediated by the United Nations, the agreement forced Indonesia to join as a part of the United States of Indonesia. The consequence of this agreement was Indonesia's territory was limited to Central Java, Yogyakarta, and Sumatra.

agreement, the PNI and Masjumi criticized him and withdrew their support from his cabinet.

This move effectively ended his tenure, marking the end of the left's leadership in the Indonesian

state.

The fall of Sjarifuddin's government ushered in Hatta as the prime minister in 1948. As

president, Sukarno mandated that he formed a cabinet on January 29, 1948. In his cabinet,

Masjumi and the PNI gained a significant number of seats, continuing their dominance since the

previous government. Masjumi five cabinet seats, while the PNI seized three cabinet seats.

Hatta's ascension to power provoked opposition from Sjarifuddin's loyalists, the People's

Democratic Front (*Front Demokrasi Rakyat*; FDR). The group opposed Hatta's continued

participation in the Renville Agreement, demanding the Indonesian government to scrap the

agreement and nationalize all Dutch companies.[118] Another challenge came when the PKI started

rebellions in Central and East Java. A PKI-led rebellion emerged in Solo and Madiun[119] in

September 1948. The PKI's plan was to force Hatta's government to step down.

The PKI's plan, however, did not succeed, due to a lack of preparation and assistance

from other leftist groups. Before the PKI's uprising in September 1948, the party had attempted

to rally all leftist groups under its wing to support the rebellion. The PKI mistakenly expected its

social bases in Central and East Java would support it. The party's leadership firmly supported

the rebellion only when Musso, a PKI's cadre, landed in Indonesia from Russia on August 10,

1948, and consolidated the party to support the rebellion. Therefore, they had only about a month

to prepare the rebellion to take over Hatta's government, a very insufficient amount of time for

launching a rebellion.

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[118] Kahin, 2003, p. 260.
[119] Towns in Central and East Java.

Because of the lack of preparation, the rebellion did not unfold as the PKI's leadership had expected. The Indonesian military swiftly clamped down on the rebellion and pursued the group's followers, dismantling the left from its strongholds in Solo and Madiun. The military dismantled the party's leadership and executed the party's prominent leaders, such as Musso and Amir Sjarifuddin. At the grassroots level, the collision between the PKI and the army took casualties from both sides. The PKI, for instance, killed 88 government officials from various levels of local bureaucracy.[120] The conflict also took the lives of 94 police officials and 44 army soldiers.[121] Despite these casualties, the military managed to end the rebellion by the end of September 1948.

After the PKI's failed rebellion, external pressure was mounting on Indonesia. For the second time in two years, the Dutch sent troops to recolonize Indonesia. The Dutch managed to detain Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir in December 1948. Thus, Hatta did not have an opportunity to work with his cabinet, leaving the course of the Indonesian state to an emergency government, established in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. During the emergency cabinet, Sjarifuddin Prawiranegara led the Indonesian government, maintaining the war against the Dutch military aggression to retake the archipelago. The military conflict with the Dutch did not cease until the signing of the Roem-Roijen Agreement on May 7, 1949. The agreement called for the end of military operations by both parties and the return of the Indonesian capital to Yogyakarta. The agreement also directed both parties to continue the negotiation in the Roundtable Conference of August 23 to November 2, 1949.

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[120] Swift, 2010, p. 80.
[121] Ibid.

As the military conflict between the Dutch and Indonesia cooled down, Hatta resumed his power, bringing Masjumi and the PNI into his cabinet once again. The two parties dominated Hatta's cabinet, each securing five cabinet seats. Nevertheless, Hatta's cabinet did not continue as Indonesia had to implement the Roem-Roijen Agreement to form the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*; RIS). RIS was short-lived. Indonesia reverted back to a republic in 1950 after RIS, led by Hatta, and the Indonesian government, led by Abdul Halim, agreed to end RIS and form again the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, a state form which exists until today.

The Coordination of Opposition Groups and Students (1945–49)

These various conflicts, alliances, and struggles constituted the context in which student activism unfolded, and through which the opportunities for and the depth of coordination between opposition groups and student activists, can be understood. Some important trends occurred during the 1945–49 period regarding the development of opposition groups and student groups. First, the formation of opposition groups began as a violent opposition against the groups controlling the state. The absence of elections forced opposition groups outside the ruling coalition to find alternative ways to replace whoever was in power. In the absence of a regular mechanism of power circulation, opposition groups cannot see if there will be an opportunity in the future to legitimately replace the incumbent. When political negotiation fails, there is no other way to gain power except through violent methods. The rebellion of the left in 1948 exemplifies this argument.

Second, although the state took violent measures to overcome the opposition groups, the impact of this strategy did not successfully demobilize the opposition groups. The best example

was the PKI's rebellion in 1948. Although the Indonesian state managed to eliminate the party's

leadership, with hundreds of casualties, state repression did not completely obliterate the party's

infrastructure. The next generation of the party's leadership was still intact, and they were able to

revive the party during the lead-up to the 1955 General Election. The PKI's links to the youths

and students did not entirely disappear, although the party lost important organizations such as

Pesindo. Because the Indonesian state did not take strong repressive strategies towards the party,

youths and students associated with the party could survive.

Third, students were not a significant force in this period as they would become in later

decades. Universities were slowly developing as the main site of students' activities.[122] The main

cause of the slow growth was the Dutch's effort to recolonize Indonesia. Between 1945–48, the

Dutch launched two military aggressions on Indonesia (1947 and 1949). The aggressions split

Indonesia into two territories under the Dutch and Indonesian governments. Facing such a hostile

situation, educational activities on campus ceased because students were participating in the fight

against the Dutch. They joined militia groups to support the Indonesian government's efforts to

defend their legitimacy. Political parties actively organized students and youths to join the war.

For instance, as the leader of the Indonesian state, the PSI formed the Indonesian Socialist Youth

(*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*; Pesindo) in 1945. In Java and Sumatra, Masjumi formed the

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[122] Although Indonesian universities were slowly growing, the base of Indonesian universities emerged during this era. The Dutch military aggression in 1946 forced some professors and students in Jakarta to relocate to Central Java. There they established Gadjah Mada State University in 1946. In Jakarta, after conquering the capital, the Dutch established The University of Indonesia (UI) on March 10, 1947. The Dutch aimed to consolidate other Dutch academic institutions across Indonesia under UI. The Dutch, for instance, controlled the faculties of medicine, law, letters, and philosophy in Jakarta; veterinary medicine in Bogor; medicine in Surabaya; and economics in Makassar. In the future, these academic institutions became the seeds of Indonesia's top-rank universities: University of Indonesia (Jakarta), Bogor Agricultural Institute (Bogor), Airlangga University (Surabaya), and Hasanuddin University (Makassar). They also became hotbeds of Indonesian student movements in the following years. See Hutagaol, 1985.

Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement (*Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia*; GPII), on October 2,
1945.[123] The Islamic leaders gathered their students and instructed them to participate in the war,
framed as a holy war against the infidels. The PSI's oppositions, such as the PNI, followed the
same strategy. On May 31, 1947, the PNI initiated the formation of the Indonesian Democrat
Youth (*Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia*; PDI).

Mobilizing youths and students were appealing for politicians from these three groups
because the youths had displayed their political power at important events during the struggle for
independence.[124] These political forces thought that, in addition to driving out the Dutch, the
students could become an important instrument for political struggle when the situation returned
to normal. Thus, the left, the Islamists, and the nationalists all forged links to students as a
political investment in possible future mobilizations.

The Repression of the Islamists (1949–59)

Starting in 1950, Indonesia changed constitutions and revived the Republic of Indonesia.
The early 1950s was a precursor for major political groups (i.e., the nationalists, Islamists, and
the left) to compete in the 1955 General Election. If previously competition had occurred inside
the Indonesian state due to the absence of elections, starting from 1950, the competition between
these major political groups involved groups at the grassroots level. In the lead up to the election,
the interactions between political elites and the masses intensified since political elites needed
stronger networks in communities to garner votes for their parties. Such interactions shaped the

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[123] Fogg, 2012, p. 184.
[124] One example was the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta by the youths. One day before independence,
they took Sukarno and Hatta, forcing them to announce independence earlier. They saw Sukarno and
Hatta as too hesitant about proclaiming independence when the news of Japan's loss was already out in
public.

relationship between the political elites and the people through two different patterns the weakening and the strengthening of their previous ties.

The Islamists exemplified the first pattern. Between 1949 and 1950, Masjumi was a dominant force inside the Indonesian state as it held five cabinet seats, led by Masjumi's politician, Mohammad Natsir. Under his tenure, Indonesia witnessed the rise of the Indonesian Islamic State (*Negara Islam Indonesia*; NII), proclaimed on August 7, 1949. The rise of NII was a continuation of Islamic groups that supported the Indonesian government during the wars to repel the Dutch Military Aggressions (1947-1949). Since the first Dutch Military Aggression (1947), Islamic groups had given their assistance in the war against the Dutch. Grassroot Islamic leaders mobilized their followers to support the Indonesian military. They utilized, for instance, religious symbols to frame the war against the Dutch as a holy war. Their support signaled their political position of endorsing the legitimacy of the Indonesian state.[125] The legitimacy of the Indonesian state, however, was not their only objective. For the Islamists, the legitimacy of the Indonesian state was a tool for launching a top-down change in the direction of an Islamic Indonesian state and society.

Natsir saw NII as a dilemma for his tenure. On the one hand, as a representative of the Islamists in the Indonesian state, Natsir wanted to install Islam as the Indonesian state's dominant ideology. On the other hand, as the prime minister, Natsir also had to accommodate the interests of other parties, especially the PNI, that had agreed to form his government. Therefore, the presence of the NII Rebellion posed a challenge for him to govern his coalition. Led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, a prominent-local Islamic cleric (*ulama*), NII had conquered

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[125] Fogg, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

West and Central Java as its strongholds in 1949. Holding the leadership of the Indonesian state,

Masjumi took a soft stance against NII due to their shared Islamic backgrounds.[126] Natsir

proposed giving amnesty to all Islamic armed guerillas associated with NII. His proposal failed

to appeal to other political parties because NII would agree to join Indonesia only if the republic

altered its name. NII proposed adding "I" in the Republic of Indonesia (i.e., Islamic Republic of

Indonesia or Republik Islam Indonesia; RII) as a requirement for its surrender.[127] This proposal

sharpened the division between the Islamists and the nationalists in the government.

Consequently, Natsir's cabinet fell due to the withdrawal of support from the PNI, Masjumi's

main coalition partner.

      Masjumi also experienced internal friction that unraveled the party's power. When

Sukiman replaced Natsir as prime minister from the same party (April 27, 1951-April 3, 1952),

Sukiman did not manage the politics within Indonesian Islam well. For instance, he gave only

one ministry post (i.e., the Ministry of Religious Affairs) to NU despite NU's position as the

largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. Sukiman's replacement, Wilopo from the PNI, even

gave the Ministry of Religious Affairs to Muhammadiyah, NU's main rival. The neglect of NU

by Masjumi highlighted the rivalry between modernist and traditionalist Islam.[128] The rivalry

forced NU to withdraw its support from Masjumi and establish its own political party, following

in the footsteps of other Islamic parties such as the PSII and the Islamic Tarbiyah Movement

(*Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* or Perti).

      Meanwhile, the nationalists exemplified the second pattern during the 1950s. The

nationalists found their perfect opportunity to emerge in the early 1950s. The weakening of both

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[126] Formichi, 2012, p. 154.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid, p. 157.

the left and the Islamists favored the nationalists' emergence as a key player inside the

Indonesian state. Starting from Sukiman's government, to Wilopo's (April 3, 1952-July 30,

1953) and Ali Sastroadmidjojo's (July 30, 1953-August 12, 1955), the PNI secured a steady

number of cabinets seats, from five cabinet seats under Sukiman, to four cabinet seats under

Wilopo, and four cabinet seats under Sastroadmidjojo.[129] These numbers remained consistent

while Masjumi, the PNI's main coalition partner, experienced a steep decline in cabinet seats.

This trend indicated the steady political influence of the PNI in those three cabinets.

Furthermore, the PNI expanded its social base by altering its ideology and programs into

Marhaenism, a political idea blending socialism and nationalism.[130] The shift to Marhaenism

allowed the PNI to net a wider social base. For instance, before the 1950s, the PNI did not have a

lot of middle-class support for the party. After a change in its programs in 1952,[131] the PNI

successfully added the native middle class to its social base. This move proved beneficial in

bolstering PNI's financial power to prepare for the 1955 General Election. The steady power of

the PNI across the three cabinets reinforced the party's economic power, especially after

Sastroamidjojo won the position of prime minister. For instance, a prominent PNI member, Iskaq

Tjokroadisurjo, occupied the Ministries of Finances and Economic Affairs. He swiftly launched

a policy to channel state funds to the General National Bank (*Bank Umum Nasional*, BUN), a

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[129] See Appendix.
[130] There was no clear distinction between Marhaenism and similar ideologies, such as Marxism or nationalism. The best way to understand Marhaenism is to view it as a pragmatic strategy to capture voters in light of facing the 1955 General Election. For instance, in 1948, the party's Marhaenism seemed to be influenced heavily by Marxism, represented by the party's stance to oppose the institution of private property. Nevertheless, in 1952, the party no longer opposed the institution of private property. This stance was aimed to reduce the antagonism between workers and companies that could jeopardize the party's position in the 1955 General Election. See Rocamora, 1974, p. 134.
[131] Ibid. p. 175.

private bank founded and owned by PNI members. Through this strategy, the PNI strengthened

its financial muscles to prepare for the 1955 General Election.

The left also strengthened its political position in the early 1950s, despite state repression

after 1948. The main reason behind the left's revival was that state repression did not completely

destroy the PKI's infrastructure. The party's members survived, and a new generation of PKI

cadres took over the party, replacing the party's old guard. Assistance from Moscow helped the

PKI's new leadership reinvigorate the party, by promoting a united front as the party's main

strategy.[132] Led by a young communist, Dipo Nusantara Aidit, the party's membership swelled

from 7,000 in early 1952 to 150,000 in 1954.[133] Aidit's leadership increased the party's

membership by forming various organizations to appeal to non-communist groups and different

social groups of the lower class, such as BTI, the Indonesian Women's Movement (*Gerakan*

Wanita Indonesia, Gerwani), and Workers' Youth (*Pemuda Rakjat*).[134] This strategic move was

the result of the party's adoption of the United Front Strategy that aimed to mold the party as a

vehicle for various social groups other than workers and peasants.[135] Through these ideological

and organizational innovations, the PKI readied itself for the republic's first general election.

The competition among the nationalists, Islamists and the left intensified when they

participated in the 1955 General Election. The election played an important role in fostering two

political processes. First, the election regularly connected the competition at the state level with

social groups outside the state. The election pushed the nationalists, Islamists, and the left to

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[132] Efimova and McVey, 2011, p. 143.
[133] Mortimer, 2006, p. 42.
[134] Ibid.
[135] The PKI's leadership did not take the strategy for granted. Although it aimed for including various social groups into the party's ranks, it still insisted the leadership of the party must be in the working class' hands. It also stressed the working class-peasant alliance and its opposition to imperialism, the two orthodox stances of the Communist International (Comintern). See Ibid., p. 50.

mobilize votes and garner resources. Consequently, political parties had to work harder to

connect with communities that they might not otherwise have interacted with. Parties with strong

historical and traditional ties to the population gained an advantage in the expansion of the

Indonesian political arena. The nationalists, represented by the PNI, won the election by

receiving 22% of the votes (8.4 million votes). Masjumi almost matched the votes gained by the

election winner, acquiring 20% (7.9 million) of total votes. Another Islamic party, NU, followed

in the third position with 18% votes (6.9 million votes). Other Islamic parties also managed to

secure their positions in the top ten, such as PSII (2.89%, one million votes) and Perti (1.28%,

four hundred eighty thousand votes).

Regardless of the success of the Islamic parties in gaining votes, the total share of their

votes did not manage to form a majority in the parliament. This limitation hampered their agenda

to Islamicize the Indonesian state and society, especially for Masjumi. Masjumi's political

project crumbled because they lost NU, the third-largest political party in the 1955 election. NU

altered its ideological stance by adopting the Five Pillars (*Pancasila*) as its ideology. Thus,

Masjumi was the only Islamic party with a significant number of votes that had maintained the

objective to realize Islamic principles in the parliament. This position was weak in comparison to

those of its secular rivals, such as the PNI and the PKI.

In the 1955–59 period, the rivalry between the nationalists and Islamists turned fierce.

This was reflected in the formation of the cabinets that followed the general election. In the first

cabinet, led by Ali Sastroamidjojo, the PNI, Masjumi, and NU coalesced to form a government.

The PNI received six cabinet seats, while Masjumi and NU each four cabinet seats. This

formation was in response to a common threat: the PKI.[136] As the party with the fourth-largest number of votes, the PKI's rise surprised everyone. After their failed rebellion in 1948, almost all political groups rejected the incorporation of the PKI in the cabinets. The exception was Sukarno, who eagerly advocated for the inclusion of the PKI in Sastroamidjojo's cabinet due to the PKI's support for Sukarno in the All Indonesian People's Congress in early 1955.[137] Lacking a consensus from other parties, Sastroamidjojo left the PKI out in forming the cabinet.

Sastroamidjojo's cabinet did not last long. The main cause of his short-lived cabinet (which lasted less than a year, from March 24, 1956, to March 14, 1957) was the disruption from local rebellions. The most prominent party in the rebellions was NII, which continued its opposition to the Indonesian state. The rebellions opened an opportunity for the PKI to regain its political influence. The PKI was among the groups that condemned the rebellions. This stance brought the PKI closer to Sukarno, who at the time expressed his dissatisfaction with the instability of the parliamentary system.[138] The mounting pressure from the PKI toppled Sastroamidjojo's government on March 14, 1957. To undermine the parties' influence, Sukarno appointed Djuanda as the prime minister. Djuanda swiftly formed a cabinet consisting mostly of technocrats without links to political parties. They composed 50% (twelve seats) of his ministry posts. NU and the PNI received four and three cabinet seats, respectively. Despite this composition, the PKI, Sukarno's ardent supporter, did not yet get a position inside Djuanda's cabinet. It opposed the formation of the cabinet. Sukarno sang the same tune, reiterating his distrust over political parties. He condemned them as a source of instability, leading to his authoritarian turn of Guided Democracy in 1959.

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[136] Feith, 2006, p. 466.
[137] Ibid., p. 468.
[138] Ibid., p. 540.

The declining political influence of Masjumi determined the fate of the NII rebellion. After the election, the coalition government of the nationalists and the Islamists could not agree on how to deal with the rebellion.[139] Masjumi still took a soft stance against the rebellion, treating NII as though it were just a delinquent child. In contrast, other parties, particularly the PNI, the PKI, and NU, sought to crush the rebellion. Eventually, Masjumi gave up, letting the government start a military initiative in 1958 to end the NII rebellion. The inability of Masjumi to stop the state's coercive measure towards NII pushed them further towards joining the small rebellions around Indonesia.[140] Some of Masjumi's elites, such as Muhammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Burhanuddin Harahap, joined the rebellions and founded the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*; PRRI) in February 1958.[141] This move by Masjumi's political elites in effect undermined the rebellions because these elites had been a bridge between the rebellions and the Indonesian state. They were the ones holding back the nationalists and the left from using coercive measures against the rebellions. Once the political elites were no longer part of the state, state repression soon began.

The Indonesian state immediately implemented a military approach to eliminate the rebellions. Between 1958 and 1965, the military launched a series of operations to wipe out the rebellions. By issuing Government Rule 59/1958, the Sukarno-led regime launched a military operation.[142] It successfully suppressed the rebellions with operations centered in Padang, West

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[139] Formichi, op. cit., p. 163.

[140] The rebellions spanned from North Sumatra to South Sulawesi. For instance, in Sulawesi and East Indonesia, the rebellions united, forging the Total Struggle (*Perjuangan Semesta*, Permesta) in 1957. Formichi, op. cit., p. 166.

[141] Formichi, op. cit., p. 166.

[142] The military operation rested on 'the Human Fence' strategy. The military utilized local civilians to form a combat unit that moved and surrounded the rebellion, mostly residing in the mountain. The human fence gradually closed the space available to the rebellion so that it would diminish their resources and supplies. Formichi, op. cit., p. 168.

Sumatra. Between March and April 1958, the military docked along the east and west coasts of

Sumatra, forcing the rebellion there to take refuge in Bukittinggi, a town in the mountains of

West Sumatra.[143] The military operation also pushed the rebellion to take refuge in the jungle.

Two years after the PRRI rebellion, the Indonesian government dissolved Masjumi, and a year

later, the leadership of the PRRI rebellion surrendered to the Indonesian government. Although

the state detained the leaders, smaller rebellions kept flaring up until 1965. These rebellions,

however, were weak due to the lack of resource support. The Indonesian state managed to

eliminate the leadership, ending the rebellions.

The Coordination of Opposition Groups and Students (1949–59)

In the period from 1949–59, there were several important developments with opposition

and student groups. First, the repression of opposition groups managed to weaken their

organizational power. The clampdown of the NII rebellion successfully undermined the

rebellion's organizational power. The killing of NII leaders such as Kartosuwiryo (1962) and

Abdul Kahar Muzakkar (1965) managed to weaken the rebellion. Although the NII rebellion lost

its leadership, remnants of the rebellion managed to preserve their influence and survive the

subsequent regimes through personal networks and institutions, even though they were no longer

a strong and coherent political unit.[144] The repression of the Islamists in the 1950s was a replay

of the Indonesian state's failure to completely annihilate the PKI in 1948.

Second, universities were developing rapidly in the 1950–59 period. The number of state

universities grew from 2 to 8.[145] Meanwhile, between 1949 and 1956, the number of private

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[143] Fogg, op. cit., p. 386.
[144] Van Bruinessen, 2002.
[145] Lumbagaol, op. cit., p. 106.

universities expanded from 2 to 27.[146] At both types of universities, there was a rapid increase in the number of students, from 6,158 in 1950–51 to 32,501 in 1956–57. Some crucial factors that caused the development of education from 1950–59 include the promise by the government of a better socioeconomic life, openings in regional governments to fill bureaucratic openings left by the Dutch, the investment of religious and secular organizations in education, and the increasing value of a college degree.[147] The rising number of Indonesian universities and students opened up competition for political forces to gain supporters in this setting. This trend marked a shift from universities as the suppliers of the colonial state's bureaucracy to universities as a pool of educated individuals to support various political forces. Thus, since independence, Indonesian universities have been a locus and target of political propaganda.[148]

Consequently, to prepare for the 1955 General Election, opposition groups expanded their networks to Indonesian universities to build connections with students. Apart from some student groups that had existed since 1945–49, new youth and student organizations blossomed from 1950–59. For instance, in 1954, the Nationalist Indonesian Student Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia*; GMNI) emerged. The PNI gradually incorporated them as part of the party's structure. Another instance was the Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements (*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*; CGMI). Established in 1956, CGMI was a fusion of small leftist youth and student organizations that had existed since the early 1950s. They complemented other organizations that the PKI incorporated, such as peasants in BTI and women activists in Gerwani. Moreover, opposition groups also established universities that reflected their political leanings. For instance, NU established the Nahdlatul Ulama

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[146] Lumbagaol, op. cit., p. 107.
[147] Lumbagaol, op. cit., pp. 106-110.
[148] Lumbagaol, op. cit., p. 118.

Academy for Spreading the Faith in Jakarta, and the PKI established several educational institutions such as Bacharudin Political Science Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Politik Bacharudin*), Ir. Anwari Technique Academy (*Akademi Technik Ir. Anwari*), Dr. Rivai Journalism Academy (*Akademi Djurnalistik Dr. Rivai*), Multatuli Literature Academy (*Akademi Sastra Multatuli*), Dr. Ratulangi Economics Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Ekonomi Dr. Ratulangi*), Ronggowarsito History Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Sedjarah Ronggowarsito*), The Indonesian People's University (*Universitas Rakyat Indonesia*), Res Publica University (*Universitas Res Publica*), Aliarcham Social Science Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Sosial Aliarcham*), and Egom Agriculture School (*Sekolah Pertanian Egom*). The establishment of these institutions was an effort of opposition groups to garner political support from the rising educated class.

The Dissolution of the Left (1959–67)

The dissolution of the parliamentary democracy system in 1959 cemented the power of the military in Sukarno's government. From 1959 to 1967, alongside the technocrats, the military was a rising political force. In 1957, the military cemented its economic power by occupying managerial positions in the Dutch companies, taken over by Sukarno's government.[149] The takeover of the Dutch companies was initiated by Sukarno's government due to the dispute over the status of West Irian (now West Papua) between Indonesia and the Dutch. Furthermore, the composition of the cabinets between 1959 and 1967 affirms the rise of the military's political influence. The military constantly maintained its domination of ministry posts in that period.[150] Approaching 1967, its share even significantly increased as Sukarno's power was weakening.

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[149] Lev, 1963, p. 351.
[150] See Appendix.

The rise of the military under Sukarno did not meet meaningful challenges from the nationalists, Islamists, and the left. Even the PKI did not get a significant number of seats in his cabinet. The PKI only gained two cabinet seats in Sukarno's administration.

The problem with Sukarno's Guided Democracy was the absence of a political mechanism to compete for power. Because elections were absent, political forces could gain political influence only when they became Sukarno's client. The impasse in replacing Sukarno pushed the political competition from the state to the grassroots level. This shift caused the intensification of political conflict at the grassroots level, especially between the PKI and Islamists. Their history of enmity had started with the takeover of SI's branches by the left in the 1920s and 1930s. The PKI's failed rebellion in 1948 also created hatred toward the party from Islamic groups as well as from the military, and especially from the army. In the late 1950s, due to its close association with Sukarno, the PKI launched "unilateral actions" aimed at taking over lands in rural areas. The PKI's actions deeply hurt landowners who were mostly affiliated with Islamic groups such as NU. Thus, the PKI's strategy fanned the flames of an old rivalry that then became fuel for a larger conflict.

The opposition against the PKI reached its peak when the PKI launched an attempt to kidnap the army's generals. The PKI's plan was to bring the generals to Sukarno and prove a rumor that the army had planned to launch a coup against him. The PKI's plan also sought to establish a revolutionary council that would eliminate the army's leadership.[151] The kidnapping occurred on the night of September 30, 1965. In the early morning hours, elements of the PKI, combined with dissidents from within the armed forces, set out to kidnap seven army generals

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[151] Roosa, 2006, pp. 212-213.

they viewed as politically threatening to President Sukarno. One of the generals escaped, three were shot at their homes, and the remaining three were taken to a military airbase and executed. The move against the generals did not go as planned, and the deaths of the officers that morning showed the extremely unorganized nature of the action.[152] The kidnappers and their leaders were quickly foiled by General Suharto, and the movement collapsed. The armed forces were eager to downplay the fact that their own troops and officers had played a role in a violent action against the top leadership – a dangerous precedent in the chain of command. The army aggressively portrayed the attack on the generals as an attempted "coup" by the PKI. In the following months, under the leadership of Suharto, the army executed the PKI's members and sympathizers, causing between 200,000 and 1 million casualties – none of whom had any knowledge there would be kidnappings.[153] During the massacre, the army exploited the hatred against the PKI that had been boiling over since its failed rebellion in 1948. Mobilizing Islamic and vigilante groups, the army launched a systematic repression of the PKI and PKI-affiliated organizations. While the massacre had a heavy casualty toll, it also destroyed the PKI's organizational power. PKI-affiliated organizations had deep networks and thousands of members. Consequently, the banishment of these organizations substantially weakened the Indonesian left since the state repression cut off social ties that were necessary for mobilizations. The destruction was so complete that the left never recovered.

When Suharto was inaugurated as president on July 25, 1966, he rose to power by using the army as the base of his power. The military dominated his cabinet with nine cabinet seats. The second group in the number of seats was the technocrats (eight cabinet seats). Meanwhile,

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[152] Ibid., p. 215.
[153] Cribb, 2001; Cribb, 2002.

the nationalists (PNI) got one cabinet seat, and the Islamists (NU) got only two cabinet seats in Suharto's first cabinet. Their numbers would decline further as Suharto consolidated his power through the government-sponsored party, the Functional Groups (*Golongan Karya*; Golkar), and the military. Suharto's rise to power conveyed the reorganization of power that rested on an old pattern, initiated by Sukarno. The heavy presence of the military was a continuation of Sukarno's Guided Democracy era.

The Coordination of Opposition Groups and Students (1959–67)

During 1959–67, there was a significant development of opposition groups. First, state repression of the left in 1965–66 was more lethal than the one in 1948 or the one against the Islamists in the late 1950s. As the leading figure in the effort to eliminate the PKI, Suharto established and led the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*; Kopkamtib) in 1965. The institution aimed to banish the influence of the left in politics, as well as to cement the power of the army during the transition from Sukarno to Suharto. The murders involved vigilante groups and Islamic organizations such as the Multipurpose Anshor Front (*Barisan Anshor Serbaguna*; Banser). Some provinces, such as Central Java, East Java, and Bali became areas in which the death toll was extremely high.[154] The regime destroyed not only the party's leadership and members. Organizations and people associated with the party were also on the regime's target list. During the purge, organizations that had become the party's networks to certain social segments could not avoid the purge. For instance, the regime eliminated Gerwani and the Central

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[154] See, for instance, Sudjatmiko, 1992.

All-Indonesian Workers Organization (*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*; SOBSI).

Both organizations were the party's backbone in mobilizing support from women and workers.

Second, 1959–65 saw a continuation of the development of Indonesian universities. During 1961–65, for instance, there was a sharp increase in state universities, from 14 to 39.[155] Private universities also increased from 112 to 228 in the same period.[156] As the number of universities rose, the number of students also increased. State universities recorded a rapid increase from 65,000 to 158,000 students in the 1961–65 period.[157] The same trend occurred in private universities. An increase from 27,000 to 82,000 students occurred in the same period.[158] The rapid development of higher educational institutions signaled the expansion of space for students to gather.

Politically, students raised their value for both the regime and opposition groups. Thus, Indonesian universities continued to become an arena of the power struggle between the regime and opposition groups. For instance, as a supporter of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the PKI mobilized students through CGMI and the Education Workers' Union (*Serikat Sekerja Pendidikan*; SSP) to attack the Islamic Students Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*; HMI), accusing them of being a tool of foreign imperialists.[159]

Third, the politicization of Indonesian universities positioned universities as a target for the regime's purge project. For instance, on October 10, 1965, Minister of Education Sjarief Thajeb disbanded four universities, nine academies, and one institute that had links to the PKI.[160]

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[155] Hutagaol, op. cit., p. 148.
[156] Hutagaol, op. cit., p. 148.
[157] Hutagaol, op. cit., p. 148.
[158] Hutagaol, op. cit., p. 148.
[159] Wahid, 2018, p. 37.
[160] The universities were Universitas Res Publica, Universitas Rakjat Indonesia, and Universitas Rakjat. Meanwhile, the academic institutes were Aliarcham Social Science Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Sosial*

Three days later, Thajeb dissolved other PKI-related institutions.[161] PKI-associated student

movement groups did not escape the repression. On October 11, 1965, the regime banned CGMI

and the Indonesian Students' Association (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*; Perhimi) from

Indonesian universities.[162] The regime disallowed the rights of students affiliated with these

organizations, such as the right to have representatives and the right to have memberships in

student representative bodies, student clubs (e.g., art clubs, sports clubs), and any government

organizations.[163]

     Following the ban of these academic institutions came a screening program that expelled

PKI-affiliated people (e.g., lecturers, administrators, students) from universities. According to

historical records, for instance, the Gadjah Mada University (UGM) expelled 115 employees,

2,986 students, and 1,212 administrative staff. The university suspected them of affiliation with

the PKI, which was a legal party, and there were no procedures through which evidence was

produced and those being expelled could defend themselves or their jobs. At UI and UI-Bogor,

about 1,000 and 700 students were suspended, respectively.[164] Another source confirmed that UI

Aliarcham), Bacharudin Political Science Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Politik Bachtarudin*), Ir. Anwari Academy (*Akademi Technik Ir. Anwari*), Dr. Rivai Journalism Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Djurnalistik Dr. Rivai*), Multatuli Literature Academy (*Akademi Sastra Multatuli*), Dr. Ratulangi Economics Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Ekonomi Dr. Ratulangi*), Ronggowarsito History Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Sedjarah Ronggowarsito*), W.R. Supratman Journalism Academy (*Akademi Djurnalistik W.R. Supratman*), Patrian Teruna Publishing and Journalistic Academy (*Akademi Djurnalistik and Publisistik Teruna Patria*), and Egom Agriculture School (Sekolah Pertanian E.G.O.M). Ibid., p. 39.

[161] They were the People's Art University (*Universitas Kesenian Rakjat*), Ngurah Rai Political Science Academy (*Akademi Ilmu Politik Ngurah Rai*), the University of Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo (*Universitas Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo*), Institut Pendidikan Harjono (*Harjono Educational Institute*), the Kudjang Institute of Teaching and Education (*Institute Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan Kudjang*), Cornel Simandjoentak Art Institute (*Akademi Seni Cornel Simandjoentak*), and Sotexi Textile Academy (*Akademi Textil-SOTEXI*). The government also disbanded the Indonesian Scholars' Association (*Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia*), Taman Kanak-kanak Melati (a kindergarten managed Gerwani). Ibid., p. 40.

[162] Ibid., p. 40.

[163] Ibid., p. 41.

[164] Ibid., p. 44.

scrutinized 1,153 students, resulting in the arrest of 219 students due to their involvement with the PKI.[165] Padjajaran University suspended 227 students and 25 lecturers and academic administrators for the same reason.[166] Other Indonesian state universities treated those affiliated with the PKI similarly, such as the Bandung State Institute of Teacher Training and Education (IKIP Bandung; 80 people), the Diponegoro University (*Universitas Diponegoro*; 4 lecturers removed, 2 lecturers suspended, 11 lecturers terminated), the North Sumatra University (*Universitas Sumatra Utara*; 10 students and "several" lecturers), the University of Andalas (*Universitas Andalas*; 39 students), the Hasanuddin University (*Universitas Hasanuddin*; 95 lecturers suspected as PKI-affiliates), the Sam Ratulangi University (*Universitas Sam Ratulangi*; 16 lecturers, 8 administrators, and 100 students) and the Manado State Institute of Teacher and Training and Education (IKIP Manado; 19 students).

Fourth, after the purge in 1965–67, Suharto ascended as the president of a regime popularly called the New Order.[167] His inauguration did not stop state repression of the left. The New Order regime formalized the exclusion of the left by issuing the State Decree 25/1966. The decree announced the dissolution of the PKI and designated it as a restricted political organization. The decree also restricted the dissemination of communism, Marxism, and Leninism in every form. The regime allowed the scientific discussion of these ideas as long as there was sufficient supervision, and it was regulated by the authorities. Furthermore, the everyday life of the survivors of the massacre did not get easier when the massacre was over. The New Order regime institutionalized the complete marginalization of the left. The regime, for

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[165] Ibid., p. 44.
[166] Ibid., p. 44.
[167] The term was to contrast with Sukarno's "Old Order regime."

instance, classified people into three categories: A, B, and C.[168] Category A was for people who were intensively involved with the PKI; Category B for those who were moderately involved with the PKI; and Category C for those who were less involved with the PKI. In practice, the distinctions among the groups did not mean starkly different treatment by the regime. People accused of being affiliated with the PKI could not apply for state jobs or participate in politics.

Fifth, the heavy state repression of the PKI and the Indonesian left gave rise to some political groups. They were opposition groups that lamented Sukarno's policies and his association with the PKI. The military, the Islamists, and the nationalists were among the prominent groups that opposed Sukarno and the PKI. They could not stand Sukarno's support of the PKI, and they found their opportunity to oust Sukarno and the PKI when the PKI coup attempt failed. As Suharto's main power base, the army had entrenched its influence since Sukarno's Guided Democracy. As previously described, Sukarno already included the military as one of his strongest supporters, besides the PKI.[169] Suharto utilized the same structure in erecting the New Order in 1967. The main difference rested on which individuals filled the structure. Suharto picked his favorite military officers who could ensure his tenure, instead of those who had been loyal to Sukarno or the PKI in the past.

Some Islamic groups also had interests aligned with Suharto and assisted him and the army with the execution of PKI-affiliated people. They also helped the regime to delegitimize Sukarno's presidency while Suharto and the army launched the purge in the period of 1965–67. For instance, NU swiftly prepared a public statement to condemn the failed coup. On October 5,

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[168] The categories were written on identity cards.
[169] The Indonesian military was not a unified faction. Inside the military there was a split between those who supported Sukarno's tenure and those who were against him. Sukarno maintained these two conflicting groups to secure his power.

1965, after a negotiation between young NU activists and its leadership, NU released a statement delegitimizing the PKI's action.[170] NU also supported student protests against Sukarno that swarmed Jakarta until his resignation in 1966.

The PNI, once a supporter of Sukarno, also began to distrust him. A segment of the PNI, led by Osa Maliki, voiced its disagreement with Sukarno's closeness to the PKI.[171] The group's stance was in the opposite camp from Sastroamidjojo, which bluntly defended Sukarno. Maliki's faction pressed Sukarno even further when he no longer had a strong grip on his presidency. They joined other anti-PKI groups to show their support to Suharto. Maliki's faction, for instance, supported student protests against Sukarno.

The rise of opposition groups that opposed Sukarno during the destruction of the PKI also provided an opportunity for some student movement groups to rise. Students became the vital instrument for Suharto to oust Sukarno. As he garnered support from the Islamists and the nationalists to eliminate the PKI, these groups mobilized their student networks. Some major groups such as NU and the PNI had student organizations associated with them. Thus, when their interests aligned with Suharto to abolish the PKI, they employed these student groups to demand Sukarno's resignation. For instance, student organizations such as HMI, GMNI, and the Indonesian Republic Catholic Student Movements (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia*; PMKRI) formed the Indonesian Students Action Union (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*; KAMI) on October 27, 1965. The main contribution of the group was to launch a series of protests against Sukarno until his resignation in 1967, together with other student organizations such as the Indonesian Youth and Students' Association (*Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar*

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[170] Feillard, 1996, p. 47.
[171] McIntyre, 1972, p. 201.

Pemuda Indonesia; KAPPI). These organizations maintained their connections with army officers when they participated in the campaign and massacre against the PKI.[172] Their momentous protest was on January 12, 1966, when they marched while voicing the Three People's Demands (*Tiga Tuntutan Rakyat*; Tritura). They demanded the dissolution of the PKI, the termination of Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet, and the lowering of basic commodity prices. Another mobilization took place when they rallied to the State Palace in Jakarta to protest Sukarno's tenure on March 10, 1966. Bringing up the same demands, they condemned Sukarno and other parties' leaders who lamented student protests.[173] The army did not stay silent. Its military units, the Army Strategic Reserves Command (*Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat*; KOSTRAD) and the Army Para-Commando Regiment (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*; RPKAD), joined the students the next day, forcing Sukarno to retreat to Bogor State Palace.[174] Cornered by students and the army, Sukarno signed the Eleventh March Command Letter (*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*; Supersemar). The letter imbued Suharto with the power to bring back stability after the failed coup. Suharto took the opportunity to dismantle Sukarno's power and solidify his own power structure. Students clearly played an important role in this process.

Conclusion

The period from 1945 to 1967 showed that the Indonesian state employed various degrees of state repression toward different opposition groups. The targets of state repression varied, depending on which group controlled the state. Some patterns in the state repression

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[172] Hindley, 1968, p. 350.
[173] Ibid., p. 351.
[174] Ibid., p. 351.

emerged. First, in 1945–49, the nationalists, Islamists, and the far-left opposition groups aimed to control the Indonesian state by opposing the moderate left government. The culmination of their opposition was the weak state repression after the failed rebellion in 1948 by the PKI. The repression was weak because the party's network survived, and the PKI was even able to revitalize itself in the 1955 General Election. Second, in 1950–59, the Islamists received the same treatment, mostly because of its partial grasp on the Indonesian state (i.e., Natsir as prime minister). The Indonesian state weakened Islamic groups' organizational power, especially Masjumi. Nevertheless, the Masjumi network survived, although it became an underground movement. Other major Islamic groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah remained intact, unaffected by the ban of Masjumi. They only succumbed to state repression when the New Order regime repressed them in the 1970s and 1980s. Third, only at the end of the 1959–67 period did the Indonesian state employ heavy repression that crippled the balance of power between the nationalists, the Islamists, and the left. The destruction of the PKI and the massacre of its followers brought a devastating consequence to the Indonesian left. Its organizational structure crumbled. Such state repression restrained the capacity of the Indonesian left to bounce back, at least not until the late 1980s.

Meanwhile, the development of Indonesian student movements followed the ups and downs of the opposition groups. From 1945–49 was the period when opposition groups just initiated the mobilization of youths and students. They formed organizations that could garner youths and students, targeting Indonesian universities as pools for student mobilizations. Moreover, some of the youth and student movement organizations participated in the political opposition, such as Pesindo in the PKI's 1948 rebellion. Nevertheless, since the state repression

was weak, they could survive and would become important organizations in supporting the PKI's reemergence in the 1955 General Election.

The period from 1950 to 1959 intensified the involvement of Indonesian students with opposition groups. The 1955 General Election drove opposition groups, as well as those who controlled the state, to deepen their networks to potential voters. Included in this strategy were students as one of the primary targets of mobilization, alongside other groups such as workers and women. The strategy to mobilize students positioned universities as a key arena for both opposition groups and the regime. During the same period, state repression was weak, especially towards the NII rebellion. The NII network was still relatively intact and survived the New Order regime.

In the following period (1959–67), a striking pattern emerged when lethal state repression destroyed not only the PKI but also student organizations associated with the party. PKI-related student movement groups such as CGMI and Perhimi were the primary targets of state repression. Their role as prominent student organizations in Indonesian universities swiftly diminished. On the contrary, the purge also catalyzed the emergence of student groups in political camps on the opposite side. When Suharto banished the PKI and affiliated student groups, Islamic student organizations and those who participated in the repression of the PKI thrived. HMI, PMII, and PMKRI, members of KAMI, became "the winners" after the massacre. They contributed to the formation of the New Order under Suharto.

The period from 1945 to 1967 left a political legacy that shaped the development of opposition groups and students in the 1968–90 period. The Indonesian left vanished from the configuration inherited from the colonial period. The Islamists and the nationalists survived with the army as the new political force. Student movements followed the same pattern. Universities

permitted only the Islamists and the nationalists as active student groups. The leftist student groups were completely absent. The Islamic and the nationalist students won the battle against the left, but they failed to fundamentally change the character of the regime that replaced Sukarno. The subsequent period proved that they would face a bigger and stronger regime than before. They would feel that their role in toppling Sukarno was merely an instrument for Suharto to establish an even more oppressive regime. Under the New Order regime, the state was finally successful enough to repress opposition groups and, in turn, students.

Chapter Three

Opposition Groups and Students during Suharto's New Order Regime

(1967–90)

Introduction

During the massacre of the left in 1965–67, Suharto ascended to power. He became the

president of Indonesia with massive support from those who had defied Sukarno, such as the

military, Islamists, and some sections of the nationalists. In his early years, the New Order[175]

made friendly gestures toward the Islamists, the nationalists, and, especially the military,

Suharto's main power base. This alliance kept the left marginalized. The friendly gestures

gradually changed, however, when Suharto consolidated his power by employing the military

and a state-backed political party, Golkar. The regime became stronger towards the opposition

groups. To cement its power, the regime established repressive institutions that aimed to monitor

and prevent the emergence of opposition forces. Stability was the main focus of the New Order

regime.

Two political processes were important during this period and form the central theme of

this chapter: the growth of the New Order regime's repressive institutions and how those

repressive institutions shaped the development of coordination between opposition groups and

student movements. This chapter first focuses on the expansion of key repressive institutions that

then became the regime's main instruments to repress opposition groups. This is followed by an

examination of the impact of the repression on the declining development of opposition groups

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[175] The regime promoted the term to contrast itself with Sukarno's regime. The regime stamped the latter as the Old Order.

from the 1970s to the 1980s. This leads to the argument that the New Order's repression prevented strong coordination between opposition groups and students by increasing the cost for opposition groups of engaging in collective action. State repression created a devastating fragmentation effect between opposition groups that, in turn, shaped their relationships with students. The result was the inability of opposition groups to forge strong coordination with students.

This study maintains that state repression is an important factor in shaping the development of opposition groups and students. This study rests on the narrative of state repression in two periods: 1967–80 and 1980–90. This study focuses on the declining relationship between the regime and "the winners" from the first to the second period. Here, the declining relationship refers to the way the New Order regime altered its friendly posture towards Sukarno's opposition. In the first period, the regime enjoyed a honeymoon period with Sukarno's opposition that assisted the regime to oust Sukarno and eliminate the PKI. This study also outlines how, during the same period, the regime planted repressive state institutions as mechanisms to nullify opposition groups. This process occurred simultaneously with the rise of the regime's economic performance. For the second period, from 1980–90, this study explains how the New Order's state repressive institutions became stronger, hunted opposition groups, and prevented their consolidation. Through sustained state repression of opposition groups, the regime continuously demonstrated the high price for those who opposed the regime. This display of repressive state power frightened the opposition groups, and they opted for less-confrontational tactics. The left started to revive its movements by incorporating students through advocacy for marginalized local communities. In contrast, some Islamic groups dived into universities to organize students, smuggling their movements in by harnessing student clubs.

Meanwhile, the nationalists experienced a deep division that limited their capacity to forge ties with students.

The Growth of State Repressive Institutions (1967–80)

Suharto's inauguration brought with it the hope of ending the chaos of Sukarno's tenure. The New Order's economic performance generated public confidence and support. After the economic hardship under Sukarno, Suharto made friendly gestures towards foreign capital. In 1967, for instance, he issued the Bill 1/1967 on Foreign Capital Investment that facilitated the influx of foreign capital to Indonesia. Moreover, the rise in oil prices also benefited the regime. From the 1970s to the early 1980s, Indonesia experienced an increase in oil price from US$ 3 a barrel to US$ 30. This increase lifted Indonesia's oil revenue at a rate of 45% between 1970–81. In 1970, oil and gas contributed only 37% to the country's GDP, but by 1981 it had soared to 82%. In the same period, the regime bolstered the rapid growth of the country's GDP at around 7-8% annually.[176] Moreover, the regime managed to raise its income per capita from US$ 250 to US$ 500 in 1970–80.[177] Using the windfall profits from the oil boom, the regime invested the money in education and health facilities. It also successfully gained the status of a self-sufficient country by providing food for its population in the early 1980s.[178]

Politically, Sukarno's opposition groups also enjoyed a brief honeymoon period in the New Order's early years. The regime saw that their contributions during the purge against the PKI between 1965 and 1967 were vital in paving the way for the rise of Suharto. Thus, in the early years, the New Order accommodated demands and complaints from Sukarno's former

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[176] Vatikiotis, 1998, pp. 34-35.
[177] Ibid., p. 35.
[178] Ibid., p. 35.

opponents. Opposition groups could voice their disagreements with the regime without being

terrified of repression. For instance, in 1967, intellectuals and students protested the high prices

of public transportation, basic commodities, and food.[179] National newspapers such as the Great

Indonesia (*Indonesia Raya*), the Indonesian Students Action Union Daily (*Harian KAMI*), and

the Indonesian Students (*Mahasiswa Indonesia*) also reported corruption cases related to the

regime's cronies.[180] Furthermore, the regime trusted the students to coordinate amongst

themselves to channel their support to the regime's development projects. Specifically, the

regime established the Coordination and Mobilization of Students Power for Development Body

(*Badan Pembina dan Pengerahan Tenaga Mahasiswa untuk Bidang Pembangunan*) in 1968.[181]

The body explicitly bestowed upon KAMI, the anti-communist student alliance, the role of

coordinator for channeling students' participation in the regime's development projects. This

initiative was a sign that the regime had interests similar to those of the students.

In the early 1970s, the regime still allowed students to criticize the lavish lifestyles of the

politicians who occupied public office and exploited their official positions for their own benefit.

Some corruption cases emerged as public issues brought up by students.[182] Responding to these

cases, Indonesian students protested against the regime's abuse of power. Students, for instance,

formed the Indonesian Students' Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia*;

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[179] Aspinall, op. cit., p. 23.
[180] Ibid.
[181] The Ministry of Education and Culture, 2018, *Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia 082a/1968* (Ministrial Decree).
[182] A widely reported case was the corruption in Pertamina, a state-owned oil company. Lieutenant General Ibnu Sutowo led Pertamina from 1968 to 1976. Under his leadership, Pertamina spent extravagantly. The problem with the spending was the majority of it was not liable. From US$ 363 million borrowed from the World Bank in 1973, only US$ 113 million was specifically allocated for specific projects. By 1976, the company also had an outstanding debt US$ 6.2 billion as a result of uncontrolled projects such as the construction of oil refinery, and fertilizers plants. See Goldstone, 1977; McCawley, 1978.

KAPPI) on January 16, 1970.[183] The front protested the rise of fuel prices, which then became

their platform for protesting corruption by the regime. In Jakarta, students gathered and formed

the Anti-Corruption Committee (*Komite Anti Korupsi*; KAK) in 1970. KAK attacked the

regime's corruption by attempting to hang anti-corruption posters near the Attorney General's

Office.[184] In 1971, students in Jakarta also launched a series of protests against the regime's plan

to build Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, a theme park in Jakarta. The students launched these

protests because the project mimicked Sukarno's wasteful monument construction projects that

had emerged during a period of economic hardship.[185] The Taman Mini protests involved KAMI

members such as HMI, PMKRI, GMNI, and GMKI, all of which had been the regime's allies

during the purge of the PKI. The regime's tolerance of student protests was growing thin but

continued until as late as 1974. A signal of this tolerance occurred when Suharto agreed to have a

dialogue at his house with student representatives from 34 universities, three days before the

Malari.[186] The students brought up several key issues, such as inequality and corruption, which

had served as the reason for a series of student protests in the early 1970s.[187] In contrast to the

students, the opposition groups set their criticisms of the regime in "reserved and respectful"

tones.[188] They believed that the regime could still fix the issues since these were problems arising

from the corrupt cliques around Suharto. The opposition groups were confident that the regime

could overcome these problems.

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[183] Boudreau, op. cit., p. 111.
[184] Boudreau, op. cit., p. 112.
[185] Boudreau, op. cit., p. 112.
[186] The Secretariat of Vice President. (n.d.). *Risalah Pertemuan Presiden dengan Dewan-Dewan Mahasiswa, Tanggal 11 Januari 1974 di Bina Graha* (Meeting Minutes).
[187] Ibid.
[188] Ibid.

Starting in the mid-1970s, however, the regime gradually shifted towards authoritarianism. The regime started and solidified repressive state institutions, including the political party fusion policy, the floating mass policy, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security Order (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Ketertiban dan Keamanan*; Kopkamtib), and the sole basis principle (*asas tunggal*). These next paragraphs elaborate on these institutions.

After winning the 1971 General Election by a landslide,[189] the regime initiated the party fusion policy in 1973. Suharto had already introduced the idea of simplifying Indonesian parties before the 1971 General Election. The regime intended to reduce the number of Indonesian political parties from nine to three. The regime forced political parties with similar ideologies to fuse and form one political party for each of the two major ideologies: Islam and nationalist-secular.[190] The result of the party fusion policy was the emergence of the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*; PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*; PDI). The PPP was a fusion of Islamic parties such as Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Moslem Party (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia*; Parmusi), PSII, and Perti. Meanwhile, the PDI was a fusion of nationalist leaning political parties and non-Islamic parties such as the PNI, Murba, IPKI, the Indonesian Christian Party (*Partai Kristen Indonesia*; Parkindo), and the Catholic Party (*Partai Katolik*). Since Golkar was Suharto's political vehicle, the policy did not apply to it. Golkar kept its status as a party that represented the regime's main

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[189] The 1971 General Election marked the first win of the regime-sponsored party Golkar. It won the election by utilizing the networks of local bureaucrats (*pamong praja*). The mobilization of *pamong praja* for supporting Golkar utilized the Ministry of Home Affairs. The bureaucrats in the ministry employed organizations such as the Corps of Functionaries of Ministry of Home Affairs (*Korps Karyawan Kementrian Dalam Negeri*; Kokarmendagri). The regime's vast networks reached to the sub-district level and the regime used them to mobilize voters to support Golkar. Liddle, 1973, pp. 291-292.

[190] Mietzner, 2018, p. 87.

supporters, such as civil servants and the military. In other words, Suharto forced parties with histories of competition to merge into one party, while Suharto built Golkar as a party with less danger of fragmentation.

The party fusion policy would not have been successful without the floating mass policy. The policy limited the influence of opposition groups in Indonesian society. Relying only on the party fusion policy might have consolidated the opposition groups instead of weakening them. Thus, the regime required another policy to ensure that the unification of opposition groups with similar ideologies would not create a unified ideological opposition with a large mass of public support. The floating mass policy served that objective.

The floating mass policy allowed for the penetration of Golkar's networks to the village level. In contrast, the policy restricted the PPP and the PDI from having party branches at or lower than the sub-district level. In the 1971 General Election, Golkar repeated its tactics to garner votes by mobilizing civil servants and the military. The regime supported Golkar by obliging civil servants and the military to vote for the party. Such a policy was known as the mono loyalty principle.[191] Utilizing the structures of the state bureaucracy and the military, Golkar ensured that it had state agents working at the village level to secure the support of the voters by employing tactics such as vote-buying and threatening the voters. The ability to rely on the state bureaucracy and the military expanded the party's network of influence at and below the sub-district level, reaching even to the village level. The mono loyalty principle limited the mobilizational capacity of PPP and the PDI. They could reach voters at the sub-district level only. During the elections, the policy harmed the opposition groups the most, since the majority

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[191] The mono loyalty principle refers to the restriction that disallowed civil servants and the military from choosing political parties other than Golkar in elections.

of the Indonesian population still lived in villages. Without the ability to mobilize the rural population, the opposition groups were not able to challenge Golkar. At the same time, by having the privilege to form networks at the village level, Golkar was able to mobilize a vast number of voters.

Another key state institution that was vital to the regime's power structure was Kopkamtib. This institution originated in the period of transition from Sukarno to Suharto. On March 11, 1966, after the failed coup, Suharto swiftly established Kopkamtib as an institution to coordinate state apparatuses in restoring order. Nevertheless, instead of being an institution that stopped only the conflict between the PKI and Islamists and the military, Kopkamtib became an institution that stoked hostility towards the PKI. In its early years, Kopkamtib cleansed PKI-affiliated civil servants and military officers from the state.[192] It also branded the PKI as the mastermind behind the failed coup, establishing its status as the enemy of Indonesians.[193] Kopkamtib also issued a vague system for screening PKI-associated Indonesians.[194] After establishing these policies, Kopkamtib coordinated arrests and mass killings across Indonesia.[195] Alongside the killings, Kopkamtib also created detention centers for PKI-affiliated people who were kept in jail for an unknown period and later sent to other prisons or killed.

In the long run, Kopkamtib became an institution that safeguarded the regime's interests. Some of its functions were significant in the suppression of opposition groups. Kopkamtib, for instance, monitored and curbed civilian dissent by Islamic groups and students.[196] Moreover, Kopkamtib had the authority to issue or not issue the publication license for newspapers. If

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[192] Kammen and Zakaria, 2012, pp. 443-444.
[193] Ibid., p. 444.
[194] Ibid., p. 444.
[195] Ibid., p. 444.
[196] Crouch, 2007, p. 223.

Kopkamtib felt that a newspaper was criticizing the regime, then the license would be difficult to

attain. Kopkamtib also participated actively in rigging elections. In the 1971 General Election,

Kopkamtib detained people who were accused of "disrupting" security and order. However, its

main function was still to suppress the potential growth of the left. Kopkamtib monitored the

potential revival of the left. It maintained its political supervision over PKI-affiliated people by

establishing categories A, B, and C for those people.[197] Kopkamtib screened PKI-affiliated

people by utilizing its vast military network. Utilizing this network, Kopkamtib coordinated its

actions with local state bureaucracies, the police, universities, and social organizations to repress

any reemergence of the left.

Another repressive state institution was the sole basis principle (*asas tunggal*). The

regime enacted this principle by first issuing the Bill 3/1975 on Political Parties and Golongan

Karya. Besides cementing the fusion of political parties, the bill also forced Indonesian political

parties to adopt the Five Principles (*Pancasila*) as the parties' ideology.[198] Although PPP

represented the Islamists and PDI symbolized the nationalists, they could not display their

ideological stance as Islam or nationalism. They had to adopt Pancasila as their official ideology.

Consequently, these political parties lost their political identities in the eyes of their supporters.

This appeared to be what the regime wanted. With all parties adopting Pancasila, there was no

clear ideological distinction between them. Therefore, voters might not distinguish voting for

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[197] As explained in Chapter 2, Category A was for those who intensively participated in PKI, Category B was for those who moderately participated in PKI, and Category C was for those who less intensively participated in PKI. Regardless of these distinctions, the three categories did not significantly affect how these people were treated since the regime discriminated against leftists as Indonesian citizens. For instance, they could hardly get jobs in the state bureaucracy or occupy public positions.

[198] Pancasila is the Indonesian state's official ideology. The Five Principles are: the belief in one God, a Just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives, and social justice for the entire Indonesian society.

PPP from voting for PDI. This meant that political ideology became irrelevant to garnering support during elections. Under this constraint, the floating mass policy gave an advantage to Golkar, as vast networks of bureaucrats and the military provided Golkar with an edge over the other parties in mobilizing voters. Supplemented by coercion and money politics, Golkar exploited Pancasila to cement its domination over the opposition groups.

Employing these four institutions, the New Order dominated general elections from 1973 to 1997. It consecutively won these elections by landslides, gaining 62.80% of the total votes (1971 General Election), 62.11% (1977), 64.34% (1982), 73.11% (1987), 68.10% (1992), and 74.51% (1997). These wins were parallel with the domination of Golkar and the military in the formation of the New Order's cabinets from 1971 to 1997. By dominating the general elections, the regime easily filled its cabinets with favored personnel. From 1971 to 1998, the military and technocrats were the backbones of the regime's power.[199] Although Golkar did not always have significant representation in the cabinets, the bureaucrats and the military treated its members as the regime's supporters, instead of as competing forces. Especially during the peak of the regime's power in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the specific representations did not matter much, as the military, technocrats, and Golkar all supported Suharto. Membership in these groups could overlap, as a technocrat or military officer could also be a Golkar member. Suharto's control over the state's repressive institutions posed a credible threat to those who might attempt to break the alliance among those three groups.[200]

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[199] See Appendix.

[200] In this way, state repression also functions to tame not only opposition groups but also defying elites. Some cases such as the exclusion of Moerdani in Suharto's 1993 cabinet affirmed another function of state repression by the regime.

The opposition groups felt the harsh impact of the rise of the state's repressive institutions in the 1970s. The repressive state institutions hampered and undermined their power to challenge the regime. The left experienced further marginalization as the regime ensured that the left would not be able to revive its organization. The regime's anti-communist propaganda, widely disseminated by Kopkamtib, prevented the left from being able to start over. In comparison to other political forces, due to past and continuing state repression, the left remained the weakest. For the Islamists, the official unification of Islamic parties impaired the Islamists as a political force. With the variety inside the house of Islam, unification was an impossible task, as exemplified by the failure of PPP to keep major social organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah together under the same roof. The inability to reach the village level, because of the floating mass policy, weakened their power even further. Despite the vast network of Islamic organizations in Indonesian society, the restriction on capitalizing on it for political purposes limited their mobilization potential. The repressive state institutions caused a similar problem for the nationalists. Forced to unify, the nationalists and non-Islamic parties had to compromise to form PDI. Besides the difficulty in compromising their ideological differences, the restriction against expanding and capitalizing on their networks limited their power greatly.

Another devastating impact of the repressive state institutions was the fragmentation within opposition groups. Since the destruction of the PKI in 1965–67, the left had not had formal representation in national politics. Both the absence of a formal political party and the desolation of its networks to social groups closed the opportunity to mobilize support. Thus, the Indonesian left was an insignificant opposition in the 1970s. After being forced to form PPP in 1973 as a representation of Islamists in the national politics, PPP experienced some heavy internal rifts that originated from state repression. When the regime issued the party fusion

policy, the potential of internal conflicts within PPP was high because of ideological and

political differences among Islamic parties. Moreover, the policy instigated the rise of two

camps: the accommodationist and the oppositionist. For instance, the rise of Jailani Naro's

leadership in 1978 sparked opposition inside PPP. Naro was a well-known accommodationist,

and his attempts to cleanse the party's radical elements and influential Islamic religious leaders,

mostly from NU, sparked controversy inside the party.[201] Another issue came when Naro's

composed the party's list for the 1982 General Election. Because the list favored the

accommodationist elements among its constituents, such as NU and Indonesian Moslems

(*Muslimin Indonesia*; MI), the oppositionists fought the list by not supporting the party's election

campaign.[202]

  A similar effect of repressive state institutions also impacted PDI. The party fusion policy

triggered the exact same rise of the accommodationist and oppositionist factions inside the party.

For instance, the regime supported Sanusi Hardjadinata and Usep Ranawidjaja to lead the party

from 1975 to 1980. Their rise to the party's leadership created a feud inside the party.[203] In one

example, Mohammad Isnaeni and Soenawar Soekawati challenged the leadership after the

election of Hardjadinata and Ranawidjaja as the party's chair and deputy chair in 1975. Although

both politicians competed in 1974–75, the regime's support for Hardjadinata and Ranawidjaja

brought Isnaeni and Soekawati together. Furthermore, ahead of the 1977 General Election,

Hardjadinata's political vision to bring unity within the party met a stumbling block as

Ranawidjaja, who had initially supported Hardjadinata's leadership, steered the party to vote for

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[201] Hakim, 1993, p. 80.
[202] Ibid., p. 83.
[203] Eklöf, 2004, pp. 64-65.

Golkar instead of PDI.[204] The result was the decline of the party member's votes from 10.1% to

8.6%.[205] The rift inside the party caused the regime to freeze the party's leadership and existing

factions in 1978. The ultimate goal of this action was to secure the 1978 People's Assembly

Session in March. The quiet did not last long since, after the People's Assembly Session, Isnaeni

and Soekawati attempted to insert their sympathizers in the local and regional party structure,

creating another feud inside the party.[206] The list of the opposition parties' internal rifts shows

that the regime's party fusion policy successfully undermined the power of the opposition

groups.

The Coordination of Opposition Groups and Students (1967–80)

In 1967–80, the coordination between opposition groups and students shows several key

trends. First, there was loose coordination between opposition groups and students in challenging

the regime in the 1970s. The repressive state institutions were successful in stifling the

development of a unified opposition against the regime and preventing the expansion of the

mobilization of students by opposition groups. Some instances affirm the weak coordination

between the students and opposition groups. The protest waves in the late 1960s and early 1970s

against the regime's corrupt practices showed that the students remained the political actors able

to initiate mass mobilizations against the regime. Their mobilizations utilized the remnants of

their networks after they assisted the regime in toppling Sukarno. Since the student mobilization

to oust Sukarno was only a few years earlier, the student mobilizations in the late 1960s and

early 1970s were still able to tap their networks. The continuous role played by KAMI in

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[204] Ibid., p. 65.
[205] Ibid., p. 65.
[206] Ibid., p. 66.

mobilizing students from the 1960s to the 1970s confirmed how the students utilized their old networks for their mobilizations. The students also gathered to form Cipayung Group (*Kelompok Cipayung*) on January 22, 1972, which consisted of student groups that coalesced under KAMI, such as HMI, GMNI, PMKRI, and GMKI.[207] After KAMI was no longer active, they formed *Kelompok Cipayung* to react against the regime's corrupt behaviors. In contrast to the students' attempts to oppose the New Order regime, formal opposition groups, such as political parties, appeared to accept the leadership of the regime. Their acceptance of the New Order's tenure was owed to the effective functioning of the regime's repressive institutions. These institutions posed credible threats to the opposition groups such that the latter had to comply with the former. The compliance of Islamic parties, non-Islamic parties, and nationalist parties to the regime's party fusion policy confirmed the setbacks of the opposition groups following their assistance in toppling Sukarno. With the Islamic and nationalist parties succumbing to the regime's repressive institutions, students had to act by relying only on their limited organizational resources.

The repression on the Islamic and nationalist parties undermined the coordination between opposition groups and students. Students were still able to press the regime. Nevertheless, without a unified and robust opposition, the students seemed able to put pressure on for only a short period and did not have the capacity to systematically draw other groups to join their movement. There are several examples that demonstrate this argument. One occurred on January 15, 1974, popularly known as the Fifteen January Catastrophe (*Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari*; Malari). On that day in Jakarta, students protested the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. The protest objected to the visit, condemning it as a sign of the

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[207] In 1976, Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*; PMII), a student organization affiliated with NU, became a member of Kelompok Cipayung.

domination of Japanese foreign capital in Indonesia. The students, however, were not the only

party that launched a protest. In central business districts such as Pasar Senen, mass protests

occurred but had different demands. These protests demanded the firing of the corrupt

president's assistants, the lowering of basic commodities prices, and the eradication of

corruption. The regime attempted to control the protests, so as not to embarrass Indonesia in

front of Tanaka. Nevertheless, the situation got out of control as the police and military could not

calm the masses. As a result, a riot occurred from January 15-16, 1974. The riot destroyed 807

Japanese-made cars and motorcycles, caused the death of 11 people, injured 300 people, and

destroyed 144 buildings.[208] These badly organized protests confirmed that the students did not

have strong coordination with other groups.

After the Malari riot, the regime saw students as a potential threat to political stability.

Thus, the Ministry of Education issued Regulation 28/1974 that aimed to control university

life.[209] The rule specifically stated that it was issued to prevent a recurrence of the Malari riot.[210]

Furthermore, the rule restricted students from rallying, marching, and engaging in other political

activities.[211] Students had to request permission from the university administration if they wanted

to have official gatherings or to travel to foreign countries.[212] This policy positioned universities

as the regime's first defense against student political activities.

The Malari incident showed that there was weak coordination between opposition groups

and students. During the incident, there were no large-scale mobilizations coordinated by major

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[208] Agustina et. al., 2014, p. 112.
[209] The Ministry of Education and Culture, 2018, *Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia 028/u/1974* (Ministrial Decree).
[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.

opposition groups such as PPP and PDI. Their absence undermined the student protest because the students relied only on their organizational capacity. They managed to field thousands of students to participate in the rally, but without strong coordination with the opposition groups, their movement was easily undermined and co-opted.[213] The presence of the mass protest in Pasar Senen showed that the students did not have the capacity to control the situation. When the mass protest got out of control, and the protestors started burning and looting in Jakarta's central business districts, the students could not control it. The regime used the riot to blame the students and as a pretext to curb student political activism.

In 1978, the coordination between opposition groups and students improved because they rallied behind the same cause: the rigged 1977 General Election. The 1977 General Election was a replay of the 1971 General Election in which the New Order regime dominated. Golkar won 62% of the total votes, followed by PPP (29.9%) and PDI (8.6%). The regime employed similar tactics in 1977, employing state bureaucrats and military officers to ensure the votes for Golkar. The regime also revamped Golkar, making it look friendly in the eyes of Indonesian Muslim voters by incorporating Islamic grassroots leaders in its ranks.[214] Golkar's domination in the general election fermented opposition groups. In 1978 the opposition groups launched a series of protests. After the election, opposition groups' figures such as Abdul Haris Nasution[215] and Ali

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[213] The riot triggered a rumor that Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the Chief of Kopkamtib was the mastermind behind the riot. After the riot, the regime fired Djojohadikusumo for his inability to prevent the riot. He became the culprit because of his rivalry with Ali Moertopo. Ali Moertopo himself was one of Suharto's confidants. He was a fierce opponent to the PRRI/PERMESTA rebellion in the 1950s of which Sumitro was one of the proponents.

[214] Liddle, 1978, p. 129.

[215] Abdul Haris Nasution was the army general who led the military operations against PKI in 1948. He was also the one who promoted the dual role of the Indonesian military (*dwifungsi*) in the military and civil life. He avoided being kidnapped by PKI on September 30, 1965. His political career stagnated when Suharto took the presidency from Sukarno since Nasution had attempted to prosecute Suharto when Suharto was a colonel in Diponegoro Regional Military Command, Central Java in 1957.

Sadikin[216] criticized the way the regime conducted the election.[217] Political parties' leaders also condemned the regime for the heavily rigged election. Students expressed their disagreement by protesting throughout Indonesia. The students launched protests in Indonesia's major cities, such as Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta. They also gathered in October 1977, releasing a statement to demand Suharto to decline his nomination for the 1977–83 presidential term. In 1978, their protest continued. One well-known incident is the occupation of the Bandung Technology Institute (*Institut Teknologi Bandung*; ITB) on February 9, 1978. The ITB students took the initiative to hold a direct election for the university student council. The students also published a white book, containing a list of the failures of the regime's development projects. The students' attempt to hold the election and criticized the regime led to the occupation of ITB. In mid-February 1978, the regime deployed the army to occupy ITB. The regime also apprehended more than 200 students related to the protests. Furthermore, the regime occupied some Indonesian universities to ensure the security of the People's Assembly Session in March 1978.

In reaction to the opposition in 1978, the regime began a familiar series of repressive actions. The regime used the protests of opposition groups and students as a pretext for solidifying its repressive institutions. After the wave of student protests calmed down, the Ministry of Education and Culture issued Regulation 156/1978 on the Normalization of Campus Life (the NKK/BKK policy).[218] The regulation contained several ways to obstruct the link between opposition groups and student movements. It dissolved the student council that represented Indonesian students at the university level, allowing a body for student

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[216] A marine, Ali Sadikin, was the governor of Jakarta in the 1966-1977 period.
[217] Liddle, op. cit., p. 135.
[218] The Ministry of Education and Culture, 2018, *Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia 0156/u/1978* (Ministrial Decree).

representation at the Fakultas and department levels only.[219] The regime also only permitted the

coordination of student activities through the Students' Activities Unit (*Unit Kegiatan*

Mahasiswa; UKM) under the supervision of the provost of the student division (*Pembantu*

Rektor Tiga). Employing strict surveillance from universities, the regime banned students'

political activities, designating universities only as a place for students to study. Consequently,

student organizations such as HMI, PMII, GMNI, GMKI, and PMKRI could not organize

political activities at Indonesian universities. They could no longer exert their organizational

power to mobilize students as they had once done in the movement against Sukarno and during

the protest movements of the early 1970s. This state policy successfully emptied universities of

political activities. Although students helped Sukarno to topple Suharto, the regime saw the

students as a potential destabilizing force in Indonesian society.

By 1978, the regime had installed all of these institutional barriers to obstruct the

Although the 1978 protest represented the potential alliance between opposition groups

and students, the protest was not sustainable because it spontaneously emerged, responding only

to the rigged election. When the regime curbed the opposition groups and students, neither group

could apply continuous political pressure. Another cause of the unsustainability of the 1978

protest was the earlier state repression in 1974. That repression had disentangled the coordination

between opposition groups and students by preventing their coordination at Indonesian

universities. Without the freedom to organize political activities inside the universities,

opposition groups could not weave robust networks with the students.

By 1978, the regime had installed all of these institutional barriers to obstruct the

mobilization of Indonesian students by opposition groups. Opposition groups could not compete

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[219] Fakultas is sometimes translated as "Faculty," but this is confusing in English because it also refers to the university teaching staff. Fakultas will be used in this dissertation. It refers to a unit that is equivalent to a college within a university, which comprises several departments.

with the regime due to the uneven playing field designed by the regime itself. Despite the presence of elections, the regime had revamped the election system to ensure the domination of the regime-backed party, Golkar. The opposition groups' outreach to students was also weak because the depoliticization policy prevented them from forging strong coordination with students. Mobilizing students became even harder when the regime issued the NKK/BKK policy in 1978, which caused more weakening of the coordination between the opposition groups and students. Contrast this situation to the previous era when opposition groups could freely mobilize students by forging organizations such as HMI, PMII, PMKRI, GMNI, and CGMI. In that earlier period, universities were an arena for opposition groups to mobilize resources and support. The New Order regime reversed that trend by undermining the opposition groups' political influence in Indonesian universities.

The Strengthening of the Authoritarian Regime (1980-1990)

In the 1980s, the regime grew stronger in comparison to the opposition groups. After the fiercely protested 1982 General Election, the regime did not stop its attack on the opposition groups. The regime continued employing state institutions to surveil and repress opposition groups. Although there was no state repression at the same level as what the Indonesian state did during 1965–67, repression in the 1980s transformed into multiple small-scale state repression. These pressures were intended to ensure regime opponents could not trigger a larger mobilization.

First, the regime utilized repressive state institutions such as Kopkamtib to maintain surveillance, so as to monitor the possibility of a revival of the Indonesian left. The regime modified its previous repression methods. For instance, the regime developed new political terms

such as "ex-political prisoners" (*eks-tahanan politik*; *eks tapol*), "unclean in itself" (tidak bersih

diri), "unclean by association" (*tidak bersih lingkungan*), "involved in G30S/PKI" (*terlibat*

dalam G30S/PKI), and "special screening" (*penelitian khusus*) as modifications of the categories

A, B, and C for ex-PKI. All the terms, however, served a common objective: to impede the rise

of the left. Each term had its own political functions.[220] The regime branded persons with the

category "ex-political prisoners" when they had gone to jail due to political reasons.[221] Often

Indonesians who got this brand were former PKI members who went to jail. "Unclean in itself"

was a political category for a person accused of having past involvement with the PKI or with

people associated with the PKI.[222] "Unclean by association" was a political category for those

who had social relations through marriage or family to a person under either of the two previous

categories.[223] "Involved in G30S/PKI" was for those who directly participated in the failed coup

on September 30, 1965.[224] By using these political terms, the regime eliminated the possibility

for the left to gain state power, as people with these labels could not enter the state bureaucracy.

In their everyday life, they also had to routinely report to the military office in their

neighborhood to ensure that they had were well-behaved and had not been involved in any leftist

organizations.

The terms, however, were flexible enough that they would be useful, not only for

repressing the left but also for undermining opposition groups, from both inside and outside the

regime's circle. For instance, the accusation of being a communist undermined Sudharmono's

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[220] Heryanto, 2006, p. 36.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid., p. 37.
[223] Ibid., p. 37.
[224] Ibid., p. 38.

nomination as Suharto's vice president after Golkar won the 1987 General Election.[225] The anti-

Sudharmono camp[226] accused him of having a history with Pesindo, the youth wing of the PKI

during the 1948 rebellion.[227] Although Sudharmono smoothly proceeded to become Suharto's

vice-president, the accusation of being "unclean" was evidence that the term was a useful tool for

political battles inside the regime. Furthermore, the terms were functional for weakening the

opposition from outside the regime. In 1988, for instance, the regime investigated three PDI

politicians in Medan, North Sumatra. The regime investigated them based on the accusations of

being "unclean by association."[228] These examples show the regime's capacity to diversify its

repression tools instead of only relying on physical state repression.

Second, the regime launched a series of crackdowns against the Islamists in the 1980s to

attack those who criticized the regime's policies. The fusion of Islamic parties in 1973 enraged

the Islamists. They complained about how the policy's allowed Islamic groups only a single

political channel (i.e., PPP) to promote their interests. The policy did not recognize the various

interests of Indonesian Islamic groups, such as the modernist and traditionalist groups. Islamic

groups saw the policy as undermining the power of the Islamists in Indonesian politics.

Moreover, in the early 1980s, the regime started raising the idea of obligating all social groups to

formally adopt *Pancasila* as their sole ideology (the *asas tunggal* policy), an extension of the

Regulation 3/1975 on Political Parties and Golongan Karya. If the regime had previously obliged

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[225] During that time, the Indonesian election system was indirect. Indonesians chose political parties in the election which then arranged who would get seats in the local and national parliaments. The national parliament voted for the president and vice president.
[226] The camp's reservation on Soedharmono's nomination was his lack of experience in war. Soedharmono had promoted more civilians, instead of the military officers, inside Golkar's party structure during his tenure as the party's chairman (1983-1988). This move hurt the military which attempted to dominate the party's structure. Ricklefs, 1981, p. 377.
[227] Heryanto, op. cit., p. 41.
[228] Heryanto, op. cit., p. 45.

all political parties to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideology in the early 1980s, the regime now

aimed to apply the policy to all social organizations in Indonesia. Islamic groups felt that doing

so would violate belief in Islam as their sole true ideology. Reacting against the policy, some

Islamic groups launched resistance actions that were harshly countered by the regime. The

Tanjung Priok massacre on September 12, 1984, exemplified state repression against Islamic

groups that resisted. The massacre happened when the military killed several hundred protestors

who demanded the release of local mosque officials held by the military.[229] Benny Murdani,

supervisor of the security on that day, claimed that only nine protestors died. He also argued that

the protestors attempted to attack a military office that was guarded by only fifteen officers.

Murdani's claim provoked protests from Islamic organizations such as the Indonesian Lay-

Preachers Corps (*Komunitas Mubaligh Indonesia*; KMI).[230] As a result, the military arrested

activists from KMI and prosecuted others due to their involvement in the protests.

Another example of state repression against the Islamists occurred in 1989, involving an

Islamic community at Cihideung, Lampung. The community started as a shelter for people who

had escaped after being imprisoned by the regime because of their opposition to the *asas tunggal*

policy. They were a part of the study circle (*usrah*) established by Abdullah Sungkar, an Islamic

leader associated with Masyumi and NII.[231] The study circle transformed into a movement,

emphasizing small group discussions to disseminate Islam as a political ideology. When the

regime began hunting the movement's participants, they escaped from their base in central Java

and took refuge in Lampung Province. In Lampung, they met with a local community that

empathized with their movement. Together, the escapees and the community established a

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[229] Budiardjo, 1986, p. 1233.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Van Bruinessen, op. cit., p. 129.

religious school in Cihideung and a village where they could implement sharia law. News of the community's activities reached the district military office of Central Lampung. The military sent its envoy, together with local bureaucrats, to inspect the community on February 6, 1989. The community reacted by unexpectedly attacking the envoy, killing one military officer. The next day, the military deployed three army platoons and one police platoon, all fully equipped with weapons and helicopters. The platoons massacred the community, taking the lives of 246 people.

Third, in the 1980s, the regime had an easy time controlling the nationalists. Before the congress of PDI in 1981, the party's leadership announced its four political stances: supporting the New Order based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; accepting the military's dual function; supporting Suharto's leadership; and supporting the regime's development programs with a corrective-constructive characteristic.[232] These four stances signaled the regime's success in repressing the nationalists. The regime's repressive strategy, however, still had an impact during the rest of the 1980s. The forced unification of the party in 1973 continued to create fragmentation in the 1980s. During the party's congress in 1981, the division between the Isnaeni-Soenawar camp and Hardjantho Sumodisastro, a former supporter of the Isnaeni-Soenawar camp, emerged. The rivalry between the two camps, however, subsided due to pressure from the regime. The result was a compromised leadership that included both camps.[233] Further, in 1986, the party experienced more devastating internal friction between the Isnaeni camp and Hardjantho, as they competed for the party's leadership. The emergence of a third camp led by Sabam Sirait and Jusuf Merukh complicated the congress further since they consulted with the regime's Director General of Social and Political Affairs Hari Soegiman to

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[232] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 69.
[233] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 70.

solve the problem.[234] Their meeting with the regime official raised tension inside the party because the congressional participants saw it as another intervention by the regime. The inability to settle the conflict forced the party's leadership to invite the regime to settle it. The 1986 congress was a weak point for the party as it was under the dominant control of the regime.

With the regime taking control of the party, the nationalists did not have time to develop its organizational power. Although the regime did not build layers of repression against the nationalists, as they did against the left, the regime's repressive institutions worked successfully to undermine the nationalists' power. From being a force that dominated Indonesian politics in the 1950s and early 1960s, the nationalists sank as an opposition force in the 1980s. With the containment of the conflict inside the party's leadership, the regime eased its control over the nationalists since the conflict did not spill over into a street protest movement as had been demonstrated by Islamic groups. Together with the left, the nationalists were among the weakest opposition groups in the 1980s.

The persistence of state repression against the left, the Islamists, and the nationalists narrowed the space for these groups to challenge the regime publicly. They had limited space to link their organizations with communities, including students. The development of coordination between opposition groups and students rested on a fundamental question: how do opposition groups build power under an authoritarian regime? Each group had a different answer to this question, depending on past state repression that they experienced. The more destructive the state repression of an opposition group, the less its capacity to coordinate with students. When state repression was low, an opposition group could coordinate better with the students.

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[234] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 74.

The Coordination of Opposition Groups and Students (1981–90)

Although the regime repressed the opposition groups, the opposition groups managed to devise some strategies to coordinate with students. First, the left attempted to recover from the heavy state repression of 1965–67 by organizing in marginalized communities and with students. It is notable, however, that the left in the 1980s was not the same political force as the left in the 1950s and early 1960s. The left in the 1980s was a new generation of opposition that grew from study clubs in the universities during the 1970s. In these study clubs, students digested leftist theories on dependency and Marxism.[235] There was no umbrella organization (i.e., political party) that could coordinate their actions nationally, stifling their efforts to forge a strong opposition against the authoritarian regime. At most, their efforts appeared only as small localized movements.

The left mobilized students in the 1980s by forming non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that advocated for marginalized communities. The regime's development projects had stimulated the growth of these organizations. In the 1980s, the regime ruthlessly planted its development projects across Indonesia. These projects were partly a result of the regime's rapid economic development in the 1970s. Before the oil boom hit its peak in the mid-1980s, Indonesia had gained a profit windfall that allowed the regime to invest in various development projects. The projects required a vast amount of land to establish factories, buildings, and infrastructures. Many local communities became the victims of the regime's development projects, as the regime evicted them from their local communities.

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[235] Aspinall, op. cit.

Evictions and state repression became the regime's main strategies in securing the required lands. Some big cases represented the regime's development ambitions. For instance, one well-known case was a land dispute in Cimacan Village, West Java. The dispute involved a peasant community versus the company PT Bandung Asri Mulia. The village head leased 30 hectares of land to the company without any consultation with the community.[236] The village head also agreed to what the peasants felt was an unjust compensation from the company, without the peasants' discretion.[237] The state apparatus intervened by deploying prominent figures, including the Minister for Home Affairs Rudini,[238] Minister Coordinator for Politics and Security Sudomo,[239] and Chairman of the National Council for Land Affairs (*Badan Pertanahan Nasional*; BPN) Sony Harsono.[240] They were present to ensure the case did not escalate into a massive confrontation between the regime and the peasants. Another case was the development of Kedung Ombo Dam, Central Java. The Indonesian Government and the World Bank financed the project. The project started in October 1985 and began flooding an area of 6,576 hectares. The regime evicted 5000 families from 37 villages and forced them to accept what they felt was unjust compensation. The state bureaucrats intimidated and threatened the peasants to accept this compensation.[241]

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[236] The village had owned the land since 1943 when the Dutch left Indonesia. According to the village chief, 287 people farmed the land, and as the chief the land was under his disposal. Such a land arrangement was common in Indonesia. Lucas, 1992, p. 86.

[237] Ibid.

[238] Before taking this position, Rudini was the chief of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command. In August 1989, his name became famous during his visit to ITB to give a speech about the Realization and Enactment of Pancasila (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*; PPPP) that ended with a violent student protest. After the protest, the regime detained 11 Students.

[239] Before occupying this position, Sudomo was the former chief of Kopkamtib. He was a central figure during the army's occupation of Indonesian universities in 1978.

[240] Lucas, op. cit., p. 86.

[241] Lucas, op. cit., p. 87.

As the regime's development projects marginalized communities, opposition groups established NGOs as their strategy to advocate for the victims and build pockets of resistance against the regime. There were different strategies among the NGOs as to how they advocated for communities.[242] First, there were NGOs that focused on building cooperation with local communities, relying on a cooperative, non-political approach with the regime and building small-group initiatives.[243] Second, some NGOs concentrated on "high-level politics-grass-roots mobilization."[244] Although this type of NGO stressed building relations with local communities, they also sought state protection for their agenda. They aimed at a "critical collaboration" with the regime. They also stressed the empowerment of the social and economic capacities of local communities. Third, the main strategy of the third type of NGO was avoiding involvement with the regime.[245] They maintained a distance from the regime and focused primarily on sparking grassroots initiatives. They were similar to the first type of Indonesian NGO in promoting the empowerment of small communities at the local level, but they were different from the first two types in that they completely avoided cooperation with the regime. Finally, the fourth type of NGO was made up of radicals that clearly stated their political opposition to the regime. They criticized the existing types of NGOs for their failure to mobilize larger support for the opposition groups.[246] The fourth type rested on leftist ideas (e.g. dependency theories, Marxism) to oppose liberal capitalist development models promoted by the regime and international agencies (e.g., the World Bank).

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[242] Eldridge, 1995.
[243] Ibid., pp. 36-37.
[244] Ibid., p. 37.
[245] Ibid., p. 38.
[246] Ibid., p. 38.

The left tended to set up radical NGOs. The heavy state repression in the past and continuous monitoring from the state forced them to keep their distance from the regime. In return, they dived into local communities, advocated for the communities' grievances, and mobilized them to oppose the regime. Some instances of the fourth type of NGOs are worth mentioning. The Indonesian Front for the Defense of Human Rights (INFIGHT) emerged in the 1980s as an NGO that advocated for human rights issues.[247] INFIGHT campaigned for the actualization of marginalized communities' social and economic rights as the main issue of their advocacy. It did not believe in the UN Charter on Human Rights, seeing it as prioritizing individual political and legal rights instead of social and economic empowerment of the masses.[248] INFIGHT was less-bureaucratized compared to more established NGOs. It also relied on open forums in making decisions instead of formal rules and meetings. INFIGHT pinpointed the repressive Indonesian state as the cause of the marginalization of local communities.[249] INFIGHT also stressed the importance of mass action as a means to liberate Indonesians from the repressive regime. This strategy often brought them in a direct confrontation with the regime. For instance, they deployed a mass protest against the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu in 1989. Soon after the protest, the military interrogated the leadership of INFIGHT for igniting the protest.[250]

The rise of the NGO Network for Forest Conservation in Indonesia (*Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia*; SKEPHI) represented another instance of radical Indonesian NGOs in the 1980s. In 1982, the Indonesian Forum for Environment (*Wahana*

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[247] Ibid., p. 105.
[248] Ibid., p. 106.
[249] Ibid., p. 106.
[250] Ibid., p. 108.

Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia; Walhi) helped to initiate the formation of SKEPHI to advocate on the forest conservation issue.[251] Over time, SKEPHI grew apart from WALHI. While Walhi was an organization that focused on environmental issues with a less political approach, SKEPHI was in opposition to such a stance. Led by a former 1978 student activist from ITB, Indro Tjahjono, SKEPHI altered its approach in 1987 from being an NGO that focused on technical issues related to forests to one that incorporated neo-Marxism as a lens to see environmental issues as a problem of social injustice.[252]

The growth of NGOs in the 1980s was a continuation of the activism of the late 1970s. Some of the leftist-radical NGOs had historical ties to the student activism of the 1970s. For instance, in the Kedung Ombo case, the initiator of the Solidarity Committee for the Victims of Kedung Ombo Project (*Komite Solidaritas Korban Pembangunan Kedung Ombo*; KSKPKO) was an organization, named the Legal Aid Study Group (*Kelompok Studi Bantuan Hukum*; KSBH) that emerged from a collective of students concerned with social issues and who prioritized empowerment instead of litigation.[253] INFIGHT and SKEPHI also grew from a similar network of ex-student activists in the 1970s. Indro Tjahjono was the one who founded the two organizations after his dissatisfaction with the non-political approach adopted by other NGOs. He was an ex-ITB student who had participated in the student protests in 1978.

Besides being initiated by students, students also actively participated in these NGOs.[254] The NKK/BKK policy forced this strategy. Because students could not arrange political activities at their universities, they sought opportunities outside of their universities. NGOs

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[251] Nomura, 2006, p. 119.
[252] Ibid., p. 120.
[253] Eldridge, op. cit., p. 119.
[254] Nomura, op. cit., p. 108.

offered an opportunity since they needed fresh blood to support their programs. Thus, in the

1980s, some Indonesian NGOs started incorporating students in their programs. In the cases

mentioned previously, the involvement of students was considerable. Students played roles as

both the initiators and the participants of the radical NGO projects. In the Kedung Ombo case,

for instance, students participated, supporting the struggle of the evicted villagers along with

activists who joined KSKPKO. For instance, they reinforced the movement against the dam

project by communicating with the villagers and politicizing their grievances. They also

organized protests to support the villagers.[255] The development of SKEPHI also involved student

activists. When they advocated for Cimacan peasants against PT Bandung Asri Mulia and the

regime, SKEPHI involved both peasants and students. In that case, the participation of students

and other NGOs reinforced the protest movement by increasing its exposure at the national

level.[256] Although the project continued, this was a sign that the left was attempting to act as a

broker for radicalizing both students and marginalized communities.

The coordination between the left and students in the 1980s, however, was weak. There

were no systematic plans to radicalize students and unify opposition groups. Some factors

contributed to this condition. First, the heavy state repression in the 1960s had undermined the

capacity of the left to escalate their opposition. The past state repression eliminated the networks

and resources that the left might otherwise have harnessed in the 1980s. The absence of these

networks and resources forced the new generation of the left to start over by building their

opposition from the ground up. Thus, although there was coordination between leftist NGOs

such as SKEPHI and students, such an effort did not occur on a massive scale. Second, the

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[255] Tempo, "Kronologi Kedung Ombo", Tempo, March 25, 1989.
[256] Bachriadi and Lucas, 2001, p. 69.

regime's capacity to clamp down on opposition groups was seen as a credible threat to the left. The regime's show of force in repressing opposition groups in the 1970s and 1980s had created fear in the opposition groups about planning a large-scale mobilization. Furthermore, the regime had formally branded the left as a restricted political force based on the State Decree 25/1966. The decree limited initiatives from the left to assemble strong opposition to the regime. Third, although students joined the left's effort to build opposition at the local level, their coordination was weak. The weakness of the left due to past heavy state repression limited coordination at the local level. Indonesian students who had already gained a reputation for forming a significant political force at the national level had to lower their status to coordinate with weak opposition.

Second, the Islamists had taken a different approach in reacting against the regime's rising coercive power in the 1980s. As the channel for Islamic political aspirations, PPP already accepted Pancasila as its ideology in the 1980s, positioning itself as conforming to the New Order. Previously, PPP had still opposed some of the regime's policies that threatened Islamic interests. For instance, in 1978, PPP opposed the idea of including native-faith (*aliran kepercayaan*) as a formal religion.[257] PPP believed that to put *aliran kepercayaan* in the same status as other formally-sanctioned religions would violate PPP's political stance.[258] After the regime accommodated PPP's demand, PPP seemed to soften towards the regime. NU and Muhammadiyah, the two biggest Islamic social organizations, opted to take a softer approach against the regime's tenure. They, for instance, accepted Pancasila as the ideology of their organizations. NU embraced it in the national congress of 1983, while Muhammadiyah signaled

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[257] During the New Order, the regime permitted only five religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism.
[258] Hakim, op. cit.

its acceptance in 1985. The stances of NU and Muhammadiyah signified the credibility of the regime's threats to opposition groups.

Although PPP, NU, and Muhammadiyah preferred to cooperate with the regime, at the grassroots level, some Islamic organizations tended to oppose the regime. The surviving NII rebellion networks chose to continue their opposition against the secular New Order regime. The regime also partly contributed to the revival of the rebellion under the flag of the Indonesian Islamic State (*Negara Islam Indonesia*; NII). The regime cultivated this organization via the creation of the Jihad Command (*Komando Jihad*). Initially, the regime employed the group as a proxy for the campaign against communism. In the early 1980s, the regime utilized it to discredit the Islamists through the initiative of Ali Moertopo, Suharto's confidant, and the designer of the New Order's intelligence. The network of the NII initiated some violent actions, such as hijacking Garuda Airlines Aircraft in 1981 and the bombing of the Buddhist temple of Borobudur in Central Java in 1985.

Other Islamic opposition groups that had ties to Masjumi chose underground activism as a means to building their power. Since the New Order continued the exclusion of Masjumi, its activists, such as Natsir, Indonesia's former prime minister, formed the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*; DDII) in 1967. The core activity of DDII centered on Islamic sermons. They utilized mosques to mobilize support. After prayers, *ulema* associated with DDII often gave sermons related not only to individuals' piety but also to the relationship between the Islamists and the regime. They often criticized the New Order, especially on its marginalizing policies towards Islamists. Although criticizing the regime, DDII never supported a violent approach for its political struggle. For instance, it participated in Petition 50 (*Petisi* 50), an informal opposition group that consisted of intellectuals and former

regime allies such as Abdul Haris Nasution and Ali Sadikin.[259] The group was a public statement

by those who lamented the way the regime managed the economy and politics. It never acted

violently in challenging the regime. Nevertheless, it could not avoid being associated with its

radical flank. For instance, it could not escape from its image as a shelter for Islamic radicals

when the regime prosecuted Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, two Islamic clerics

associated with the organization. The regime accused them of being involved with Komando

Jihad and its violent acts.

Another opposition group that had a close relationship with Indonesian students was the

Tarbiyah Movement (*Jemaah Tarbiyah*; JT). There were important contexts for the reemergence

of Islamic movements inside Indonesian universities. First, the heroic win of Iranian Islamists in

1979 invigorated Islamic groups in Indonesia to follow the same path. Although Iran represented

a different strand of Islam,[260] such a win encouraged Indonesian Islamic groups to imagine that

there was a possibility of Islamists' triumphing under a secular state. Second, the influx of

Indonesian Islamic activists and scholars who had studied in the Middle East also provided

various ideological and organizational strategies for Indonesians and served as the inspiration for

their struggles. During their time studying in the Middle East, these Islamic scholars established

contact with Muslim activists from organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in

Egypt. The success of MB in building its movement despite a long history of state repression

fascinated the activists. When the scholars came back to Indonesia, they brought MB's

organizational model and applied it to their movement. Third, as with other Islamic opposition

groups, the repressive state institutions forced some Islamic groups, including Jemaah Tarbiyah,

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[259] Machmudi, 2008, p. 87.
[260] The rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 marked the win of Shia over Sunni.

to take refuge in Indonesian universities. With no support from PPP and other major social organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, Jemaah Tarbiyah had to find other strategies to challenge the regime without directly opposing it. Indonesian universities provided shelter for Jemaah Tarbiyah to avoid state repression. Using student clubs and study groups, they hid their activities from state surveillance and repression. Fourth, Jemaah Tarbiyah found fertile soil in Indonesian universities due to the growth of a middle class that could access higher education. In the 1980s, the regime enjoyed its peak of economic development because of the windfall profit from the oil boom. As the oil boom filled the regime's coffer, it was able to provide Indonesians with access to higher education. The middle class filled universities, supplying Islamic groups with potential supporters of their organizations. These factors facilitated the rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesian universities.

Jemaah Tarbiyah's activists rose from the Indonesian Student Da'wa Institut, (*Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Indonesia*; LDMI), an HMI-affiliated group.[261] Led by its founder, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, an ITB student, Jemaah Tarbiyah started gaining influence in the late 1970s and 1980s. Rahim initiated the organization by utilizing university mosques as the base for its activities. The ideology and strategy of MB heavily influenced him in nurturing the activities of the organization.[262] His position as the secretary general of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organization (IIFSO) facilitated his having an encounter with MB activists.[263] The *usrah* system hugely influenced the way Rahim and his colleagues set up the movement structure. He absorbed the system of the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia

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[261] Damanik, 2002, p. 69.
[262] Ibid., p. 71.
[263] Ibid., p. 71.

(*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*; ABIM).[264] Not only similar in its organizational structure, but Jemaah Tarbiyah also had a similar worldview. It viewed Islam as more than a religion or community of believers. Islam represented a set of social, cultural, and political beliefs that needed to be fully implemented in everyday life as an alternative to western-liberal lifestyles.[265]

Jemaah Tarbiyah's strategy was to gradually develop a social base in Indonesian universities that could oppose the regime in the future. In this way, Jemaah Tarbiyah was different from other Islamic groups that accommodated the regime's political view, such as PPP, NU, and Muhammadiyah, as well as Islamic groups that favored direct political confrontation such as DDII. Jemaah Tarbiyah encroached upon Indonesian universities by utilizing Islamic study groups. Jemaah Tarbiyah usually entered Indonesian universities through Islamic spirituality lectures (*Rohani Keislaman*; rohis), a common extracurricular activity in Indonesian universities and schools.[266] The lectures usually took the form of small study groups of between 5 and 20 students. In a university, Jemaah Tarbiyah could divide the members into several of these small study groups. One person acted as the leader of a small study group and supervised the group's learning process. In their daily activities, the group helped the members to understand study materials, especially the first- and second-year students who had similar courses. Meanwhile, the groups regularly met to discuss issues related to the improvement of individual piety. Social and political issues, surprisingly, were not on the main menu of discussion within these groups. Focusing on individual piety helped the group to attract students

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[264] Ibid., p. 72.
[265] Ibid., p. 72.
[266] Since the NKK/BKK policy did not allow students' political activities inside Indonesian universities, the regime allowed activities related only to the development of students' intellectual capacity and their hobbies. Thus, non-political student groups were the main options for Indonesian students under the post-NKK/BKK policy. Student clubs such as study groups and religious groups were some examples of what were available to students during that time.

because it avoided the risk of being repressed by the university administration due to the restriction on conducting political activities. Furthermore, in more established universities such as ITB, Jemaah Tarbiyah expanded the organization to provide activities such as child development training, organization student cadre training, Koran reading gatherings (*pengajian*) for mothers, the provision of Islamic teachers, translation and publication of Islamic books, and religious consultations.[267]

The *usrah* system also became a base for developing a structured student movement. Besides functioning as a learning center, the study group acted as the first layer of selecting potential leaders for the movement. Within the study group, the leader of the group assessed the potential of each small group's members. The leader evaluated the members' performance and commitment related to the group task. For instance, the evaluation included the members' commitment to performing additional Islamic prayers (*sunnah*) outside of the obliged five times a day. The members earned a more positive assessment from the group leader when they added additional prayers to their routine ones. As they built a good rapport with the group leader, the members could climb the leadership ladder of the organization, including to the leadership of the organization at the university level. As Jemaah Tarbiyah members gained a higher position in the organization, they could run as a candidate for a position in student body representation at the Fakultas or university level.

Jemaah Tarbiyah's approach, rested on the improvement of individuals' piety, was appealing for Indonesian students. It swiftly gained traction among Indonesian students and traveled to other Indonesian universities. From the Da'wa Mujahid Training (*Latihan Mujahid*

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[267] Damanik, op cit., p. 74.

Dakwah) at ITB, Jemaah Tarbiyah members spread its views and strategies to other Indonesian universities, particularly public universities. Public universities in big cities such as Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Medan became fertile soil in which Jemaah Tarbiyah activists planted their networks.[268] When they aimed to establish the same organization in a different university, they did not necessarily use the name *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah*, instead of using names such as the Islamic Basic Values Learning (*Pengkajian Nilai Dasar Islam*; PNDI). Regardless of the different organizational names, the groups shared the same values and strategies. They infiltrated university mosques and harnessed them as hubs for their activities. At UGM, for instance, they took over the activities in Shalahuddin Mosque, while at the University of Indonesia (UI), they utilized Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque.[269] When they started gaining influence, they outshined other well-established Islamic student organizations such as HMI.[270]

Third, the nationalists had a hard time coordinating with students. The regime's NKK/BKK policy had been successful in driving out student political activities, including weakening the base of the nationalists inside Indonesian universities. Its student wing, GMNI, faced a major obstacle in creating networks with students. The persistent conflict inside PDI's leadership caused the inability in creating networks with students. Relentless conflicts drew the party's energy, leading to its abandoning attempts to mobilize students. An alliance between the

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[268] Damanik, op. cit., p. 83.
[269] Damanik, op. cit., p. 85.
[270] During the 1980s, HMI had declined due to the division inside the organization. Once a member of KAMI that that helped Suharto and the military to topple Suharto, in the 1980s, HMI had to decide between accepting or rejecting the sole base policy in its 1983 congress. Two camps emerged from the congress, those that accepted Pancasila, the Muslim Students Association (HMI Diponegoro; HMI Dipo) and those that rejected it, the Assembly to Save the Organization of Muslim Students Association (HMI *Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi*; HMI MPO). The division and the inability to conduct political activities inside Indonesian universities spurred the growth of less political student organization like Jemaah Tarbiyah.

party and the students was simply not possible. Although the nationalists did not experience heavy repression, such as that experienced by the left in 1965–67, the regime's repressive institutions managed to weaken it.

Fourth, the various forms and degrees of connection between opposition groups and students were impacted by state repression. The fragmentation effect of the repression loomed large. The continuous state repression divided civil society actors into NGOs with different strategies for engaging with the repressive regime. The left selected the mobilization of communities and students as its primary strategy as it avoided cooperating with the repressive regime. This strategy separated the left from other opposition groups that took a conformist approach with the regime (e.g., the non-political NGOs). The mobilization of students by the left occurred in a limited way and as part of the initiative to politicize marginalized communities and students to spark local resistance to the regime's development projects. Among the Islamists, state repression also demonstrated its fragmenting effect. The fragmentation between those that accepted the regime's reign and those that opposed it signaled the different effects of state repression. Major groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah accepted the regime's tenure, while fringe groups such as Jemaah Tarbiyah tried to build the opposition inside Indonesian universities. With a weak network and resources, Jemaah Tarbiyah could not afford a direct confrontation with the regime. Thus, starting at Indonesian universities became the logical choice for Jemaah Tarbiyah to build power. Meanwhile, the fragmenting effect of state repression heavily affected the nationalists. As its representation, PDI was paralyzed due to the state-induce internal conflict. The nationalists could not even start small initiatives to mobilize students as the left and Islamists were able to do.

Reflecting on the responses of opposition groups to state repression, the critical question is why they chose for different strategies in mobilizing students. Especially between the left and the Islamists, their different tactics reflected different strategies of social change, conditioned by state repression. As a movement, the left has usually attempted to create a movement based on workers. It believes that workers are the most marginalized class in society. The left believes that change can only occur through the hands of those who experience the most oppression in a society. Other social groups, such as students, that do not experience oppression, cannot become the agents of change. Thus, relying only on students would never be an option when trying to create change. The leftist activists who tried to revive the left as a political force in Indonesia never believed that students by themselves could challenge the authoritarian regime and bring change. Changes could happen only through the alliance of students and the marginalized class. Such a belief explains the Indonesian left's tactical selection to draw students from their universities to forge alliances with marginalized communities. State repression that targeted Indonesian universities pushed the left further from universities, impeding coordination with students.

Meanwhile, the Islamists, particularly Jemaah Tarbiyah, were heavily influenced by the experience of MB. MB projected building an Islamic society through long-term change, as opposed to Islamic radical groups that believed in rapid systemic change through force. MB's idea of change rested on Islamic preaching (*da'wa*) as a method. It targeted mosques and public places such as coffee houses as venues where da'wa could be conducted.[271] The activists also promoted social activities to help the poor.[272] MB's activism thrived in universities, positioning

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[271] Wickham, 2011, p. 206.
[272] Ibid.

students as one of the most important segments of its social base. The tactical success of MB in building a movement under a repressive regime inspired Jemaah Tarbiyah activists. MB's particular success in utilizing universities as a base for building its movement encouraged Jemaah Tarbiyah activists to apply the same tactics in Indonesia. The similarity of oppressive environments also facilitated Jemaah Tarbiyah's adoption of those tactics in the Indonesian context. These different tactical experiences determined the different paths between the left and Islamists in building coordination with Indonesian students in the 1980s.

Conclusion

The two decades of the New Order showed how the regime built and strengthened its repressive institutions to keep opposition groups weak. In the early years of the 1967–80, the regime still tolerated the opposition groups since they assisted the regime in ousting Sukarno from power. Gradually, the regime built up its repressive institutions by creating institutions that monitored and readily crushed the opposition groups. The shift towards a more authoritarian regime occurred after the Malari Riot in 1974. Both opposition groups and students became victims of the regime's repressive measures. In the late 1970s, the regime built up its repressive institutions by cutting the ties between opposition groups and students through the NKK/BKK policy.

The continuation of the regime's repressive measures in the 1980s successfully divided the opposition groups. To survive, they devised different mobilizational strategies, particularly in relation to recruiting students. The left focused on building local opposition against the regime's development projects. Although this effort rekindled the ties between the left and students, the left did not manage to build a unified opposition movement against the regime. The lack of

organizational structure and resources forced it to start from the beginning to build its movement.

Meanwhile, the Islamists managed to smuggle their movement inside Indonesian universities.

The movement avoided a direct confrontation with the regime. The demonstration of state

repression led the group to fear directly opposing the regime. The nationalists had an obstacle in

starting to build coordination with students. The internal conflict instigated by the regime's

repressive institutions closed the opportunity for the nationalists to create a strong connection

with students.

Although there were some efforts to rekindle opposition groups to the regime in the

1980s, the question is: Were their efforts sufficient to reignite the opposition? This study

contends that even though there were initiatives from the left and the Islamists to mobilize

students, they suffered some weaknesses. First, they were fringe movements. The left that

mobilized students using NGOs did not have a strong tie to the left of the 1960s. They also drew

students from universities instead of building strong bases at the universities. Such a strategy

only weakened students. Jemaah Tarbiyah's strategy to mobilize students was also a new

initiative and did not have strong coordination with PPP and other major Islamic organizations

such as NU and Muhammadiyah. The acceptance of the major Islamic forces of the regime's

tenure only affirmed the disentanglement between the major Islamic groups and Jemaah

Tarbiyah. Second, these initiatives were politically divided. There was no national-scale

organization that could become an umbrella for their struggle to organize a larger movement.

The different tactics between the left and the Islamists, for instance, showed that opposition

groups were fragmented. Due to repressive state institutions, there was not an option to build the

opposition at the national level. They had to start by organizing in the communities with which

they had the closest relationships. The left opted for organizing marginalized communities, while the Islamists selected universities as their bases.

The weakness of opposition groups in the 1970s and 1980s also showed another impact of state repression. State repression had not only eliminated important organizational resources preventing the opposition groups' ability to recover, but also fragmented opposition groups. Among NGOs, state repression created division between those that cooperated with the regime and those that opposed it. The state repression in the 1980s also successfully overcame major Islamic groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah, while at the same time forcing Islamic movements such as Jemaah Tarbiyah to take refuge in Indonesian universities. State repression even had a destructive impact on the nationalists, sending PDI reeling due to the regime-induced internal conflict. The differences in the strategies for mobilizing students between the left, the Islamists, and the nationalists caused fragmentation among Indonesian students. Students who followed the left participated in political struggles alongside marginalized communities. Students who followed Islamic groups such as Jemaah Tarbiyah participated in building social bases inside Indonesian universities. Meanwhile, the nationalists did not have an opportunity to create a meaningful connection with students due to their severe internal conflicts.

The fragmentation effect of state repression on opposition groups would continue to the student movements in the 1990s. What limited the impact of fragmentation between students in the 1980s was the absence of a competitive arena within Indonesian universities. When the regime installed such an arena in the early 1990s, the fragmentation effect would increase as students competed for power amongst themselves. The fragmentation worsened during the mobilizations before the fall of the regime in 1998 and reached its peak after the fall of Suharto on May 21, 1998. This study dedicates the next chapter to explain that process.

Chapter Four

Opposition Groups and Students During the Transition

(1990–99)

Introduction

  This chapter explains the preemption outcome. Some of the Indonesian student demands during the regime transition in 1998–99 were realized without being systematically accepted into the Indonesian state. The preemption outcome occurred due to the past state repression effect. The Indonesian state repression prevented strong coordination between opposition groups and students. Students were still able to spark massive student mobilizations, especially after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 weakened the regime. Their mobilizations were owed to the legacy of networks with weak opposition groups that had already been infiltrating Indonesian universities since the 1980s. Nevertheless, without strong coordination with opposition groups, Indonesian students witnessed only some of their demands being met, while the new regime kept students from systematically entering the state.

  This study demonstrates the trajectory to the preemption outcome by narrating several key historical events. First, this study focuses on the continuity of the trend of repression of opposition groups in the 1990s. Second, this study traces the impact of state repression on opposition groups and students before the student mobilizations in late 1997 through May 1998. This study explicates how state repression culminated in some key events that showed the weakening of opposition groups, leading to the severing of their ties to students and describes how past state repression impacted the mobilization of students. This study heavily emphasizes the fragmentation effect of state repression that weakened Indonesian student groups. Third, this

study continues tracking the fragmentation impact of state repression when students started

mobilizations in late 1997 through May 1998. This shows how the students mobilized and played

their traditional role as the initiator of protest and how doing so applied pressure to the regime

until Suharto's resignation on May 21, 1998. This study maintains that the fragmentation

persisted during that mobilization. Fourth, this chapter demonstrates the persistence of the

fragmentation after the fall of Suharto. At the same time, this study narrates how the opposition

groups left the students, leading to the preemption outcome.

State Repression in the 1990s

The regime continued its repression of opposition groups into the 1990s. Against the

nationalists, the regime launched an onslaught of repression on its main representative, the PDI.

Although in the 1980s, state repression successfully nullified the PDI, the regime maintained its

repressive stance towards the party into the 1990s. The regime sought to block the party's

potential resurgence. For instance, during the 1993 Medan PDI Congress, the regime relaxed its

security, allowing the forced entry to the congress by Group 17 (*Kelompok* 17), a splinter

group.[273] The group's presence created a deadlock in the congress, creating an opening for the

regime to intervene.[274] The regime's intervention forced the party to set up a caretaker board,

which successfully canceled the election of Soerjadi Soedirdja, a person disfavored by the

regime. The 1993 Surabaya Congress became an arena in which the regime applied a similar

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[273] The group originated from a disagreement in 1987 when a group of PDI politicians protested the party's compliance with Pancasila and failure to push the anti-corruption and anti-monopoly campaigns in the national parliament. Another triggering issue was the party's decision to scrap religious curricula from schools and the group formed to protest the authoritarian leadership of the party's handling of those issues. See Eklöf, op. cit., p. 110.

[274] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 200.

tactic of repression. During the congress, Megawati Sukarnoputri was the strongest candidate to lead the party. Threatened by her rise to the party's leadership, the regime divided the party by cultivating the regime's loyalists inside the party and intervening in the congress's procedures.[275] The result was a growing division inside the party between Sukarnoputri and Budi Hardjono, the regime's favorite.

Although the regime could not stop Sukarnoputri's rise as the party's head, it did not cease its repression of the party. In 1994, during the election of the head of PDI's East Java Chapter, the regime conspired with East Java's Governor Basofi Sudirman, who supported Latief Pudjosakti, Sukarnoputri's rival.[276] The regime also spread rumors about Sukarnoputri's association with communism to destabilize her leadership.[277] Her father's close relationship to the PKI became a bullet for the regime to delegitimize her. The regime supported the leadership of Soedirdja by sponsoring the party's Medan Congress in 1996.[278] Sukarnoputri refused to acknowledge the legality of the Congress, but the regime publicly recognized the election of Soedirdja, invoking deep conflict inside the party.

The regime's repression of the party peaked on July 27, 1996. As a response to continuous repression, Sukarnoputri gathered about 30 NGO representatives, students, and intellectuals to form the Indonesian People's Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Indonesia*; MARI) on June 26, 1996. They included members of the People's Democratic Party (*Partai Rakyat Demokratik*; PRD), a left-leaning party.[279] The coalition staged a free-speech forum that involved the members of the coalition. The forum condemned corruption and the repressive stance of the

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[275] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 211.
[276] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 231.
[277] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 234.
[278] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 258.
[279] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 263.

regime. As the forum gained popularity, it attracted more supporters. The regime feared that the

forum would create a larger opposition against the regime. To impede the coalition, the regime

slated an attack on July 27, 1996. On that day, the regime deployed a group of people, disguised

as Soedirdja's supporters, to break into the party's headquarters on Diponegoro Street in

Jakarta.[280] The group started throwing stones at the party's headquarters. The police quickly

arrived on the scene. But instead of stopping the attack, they blocked access to the headquarters.

They also requested that Sukarnoputri's supporters inside the headquarters evacuate. Before the

evacuation occurred, however, the police broke into the headquarters with the disguised

Soedirdja's supporters, attacking Sukarnoputri's supporters. In a later investigation, the National

Commission on Human Rights (*Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*; KOMNAS HAM)

revealed that 5 people died, and 16 others are still missing to this day because of the attack.[281]

The regime blamed the PDI and the MARI coalition rather than prosecuting the attackers.

Instead, the regime prosecuted 124 of the party's supporters.[282] Furthermore, the regime

prosecuted NGO activists who participated in MARI. The PRD took the heaviest hit because the

regime disbanded the party and jailed its leadership and members.[283] After that day, the

nationalists were absent from the opposition against Suharto until his final day on May 21, 1998.

Against the left, the regime never relaxed its repressive measures. In the 1990s, political

screening was still obligatory for people who wanted to become civil servants. In line with the

official state ban on Marxism, Leninism, and communism, the regime was always on the alert for

attempts to revive the left. The case of the PRD is exemplary. The party was an initiative by

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[280] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 264.
[281] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 265.
[282] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 268.
[283] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 269.

students from two established organizations: the Indonesian Students in Solidarity for Democracy (*Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi*; SMID) and the Indonesian Center for Labor Struggle (*Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia*; PPBI). Both organizations actively protested the regime in the 1990s. As a part of PRD, in 1994, SMID demanded democratization in the political, economic, and cultural fields; the freedom to establish political parties; the cancellation of the military's Dual Function; and the peaceful resolution of the East Timor problem.[284] Meanwhile, PPBI was involved in a series of protests between 1994 and 1996 that triggered repressive measures from the regime.[285] The apex of their protests was the formation of the PRD on April 15, 1996. The PRD became a political party that aspired to coordinate opposition groups to fight against the regime. The party's vision was to mobilize the marginalized class to push for democratization and realize an egalitarian social order.[286]

The regime seized on the opportunity to repress the PRD. After the July 1996 attack on the PDI's party office, the regime scapegoated the PRD. The regime accused the party of being the mastermind behind the attack. The accusation was followed by the detainment of its several top leaders.[287] Officially, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs issued the Decree 210-221/1997 on the Dissolution and Ban of the People's Democratic Party. The decree dissolved the PRD and organizations affiliated with it such as SMID, PPBI, the People's Cultural Network (*Jaringan Kesenian Rakyat*; JAKKER), the National Peasant's Association (*Serikat Tani Nasional*; STN), the Indonesian People's Association (*Serikat Rakyat Indonesia*; SRI), the Jakarta People's Association (*Serikat Rakyat Jakarta*; SRDJ), and the Solo People's Association (*Serikat Rakyat*

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[284] Aspinall, op. cit., p. 130.
[285] Ford, 2003, p. 72.
[286] Aspinall, op. cit., p. 142.
[287] Liddle and Mallarangeng, 1997, p. 170.

Solo; SRS). The decree disbanded these organizations and banned them from engaging in any

activities. The decree also specifically named the PRD as a restricted organization. Upon being

disbanded, the party's members went underground.

The New Order regime took action against the Islamists and by coopting political Islam

as a means of control. The regime saw an opportunity when Islamic students from Brawijaya

University (*Universitas Brawijaya*) and Malang's Muhammadiyah University (*Universitas

Muhammadiyah Malang*), both in Malang, East Java, came up with the idea of establishing a

symposium for Indonesian Islamic intellectuals.[288] To advertise the idea, they met with

prominent Muslim intellectuals such as Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Dawam Rahardjo. The

former was the initiator of the Indonesian Student Da'wa Institute (*Lembaga Dakwah

Mahasiswa Indonesia*; LDMI), and the latter was a prominent Muslim scholar. Through their

introductions, the students had the rare opportunity to meet with B.J. Habibie, Minister of

Research and Technology and Chair of the Research and Technology Implementation Board

(*Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi*; BPPT). Habibie brought the symposium idea to

Suharto, who was surprisingly supportive. The symposium led to the establishment of the

Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*; ICMI)

in 1990. The establishment of ICMI signaled the regime's corporatist strategy to control

Islamists.[289] After its formation, the regime gained influence over ICMI by installing its

representatives. For instance, ICMI was occupied by Vice-President General (ret.) Try Sutrisno;

former Vice-President Lieutenant (ret.) Sudharmono; the former PSI leader, Professor Sumitro

Djojohadikusumo; Minister of State and Head of the National Development Planning Board

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[288] For a detailed chronology of the formation of ICMI see Hefner, 1993, pp. 16-18.
[289] Liddle, 1996, p. 6

Ginanjar Kartasasmita, and former Army Chief of Staff and Minister of Home Affairs General

(ret.) Rudini.[290] None of them had been aligned with Islamists in the past. The regime also

brought in Amien Rais, the head of Muhammadiyah, and some of NU's key figures, although not

the head of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid.[291] Representation from the three political parties, Golkar,

PDI, and PPP, was also present in ICMI.[292] Initiated by students and Indonesian Muslim scholars

to be the voice of Islamists in the regime, ICMI turned out to be another regime strategy to

control political Islam.[293]

      The repression of Islamic groups through ICMI strengthened the fragmentation among

the Islamists. The fragmentation continued in the division between Muhammadiyah and NU, the

advocates of modernist and traditionalist Islamists, respectively. In its early years, ICMI

attempted to control both groups by absorbing them into ICMI's structure. Nevertheless, as ICMI

developed, tensions grew inside the organization. For instance, as a result of NU's decision to

withdraw from ICMI, Muhammadiyah accused NU of being undemocratic and maintaining the

division between Indonesian Islamists.[294] Meanwhile, the head of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid,

criticized Muhammadiyah for selling out the organization to support the New Order regime.[295]

      The regime's intervention inside PPP was still a popular repression tactic in the 1990s.

For instance, during the division between the accommodationists and rejectionists at the party's

congress in 1994. Accommodationists supported the close relationship between the regime and

PPP while rejectionists wanted the party to take a critical stance against it. Two Islamic

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[290] Ibid., p. 613.
[291] Ibid., p. 614.
[292] Ibid., p. 614.
[293] Ibid., p. 15.
[294] Kadir, 1999, p. 28.
[295] Ibid.

organizations inside PPP found themselves internally divided between these two groups: the

Indonesian Muslims (*Muslimin Indonesia*; MI) and Nahdlatul Ulama.[296] Inside MI, this division

took the shape of a conflict between those who supported the tenure of PPP's chairman Ismail

Hasan Metarum and those who opposed him. Metarum was close to the regime and supported by

the accommodationists, which triggered the opposition against him by the rejectionists.

Meanwhile, within NU, the division was between the accommodationists who believed NU must

aim for PPP's leadership and the rejectionists who wanted NU to stay away from politics inside

the party. Mathori Abdul Jalil, PPP's secretary-general, led the accommodationist camp while

Communication Forum of the Young Generation of Nahdlatul Ulama (*Forum Komunikasi*

Generasi Muda Nahdlatul Ulama; FKGMNU) represented the rejectionist camp. This division

originated in NU's decision at the organization's congress in 1984, called the Return to Khittah

1926 (*Kembali ke Khittah* 1926). In 1984, NU decided to restore the organization to its original

purpose as a social organization, rather than as a political organization. The regime's repression

influenced this decision because being forced to join PPP had undermined NU's power.

Returning to its original 1926 charter (*kembali ke khittah* 1926) emerged as a central issue within

NU at the 1994 PPP congress, as some NU members did not want to compete for PPP's

leadership. For them, mostly inspired by Wahid's oppositionist stance, PPP already exemplified

the regime's control over Indonesian Islam. The 1994 PPP congress represented the regime's

continuous repression of Islamists. The repression that divided the party undermined the capacity

of the party to coordinate with students, especially as the party's elites concentrated their

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[296] Mujani, 1994, p. 184.

attention on solving the division in the party. The party's inability to coordinate with students continued until the fall of Suharto in May 1998.

To summarize, state repression in the 1980s continued into the 1990s. Coercing and dividing opposition groups remained the regime's repertoires in the 1990s. These tactics debilitated the opposition's capacity to organize themselves. State repression also limited the opposition's ability to develop their organizational power. Coordination with other groups, including students, was minimal, as attempts to build networks often faced state repression. Thus, with no networks for mediation, there was no strong shared vision or pooling of resources between opposition groups and students. State repression of the PDI and the PRD affirmed the regime's intention to block all efforts to connect and strengthen coordination between opposition groups and students. Under these conditions, students relied only on their weak ties to fringe opposition groups like Jemaah Tarbiyah and the leftist activists.

The Coordination between Opposition Groups and Students (1990–97)

Suffering from a lack of coordination with major opposition groups, Indonesian students could only rely on their ties to the growing coordination initiated by fringe opposition groups. Starting in the 1980s, two fringe groups were able to coordinate with students, although they applied different strategies (these are outlined in Chapter Three). The left mobilized students by forming leftist NGOs. They drew students from universities to forge connections with peasants and workers. Meanwhile, Islamic groups, especially Jemaah Tarbiyah, infiltrated Indonesian universities by using student clubs as their cover. The nationalists did not manage to build similar ties since the regime had incapacitated the PDI as the representative of nationalist organizations. Thus, only small groups of leftist and Muslim students had close relationships

with student mobilizations in the 1990s. This coordination was the seed of the student

mobilizations during the regime transition.

Table 2. The Evolution of the Structure of Student Senate

Level	1966-1978	1978-1989	1990-1998
University	The Students' Council (*Dewan Mahasiswa*; Dema)	-	The University Student Senate (*Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi*; SMPT)
Fakultas	The Fakultas Student Senate (*Senat Mahasiswa Fakultas*; SMF)	The Fakultas Student Senate	The Fakultas Student Senate
Department	The Department Student Senate (*Senat Mahasiswa Jurusan*; SMJ)	The Department Student Senate	The Department Student Senate

In 1990, the fringe opposition groups had an opportunity to intensify the mobilization and

politicization of Indonesian students. That year, the Ministry of Education and Culture issued the

Decree 0457/1990 on the General Guidance for Student Organizations. Through the decree, the

regime strengthened its grip on universities. For instance, the decree positioned student

organizations under the office of the rectorate, which meant they answered to an official in the

university administration. Consequently, every student activity had to be agreed by the rectorate.

Although the decree limited access to space for student mobilizations, it did allow for the

reemergence of a university-level student organization. The decree allowed for the representation

of students at the university level, called the University Student Senate (*Senat Mahasiswa*

Perguruan Tinggi; SMPT). Each senate consisted of the heads of the Fakultas Student Senate in

a university. Students elected a leader of the University Student Senate, called the Head (*Ketua*).

The existence of this leadership position implied that Indonesian students had formal leadership

in their university and a leadership over a large number of students. To be able to have

representatives at the school and university levels, students had to decide amongst themselves who would represent them. The students introduced elections as the mechanism to select the leadership at the Fakultas and university levels. This system was similar to the Students' Councils (*Dewan Mahasiswa*; Dema) before the regime abolished them by issuing the NKK/BKK policy in 1978. Through elections, the politicization of Indonesian students intensified during the 1990s.

While this representation consisted of only a group of the Fakultas Student Senate leaders, the re-installment of this student senate leadership was an improvement in comparison to the 1978–89 period. During 1978–89, there was no student representation at the university level because the NKK/BKK policy eliminated the Students' Council. During 1978–89, the regime banned all student associations, except for those related to extracurricular activities. The regime also cut off the presence of political student movement organizations inside universities. Student movement organizations such as HMI, PMII, PMKRI, GMNI, and PMKRI were not present at university from 1978–79. Meanwhile, in comparison to the Student Council (the 1966–78 period), the University Student Senate had a lower degree of freedom. During 1966-78, students were particularly politically active, which led to the heightened presence of political student movement organizations at universities. The Student Council did not have to ask permission from the university for their activities. In 1966-1978, this led to a battle at the universities as all of the groups tried to recruit student supporters.

The election of student representatives at the school and university levels opened up an opportunity for opposition groups to gain influence at Indonesian universities. The elections benefited various groups. At the public universities such as the University of Indonesia and IKIP Jakarta, the student senates were dominated by Islamic groups, especially Jemaah Tarbiyah. Due

to the long-term absence of *Kelompok Cipayung,* Jemaah Tarbiyah did not face significant

challenges in the Indonesian universities. At the University of Indonesia, starting with the

reintroduction of the Student Senate elections in 1993 until 1997, students associated with

Jemaah Tarbiyah consistently won the leadership. This domination of students connected to

Jemaah Tarbiyah in the Student Senate elections was owed to the networks that were built by

Jemaah Tarbiyah in the 1980s. After the Ministry of Education's 1990 Decree, Jemaah Tarbiyah

was the group most ready and able to compete in the new system, since it had already built

strong networks with students. Furthermore, the weakness of UI's leftist students contributed to

the persistent tenure of Jemaah Tarbiyah-associated students at UI. Just like Jemaah Tarbiyah

student members, leftist students at UI leftist initiated study groups, such as the Freedom Vehicle

(*Wahana Pembebasan*), in the early 1990s. However, the leftist students could not match the

performance of the Jemaah Tarbiyah students in the University Student Senate elections. On the

ineffectiveness of the leftist students, Robertus Robet, a student activist associated with leftist

students, reasoned:

> Why did we lose in the Student Senate election? First, these independent groups and
>
> study groups did not have enough supporters like them [Jemaah Tarbiyah], right? And,
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> during that time, the study groups were too exclusive. Second, they [leftist students] did
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> not have a discipline level like Rohis[297] students. Third, from a tactical point of view to
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> win an election, we were also too naïve.[298]

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[297] *Rohis* and *musholla* (mosque) students are used interchangeably with Jemaah Tarbiyah students. They refer here to the same students who were associated with Jemaah Tarbiyah.

[298] Robertus Robet, personal interview in Jakarta, July 16, 2018.

The lack of support from other students was a consistent problem for the leftist students since the leftist students relied only on study groups as a strategy to garner supporters. Relying on study groups alone was problematic since, as an informal organization, study groups did not have the capacity to accommodate a large number of students. Also, the leftist students lacked structure in comparison to the Jemaah Tarbiyah students, who were able to easily coordinate a large number of students in a university. As explained in Chapter Three, they assembled small study groups in each Fakultas to gain potential members and held weekly meetings to discuss issues related to Islamic beliefs and rites. This system gradually built discipline into their movement's structure. Lastly, the leftist students were particularly naïve, which prevented them from winning the Student Senate elections. On the naivety of leftist students, Robet said, "*Rohis* students, they put people inside our team [to gather intelligence]…we were more open, in politics we thought we needed to hold on ethics in our propaganda in front of the public. We did not know that there were such political tactics."[299] Because of these tactical differences, Jemaah Tarbiyah thrived in the Student Senate elections in the 1990s, where the leftists failed.

A similar pattern occurred at IKIP Jakarta. Islamic groups, particularly Jemaah Tarbiyah, won the University Student Senate elections from 1996 to 1998. Previously, HMI MPO had dominated the University Student Senate elections from 1991 to 1994. The rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah at IKIP Jakarta rode the wave of Islamic groups entering Indonesian universities in the 1980s. As explained in Chapter Three, Jemaah Tarbiyah was not the only group that attempted to infiltrate Indonesian universities. The other prominent group was HMI MPO, a splinter group of HMI. The regime's repression, as well as the obligation for social groups to embrace *Pancasila*,

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[299] Ibid.

divided HMI into HMI Dipo and HMI MPO. Of the two, HMI MPO rejected Pancasila and maintained Islamic principles as its organization's ideology. In the early 1990s, HMI MPO was dominant in the Student Senate elections by utilizing its networks of small study groups at At-Taqwah Mosque, Rawamangun, East Jakarta. At-Taqwah Mosque was a popular place for various Islamic groups to gather, including the activists who formed Jemaah Tarbiyah. HMI MPO also strategically exploited the negative public sentiment against the regime. Regarding HMI MPO's political position and how the organization built its organization, Ubedillah Badrun from HMI MPO said:

> During that time [1991-1995], the critical voices gathered inside HMI MPO because all groups were controlled by the regime through the Law on Mass Organizations[300]…the critical group that attempted to be different was HMI MPO. The group was not sponsored by the government. [HMI MPO] trained students to take a critical stance to oppose [the regime]. Thus, the spirit to fight and leadership of the group grew strong inside the group at that time.[301]

The imposition of Pancasila as the obligatory ideology for all social groups provoked opposition groups. HMI MPO exploited these grievances to attract students to join and support the organization in the Student Senate elections.

After its early wins, HMI MPO grew weaker, opening the opportunity for Jemaah Tarbiyah to take over the leadership of IKIP Jakarta's Student Senate. Jemaah Tarbiyah student

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[300] The law was issued in 1985 to force all social organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideology.
[301] Ubedillah Badrun, personal interview in Jakarta, January 18, 2019.

activists exploited the weakening of HMI MPO to expand its organization by attracting new students. Although HMI MPO students were well-versed in critical social and political discourses, they were not popular with students who saw themselves as apolitical. Jemaah Tarbiyah's attracted these apolitical students by relying on apolitical Islamic content, which they found appealing. Henri Basel, a Jemaah Tarbiyah student activist, compared his organization with external student organizations (*ekstra kampus*)[302] such as HMI MPO:

> We were different from students affiliated to extra university student organizations. These students were superior in their knowledge, and they were also more critical, while people like me were not too critical…We, however, were more accepted by other students since, at that time, the situation was apolitical. Students who were too political tended to be shunned by other students because students did not like the way they talked and being too critical.[303]

The lack of a systematic network of students undermined HMI MPO's performance during the Student Senate elections since the elections had applied a one-student-one-vote system since 1996. Henri Basel, a Jemaah Tarbiyah activist, assessed the rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah at IKIP Jakarta, made possible by the weakening of HMI MPO:

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[302] External university student groups (*ekstra kampus*) refers to student organizations in Kelompok Cipayung. They are "external" because the NKK/BKK policy disallowed them to exist in Indonesian universities. The opposite of *ekstra kampus* is internal university student groups (*intra kampus*). This category usually refers to student groups such as extra curricula activities and formal organizations such as SMPT at its various level (i.e. university, fakultas, department).

[303] Henri Basel, personal interview in Jakarta, January 25, 2019.

…because of the lack of cadre, militant voters. The Tarbiyah students, they organized students through mentoring…When we already had 1000 students, they [HMI MPO] only had a few supporters. That definitely caused their loss. These 1000 Tarbiyah students also asked other students [to vote]…They [HMI MPO] were not elected, not because they were stupid. They were great at talking, but they just did not have enough supporters. That was a simple problem… if they [HMI MPO] were so active in discussions, but when they had to work, they were not that good. Their rhetoric was so appealing, but they did not have the mass. They participated in the elections, but they still lost. They [HMI MPO] often complained, "I lost. Even if *musholah* and Tarbiyah students endorse a bottle as their candidate, they definitely will still win."[304]

In contrast, Jemaah Tarbiyah aggressively expanded its social base by establishing networks across different Fakultas and recruiting more cadres. Jemaah Tarbiyah student activists started their recruitment by approaching new students. Jemaah Tarbiyah did not just concentrate their efforts on leaders in the different Fakultas but made sure to reach out to individual students who had not yet joined the study groups. When the activists approached new students, they invited them to join activities such as Koran reading groups and Islamic preaching, which were more appealing to apolitical students. Through this strategy, Jemaah Tarbiyah rose as an influential student group at IKIP Jakarta. Agus Sunaryanto, a student activist from IKIP Jakarta, discussed the method by which Jemaah Tarbiyah recruited students into the organization:

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[304] Ibid.

When I was in my department's Student Senate, the Student Senate was already controlled by KAMMI[305] students. Then, I was asked to join a Koran reading group. Usually, after a session of the group, they preached to us. Because I was a new student, I did not know I was led to that kind of path. I was just happy about it. I knew that even they selected students who were in my cohort to join the organization. Later, students who were deemed pious were promoted to manage KAMMI.[306]

Despite their small numbers, leftist students became an important student group at IKIP Jakarta. In the early 1990s, leftist students gathered in the university's student press organization, Didactic (*Didaktika*). Students gathered in *Didaktika* were often described as "radicals and progressive."[307] *Didaktika* politicized students through training and activities that introduced new students to contemporary social and political discourses and practices. These practices aimed to evoke students' "critical consciousness" (*kesadaran kritis*).[308] They exposed students to cases that demonstrated the viciousness of the New Order regime. As a student activist, Yana Supriatna told a story of how he was involved in such cases and how *Didaktika* became a hub for students to become exposed to current political situations:

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[305] The Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*; KAMMI) was the national student organization, established on March 29, 1998. Jemaah Tarbiyah students were behind the rise of this organization. "KAMMI" is used interchangeably with Jemaah Tarbiyah, rohis, and musholla, as they all represent networks of different organizations, but are centered on Jemaah Tarbiyah.

[306] Agus Sunaryanto, personal interview in Jakarta, February 4, 2019.

[307] Yatna Supriatna, personal interview in Jakarta, January 11, 2019.

[308] Bejo Untung, personal interview in Jakarta, January 8, 2019.

All students consolidated in Jakarta to reject the repression on mass media, which was

TEMPO.[309] We requested Gunawan Muhammad[310] to come to Didaktika. At that time,

Gunawan Muhammad could not get his voice heard because his media [TEMPO] had

been banned. Harmoko [the minister of information] controlled all mass media, and we

asked Gunawan Muhammad to tell the story behind the ban. Many students from Jakarta

came to IKIP Jakarta just to watch him.[311]

Although *Didaktika* gathered students who were critical of the regime, the number of

Didaktika students were not a match for Jemaah Tarbiyah. As a student press organization,

Didaktika was limited to the student member of the press and those who were interested in the

press and struggle to gain a large social base beyond what was directly related to the press. It did

not have a structured organization that could rival Jemaah Tarbiyah's organizational power to

compete in the Student Senate elections. As a student press organization, it did not have

networks in the Fakultas to garner student supports as the organization only existed at the

university level. Meanwhile, Jemaah Tarbiyah had their networks and small study groups at the

Fakultas level, which were able to mobilize support from students. Another issue with example

support was that within *Didaktika,* a division existed between those who believed a student press

should focus purely on journalistic matters and those who demanded *Didaktika* be a political

press. Adnan Topan Husodo, a student activist from Didaktika, labeled the first group as "the

professional press" and the second group as "the movement press."[312] The first camp believed

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[309] The regime banned TEMPO in 1994, along with two other national newspapers, *Detik* and *Editor*, for being too critical of the regime.
[310] In 1994, Gunawan Muhammad was a chief editor of TEMPO
[311] Yatna Supriatna, op. cit.
[312] Adnan Topan Husodo, personal interview in Jakarta, January 24, 2019.

Didaktika should only report hard news and make decisions based on journalistic principles. In

contrast, the second camp hoped *Didaktika* could assist the opposition groups against the

authoritarian regime. This division, coupled with *Didaktika*'s limited organizational capacity,

enabled the rising influence of Jemaah Tarbiyah at IKIP Jakarta.

At other Indonesian universities, there were fewer notable instances of student groups

connecting to opposition groups when compared to what occurred at the University of Indonesia

and IKIP Jakarta. Although the regime allowed the student representation senate system, political

competition between the student groups seemed to be absent at private universities. For instance,

at Trisakti University in the early to mid-1990s, the coordination between students and

opposition groups was relatively weak. Due to the NKK/BKK policy, *Kelompok Cipayung* could

not infiltrate private universities such as Trisakti University. Also missing from Trisakti was

Jemaah Tarbiyah, as Jemaah Tarbiyah was concentrating on expanding its networks in public

universities. The left faced particular hurdles trying to make inroads at Trisakti due to the

perceived incompatibility between Trisakti students' middle-class backgrounds and leftist

discourses. Usman Hamid, a student activist from Trisakti, said that the students at Trisakti felt it

was better to "lower the price of car rims than basic commodity prices."[313] Although there were

the Student Senate Elections, the mobilization of students based on affiliations with opposition

groups was non-existent. A similar pattern occurred at Moestopo University (*Universitas

Moestopo*), located in South Jakarta. The students there safeguarded the university from

intrusions by the members of *Kelompok Cipayung*. The students observed that the presence of

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[313] Usman Hamid, personal interview in Jakarta, May 22, 2018.

Kelompok Cipayung was creating fragmentation among students based on their religion. According to Wendy Putranto, a student activist from Moestopo University:

> From HMI, GMKI, and PMKRI, even if students had affiliations to these organizations outside the campus, they could not bring [their affiliated organization] inside the campus… we asked them to take off their religious identities and ethnic group affiliations. Moestopo did not allow those who wanted to bring religious jargon into the campus.[314]

Although *rohis*, the student clubs affiliated with Jemaah Tarbiyah students, existed as a curricular activity for Muslim students, the secular students limited the activities by rohis-affiliated students. They were trying to prevent the Jemaah Tarbiyah student from developing into an influential student group, as had occurred at the University of Indonesia and IKIP Jakarta. According to Putranto, they "cannot enter because we already amputated them since the beginning."[315] On how the secular students prevented the influence of *Kelompok Cipayung,* Putranto said:

> …the heads of the Student Senate were controlled by them [secular students]. They controlled the leadership at the Fakultas of Dentistry and the Fakultas of Economics. So, all the leaderships were under their leadership. Student political organizations [ekstra kampus] such as HMI that wanted to open a branch were cleaned (*dibersihkan*).[316]

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[314] Wendy Putranto, personal interview in Jakarta, November 21, 2018.
[315] Ibid.
[316] Ibid.

Things went differently at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, where *Kelompok Cipayung* gained influence. HMI, a member of *Kelompok Cipayung*, dominated the Student Senate Elections from 1990 to 2001.[317] HMI consistently won the elections by defeating its biggest rival, another member of *Kelompok Cipayung*, PMII. Although the two organizations competed in the elections, both were Islamic-leaning student groups. Both organizations shared a similar traditionalist interpretation of political Islam as compared to the interpretation of modernist groups like, for instance, the Muhammadiyah Student Association (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah*; IMM). Despite the presence of both traditionalists and modernist groups, because the IMM was such a small group, fragmentation did not develop among the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah students.

Social divisions, based on which Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) students had attended, had the potential to fragment IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah's students. Historically, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah's students came from different *pesantren*. Among students who came from different *pesantren*, there were rivalries. According to Ferry Muhlis, a student activist from IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah:

> The competition was between the *pesantren* alumni, and, during that time, there were only two camps of *pesantren* that were influential: Gontor and Gintung. *Pesantren,* such as *Darussalam,* was from Gontor Ponorogo, East Java Province, while *Daar El-Qolam* was from Gintung, Banten Province.[318]

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[317] Ahmad Muhibbuddin, personal interview in Jakarta, October 7, 2018.
[318] Ferry Muhlis, personal interview in South Tangerang, January 31, 2019.

Both boarding schools were modern in the sense that they provided not only an Islamic religious education but also a secular curriculum such as natural sciences. Their alumni enrolled at IAIN and competed for positions in student organizations (for example, head of the HMI chapter), the opportunity to give public speeches, and to publish their writings in national newspapers. The introduction of the Islamic High Schools Special Program (*Madrasah Aliyah Program Khusus*; MAPK) in 1987 added to the competition between student organizations at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah.[319] Branded as "distinguished students," the graduates of MAPK utilized their school history to mobilize other students to vote for a candidate from the same program. Muhlis witnessed the influence of MAPK students:

> They were MAPK students from all over Indonesia. They established the Association of the Special Program Madrasah Aliyah (*Ikatan Madrasah Aliyah Program Khusus*; Ikamasus), becoming the third force in the campus…even though their ties were not like other students from *pesantren*, they had enough seeing the political competition on the campus was dominated only by *Gontor* and *Gintung*. Then, the third force [MAPK students] infiltrated many organizations such as HMI and PMII.[320]

The variety of students' social backgrounds provided a fertile ground for the rivalry between students, but the differences turned out not to be strong enough to do so. Although there was a competition between students from these *pesantren*, it did not cause significant divisions.

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[319] The regime initiated the program by issuing the Minister of Religious Affairs' Decree 73/1987. The program aimed to produce a new generation of Muslim intellectuals capable of performing state bureaucratic functions, especially under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
[320] Ferry Muhlis, op. cit.

Certain factors led to only weak fragmentation between the students. First, the students' political alliances were not exclusively determined by the *pesantren* they had attended. For example, students from both *Darussalam* and *Daar El-Qolam* might join HMI, while MAPK students might join any one of various different student organizations. Second, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah had a lot of study groups, the most well-known being the Forum of Ciputat's Students (*Forum Mahasiswa Ciputat*; Formaci) and the Action Study Circle for Democracy (*Lingkar Studi Aksi untuk Demokrasi*; LSADI), where students from different backgrounds could intermingle and strengthen ties. These organizations enriched social associations at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and provided an arena for students to interact and adapt themselves to differences. Although students' various social backgrounds may have led to divisions, their study group identity could unite them. Third, the students' familiarity with Islamic values and practices through student groups meant that many of them shared those values, giving them a common set of values to temper other differences.

Fragmenting Frames

Whether there was division or unity within Indonesian universities reflected the efforts of state repression. In the past, state repression had not only incapacitated the left but also left an impression in the public's memory of the left as a restricted political ideology represented by restricted organizations. Through state repressive institutions such as Kopkamtib, the regime preserved the hostility towards the leftist opposition groups and students. State repression divided not only opposition groups but also the students at some universities. The narratives of rivalries among Indonesian students resonated with state repression of the past.

Student Senate elections are the best site for excavating the impact of state repression on opposition groups, which in turn provoked fragmentation among students. In these elections, students employed fragmenting frames that echoed social divisions promoted by the regime. Fragmenting frames are contesting schemata of interpretation that divide a movement.[321] Within the Indonesian student movement, these frames took advantage of anti-communist stigma and stigmas about religions. Both were rooted in Indonesian state repression, which worked not only to crush opponents but also created social stigmas framing the repressed groups as common enemies. These stigmas became fragmenting frames when political actors exploited them as part of their rivalry with other actors. That these frames were then adopted as part of the rivalries between student groups confirms the impact of state repression beyond its destruction of the opposition groups.

At the University of Indonesia, the Student Senate elections were an arena in which fragmenting frames were prevalent. For instance, during the Student Senate elections, leftist students were often labeled "Communists" by Jemaah Tarbiyah students. The Communist label was used interchangeably with the word "leftist." These terms circulated through the dissemination of flyers to students, fueling hostility towards leftist students. According to Robet, a student activist:

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[321] Activists in a social movement produces frames to guide their actions and define their targets. The production of the frames is not always harmonious since a social movement may produce contesting frames that in turn could undermine the movement. See, for instance, Benford, 1993.

Yes, but we [leftist students] were more militant in advocating our concerns. We were always better in that kind of activism. Consequently, we were not perceived as merely a political movement, but leftist, communist.[322]

At the same time, leftist students framed Jemaah Tarbiyah students as religious fanatics. According to Robet, religion "would not solve problems in Indonesian politics. That is, that is our view that religion tends to make the real problem look vague."[323]

An example of this stigmatizing occurred when a coalition between leftist students and HMI won the 1997 election for the Head of Student Senate in the Fakultas of Social and Political Science (*Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*). Elfansuri Chairah, an HMI student activist who ran as the candidate from the coalition, explained how Jemaah-Tarbiyah affiliated students framed the coalition:

They often blamed leftist students and other students who loved playing music. When there was an event, they [Jemaah Tarbiyah students] accused it as an event that led to drunk culture and promiscuity. They judged us for anything. I thought this kind of attitude was silly. They already crossed the line…I was focused on beating them in the election…When I was running [in the election], I had to face a black campaign such as "Pakcik [Chairah's nickname] is a leftist, supported by the cafeteria[324] and Christian students."[325]

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[322] Robertus Robet, op. cit.
[323] Robertus Robet, op. cit.
[324] Cafetaria students (*anak kantin* or *anak kafe*) refers to mostly apolitical students who were often absent from voting in the Student Senate Elections.
[325] Elfansuri Chairah, personal interview in Jakarta, October 18, 2018.

Meanwhile, according to Rival Ahmad, a student activist from the Fakultas of Law, when the coalition beat a Jemaah Tarbiyah-supported candidate, the coalition students celebrated the victory as a symbol of the fall of "God's kingdom."[326] The coalition also branded Jemaah Tarbiyah students as abusers of power. Chairah told a story about what motivated him to run in the Fakultas Student Senate Election in 1997:

> When we made a new mosque, they [Jemaah Tarbiyah students] still prayed in the Student Senate Office. As an official of the student senate, I said, "why are you praying here?" "Just Go!"...I said, "why are you praying here while you already have a new mosque." "This office is also for other students to do their activities, some students here are Christians and others"…I felt that they already crossed the line…then you could see how abusive they were in using their power in the student senate. They started limiting activities from other students, especially from leftist students. So, people who they branded as leftists, who they did not like, were limited in organizing student events. For instance, the leftist students could not make an event at the Gazebo.[327]

A similar division occurred at IKIP Jakarta. Jemaah Tarbiyah students tended to frame students affiliated with *Didaktika* as "leftist." In the 1990s, this frame emerged during the Student Senate elections to undermine the candidates who posed a critical stance, such as students from leftist groups. The leftist frame often went hand-in-hand with the "red" stigma, a

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[326] Rival Ahmad, personal interview in Jakarta, October 30, 2018.
[327] Elfansuri Chairah, op. cit.

color associated with the PKI. For instance, in one contentious meeting with the rectorate, the official from the rectorate called a student activist a "PKI."[328] Jemaah Tarbiyah students framed leftist students as people who were rude and had arrogant attitudes. Basel said:

> There was this image that they were rude people and arrogant. Women did not like them because of that. While we [Jemaah Tarbiyah students] were more polite as we learned from Ubed [Ubedillah Badrun], so we just followed his example…they felt that they were great and did not want to compromise things; hence they often lost [to Jemaah Tarbiyah].[329]

Meanwhile, leftist students resented Jemaah Tarbiyah students, who they saw as promoting dangerous stigmas and stereotypes. Ade Irawan, a student activist and member of *Didaktika,* explained that Jemaah Tarbiyah students "easily accuse people as infidels, stamping people as communists."[330] Jemaah Tarbiyah students were often depicted as not having a comprehensive understanding of Islam since they had only just recently become serious about studying Islam when they entered university. According to Irawan:

> I have been in that kind of organization [Jemaah Tarbiyah], and I can say that their religious belief was shallow. That is why I left [Jemaah Tarbiyah], I felt a setback. They were rookies in learning religion. We were used to reading Koran in our village since we were kids. When we enrolled on the campus, we had to read Koran again, hahaha...But

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[328] Informant 34, confidential interview in Jakarta, January 11, 2019.
[329] Henri Basel, op. cit.
[330] Ade Irawan, personal interview in Jakarta, January 29, 2019.

they have their own *taqlid*[331] to different groups. That was why we could not agree with them. They had their own affiliation to Ikhwanul Muslimin, a new emerging group at that time.[332]

Irawan accused Jemaah Tarbiyah students of being religion sellers (*jualan agama*) due to their use of Islam in political competitions. Similarly, to how leftist students were discredited, Jemaah Tarbiyah students were described as people who were "anti-dialogue" because they were blindly following their leaders and Islamic doctrine. The leftist students lamented that such servile and dogmatic tendencies were perplexing since Jemaah Tarbiyah students applied them in a university setting, a place for critically discussing all ideas. According to Irawan:

> Their characteristic was, first, they were anti-dialogue. Second, they were very centralistic and obedient to *taqlid*. They just had to follow their leader. That was what I thought weird from them [Jemaah Tarbiyah students]. On campuses, there should have a freedom to think while they really believed in *taqlid*. They cannot ask many questions, which was really weird.[333]

The frames that circulated in the competition between the leftist and Islamic students were a sign of state repression of the past. The repression the left suffered from 1965–67 and its continuation under the New Order caused the fragmenting frames such as "communist," "leftist,"

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[331] Taqlid means the conformity of one person to a religious teaching. Here the informant meant it as obedience.
[332] Ade Irawan, op. cit.
[333] Ade Irawan, op. cit.

"Christian," and "red" to intrude even at the university level. The repression not only destroyed the organizational structure of the Indonesian left but also disseminated political discourses that could turn fellow regime opposition groups against each other. Besides dividing the left from other NGOs in the 1980s, a similar effect trickled down to the university level, also dividing students. But it was not just the leftist groups who found themselves labeled by the regime's political discourses. A similar effect was true for the Islamists as well. Frames such as "anti-dialogue" and "rookie Muslim" referred to the Islamic groups' insistence on applying Islamic values as the fundamental principles of the Indonesian state and society. They originated from the Islamic opposition to the New Order in the 1980s when the regime forced Islamic groups to embrace Pancasila. As a mechanism to resist oppression, Islamic groups campaigned to reject the obligation to embrace Pancasila.[334] The campaign as a movement encouraged the full embrace of Islamic ideology (*kaffah*). The followers of this movement were different from Muslims who had embraced Islamic teachings throughout their education in *pesantren*. The former group had studied religion through their involvement in Islamic study groups at university, while the latter had arrived at university already having studied Islamic teachings beginning in elementary and secondary school. People ridiculed these new adherents to Islam as "Muslim rookies." Despite the history of embracing political Islam in the 1980s as an expression of resistance to state repression, these newcomers to Islam were still mocked and seen as "Muslim rookies."

These stigmatizing frames did not reside only at the University of Indonesia and IKIP Jakarta. To differing degrees, these frames also existed at other universities. For instance, at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, HMI MPO students employed the "leftist" label to discredit study

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[334] Hasan, 2009.

groups such as the Ciputat's Student Forum (*Forum Mahasiswa Ciputat*; Formaci), a prominent study group at the university.[335] In the context of a student senate election, Abrori, an HMI MPO student activist, provided an example of why they employed the leftist label:

> We perceived Formaci as our rival. Why did we attach the leftist identity to them? What was leftist? It was because the left was the opposite of Islam. Then, by using that label, we asked other students from PMII and GMNI [to join]. That was how we used identity [in student politics].

The HMI MPO specifically identified leftist students as the opposite of the Islamists. This association surfaced because students viewed Formaci as a study group that discussed Marx and Marxist literature. In contrast, the "leftist" label was not considered applicable to other study groups such as Piramida Circle, because they discussed progressive Islamic scholars such as Ali Shariati.[336] At private universities, the "leftist" label had less impact. At Trisakti during the 1990s, the candidates for student senate elections did not employ the communist label. The communist label only emerged later, after the fall of Suharto, when it was associated with "progressive" groups such as the Trisakti Study Group (*Kelompok Studi Trisakti*; KST).[337] According to Erik, a student activist from KST:

> For sure. [We were] accused as a communist. We were called in [by the campus administration]. After, sorry, our event on May 9, all of us were called in…My friends

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[335] Abrori, personal interview in South Tangerang, September 10, 2018.
[336] Ibid.
[337] Erik, personal interview in Jakarta, July 17, 2018.

said, "Erik, they called you to come!" "Let us move now, Rik!" 30 students from the Fakultas of Law were ready to involve in a war…Those who were called in were being interrogated just like being interrogated by *tekap* (intelligence).[338]

"Regime supporters" was another frame that divided Indonesian students. This label was usually applied to student organizations associated with assisting the rise of the New Order in 1965–67, especially members of *Kelompok Cipayung,* the continuation of KAMI. HMI-affiliated students were labeled "regime supporters" since they participated in the student protests to oust Sukarno, and some of their alumni entered the New Order state as bureaucrats or Golkar members. At the University of Indonesia, both leftist and Jemaah Tarbiyah students opposed the presence of HMI. As fringe opposition groups repressed by the regime, they saw HMI students as a common enemy, because of HMI's assistance in the rise of the New Order. Chairah explained the existence of "regime supporters" frame among students at UI:

Because *ekstra kampus* were outsiders and, from past experiences, HMI had these figures such as Akbar Tandjung,[339] Cosmas Batubara,[340] Bedu Amang,[341] and Mar'ie Muhammad.[342] They were all HMI who, at that time, became a common enemy because they were holding power. They were also corrupt and supported the authoritarian regime.

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[338] Ibid.

[339] Tandjung was an HMI student activist from UI. He was the head of HMI in the 1972–74. He then joined Golkar and served as the State Minister of Youths and Sport in the 1988–93.

[340] Batubara was the chairman and founder of KAMI.

[341] Amang was an HMI student activist from UGM. He joined the New Order as the head of the State Logistics Agency (*Badan Urusan Logistik*; Bulog) from 1995 to 1998.

[342] Muhammad was a former Secretary General of HMI. He was also the Minister of Finance under the New Order from 1993 to 1998.

So, we were traumatized with [the existence of] *ekstra kampus*… FSI[343] felt the same

thing. They did not want [HMI students] among them. They did not want to be

contaminated by *ekstra kampus*, especially HMI. They were so afraid of that because

their assumption was HMI students were outsiders and moderate. Meanwhile, their creed

[Jemaah Tarbiyah students'] oriented to be *kaffah*.[344] They aimed to be *kaffah*, and if

there were HMI, their [creed] would become mixed (*belang-belang*).

At IKIP Jakarta, according to Untung, students accused HMI students of being "opportunists"

because of their close relationship with the New Order regime.[345] At IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah,

where HMI was the dominant student group, the same framing also thrived. Anick H.T. from

IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah understood student organizations such as HMI and PMII existed only

as vehicles to grab power.[346] He also criticized the two student organizations:

> HMI and PMII are just organizations like political parties that compete to grab power.
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> There are no efforts to develop the organizations' ideology except for mobilizing
>
> people…Ideologically, they are no different. HMI students could be *Gusdurian*.[347] PMII
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> students could also be a Golkar's member. That means that they are no different
>
> ideologically.

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[343] Islamic Study Forum (*Forum Studi Islam*; FSI) was a Fakultas' level student organization associated with Jemaah Tarbiyah. It existed at the Fakultas of Social and Political Science, UI.
[344] *Kaffah* means to fully implement Islam in one's everyday life.
[345] Bejo Untung, op. cit.
[346] Anick H.T., personal interview in South Tangerang, August 21, 2018.
[347] Gusdurian refers to those who follow Abdurrahman Wahid's teachings.

The impression was that students joined HMI and PMII only to network with political elites. Once they graduated, their "brothers" (*abang*) would recruit them into politics. HMI students tried to develop relationships with their alumni in Golkar, while PMII students did the same with their alumni in NU.[348] These relationships took the form of patron-client, with the seniors and alumni acting as patrons to their younger classmates. For PMII students like Rahmat Zaelani, the impression was that HMI had a closer relationship with the New Order since the regime regularly attempted to repress NU, PMII's parent organization.[349] According to Zaelani, HMI was already "comfortable with power" (*nyaman dengan kekuasaan*).[350] They saw HMI as an extension of the regime's influence inside IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah. HMI's dominance in the University Student Senate resembled the supremacy of the regime. Such a frame, however, did not exist at universities in which the presence of *Kelompok Cipayung* was weak. For instance, at Trisakti University, the frame of HMI as an extension of the regime's power was non-existent, since HMI opened its chapter at Trisakti only after the fall of Suharto.

The fragmentation of students shaped the student mobilizations when the Asian Financial Crisis struck in 1997 and weakened the regime. It divided students even though they swarmed Jakarta's streets together in a way that appeared unified. The fragmentation lasted until the last days of Suharto, when students occupied Parliament in May 1998 and continued after his resignation. This next section focuses on that fragmentation.

The Economic Crisis and Student Mobilizations

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[348] Anick HT, op. cit.
[349] Rahmat Zaelani, personal interview in Jakarta, January 15, 2019.
[350] Ibid.

In 1997, Indonesia was plunged into the Asian financial crisis. It began in Thailand when the Thai government devalued the baht in July 1997.[351] Affected by the devaluation, the rupiah, Indonesia's currency, weakened further in August 1997. The value of short-term debts, twice the level of the central bank's reserves, destabilized the Indonesian economy to a greater degree than the crisis-affected Indonesia's neighbors such as Thailand and Malaysia.[352] Although Suharto signed a Letter of Intent from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on November 13, 1998, in an attempt to reinforce the Indonesian economy, IMF's assistance did not manage to protect Indonesia from sinking deeper into the crisis. In fact, the IMF's Letter of Intent only worsened the situation because it obligated Indonesia to withdraw subsidies for fuel and basic commodities. This policy only fanned grievances from the Indonesian poor.

Although the financial crisis started weakening the regime in the first six months of 1997, opposition groups remained dormant. The decades of state repression had undermined their capacity to coalesce with students. The violence on July 27, 1996, at the PDI headquarters had scared the nationalists away from trying to rally Indonesians to topple the regime. The common impression at the time was that during the economic crisis, the nationalists did nothing and watched from afar.[353] Sukarnoputri's silence after the reelection of Suharto in 1997 affirmed the insignificant role of the nationalists in the regime transition. The left was also heavily battered. The arrests of PRD's leadership after July 27, 1996, demobilized the party, leaving only its underground networks. Some PRD-affiliated activists travelled to Indonesian universities to encourage students to increase their pressure on the regime. They formed the Central Leadership Committee of the Democratic People's Party (*Komite Pimpinan Pusat-Partai Rakyat*

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[351] Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 220.
[352] Hill, 2000, p. 124.
[353] Eklöf, op. cit., p. 289.

Demokratik; KPP-PRD) to coordinate the effort. On April 14, 1997, they also formed the

National Committee for Democratic Struggle (*Komite Nasional untuk Perjuangan Demokrasi*;

KNPD) to unify opposition groups. However, after several members of the party were kidnapped

between February 1998 and March 1998, the party was in decline.[354] Political Islam retained

only figures such as Amien Rais as opposition leaders. Rais was a former ICMI member. ICMI

had sidelined him in 1995, due to his criticisms of the organization and the regime. He went on

to Muhammadiyah, the second-largest Islamic organization after NU, and when the financial

crisis struck in 1997, he criticized the regime's handling of it. However, he never mobilized

Muhammadiyah to place pressure on the regime. Meanwhile, under Wahid's leadership, NU

took a soft stance on the regime by reconciling with Suharto and endorsing Golkar in the 1997

General Election.[355] Wahid himself had been absent following a stroke in January 1998.

Therefore, NU did not take part in the mobilizations against the regime.[356] With the opposition

so diminished, the fragmented Indonesian students were at the forefront of the protest waves

against the regime.

As the crisis worsened, Indonesian students played their traditional role as the initiator of

change by starting protests in late 1997. Previous studies have extensively documented the

student protests in 1997–98, especially those outside Jakarta.[357] This study does not aim to repeat

their explanations and instead focuses on the impact of state repression on the coordination and

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[354] The kidnappings were a series of military operations that started in 1996, after the attack on the PDI's headquarters on July 27, 1996, which sought to secure the 1997 General Election and the 1998 MPR General Session. Some of the military operations targeted activists who were fierce critics of the regime. From 1997 to 1998, the regime kidnapped 23 activists. Only ten lived while the fate of the others is unknown. Of the 23 activists kidnapped, 9 were from the PRD. Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, 2019.
[355] Kadir, op. cit.
[356] Feillard, 2002, p. 118.
[357] See, for instance, Widjojo, 1999.

assistance between opposition groups and students and seeks to explain the preemption outcome after the fall of Suharto. Nevertheless, some key characteristics in the 1997-98 protests were noteworthy. First, the students started their mobilizations at their universities by holding rallies, establishing free speech forums, and organizing polling among students.[358] Their goal was to jump-start student mobilizations, which had been missing for decades. Some of these protests utilized moments such as the 1997 General Election as momentum for gathering students. Second, the student protests did not start in Jakarta. Big cities such as Medan, Bandar Lampung, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Makassar saw the first student protests. Student protests started in these cities because the distance from Jakarta allowed students to avoid the regime's surveillance. In addition, the smaller size of these cities facilitated students' ability to meet and organize with one another. With the short distances between universities, students outside of Jakarta had an advantage in initiating early student protests. Finally, as with Jakarta, these cities had a long history of student activism, including the 1974 protests in Yogyakarta and the 1978 protests in Bandung.

During their mobilizations in 1997-1998, the students made several key demands. According to Widjojo, students protested 30 times across Indonesia in January 1998. Students made several recurring demands: rejecting Suharto's nomination for the presidency (16 cases), lowering basic commodity prices (7 cases), promoting Sukarnoputri as the new president (3 cases), revoking the Package of Five Law on Politics (2 cases), and revoking the Dual Functions of the Military (2 cases).[359] Besides NGOs, only the student organizations such as HMI-MPO, which had been opposing Suharto since the 1980s, demanded Suharto's resignation.[360] In March

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[358] Ibid.
[359] Ibid., p. 154.
[360] Ibid., p. 155.

1998, students from both formal and informal student groups started joining the mobilizations.

The student agenda at these mobilizations was evolving. Students still wanted Suharto's

resignation. According to Widjojo there were 14 protests in March 1998 that explicitly

demanded for Suharto to step down.[361] Meanwhile, other students' demands concerned the

succession of the national leadership and the rejection of Suharto's Accountability Report.[362] In

April 1998, the demand for Suharto's resignation became stronger. Due to the physical clashes

between students and police across Indonesia, Suharto's resignation started moving to the

forefront of the students' demands, although students still softened the language of their

demands. For instance, the Student Senate at Bandung Islamic University (*Universitas Islam

Bandung*) in Bandung demanded a term-limit for the president and vice-president while the

Student Family of Bandung Technology Institute (*Keluarga Mahasiswa ITB*; KM ITB) pushed

for a Special Session by the People's Consultative Assembly to hold Suharto accountable for his

handling of the crisis. The Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa

Muslim Indonesia*; KAMMI) also pressed for his resignation. In May 1998, after the shooting of

Trisakti students on May 12, 1998, students crystallized their demand for Suharto's resignation.

The day after the shooting, there were 32 students protests across Indonesia, condemning the

shooting and demonstrating increased anti-regime sentiment.[363]

There are several reasons to focus on the student mobilizations in Jakarta. First, while the

student movements outside Jakarta usually triggered the mobilizations, Jakarta was the place

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[361] Those who explicitly rejected Suharto were student groups such as the Solidarity of Students to Solonese People (*Solidaritas Mahasiswa Peduli Rakyat Solo*), the Bandung Indonesian Youths Forum (*Forum Indonesia Muda Bandung*), and the Family of Democracy Lover Students of Yogyakarta (*Keluarga Mahasiswa Pecinta Demokrasi Yogyakarta*). Ibid., p. 166.

[362] The report is given at the end of a president's term.

[363] Widjojo, op. cit., p. 170.

where the movements reached their peak. Second, Jakarta was also where the key events that led

to Suharto's resignation occurred. Political actors grouped in Jakarta, making the city an

important arena for the power struggle among different political actors. Jakarta witnessed the

struggle between the old forces of the regime, opposition groups, and students to take charge and

shape the outcome of the transition. Third, Jakarta had big universities, which created pockets of

student mobilizations in corners of Jakarta. For example, students mobilized at IKIP Jakarta in

East Jakarta, at Trisakti University in West Jakarta, and on the outskirts of Jakarta at the

University of Indonesia in Depok and IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Tangerang. These universities

became centers for student mobilizations around Jakarta. Based on these reasons, this study

focuses on student mobilizations in Jakarta to demonstrate how the fragmentation at Indonesian

universities continued throughout the fragmentation of student mobilizations at the city level.

The pattern of student mobilizations in 1998 was a continuation of the fragmentation

among students in the mid-1990s. At Indonesian public universities such as UI and IKIP Jakarta,

student mobilizations rested on the competition between two groups. On the one hand, there was

mobilization by the Jemaah Tarbiyah students who controlled the leadership of the Student

Senate at some universities such as UI and IKIP Jakarta. The Student Senate was their vehicle

for mobilizing their supporters. On the other hand, there was a student mobilization through the

cooperation between leftist students and *Kelompok Cipayung*. The groups took contrasting

political and tactical stances. Jemaah Tarbiyah students took a wait-and-see stance regarding the

way they pressured the regime. They tended to be more cautious and less confrontational in

pressuring the regime. As a formal representative of the university, the University Student Senate

had to create a consensus with all of the Fakultas Student Senates before they took actions which

slowed their movement. In contrast, the leftist students and other student groups relied on an

informal coalition to mobilize students. They were not constrained by trying to achieve consensus with all the Fakultas in a university before they acted. Therefore, they were able to take more risks when mobilizing students.

The division between formal and informal student mobilizations was strong at UI and IKIP Jakarta. At UI, the division followed this pattern. Neither the Islam-affiliated students nor the left-nationalists organized protests until February 1998. That month was the starting point because it was the start of the new semester. Students came back from their hometowns, which provided more people for the mobilizations. In February 1998, the Big Family of the University of Indonesia (*Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia*; KBUI) emerged as an alternative group to the University Student Senate of the University of Indonesia (*Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi Universitas Indonesia*; SMPT-UI). KBUI comprised students from five Fakultas: Psychology, Social and Political Science, Literature, Economics, and Engineering. KBUI consisted of students from different ideological positions —both leftist students and HMI-affiliated students were part of KBUI. Although KBUI was an informal organization, it had a structure that facilitated its actions. An executive committee (*presidium*) led a command post (*pos komando*) that coordinated seven divisions: health, security, publication, activities, finance, equipment, and logistics.

KBUI participated in some key student protest actions from February to April 1998. For instance, on February 25, 1998, KBUI joined a protest at the Fakultas of Medicine, UI Salemba Campus, Jakarta.[364] The protestors covered up the "Welcome to the New Order Struggle Campus" sign at the Fakultas's building. One day later, at the UI Depok Campus, KBUI

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[364] Hendro, 1998, p. C.

mobilized students to hang a "People's Struggle Campus" sign near the entrance of the university's main gate.[365] On March 11, 1998, KBUI rallied at the UI Depok Campus in reaction to the People's Assembly General Session, which had reelected Suharto for a sixth term. It proclaimed a public statement, the March 11 Reform Struggle Voice (*Suara Perjuangan Reformasi 11 Maret 1998*; Supersemar), mocking the Supersemar document Suharto received from Sukarno to legitimize his tenure.[366] The students criticized the fragile economic developments under the regime and demanded reforms.[367] They continued their protest activities on April 15, 1998, when they deployed some 1,500 UI students to the Salemba Campus.[368]

The Student Senate at UI drew support from three Fakultas—Medicine, Nursing, and Mathematics and Natural Sciences—and because of its formal status, was able to accomplish some of its goals through activism and protest. For instance, the leadership of the UI Student Senate and the head of the Fakultas Student Senate of every Fakultas met with the ABRI Fractions[369] in the National Parliament on March 5, 1998. During the meeting, they rejected Suharto's accountability speech. The Student Senate at UI also coordinated a student rally on March 12, 1998, that drew approximately 8,000 UI students.[370] The rally condemned the regime and expressed dissatisfaction with the way the regime handled the crisis. They also demanded the regime to reconfigure the cabinet, which had been filled with people working in the interest of Suharto, his family, and his cronies.[371] Besides meetings and rallies, the Student Senate at UI

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[365] Ibid.
[366] Ast et. al., 1998, p. B.
[367] Ibid.
[368] Hep et. al., 1998, p. B.
[369] Fractions (*fraksi*) are the representation of political parties in the parliament. They could consist of a coalition of political parties.
[370] Nay et. al., 1998, pp. B-C.
[371] Ibid.

also gave donations to the poor. Cooperating with the military and business groups, the Student Senate at UI channeled basic commodities (e.g., rice, instant noodles, milk) to poor communities in Jakarta on two occasions, February 22 and March 15, 1998.[372]

The divided mobilizations by KBUI and the Student Senate at UI signaled a deep fragmentation between UI students. The foundation for this division was laid in the mid-1990s between leftist students and Jemaah Tarbiyah. While KBUI was inclined to press the regime directly, the Student Senate at UI was slower and more cautious. The Student Senate at UI avoided risk by focusing on social causes. The differences between the two student organizations created tension. For example, Chairah, a student activist from KBUI, criticized the Student Senate at UI for accepting donations from the military when fundraising for the charity.

> Those *rohis* students, they were too busy selling cheap basic commodities [*sembako*]. The problem is, until today, there was no audit and financial accountability regarding the money. They got free *sembako* from Sutiyoso[373] , and we never knew what they did with the money. We just thought that they were just using it to build their organizational network, the base for their future organization, KAMMI, and PKS.[374] We should be suspicious about it because they were never transparent, and they just felt happy about it, "oh, we are the heroes." And the military was happy as the government was. Why were they happy? Because they did not need to solve the crisis, but they were happy to just distribute cheap *sembako*…They were acting like traders. And everyone knew that they

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[372] Alf et. al., 1998, pp. B-C.

[373] In 1998, Sutiyoso was the Governor of Jakarta.

[374] The Justice and Properous Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*; PKS) is a political party that emerged in 1998. It is well-known as a party that becomes the channel of political aspirations from Jemaah Tarbiyah.

controlled the logistics…They suppressed political issues by selling cheap *sembako,* and I think that was when the corruption occurred because there was no audit. They were spoiled by the military at that time. And we knew how their relationship developed. The military was close to this group to temper their rebellious spirit, not like leftist students.[375]

Rama Pratama, the leader of the Student Senate at UI, defended the actions of KBUI:

So I think it was reasonable if there was an informal movement [at UI]…they [KBUI students] were relatively more agile to move. That is for sure! Meanwhile, we were more procedural as a formal organization. When I was trying to initiate a student protest or any events, I had to make a meeting with the Fakultas Student Senate. I had to use a pager when there was no WA (Whatsapp) technology. Initially, they [the leaders of the Fakultas Student Senate] did not accept that. I had to send them an invitation letter to initiate a meeting. So, how did I swiftly organize the students? Meanwhile, informal student groups such as KBUI could make it faster. That was their advantage, but they [KBUI] were not legitimate, right?...We were slower! But once we initiated a student protest, we were more legitimate.[376]

KBUI and the UI Student Senate tried to join forces during the emerging student protests and actions, but their efforts failed due to the deep chasm between the two groups. For instance,

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[375] Elfansuri Chairah, op. cit.
[376] Rama Pratama, personal interview in Jakarta, February 7, 2019.

after the announcement of Suharto's cabinet on March 16, 1998, the UI Student Senate initiated

the formation of the Assessing Commission of the Development Cabinet's Performance (*Komisi*

Penilai Kinerja Kabinet Pembangunan; KPKKP). Although the UI Student Senate rolled out the

initiative, it aimed to involve leadership from all of the Fakultas Student Senates. The initiative,

however, succumbed to the lack of coordination from the UI Student Senate. Agus Gede

Mahendra, the Secretary-General of KBUI, criticized KPKKP: "It was weird. The formation of

the commission was without us knowing, and now they asked us to join."[377] KBUI student

activist Chairah also criticized the initiative. He said, "the meeting [to form the commission] did

not meet the quorum. It must meet a quorum first. Only after that [meeting the quorum] we could

make a decision."[378] Furthermore, KBUI criticized the UI Student Senate for proposing an

institution (i.e., KPKKP) that did not touch the main problem: Suharto.[379] KBUI denounced the

formation of KPKKP since it ignored that Suharto was the designer of the cabinet. By framing

the group around assessing the cabinet, it seemed as though the cabinet was the source of the

crisis, and not Suharto himself.

A similar division was evident at IKIP Jakarta. Jemaah Tarbiyah-affiliated students won

control of the Student Senate at IKIP Jakarta (*Senat Mahasiwa Perguruan Tinggi IKIP Jakarta*;

SMPT IKIP Jakarta), while leftist students' activism centered around *Didaktika*. Both groups

mobilized their supporters in February–April 1998. However, the Student Senate at IKIP Jakarta

had existed since the early 1990s, while the *Didaktika* students established the Rawamangun

Students Union (*Serikat Mahasiswa Rawamangun*; Semar) on February 18, 1998. *Semar* was a

vehicle for students affiliated with *Didaktika*, PMII, and HMI MPO to rally students and rival the

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[377] Han et. al., 1998, pp. B-C.
[378] Han and Nay., 1998, p. B.
[379] Ibid.

influence of the Jemaah Tarbiyah-dominated Student Senate at IKIP Jakarta. The Student Senate

at IKIP Jakarta was slower at mobilizing IKIP Jakarta students to reach a consensus among the

leaders of the Fakultas student senates. In comparison, *Semar* provoked students to engage in

protests as soon as possible because students outside Jakarta had already started. A member of

Semar, Untung explained the rivalry between *Semar* and the Student Senate at IKIP Jakarta:

> The movement at IKIP Jakarta, driven by *Didaktika* and *Semar,* was a movement that
> was not satisfied with the Student Senate. Because we hoped the Student Senate would
> move and respond to other movements that had been massive. But, because the Student
> Senate did not move, so we established the movement driven by *Didaktika,* and then we
> mobilized students at other campuses to form *Semar*.[380]

In February–May 1998, the two groups mobilized students in different directions. On

March 3, 1998, *Semar* organized a protest against the economic crisis, which could decrease the

quality of life for the next generation.[381] *Semar* rejected the People's Consultative Assembly

(*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*; MPR) General Session as an "expensive political drama" for

reelecting Suharto for the sixth time. On April 15, 1998, *Semar* held one of their largest student

protests. *Semar* coordinated with students in the City Forum (*Forum Kota*; Forkot), resulting in

protests involving students from 20 universities in Jakarta.[382] About 2,000 students participated.

The Student Senate at IKIP Jakarta also mobilized students to protest during the same period. On

March 10, 1998, the Student Senate at IKIP Jakarta coordinated a rally around their university.

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[380] Bejo Untung, op. cit.
[381] Ito, 1998, pp. 5-6.
[382] Ibid.

Protestors demanded the regime to decrease prices and eradicate corruption, collusion, and nepotism.[383] A second protest was held on April 9, 1998, to protest the regime's violent attack on students at UGM, Lampung University (*Universitas Lampung*; UNILA), Airlangga University (*Universitas Airlangga*; Unair), and the Eleven March University (*Universitas Sebelas Maret*; UNS).[384]

A similar division did not occur at other universities because there was no history of competition between the Jemaah Tarbiyah-affiliated students and leftist students. For instance, there were no massive student mobilizations at Trisakti in early 1998. Usman Hamid, who was involved in the student mobilizations, estimated Trisakti students mobilized in small numbers of between 20 to 50 people before May 1998.[385] They only managed to organize larger student mobilizations in May 1998 when the political situation escalated due to state repression under the University Student Senate of Trisakti University (*Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi-Universitas Trisakti*; SMPT-UT). The student mobilizations of the University Student Senate of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah (*Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi-IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah*; SMPT-IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah) were also more unified. Although IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah students experienced various divisions dating back to the early 1990s (e.g., moderate Islam versus traditionalist Islam, modernist versus traditionalist religious schools), these divisions did not fracture their mobilizations, at least not at the university. The students established an organization in 1998, the Communication Forum for Ciputat Students (*Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Ciputat*; FKMC), as a vehicle for students from different organizations.[386] According

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[383] Ibid.
[384] Ibid.
[385] Usman Hamid, op. cit.
[386] Ahmad Muhibbuddin, op. cit.

to Muhlis, a student activist from IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, the communication forum was intended to be a group for not only IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah students but also for other university students located in the Ciputat District, West Java.[387] The lack of fragmentation among students at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah indicated that the social divisions between students from different *pesantren,* and the influence of student organizations such as HMI and PMII, were not strong enough to divide the students. According to Anick HT:

> It [religious identity] almost did not exist…In general, especially in public, it did not exist. Many students from PMI and HMI were living together in the same boarding house [kos-kosan]. When we talked about politics, we could be different.[388]

The FKMC engaged in some student protests between February and April 1998. They started on March 12, 1998, by selling cheap basic commodities at the university.[389] On March 20, 1998, they continued by joining a protest at Jayabaya University. The FKMC cooperated with students from six universities.[390] On April 9, 1998, FKMC participated in a rally in the Ciputat District with students from other universities in the district.[391] IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah students kept testing the regime's tolerance by organizing rallies outside of the campus. On April 15, 1998, they attempted to rally in the streets, marching from the university's main gate. They

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[387] Ferry Muhlis, op. cit.
[388] Anick H.T., op. cit.
[389] Wisudo, 1998a, p. 3.
[390] The six universities were UI, IKIP Jakarta, Unas, Institute of Social Science and Political Science (*Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*; IISIP), Indonesia Christian University (*Universitas Kristen Indonesia*; UKI), and Universitas Kertanegara (*Universitas Kertanegara*). Wisudo, 1998b, p. 10.
[391] The universities were Jakarta Muhammadiyah University (*Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta*; UMJ) and Muhammadiyah Academy of Finance and Banking (*Akademi Keuangan dan Perbankan Muhammadiyah*; AKPM). Wisudo, 1998c, p. 3.

argued that staying inside the campus of their university would not get their voices heard by the regime.[392] When they managed to pass the first gate, the protestors clashed with the police, with both students and police officers injured.

Although the Student Senates at UI and IKIP Jakarta wielded the formal authority of student representation, they did not have complete control over the majority of students. At UI, the Student Senate lacked a strong network across the 13 Fakultas. Instead, they relied on Jemaah Tarbiyah's networks, which only had a strong presence in three Fakultas (Medicine, Nursing, and Mathematics and Natural Sciences). At IKIP Jakarta, the Student Senate relied on Jemaah Tarbiyah's networks, which included networks of students from the Fakultas of Education, Mathematics and Natural Science, and Engineering. Meanwhile, the rivals of the Student Senates at UI and IKIP Jakarta relied on limited student networks. KBUI utilized their networks of students from leftist study groups and some small networks of students affiliated with *Kelompok Cipayung* students. At IKIP Jakarta, *Didaktika* and *Semar* students also utilized the networks of students affiliated with their organizations and their friendship networks.

This shows that power was distributed between student organizations at the two universities. Even though the Student Senate was a formal representation of students, it did not carry considerable power over students. It functioned to represent students but was without the authority to issue rules related to students. It could initiate activities involving students, such as social charities, sports competitions, music concerts, or public seminars, but it could not rule over students' lives, either academically or socially. The university still held authority over these domains. Although the Student Senates at UI and IKIP Jakarta formally represented students,

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[392] Tion Nasution, personal interview in South Tangerang, November 5, 1998.

they did not have control over the students affiliated with KBUI and Semar. The word "control"

in this study means the ability of the Student Senate to order all the students in the university to

protest on the streets, which the Student Senate was not able to do. If KBUI and *Semar* students

did not want to heed the call for a rally by the Student Senate, the Student Senate had no power

to punish them. This was also true for informal student organizations such as KBUI and Semar,

which could not control students beyond their existing networks.

At other universities, such as Trisakti and IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, students showed

more unity in their protests, activism, and ability to mobilize across divisions, which was missing

at other universities. Based on the fragmentation indicators, the small numbers of Trisakti

students who mobilized in early 1998 did not rely on the Trisakti Student Senate to organize

them. The Trisakti students showed a weak degree of institutionalization, as the students'

protests were spontaneous and utilized a free-speech forum (*mimbar bebas*) as their main avenue

for protest. The protests were an initial test to try and attract Trisakti students to become more

involved and aware of the political situation. The weak infiltration of opposition groups at

Trisakti created a weak base for mobilizations and fragmentation. At IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah,

Islamists and the presence of various groups that mediated interactions between students

tempered the fragmentation among them. Although HMI and PMII competed in the 1990s, their

shared understanding of Islamic ideology helped reconcile their differences. The formation of

FKMC marked the compromise made by the students in IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah because the

IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Student Senate led the FKMC. Nevertheless, the IAIN Syarif

Hidayatullah Student Senate did not make FKMC an exclusive forum, as students from other

organizations joined. For instance, although the Head of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Student

Senate was led by Muhibbuddin from HMI, other PMII students still joined FKMC. FKMC

emerged as a platform that unified student organizations to challenge the New Order regime. The

open structure of FKMC was reinforced by the fact that Islam was not an issue that divided

students at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah. Although HMI and PMII were the two biggest Islamic

student organizations at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, their understandings of Islam tended to be

reconcilable (see the previous quote on this subject by Anick HT, an HMI student activist).[393]

Furthermore, fragmenting frames such as "leftist" and "anti-regimes" never had a strong enough

presence to divide the students in the Student Senate Elections— the greatest division between

the students was between HMI and PMII, never a sharp ideological division. FKMC also did not

have total control over student organizations that joined FKMC because it embraced various

student organizations that did not necessarily have a direct link to the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah

Student Senate.[394]

May 1998 was the peak of student mobilization, protest, and activism. That month

opposition groups and students demanded that Suharto step down. The opposition groups

assisted the students by channeling resources to them, although at the last minute. Their

coordination with students was weak and sporadic. Prominent opposition figures remained

inactive at this moment. As the leader of the PDI, Sukarnoputri continued her silence. There

were no meaningful initiatives from the PDI to help the students, even though the protests had

started reaching a peak. The underground network of the PRD seemed successful in assisting

student protests in cities such as Lampung, Yogyakarta, and Solo.[395] Other student organizations

played a part in mobilizing students. In the same month, Islamist forces left Rais as the only

representative joining student protests and actions. But Rais could not draw support from the

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[393] Anick H.T., op. cit.
[394] Ahmad Muhibbuddin, op. cit.
[395] Widjojo, op. cit., p. 148.

broader Islamic groups. Some of his Muhammadiyah leaders did not follow him to support

students. Rais' image was not positive among students, as they suspected he was an opportunist

riding the wave of student protests for his own political benefit.

At the same time, in May 1998, which proved to be the most crucial time of student

activism, students increased the pressure on the regime mostly on their own, reinforced only by

the worsening political and economic conditions. Economically, the regime complied with the

IMF's Letter of Intent by raising the gasoline price by 70%,[396] which provoked rioting in cities

such as Medan. Jakarta also felt the impact of popular grievances after the shooting of Trisakti

students by police on May 12, 1998, after a long student protest coordinated by the Trisakti

Student Senate. Trisakti students were marching back to their campus when the shooting

occurred. Erik narrated the events of that day:

> So, I said that we should return to our campus. But, when we were walking, there was a
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> provocateur from inside [the crowd of students]…the students were returning gradually,
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> starting at 4:00 P.M. From the crowd of Trisakti students, there was one person who was
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> running hiding behind the police barricade. After that, the police acted repressively…the
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> police were shooting us. It was not repressive anymore, but we were slaughtered inside
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> our campus…I said if they [the police] entered, we all would die. We knew the
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> experience in Tiananmen, China, and how the students were run over by tanks. We would
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> definitely die. Trisakti Campus was different from UI Salemba Campus since UI had a

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[396] Bird, 1999, p. 29.

back alley, right? Or UI Depok Campus was quite vast so you could run. But Trisakti

Campus was only a square [and nowhere to run].

From May 13–15, 1998, riots spread across Jakarta. People looted shops, destroyed

property they believed belonged to ethnic Chinese Indonesians, and burned vehicles. More than

1,000 people died, and hundreds of ethnic Chinese women and girls were raped by soldiers and

police officers who were supposed to be protecting them.[397] These three days of riots increased

the pressure on Suharto to step down. During the riot, Suharto was in Egypt, attending the G-15

Summit. He returned to Indonesia on May 14, after the shooting had happened, and the riots had

started. Suharto may have miscalculated how public pressure on his regime had been building

since December 1997, when the students started protesting. His miscalculation proved costly

because he allowed the pressure for his resignation to become overwhelming.

The increasing societal grievances gave students greater legitimacy when mobilizing

larger acts of resistance. Though they were without strong coordination from opposition groups

and leaders, students escalated their coordinated protest actions. Some features of the student

actions and protests were noteworthy. First, by May 1998, the students in Jakarta had already

anchored their resistance actions to student groups outside of their universities. Two prominent

student organizations were the Communication Forum of Jakarta Student Senate (*Forum

Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta*; FKSMJ), and the City Forum (*Forum Kota*; Forkot). The

way the students affiliated with these organizations reflected the divisions at their universities.

FKSMJ emerged on March 23, 1996, as a forum for the student senate heads to meet in Jakarta,

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[397] Ricklefs, op. cit., p. 406.

including the Student Senate at UI, IKIP Jakarta, Triskati, and the other formal representatives of the campus-based student movement. Since some Jemaah Tarbiyah student activists managed to control student senate leadership positions at their universities, they became representatives for their universities in FKSMJ. This made FKSMJ predominantly a vehicle for Jemaah Tarbiyah students, although not all university representatives in FKSMJ had a connection to Jemaah Tarbiyah. Nevertheless, their political stances (e.g., moderate, pro-reforms instead of revolution) showed that the Jemaah Tarbiyah representatives in FKSMJ shaped the organization's political direction during the transition. Meanwhile, Forkot emerged on March 7, 1998, and gathered support from students who disagreed with the leadership of the formal student senates, and gathered membership from students, including members of Semar and students from KBUI, who disagreed with the leadership of the formal student senate. Forkot-affiliated students believed that a physical confrontation with the regime would be necessary to assist the development of the student movement.

Second, besides student organizations based in Jakarta, national student organizations started mobilizing to increase pressure on the regime. Members of *Kelompok Cipayung,* such as HMI, PMKRI, GMNI, PMKRI, and PMII, activated their networks to support student demonstrations and protests, although they were not at the forefront of student activism in Jakarta due to their weak presence in campuses. The newly formed KAMMI, however, did not experience such a problem. It was a national student organization that functioned to coordinate Jemaah Tarbiyah students across Indonesia. Jemaah Tarbiyah-affiliated students met on March 29, 1998, establishing KAMMI. KAMMI's positions were in line with the Jemaah Tarbiyah students and the organizations that they controlled (e.g., student senates). KAMMI favored a gradual regime transition and a non-violent approach. Because of when it was formed, KAMMI

only participated in student protests after the pressure on the regime was already high. These national student organizations (e.g., *Kelompok Cipayung*, KAMMI) were latecomers attempting to shape the transition outcome. Meanwhile, leftist students did not have a student organization on par with KAMMI. The regime had already crushed the PRD, and so the left could only rely on its underground networks to mobilize students.

Third, students expanded their protests beyond their university campuses. Protesting outside of the university's campus became the new strategy to press the regime further. The stubbornness of the regime provoked students to take more risks at their protests. The regime attempted to contain the students within their campuses to prevent the merger between students and other groups at street protests. A series of unsatisfying responses from the regime, however, only triggered students to take greater risks while protesting, by directly confronting the military and the police in the streets. Moreover, the coalitions formed between the universities encouraged students because they perceived their growing power due to support from fellow students. At this point, student activism and resistance had expanded from the campus to the city.

Fourth, although the students escalated their protests, fragmentation persisted at universities like the University of Indonesia and IKIP Jakarta. The desire to push the student protests off-campus also complicated the fragmentation. Meanwhile, for universities such as Trisakti, which had just started mobilizing students, the escalation of resistance activities created a division within the university.

Student protests in May 1998 demonstrated these four characteristics. On May 2, 1998, KBUI organized another protest at the UI Salemba Campus. This time, it managed to gather 8,000 people, comprising not only students from other universities but also high school students

and workers.[398] The protest was a test to see if the police would let them leave campus, but they were blocked. On May 7, 1998, the UI students went off campus to join forces with students from other universities near the UI Depok Campus.[399] The meeting was the result of an earlier meeting between students representing KBUI and Forkot. The students rallied together in front of Gunadarma University. Due to a lack of coordination between the leadership of different universities, the protest became unorganized. The police reprimanded the students and told them to dissolve the protest, but they did not leave. The police then took repressive measures by shooting tear gas and rubber bullets, injuring at least seven students.[400] After the protest, it was known that UI's representation in Forkot did not thoroughly inform KBUI of the protest's detailed plan, leading to chaos. The leaders from four Fakultas also had not joined the meetings to organize the protest, signaling a lack of coordination inside the leadership of KBUI.[401] Mahendra, the Secretary-General of KBUI, lamented, "today's action did not follow the mechanism to organize a collective action [from different campuses]."[402] Moreover, though the UI Student Senate condemned the police's repressive measures one day later, the lack of support from the UI Student Senate on the day of the protest showed that the protest was solely an initiative from KBUI. This lack of cohesion in the planning and the responses to the police violence shows that the fragmentation was no longer only between the UI Student Senate and KBUI but now existed among the students inside KBUI, between the KBUI leadership and the KBUI members affiliated with Forkot.

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[398] Har et. al., 1998a, p. B.

[399] These campuses were IISIP, Gunadarma University (*Universitas Gunadarma*), and the National Institute of Science and Technology (*Institut Sains dan Teknologi Nasional*; ISTN). Arf, et. al., 1998, pp. B-C.

[400] Ibid.

[401] Ast, 1998, p. B.

[402] Arf et. al., op. cit.

Semar and the IKIP Jakarta Student Senate continued their activism in early May. On May 1, 1998, the IKIP Jakarta Student Senate mobilized thousands of students. According to Basel, the plan was to march to IKIP Jakarta Campus D, which was located 3 kilometers from the main campus in Rawamangun, East Jakarta.[403] Then, the IKIP Jakarta Student Senate would prepare the students to march together to the Parliament building. However, just as the students started marching, the police put up a blockade, and they were turned back. No one was injured at this event. The next day, *Semar* and Forkot organized another student protest by gathering students from 14 universities. They demanded immediate reforms instead of the Suharto-proposed reforms, which would not take place until 2003. Their plan to march was met with violent measures by the police, who dispersed the protesters by shooting tear gas and rubber bullets. Although no students were killed, 5 students and 29 non-students were injured.[404]

That these two student mobilizations were separately planned and executed, rather than the two groups uniting for one protest, reflecting the persistent fragmentation at IKIP Jakarta. Husodo, a student activist from Didaktika and Semar, condemned the IKIP Jakarta Student Senate as a group of opportunistic people inclined towards compromise. According to him:

> Because we had a different view, we labeled them [the Student Senate] as opportunists (*kaum oportunis*). [They] chose to compromise for certain things that, in turn, caused differences. These differences were reflected from the way they decided whether or not the students needed to organize the protest for Suharto's resignation, inside or outside our campus. During that time, the information [on the danger of doing outside campus

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[403] Henri Basel, op. cit.
[404] Har et. al., 1998b, p. D.

protests] was still uncertain. Many students at the Student Senate calculated there would

be chaos if we protested outside the campus while we saw that the momentum to do that

[protests outside the campus] had come. I remembered that the first student protest

outside our campus was driven by students from *Didaktika* [and *Semar*].[405]

Abdullah Taruna, a leader of *Semar*, affirmed Husodo's argument, telling the student

protest on May 2, 1998:

Our Student Senate was led by Basel. They organized a student rally in front of Lab

School Jakarta, at Pemuda Street. They managed to move until the end of the street and

turned back. They [the Student Senate] did not organize the May 2 protest because it was

on Saturday while they organized the protest on Friday [May 1]…and then Ubed

[Ubedillah Badrun], the former head of the Student Senate, claimed that he was the one

who made the scenario on May 2…I asked the field coordinator on that day Bejo [Bejo

Untung] from the Fakultas of Engineering who was surrounded and attacked by the

police until he was unconscious. He said that he [Ubedillah Badrun] was never on the

scene on that day.[406]

According to Basel, the IKIP Jakarta Student Senate delegitimized the May 2 Protest and

claimed the success of the May 1 Protest:

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[405] Adnan Topan Husodo, op. cit.

[406] Abdullah Taruna, personal interview in Jakarta, November 22, 2018.

We [the Student Senate and Semar] were trying to delegitimize each other. For instance, we made flyers for students to not join the May 2 student protest because we did not know who was behind it. Later on, we knew that it was organized by *Semar* that later became Forkot…Students from BEM [the Student Senate] succeeded in organizing a protest outside the campus, which was very rare during that time…on May 1, we succeeded in organizing a protest outside the campus at Pemuda Street…the next day, May 2, I was also there, but the protest was organized by Semar and [HMI] MPO.[407]

At Trisakti, the increasing tensions between students and the regime triggered tensions between the Trisakti Student Senate and *Kelompok Studi Trisakti*. John Muhammad, a student activist from Trisakti, witnessed the slowness of the Trisakti Student Senate in mobilizing Trisakti students. According to Muhammad:

The Student Senate was slow in making a decision. Moreover, to organize *aksi*, they would need a process. They [the Trisakti Student Senate] always lagged behind. While outside the [students] already organized free-speech forums, we still made public declarations (*deklarasi*). While outside, they already rallied around campuses, we still made free-speech forums. While outside, they already organized long-marches and involved in clashes with the military; we still rallied around our campus. So [the Trisakti Student Senate] lagged behind.[408]

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[407] Henri Basel, op. cit.
[408] John Muhammad, personal interview in Jakarta, July 9, 2018.

Muhammad further outlined the differences between the Trisakti Student Senate and *Kelompok Studi Trisakti*:

These students from *Kelompok Studi Trisakti* already read many things…they read [Tan] Malaka and *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi*.[409] While these students from the Student Senate actually were not ready to organize a demonstration. The Student Senate was not ready to protest; they were not ready to face the challenges of the modern era, so we could see it how it manifested in public forums. Students from *Kelompok Studi Trisakti* usually dominated public forums. They [*Kelompok Studi Trisakti*] knew what to do; they knew that they had to respond [the crisis situation] fast.[410]

The difference between the Trisakti Student Senate and *Kelompok Studi Trisakti* led to conflict between the two organizations. The Trisakti Student Senate seemed to be disappointed with the authority and initiative of *Kelompok Studi Trisakti* students. According to Muhammad:

They [the Trisakti Student Senate] were angry. That I did not like from them. They dissolved *Kelompok Studi Trisakti,* and they beat one of our friends at *Kelompok Studi Trisakti*. Since then, I felt their relationship went bad…so students from Fakultas under the Student Senate were insecure, I guessed it was because of the inequality of knowledge. The inequality of political knowledge so it made them could not understand

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[409] *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi* refers to a book by Sukarno.
[410] John Muhammad, op. cit.

and could not match the language of others [from *Kelompok Studi Trisakti*]. So [they felt]

fooled or marginalized discursively in conversations.[411]

Kelompok Studi Trisakti students received the "Communist" label because they organized

the protest.[412] Erik from *Kelompok Studi Trisakti* said, "you [the Trisakti Student Senate]

accused me as a leftist. Erik and his friends [*Kelompok Studi Trisakti*] were Communists. That

was before May 12. They threw that issue."[413] The emergence of the damaging Communist label

affirmed that the regime's repression and marginalization program was successful in painting the

left as the common enemy of all Indonesians, including students.

The Occupation

After the shooting of the four Trisakti University students on May 12, 1998, student

protests focused on ousting the regime. They demanded the resignation of Suharto and occupied

the national parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*; DPR). KBUI released a joint public

statement with the UI Student Senate after the shooting. They sympathized with the victims'

families; condemned the violent acts on May 12; called for people to use a black armband as a

sign of national grief; and demanded a Special Session for the succession of the national

leadership.[414] HMI, a member of *Kelompok Cipayung* that was rarely at the forefront of student

mobilizations, also demanded the resignation of Suharto. HMI asked Indonesians to pray for

salvation from a major catastrophe; to organize a peaceful national strike; and to demand

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[411] John Muhammad, op. cit.
[412] Erik, op. cit.
[413] Ibid.
[414] Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia and the UI Student Senate, 1998.

Suharto's resignation.[415] FKSMJ, as the representative formal student senates in Jakarta, also

demanded Suharto's resignation. They pushed for the MPR to hold a Special Session revoking

the mandate given to Suharto.[416] Banners by students at the DPR demanded Suharto's

resignation, with slogans including "Bring Suharto to Court, Dismiss the Elected House of

Representatives, and the People's Consultative Assembly," "Bring Down Suharto," "Cabinet

Reshuffle Does Not Solve Our Problem," and "Bring Down Suharto and Habibie."[417]

Though the occupation of the DPR seemed to signal a unified student movement, the

fragmentation among students did not disappear. Stories recounted by FKSMJ and Forkot

student activists about the fragmentation inside the DPR during the occupation confirmed this

point. FKSMJ, the coalition of formal student senates, had already planned the occupation of

DPR before the May 12 violence.[418] The deaths of the students only confirmed their decision to

execute the planned occupation. Starting with a meeting on May 18, 1998, with the student

representatives of FKSMJ at IKIP Jakarta, the representatives of FKSMJ followed the

university's rector to the DPR. FKSMJ chartered two buses, carrying approximately 75 students

from 25 universities.[419] After negotiating with the army parliament members at the DPR,

students were granted permission to stay and occupy the DPR. The next day, the representatives

of each university started contacting their fellow students, leading to waves of students'

swarming the parliamentary complex until Suharto's resignation on May 21, 1998. Meanwhile,

following the shootings at Trisakti, Forkot had an internal disagreement regarding whether or not

they needed to occupy the DPR. Members of Forkot met on May 12, 1998, at the College of

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[415] Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, 1998, *Seruan Nasional* (Flyer).
[416] Erd and Ast., 1998, p. B.
[417] Ivy and Emf, 1998, p. 3.
[418] Henri Basel, op. cit.
[419] Ibid.

Industrial Management (*Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen Industri*; SMTI) at Cempaka Putih, Central

Jakarta. According to Taruna, the group debated what to do:

On May 12, we decided that we faced an escalation of violence by the state. Then, we

needed to decide what was our next action: to occupy the DPR or the National Monument

(*Monumen Nasional*). Then we were divided because all research showed the occupation

[of Monas] would not solve the problem. It only added another problem. If [we] occupied

the DPR, we had to compromise (*kong kali kong*) with politicians inside the DPR so we

could be safe…In the end, we all went home without a decision.[420]

Nevertheless, they marched to the DPR on May 18, 1998. The decision to occupy the

DPR came when Adian Napitupulu, a Forkot activist, got the news that FKSMJ had already

decided to occupy the DPR on May 18. Forkot swiftly gathered its members and decided to

occupy the DPR as well. According to Napitupulu, "the meeting agreed that we would go to the

the DPR on the same date, but we would arrive in the morning."[421] Once they were in front of

the DPR's gate, they initially were unable to enter the premises. They were only able to send

their representatives to negotiate with the military guarding the DPR compound. The negotiation

succeeded, and Forkot joined the FKSMJ students at the DPR.

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[420] Abdullah Taruna, op. cit.
[421] Kesuma, R. (2018). Dari Jalanan ke Gedung Dewan. Retrieved from
https://majalah.tempo.co/read/laporan-khusus/155502/dari-jalanan-ke-gedung-dewan on June 1, 2020,
2:25 PM

FKSMJ and Forkot were not the only student groups that organized their members to occupy the DPR. The IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Student Senate and KBUI, for instance, also mobilized their students after the shootings. The IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah decided to go to the DPR on its own because there had been a dispute during the meeting with FKSMJ on May 17, 1998. According to Muhhibuddin, the leader of the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Student Senate:

> One day before going to the DPR, FKSMJ had a meeting at IKIP Rawamangun. I went there with one of my division heads [at the IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Senate]. We decided that we would go to the DPR, but how? "Oh, we already prepared buses," said them [FKSMJ]. I said, "where did you get the money from? They said, "somebody had supported us." They did not want to tell the source of the money, so I decided that I did not want to go by using their buses, so we go by ourselves. I did not want to go to the DPR with FKSMJ, and, in the end, I went back to Ciputat and explained the condition to others…I stated that we had to go to the DPR because all forces would go there…We then decided we would not follow FKSMJ; it was because we were too emotional that they did not want to let us know how they got the money or from whom.[422]

After the dispute with FKSMJ, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah students went to the DPR without coordinating with FKSMJ. KBUI student activists also mobilized students to occupy the DPR without coordinating with FKSMJ and Forkot. After the shootings, KBUI had already planned to occupy the DPR, but they waited to enact their plan on May 19, 1998, because they needed the

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[422] Ahmad Muhibbuddin, op. cit.

time to prepare for the occupation and coordinate a large number of students. When May 19

came, KBUI-coordinated students swarmed the DPR.

Inside the DPR, fragmentation continued. For example, Chairah described how KBUI's

effort to mobilize and set the stage at the DPR was taken over by students affiliated to Jemaah

Tarbiyah:

> Once again, these students [Jemaah Tarbiyah] did not actively mobilize the mass [of
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> students]. They did not mobilize students from UI to Senayan…It happened again at the
>
> DPR. When we were coordinating the free-speech forum (*mimbar bebas*), that was when
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> I saw with my own eyes…Rama [the Head of the UI Student Senate] was there with
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> FKSMJ. But people who showed up at the stage were those who never showed up until
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> today. Like one of my friends Ali. He was the head of Musholla, the Head of Rohis at
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> FISIP. There was also the Head of KAMMI, Fahri Hamzah, who showed up on stage in
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> front of the DPR…I did not want to be up there, but who were they when they showed up
>
> with Amien Rais. On stage, they took over the moment. Once again, I saw they were
>
> always clever in taking over (*mengambil di tikungan*) the moment for their own
>
> interest.[423]

Erik, from *Kelompok Studi Trisakti*, also bitterly complained about the presence of UI

and Forkot during the occupation. According to him*,* "If I was not wrong, KBUI entered the

DPR, Forkot also entered the DPR. Many of the victims were my friends [from Trisakti]. My

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[423] Elfansuri Chairah, op. cit.

friends who died while you guys just opened the gate. But they [KBUI and Forkot] were the ones who seized the moment."[424] Erik was bemoaning that the Trisakti students had sacrificed more than other student organizations. Such a complaint was a sign that he was dissatisfied with how the occupation failed to give proper acknowledgment to the Trisakti students who had died.

Another issue was the fear that Christian groups could take over the stage at the DPR. Abrori from IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah described his experience during the occupation:

We only knew students from our own campus. Beyond that, we did not know anyone. I was an HMI activist, and I tried to coordinate with [HMI members] at other campuses. I asked them, "who is this guy?" who is that guy?"…The identity [politics] emerged…The issue of the Christians (*Salibis*) who wanted to control the stage emerged. Some students said, "Why? We were in this together. We could not let that happen; we had to take over the podium." So, identity politics and the contestation to seize the stage (*rebutan panggung*) occurred.[425]

The complaints from Erik, Chairah, and Abrori signaled the competition among students for their existence (*eksistensi*).[426] The students felt they had to gain respect and acknowledgment from the other students by dominating the stage at the DPR. However, the strategy to dominate the stage divided them at the DPR.

The students also had different strategies once inside the DPR. When the students managed to occupy the compound, some set up a barricade. They screened people who attempted

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[424] Erik, op. cit.
[425] Abrori, op. cit.
[426] Sastramidjaja, op. cit., p. xvi.

to join the students, allowing only those with a valid student ID to joining the occupation. One

reason for this tight security by the students was it kept out intel and military provocateurs. If the

intel and military provocateurs started violence inside the DPR, that could delegitimize the

students. Ikravany Hilman, the field coordinator for KBUI, disagreed with this position.

According to Hilman, "people who wanted to enter had to be checked for their student ID. Who

did that? The students themselves…this was wrong. Why did we have to isolate ourselves for

people's interest?"[427] Hilman argued that the students should have just opened the gate for the

people to join them. He further complained:

> They [the students] glorified student movements too much…with their sacrifice, courage,
> and idealism, students made their own myth that students were the agents of change. I
> thought it [the barricade of the DPR] was a futile effort because they isolated students
> from other social movements. Students have potential because they were intellectuals.
> They can explain the real problem. But as a social and political movement, students
> cannot be alone. If they want to make a substantive change, then they have to join forces
> with other groups such as workers, peasants, and other youth groups.[428]

Hilman's voice was in the minority during the occupation, as the students felt they need to guard

themselves against other social forces.

Students also differed over their relationships with the opposition groups. Some students

believed that some opposition groups were acting as opportunists, joining only after students had

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[427] Ikravany Hilman, personal interview in Depok, October 8, 2018.
[428] Ibid.

already occupied the parliament. For instance, Hilman (KBUI student activist) mentioned people

like Adnan Buyung Nasution and Amien Rais as opposition leaders who would negotiate with

Suharto in the end, rather than the students doing so. According to Hilman:

> So, they were coming in, people like Adnan Buyung, Amien Rais, and other political
> elites. I thought these guys would negotiate with Suharto, not us…I started saying to
> myself, "I could not trust you [political elites] anymore." We just waited for Suharto to
> fall down because our protest aimed to achieve that. On the other hand, I felt that students
> did not have roles. During a meeting, I gathered the [KBUI] leadership. I said, "we
> cannot force the people's agenda (*agenda kerakyatan*), because the fact is we only act
> here without knowing what to do." Those who were coming late were political elites, and
> I was pretty sure they negotiated with Suharto. I did not want to give my friends'
> shoulders for being stepped on [by political elites].[429]

Due to the disagreements, KBUI decided to leave the DPR on May 20, 1998, and move its

followers to the UI Salemba Campus. According to Taruna, the Forkot students despised Rais,

who attempted to be the leader of all the students by taking over the stage and orating in front of

the masses. Taruna said that "the students witnessed a scene of Amien Rais suddenly climbing

on a car and gave a speech as if he was the leader of the movement. We shouted at him to step

down."[430] Not all of the students agreed that the opposition groups were trying to take over the

moment from the students at the DPR. From a historical perspective, Hamid argued that the

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[429] Ibid.
[430] Abdullah Taruna, op. cit.

"students were actually secondary. At the beginning of the 1990s, the primary forces were actually political parties and NGOs…LBH also had a role in backing up [the students]."[431] His view was in the minority, as the students believed the political elites wanted to harness the students for their own interests. Such a perspective affirms how vulnerable students were to be used as a tool by political elites. By arguing that students were secondary, the opposition paved the way for shaping the outcome of the transition without involving students.

On the fourth day of the occupation, May 21, 1998, Suharto stepped down. In addition to the pressure from students, Suharto's allies also influenced his decision to resign. On May 18, 1998, Harmoko, the chairman of Golkar and the chair of the DPR, asked for the president's resignation.[432] Harmoko's request was a blow to Suharto since Golkar had been one of the pillars supporting his power for 32 years. Suharto announced that he would assemble a reform cabinet to administer further reforms. His proposal, however, proved futile when fourteen ministers of the reform cabinet resigned on May 20, 1998. His allies did not believe his cabinet would overcome the crisis.[433] The demand was straightforward: Suharto must resign immediately.

Post-Suharto

After Suharto stepped down, the fragmentation between the students grew stronger. The fragmentation of the students can be understood by the way they formulated their next steps after Suharto's resignation. The demands of each of the student groups evolved over time. Before the fall of Suharto, students from Forkot pressed the regime to execute a total reform of the economic, political, legal, and education sectors. While they occupied the DPR with other

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[431] Usman Hamid, op. cit.
[432] Ricklefs, op. cit., p. 407.
[433] Ricklefs, op. cit., p. 407.

student groups, Forkot pushed for Suharto's resignation. After Suharto walked out, Forkot promoted the idea of forming a committee, called the Indonesian People's Committee (*Komite Rakyat Indonesia*, KRI). The formation of KRI was supposed to achieve the following: dissolve Golkar; prosecute Suharto; and revoke the Dual Functions of the military. In contrast, FKSMJ started by promoting issues such as lowering prices.[434] When they occupied the DPR, FKSMJ pushed for the resignation of Suharto with the other student groups. After Suharto's resignation, they focused on issues such as the elimination of the New Order Regime; the eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism; the strengthening of the supremacy of law; and the recovery of the Indonesian economy. Meanwhile, KAMMI advocated for the rejection of the return of the military; the eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism; the amendment of the constitution; the enforcement of the rule of law; the recovery of the economy; and the prosecution of Suharto.

Other student organizations emerged after the fall of Suharto, some of them advocating similar agendas to each other. The Student Front for Reformation and Democracy (*Front Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Reformasi dan Demokrasi*; Famred) was a splinter group of Forkot. They demanded the same agenda as Forkot (i.e., dissolve Golkar, prosecute Suharto, revoke the Dual Functions of the Military), but the main difference between Forkot and Famred was that Famred proposed non-violent strategies to achieve their goals. Another splinter group of Forkot was the Student and People Committee for Democracy (*Komite Mahasiswa dan Rakyat untuk Demokrasi*; Komrad). Komrad demanded the revocation of the military's dual functions and the removal of the military's influence in the democratic government. They want the military

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[434] Prasetyantoko et. al. 2001.

structure dissolved.[435] There was also newly formed Islamic groups such as (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim antar Kampus*; Hammas), whose agenda was advocating for the Muslim population and lower class.

These student organizations can be split into two camps. The first camp believed that Habibie's tenure would not make a difference because he would only preserve the regime. This camp demanded a general election as the only way to transition to a democratic regime. This camp accepted that political change should be gradual and procedural. Although the first camp did not trust Habibie, they could accept Habibie's tenure as long as he would initiate gradual reforms through a general election. Thus, the realization of the students' agenda would follow the gradual process of reform set by Habibie. Although the first camp proposed accepting Habibie, the student groups in this camp required that the transition be executed under certain conditions, including: Habibie only had six months to carry out reforms; the DPR had to be cleansed from the presence of the New Order regime's apparatuses; Habibie had to execute the reforms swiftly; and Habibie would only act as the transition government. Student groups belonging to the first camp were FKSMJ, KAMMI, and Hammas.

The second camp fully rejected whatever reforms were initiated by Habibie. Habibie could not be the person in that role because he was Suharto's confidant. Students in the second camp proposed some alternatives to execute reforms. For instance, Komrad suggested the formation of the People's Council to realize the reform agenda. The council would comprise representatives from various sectors in society (e.g., student council, worker council, peasant council). The People's Council would be filled with people chosen from a series of meetings

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[435] The military structure includes the Regional Military Command (*Komando Daerah Militer*; Kodam), the District Military Command (*Komando Distrik Militer*; Kodim), and Subdistrict Military Command (*Komando Rayon Militer*; Koramil).

among the representatives. The executive government would consist of figures with a proven

track record of commitment to reforms. Once these institutions were established, they would

focus on dissolving the DPR; organizing a general election; revoking the military's dual

function; and bringing Suharto to trial.[436] Forkot also proposed the establishment of the

Indonesian People's Committee for delivering reforms. The mechanism by which people were

selected to fill the committee was unclear. Famred (a splinter group of Forkot) suggested that the

selection of the committee should be started with a People's Session. When the committee was

set up, it would organize elections. The government produced through the elections would

execute the reform agenda.[437]

These two positions became more pronounced after Suharto fell. Students from FKSMJ

and the formal student senates (e.g., the UI Student Senate, the IKIP Jakarta Student Senate)

leaned toward the first camp. FKSMJ demanded Habibie organize a general election as a step

towards democracy. Rama Pratama, the Head of the UI Student Senate, believed that the idea to

form the Indonesian People's Committee (*Komite Rakyat Indonesia*; KRI) proposed by Forkot

was too complicated and unfeasible. Pratama compared the solutions offered by FKSMJ and

Forkot:

> I imagined if Habibie replaced Suharto, he would not be legitimate. That is why I said
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> Habibie had to roll out an election. Meanwhile, Forkot and KBUI proposed the People's
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> Committee, forcing the old forces to step down. That was more complicated! We just
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> wanted a more rational option. We preferred mechanisms that could fit with the existing

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[436] McRae, 2001, p. 31.
[437] Ibid.

democratic mechanism. So, we swiftly demanded him to carry out the transition…Because the transition only had a task to organize an election. That was our issue. That is why we wanted a peaceful election. That was different from Forkot, who wanted a revolution. We could not have a revolution. Sorry, but we cannot take a revolution.[438]

Pratama could not imagine such a committee leading the revolution to revamp the Indonesian state. He said the committee would only lead to a "chaotic condition."[439] Fitra Arsil, another student activist from the UI Student Senate and Jemaah Tarbiyah, agreed. He compared the election, as a mechanism to select the new leadership of Indonesia, to Forkot's proposal to establish the People's Committee:

Our concept was we still had to be a moderate group, so our solution had to have a legitimation. We view that the democratic procedure was elections. If we aimed to form the People's Committee, we did not know the mechanisms on how to fill the committee. Who had to be the members of the committee was unclear.[440]

Arsil reiterated that Jemaah Tarbiyah did not believe in the idea of the committee formed by the students. Arsil thought such an idea was impossible to enact during a transition. Trusting democracy was the only way forward for the UI Student Senate and Jemaah Tarbiyah students. The consistency of this position was clear when they rejected an offer from the regime to sit in

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[438] Rama Pratama, op. cit.
[439] Ibid.
[440] Fitra Arsil, personal interview in Depok, November 15, 2018.

the People's Consultative Assembly.[441] Jemaah Tarbiyah believed that the offered position did

not command significant resources and power. Jemaah Tarbiyah believed that democracy should

be the way to establish a new government, not trading for power. The IKIP Jakarta Student

Senate took a similar stance. According to Basel, the Head of IKIP Jakarta Student Senate, "[we]

we wanted to press for a Special Session, but Suharto stepped down in that way, making us

confused. So, we just let the best possible mechanism which would allow an election… Praise be

to God (*alhamdulillah*) that we did not choose the people's trial. If we did that, it would turn into

chaos."[442] Muhibbuddin, the Head of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Student Senate, expressed the

same position. He said that "Forkot did not accept [Habibie], but we critically acceded to him.

We thought that he rose constitutionally and represented Islam."[443] As the national student

organization that coordinated Jemaah Tarbiyah students and Jemaah Tarbiyah-controlled Student

Senates, KAMMI took the same political stance. KAMMI insisted on the democratic process led

by Habibie, instead of supporting the second camp's proposal for establishing a new committee

to carry out the transition. KAMMI was afraid that if the second camp's proposal was realized, it

would provoke the military to take over the regime.[444]

After Habibie became the president, the first camp launched a series of student

mobilizations to guide (*mengawal*) the transition towards a democracy led by Habibie. These

mobilizations did not seek to dismantle Habibie's government since they were giving Habibie an

opportunity to execute some reforms and organize an election for selecting the future president.

One of these mobilizations took place on May 28, 1998, when FKSMJ came back to the DPR,

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[441] Ibid.
[442] Henri Basel, op. cit.
[443] Ahmad Muhibbuddin, op. cit.
[444] Kraince, 2000, p. 31.

demanding an expedited election.[445] FKSMJ students pressed the DPR to revoke the MPR

Decree 4 and 5, on the limits of presidential terms and the transfer of power between presidents,

respectively. The students pressed for a clean parliament because they believed the parliament

was still filled by people with corrupt practices.[446] At another mobilization on September 3,

1998, KAMMI organized a rally when Habibie visited a corporation in Semarang, Central

Java.[447] KAMMI students demanded Habibie to eliminate the corrupt members of the State

Logistics Agency (*Badan Urusan Logistik*; Bulog). On October 29, 1998, KAMMI, together

with HMI, launched a protest involving 400 students to reiterate their commitment to reforms.

The protestors demanded the trial of Suharto; the end of the military's dual function; and the

initiation of a general election.[448] On November 6, 1998, KAMMI held a joint protest with HMI

and a group of UI students called the Salemba Forum (*Forum Salemba*; Forsal) at UI Salemba

Campus. The protest was a warning to the government not to utilize the Special Session on

November 10–12, 1998, to legitimize the status quo. The students demanded a clean election to

be held soon; the abolition of the military's dual function; the cancellation of the *asas tunggal*

policy; and the trials for Suharto and his cronies.

Meanwhile, Forkot, Semar, some students in KBUI, and FKMC were the proponents of

the second camp, which held a series of meetings after May 21 to discuss the plan to establish

the Indonesian People's Committee. According to Hengky Irawan, a student activist from IISIP,

the second camp came up with criteria, such as lack of corruption and non-involvement in human

rights violations, for people who held the committee's leadership.[449] They proposed that the

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[445] Erd, et. al., 1998, p. D.
[446] Ibid.
[447] Kraince, op. cit., p. 35.
[448] Kraince, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
[449] Hengky Irawan, personal interview in Jakarta, November 22, 2018.

committee itself should consist of 25 people fitting the criteria. The second camp then held

rallies around Jakarta to spread the plan. For example, on June 11, 1998, Forkot launched an

attempt to occupy the DPR.[450] Although Forkot students failed to occupy the DPR, they voiced

their demand to dissolve the DPR and establish the committee. Forkot also pushed the

government to lower prices. Forkot continued their protest on October 28, 1998, when together

with other student organizations, they organized a protest in front of the DPR. They reiterated

their demands: pushing the government to organize a free and fair election; forming the

establishment of a transitional government; promoting national unity; rejecting the Special

Session proposed by the MPR; removing the military's dual function; and bringing Suharto to

trial.[451] Some FKMC students brought up ideas such as abolishing the military's dual function

and dissolving Golkar.[452]

Besides these two main camps, there were other less prominent ones. For instance, the

Trisakti Student Senate supported students with different political positions, whether they

believed in continuing to protest Habibie's tenure, keeping trusted opposition figures (i.e.,

Wahid, Sukarnoputri, Rais), or pushing formal democratic procedures.[453] Meanwhile, after

withdrawing from the DPR compound on May 20, 1998, KBUI estimated various possible

scenarios. Referring to KBUI's meeting notes on May 23, 1998, KBUI pondered two of the most

likely possible scenarios.[454] The first was that the rise of Habibie could divide the pro-reforms

group into the Islamist groups supporting Habibie and the reactionary groups opposing him.

KBUI calculated that if the Islamists' support led to the continuation of Habibie's tenure until

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[450] Nay, 1998, p. C.
[451] Bsr and Ivy, 1998, p. 1.
[452] Irfan Fahmi, personal interview in South Tangerang, November 6, 2018.
[453] John Muhammad, op. cit.
[454] Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia, 1998, *Rapat Presidium 23 Mei 1998* (Meeting Minutes).

2003, that path could lead to the rise of the military in response to the increased protests against Habibie's tenure. If the reactionary groups became more dominant, it could lead to a Special Session organized by the MPR. This path would lead to changes only at the level of the political elite. A second possible scenario considered rested on the assumption that civilians could be moved to pressure for a Special Session. The civilian movements could pressure the parties in the parliament, including the military representatives, to organize a Special Session. The Special Session could, in turn, lead to a change at the political elite level.

However, once formal democratic procedures were in place, these various ideas slowly died. Meeting notes from KBUI indicate that after Suharto's resignation, KBUI focused more on establishing an autonomous student group inside UI.[455] This move corresponded to the plan of the Ministry of Education to revoke the Ministry of Education's Decree 0457/U/1990. The UI administration gave students the opportunity to decide the best format for the student organizations that existed at UI.[456] The meeting notes also showed various paths of what had to be done. For instance, KBUI admitted that the issues that students should advocate for were becoming more diverse and complex.[457] This was in comparison to the time before Suharto's resignation when the issues were centered on ousting Suharto and fixing the corrupt system. According to the notes, KBUI should emphasize "the improvement of interactions with the society by actively forming pockets of empowerment in communities."[458]

Fragmentation within the second camp was greater than in the first. For instance, Forkot experienced fragmentation at the end of September 1998, over differing opinions on the use of

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[455] Ibid.
[456] Whd, 1998, p. C.
[457] Keluarga Besar Universitas Indonesia, 1998, *Rapat Presidium 2 Juni 1998* (Meeting Minutes).
[458] Ibid.

violence. On September 30, Forkot mobilized students for a protest outside the parliament, which

ended when the students tore down the parliament's gate. After the protest, an evaluation

meeting of Forkot activists became tense as some students disagreed with this tactic. Those who

supported it argued that violent tactics were necessary to react against state repression and create

solidarity among students.[459] Due to this disagreement, according to Abdullah Taruna from

Famred, students from 13 universities formed the Student Action Front for Democracy (*Front

Aksi Mahasiswa untuk Demokrasi*; Famred).[460] Taruna said, "Forkot was pro-violent method,

while we were developing a principle such as if we were beaten we were just silent. We were

like the prophets when their right cheek was slapped; they gave their left cheek…the other

students [Forkot] did not want to do that; they had to use violent methods."[461] The support for

different tactics divided Forkot.

From November 10–13, 1998, the MPR held the Special Session mentioned at the

beginning of this chapter. The Special Session became the moment that confirmed the further

fragmentation between the first and second camps. Before the student mobilizations by both

student camps, Habibie's government had already strengthened its defenses. The DPR, for

instance, issued a bill restricting public protests on October 26, 1998. The Bill 9/1998 on the

Freedom to Voice Aspiration in Public dictated the way citizens were allowed to express their

complaints in public spaces. The law included: an obligation to report planned protests to the

police, to provide the names of the people in charge of the planned protest, and to report the

protest plan to the host institution of the protestors. The bill formalized and limited the protests

of students, which had previously occurred without coordination with the police or universities.

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[459] Mixilmina Munir, personal interview in Jakarta, September 26, 2018.
[460] Abdullah Taruna, op. cit.
[461] Ibid.

The bill eased the way for the Habibie government to prepare and set up surveillance before a planned protest occurred. It justified repressive measures over protests. Furthermore, the bill also triggered a countermovement from Islamic groups such as Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam*; KISDI) and the Islamic Defender Front (*Front Pembela Islam*; FPI). They launched smear campaigns to undermine the student protests and framed students, especially in Forkot, as "anti-Islam," "the security disturbing movement" (*Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan*; GPK), and "Communists."[462]

Although the first and second camps proposed similar agendas, they were divided based on the strategies for achieving those agendas. The first camp opted for a collaboration with the political elites, in order to realize their agenda. On the first day of the Special Session, the first camp initiated a meeting with the opposition figures. FKSMJ students pressured opposition figures such as Wahid, Sukarnoputri, Rais, and Hamengkubuwono X to meet.[463] The students had grown impatient since the opposition figures had not moved to initiate reforms when Suharto stepped down. After hours of negotiation, the four opposition figures agreed to meet and formulated a public statement. Together with the students from the first camp, the four figures made a public statement, popularly called the Ciganjur Declaration (*Deklarasi Ciganjur*).[464] The declaration demanded for all Indonesians to maintain the unity; to return the sovereignty on the people's hands; to decentralize the government; to execute reforms by considering the interest of the future generation; to hold a clean and fair general election; to remove the military from the parliament in six years; to eradicate corruption, collusion, and nepotism; and to dissolve the citizen-based security force in the Special Session. Students played a role in the Ciganjur

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[462] Gayatri and Nurhasim, 1999, p. 222.
[463] Barton, 2002, p. 256.
[464] Ciganjur refers to Wahid's house at Ciganjur, South Jakarta where they announced the declaration.

Declaration by pressuring the four figures to meet. The four figures, however, did not have a

proven track record in supporting the students before the fall of Suharto. Wahid, for instance,

endorsed Golkar in the 1997 General Election. Sukarnoputri kept her silence during the student

protests in 1998. Rais only emerged later, when the student mobilizations had spread across

Indonesia. The students did not believe Rais when he tried to lead the students during the

occupation of the DPR. Hamengkubuwono X also never appeared in public to support the

student protests against Suharto. Based on this track record and the lack of mass support, it was

hard for the students to assert their agenda in the Ciganjur Declaration.

Although the Ciganjur Declaration successfully produced eight demands, the students

and the opposition figures initially disagreed with some of the points in the declaration. For

instance, students initially demanded the swift revocation of the military's dual function, while

political elites targeted a more gradual reduction of the military's dual function. According to

Putranto:

> One of the points of the Ciganjur Declaration was to oust the military from the parliament
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> in the 2004 General election, sorry, I meant in the 1999 General Election…We [the
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> students] typed [the declaration], and we attempted to change it because they [the four
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> figures] agreed on 2004 while we tried to change it into 1999…while they read it,
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> everybody turned their heads to us…in the end, our attempt failed, and they came out
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> with the statement that the military would leave the parliament in 2004.[465]

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[465] Wendy Putranto, op. cit.

In the end, they agreed to the revocation of the military's dual function at the end of six years period. Another disagreement came when the students demanded the prosecution of Suharto, and Wahid would not agree to it.[466] This hesitation in prosecuting Suharto showed a careful approach towards the transition by the four figures.

On the same day, students from the second camp organized a student protest. They were protesting the Special Session because the Special Session was led by Habibie and the DPR members elected from the previous election under Suharto. Some student groups such as Forkot, Famred, and KBUI joined the protests, which lasted for three days. With repressive strategies, support from Islamic organizations, and fragmentation among the students, the regime had everything in place to clamp down on the protests. During the three days of protests, a mass of people joined the students, attempting to occupy the DPR again. Nevertheless, they did not succeed in breaking the police barricade until the second day, when the mass of students and people were involved in a series of brawls with the police. One person was injured and later died. On the second day, after the violence started, the students retreated and took cover at Atmajaya University, located 3.3 kilometers from the DPR. On the third day, while the students were protesting in the afternoon, the police began suddenly shooting at them. The shooting lasted until 2:00 A.M. the next day, killing 17 people. Six of the victims were students from universities in Jakarta. This violence was the worst state repression following the shootings that caused the deaths of 4 Trisakti students on May 12, 1998. Later, people called it the "Semanggi One Tragedy" (*Tragedi Semanggi Satu*).

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[466] Barton, op. cit., p. 257.

Ultimately, the two camps of the student movement signaled the persistence of fragmentation among students. For example, Adian Napitupulu from Forkot condemned FKSMJ's tactic of collaborating with opposition figures. According to Adian:

> The method to collaborate with the elite employed by students from FKSMJ until the emergence of the Ciganjur Declaration could not be accepted by Forkot because their method was ineffective and only gave an opportunity for the old elites that failed in democratizing Indonesia.[467]

Napitupulu's criticism was shared by KBUI. Sitha, a KBUI student activist, lamented FKSMJ's tactic of cooperating with political elites. According to Sitha:

> I was most angry with [FKSMJ]. I'm fine with them kidnapping elites, but they should've taken them straight to Semanggi as a test case, to see their capacity to lead the people. Now, they were removed from the people and given a mandate of power without conditions. Terrible! When I heard about it, I was in Semanggi. I was so upset, I threw my food and scolded them: 'Bastards!' Most annoying was that the elites who claimed to be pro-reform were scared to turn to the streets, while hundreds of thousands of people were ready to be led. Only Faisal Basri and Sri Bintang Pamungkas came to Semanggi, and not for long as they also got a beating. Imagine if the leaders had joined and led the

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[467] Adian Napitupulu quoted in Yanuar H., 2005, p. 85.

people to the parliament. We could've had a revolution. We would've had a people
power movement.[468]

These criticisms by Napitupulu and Sitha confirmed the fragmentation between the first and second camps. This fragmentation meant that the first camp would not exert pressure to cancel the Special Session and the second camp was left to try to influence the political elites at the Special Session, unsuccessfully. While the FKSMJ made a deal with the political elites, the students from organizations such as Forkot, KBUI, and Famred were left out by their friends to pressure the Special Session.

The Special Session ended by incorporating the agenda of the Ciganjur Declaration, which the members of the MPR felt was reasonable. According to Abu Hasan Sazili, the Vice Chief of the Commission Two of the DPR and a member of the MPR from Golkar:

> We admitted that the four figures had a position and responsibility to the nation. Thus,
> their thought could be understood as a process towards a national reconciliation even
> though [we] did not meet directly at the MPR. But, we had the same thought between the
> four figures and the Special Session.[469]

The members of the MPR discussed the Ciganjur Declaration and adopted some demands voiced by the four figures and the students who supported the Ciganjur Declaration. The Special Session issued twelve decisions, translated as the MPR Decrees.[470] Some of the corresponding decisions

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[468] Sitha quoted in Sastramidjaja, op. cit. p. 338.
[469] Abu Hasan Sazili quoted in Al-Ngatawi, 1999, p. 148.
[470] The twelve decisions were: 1) the MPR Decree 7/1998 on the Change and Addition of the MPR Decree 1/1981 on the Change of MPR Rules; 2) the MPR Decree 8/1998 on the Revocation of the MPR

between the Special Session and the Ciganjur Declaration: the return of the sovereignty to the

people's hand (corresponded with the MPR Decree 13/1998 on the Term Limit of President and

Vice President for Maximum Two Periods); the decentralization of the Indonesian state

(corresponded with the MPR Decree 15/1998 on Local Autonomy); the demand for a general

election to legitimately replace Habibie as the transition government (corresponded with the

MPR Decree 14/1998 on the Change and Addition to the MPR Decree 3/1998 on General

Elections). Other decisions by the Special Session aimed to lift the state's restrictions under the

New Order, such as the obligation to embrace Pancasila as a social organization (corresponded

with the MPR Decree 28/1998 on the revocation of P4). By aligning the Special Session's

decisions with the Ciganjur Declaration, it marked the triumph of the first camp's gradualist

approach to the transition. The students in the first camp who accepted Habibie and the Special

Session gained an upper hand against the students in the second camp, who had rejected the

Special Session as a path towards democratization. At this point, the idea of pushing the

formation of the People's Committee lost ground, because the political elites and the students in

the first camp had successfully passed the reforms through the Special Session. The Special

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Decree 4/1993 on the Referendum; 3) the MPR Decree 9/1998 on the Revocation of the MPR Decree 2/1998 on the State Policy Guidelines (*Garis-Garis Besar Halauan Negara*; GBHN); 4) the MPR Decree 10/1998 on the Principals of Reform Developments to Save and Normalize the National Life as the State Guidelines; 5) the MPR Decree 11/1998 on the Government Free and Clean from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism; 6) the MPR Decree 12/1998 on the Revocation of the MPR Decree 5/1998 on the Special Task and Authority to President to Succeed and Secure the National Development as the Implementation of Pancasila; 7) the MPR Decree 13/1998 on the Term Limit to President and Vice President; 8) the MPR Decree 14/1998 on the Change and Addition to the MPR Decree 3/1998 on the General Elections; 9) the MPR Decree 24/1998 on the Local Autonomy; 10) the MPR Decree 26/1998 on the Politics and Economy to Fulfill Economic Democratization; 11) the MPR Decree 27/1998 on Human Rights; and 12) the MPR Decree 28/1998 on the revocation of the MPR Decree 2/1978 on the Revocation of the MPR Decree 2/1978 on the Guide to the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*; P4).

Session's decision locked down the path of reforms, by assigning Habibie and the New Order elites to guide the transition.

The Special Session granted some of the students' demands, notably reflected in the Special Session's decisions. Although these decisions would be realized at different paces, due to the need to operationalize them in formal regulations, they suggested that the transition regime had conceded to some of the demands proposed by the opposition groups and students. The pressure from the students in early 1998 had managed to force the parliament to bow to their demands. The student mobilizations that contributed to Suharto's resignation suggested that the transition regime would no longer be able to defend the New Order regime. Golkar had already signaled this when they resigned and rejected Suharto's initiative to form a reform cabinet on May 19, 1998. Considering this position, the Special Session could not take the risk of a swift return to the New Order. Thus, conceding to some of the students' proposed demands was the safest option for the regime.

The exclusion of students occurred as Indonesia proceeded to initiate the 1999 General Election. As Habibie's government prepared for the 1999 General Election, the two student camps again followed different routes. The first camp continued their mobilizations in support of the Special Session's decisions. For instance, the students joined an election monitoring organization called the University Network for Free and Fair Election (Unfrel).[471] Unfrel was funded by UNDP, and it aimed to ensure the 1999 General Election would be free and fair. The coordinator of the program, Berlian Indriansyah from Forsal, said that the organization did not only monitor the election but also educated the public on the importance of the participation in

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[471] Swe, 1999, p. 2.

the election.[472] The election monitoring program by Unfrel coordinated with the NGOs such as

the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (*Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu*; KIPP)

and other university-based election watchdog groups. The mobilization to monitor the election

was massive, as the program involved the networks of 100 universities in Indonesia, with about

159,440 volunteers in 23 provinces.[473] This election monitoring program represented the efforts

of the student organizations in the first camp, such as Forsal, to advocate for the gradualist

approach to the transition.

The second camp continued pushing their demands for the formation of the People's

Committee. On January 11, 1999, students from organizations such as KBUI, the Jakarta Front

(*Front Jakarta*), FKSMJ, Forkot, Komrad, and the Students and People Forum (*Fomara*) made a

public statement, demanding Habibie's government to stepping down and rejecting the 1999

General Election scheduled for June 1999.[474] The students did not believe that the election would

be free and fair under the supervision of Habibie's government. Famred also staged a protest on

February 19, 1999, demanding the prosecution of Suharto and his cronies.[475] Although the

students from the second camp kept demanding the committee to oversee the election, they did

not get much support, as the first camp and political elites supported a transition by Habibie. At

this point, without one unified demand, such as when the students in the first and second camp

pressed Suharto to step down after the shooting of the Trisakti students, the second camp was left

out by the opposition groups.

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[472] Ibid.
[473] Edt et. al., 1999, p. 5.
[474] Ivy, 1999, p. 1.
[475] Ivy and Emf, 1999, p. 3.

Still, the two camps tried to bridge their differences. On January 8, 1999, students from organizations such as HMI, UI, ITB, Forkot, KAMMI, FKSMJ, and UGM gathered at the National Library, Jakarta.[476] The event was organized by KAMMI to promote unity among the students from the two camps. Although 300 students gathered and demanded a unified stance on a free and fair election, the voices from the meeting were not unified. Sa'an Mustofa from HMI, for instance, emphasized the importance of the election. He said the election was important "to end today's political uncertainty."[477] Meanwhile, Napitupulu from Forkot insisted that Forkot was still supporting the idea to install the People's Committee as the transition government. The meeting was not successful in aligning the differences between the two groups in proceeding with the transition. At this point in time, it was also already too late, since the political elites and the students from the first camp had locked in the path of the 1999 General Election.

The Special Session's decisions were the only victories the students attained. They did not attempt to seize a position inside the state since their relationship to state-oriented opposition groups were weak. During the student mobilizations before May 1998, the opposition groups did not provide significant support to the students. The opposition groups also did not give them significant assistance to infiltrate the state during the transition. Consequently, there was no strong coalition between the opposition groups and students to seize the state. Their joining forces at the last minute did manage to press the Special Session to materialize some of their demands. However, they let old regime apparatuses lead the transition. The Special Session's decisions signaled that the next arena of political struggle would be the general election. This

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[476] Jakarta Post, 1999, p. 2.
[477] Ibid.

was manifested when the parliament issued three election bills on January 29, 1999.[478] Students could not play a significant role since they did not have a strong organizational basis to unify them or to compete in an electoral arena. Even though the students seemed to have the opportunity to form a solid and unified organizational base in 1997–99, they were not able to do that because they had been divided since before the crisis, due to the effect of state repression that fragmented opposition groups and students. In the face of this challenge, the opposition groups and leaders had the upper hand over the students. To make the students their partner would have required time to build the trust between the students and the opposition groups and leaders. This could only have occurred if there was a space for the opposition groups and students to interact and build trust, but such a space did not exist, because state repression limited the interactions between the opposition groups and students.

The opposition groups faced the election without systematically mobilizing students as their coalition partners. Because of their limited numbers, the students were not a part of the game competing in the election. Elections require political parties to rely on the communities that can give them the most potential voters. The students could not provide this kind of support, so the political parties did not incorporate them in the party. Meanwhile, the students themselves, especially those from the first camp, believed that the student's role should be in guarding the transition by monitoring the election. Thus, the students from the first camp did not push to align with the political parties to contribute to the election. The election results, without the students' involvement, reflected a moderate result between the opposition and the New Regime. Sukarnoputri, as the leader of the Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi*

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[478] The three bills were Bill 2/1999 on Political Parties; Bill 3/1999 on General Election; and Bill 4/1999 on the structure of MPR/DPR/DPRD.

Indonesia-Perjuangan; PDI-P), PDI's splinter party, gained success as her party won the election by winning 35.6 million votes (33%, 153 parliament seats). Under Hamzah Haz's leadership, PPP got 11.3 million votes (10.71%, 58 parliament seats). Wahid formed a new party, called the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB), which gained 13.3 million votes (12.61%, 51 parliament seats). As the head of Muhammadiyah, Rais established the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*; PAN). PAN managed to attract 7.5 million votes (7.12%, 34 parliament seats). Meanwhile, as the New Order's strongholds, Golkar and the military preserved their political influence under the new democratic regime. Although they did not win the election, Golkar was the runner-up, acquiring 23.7 million votes (22.4%, 120 parliament seats). The military and the police also got 38 free seats in the national parliament, as part of the Special Session's consensus to reduce their influence in politics gradually. Therefore, the election result represented a moderate path taken by the opposition groups and the New Order's forces without the students' input.

Not all of the opposition groups, however, maintained their distance from the students. Some opposition groups, such as Jemaah Tarbiyah and the PRD, continued their goal of infiltrating the state. Jemaah Tarbiyah initiated the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*; PK) on April 20, 1998. In general, the party stated its support for democracy; its trust in a strong government to protect citizens; and its conviction of the rule of law.[479] The party added other objectives such as increasing cooperation between *ulama*, intellectuals, and the state; creating a sharia council inside the party; reducing Western influence in Indonesian law-making; achieving Islamic solidarity and the reestablishment of the caliphate; and positioning *da'wah* as the main strategy

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[479] Diederich, 2002, p. 108.

of the party's struggle.[480] The establishment of the PK owed much to the solid bases of social

organizations such as KAMMI and Salimah, the women's wing of the party. This was true

especially of KAMMI, as the student organization supplied the PK with a university-educated

Muslim middle-class that ran the party in its early period. The role of KAMMI in supporting the

party established it as the party's main institution for cultivating its future leaders.

Nevertheless, Jemaah Tarbiyah's strong coordination with students was not enough to

compete in the general election. Although Jemaah Tarbiyah had successfully formed the PK, it

did not help enlarge the party's social base for the election. The party gained only 1.36% of the

total votes and only 7 out of the 462 total seats in DPR. The party's social bases in Indonesian

public universities were insufficient to compete with parties like the PDI-P. As university

students composed only about 2.48 million people during 1998–99,[481] they did not provide a

strong enough base of voters for the PK. Such a number proved significant in shaking the regime

during the regime transition but was not sufficient for competing in the election. Moreover,

Jemaah Tarbiyah's organizational networks were not deep enough to consolidate its social base,

as the networks existed mostly in Indonesian public universities. As explained before, Jemaah

Tarbiyah's infiltration into private universities was weak. In public universities, it faced

competition from other Islamic student groups (e.g., HMI, HMI-MPO) and leftist student groups.

Although Jemaah Tarbiyah managed to win the leadership in some big Indonesian universities

such as UI and IKIP Jakarta, it was weak in broadcasting its influence and attracting support

from other students.

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[480] Ibid., p. 109.
[481] Welch, 2007, p. 676.

Meanwhile, the leftist students' patron, the PRD, fared even worse than the PK, gaining only 78,730 votes and zero seats in the DPR. One of the main causes of this fiasco was friction inside the party. Approaching the general election, two camps emerged inside the PRD. The first camp pushed the PRD to participate in the general election while the second camp opposed this idea.[482] The second camp insisted that the PRD should continue to be an extra-parliamentary force. Another reason for the PRD's failure was its inability to transform into a mass party. It still maintained a closed structure in recruiting people to fill the party's candidate list.[483] Only those who fit the party's criteria could be party members and enrolled on the party's candidate list. This strategy was in contrast to the strategies of other parties that opened their candidate list to the public. Thus, the PRD was not ready to compete in the election, as it did make choices that set up the party to gain as much support as possible for the election. Lastly, its social bases apparently were not wide and deep enough to support it. The PRD had networks inside Indonesian universities, but the support was weak because leftist students were not a dominant force in Indonesian universities. The result of these various factors was the PRD's slump in the election.

The Preemption Path

The Indonesian students were on course to the preemption path during the 1998–99 regime transition. Based on Gamson's criteria of success, the students scored variously in the two criteria of success: new advantages and acceptance. Understood as the realization of the challenger's demands,[484] the students managed to press Habibie's government to realize some of

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[482] Novianto et. al., 2018, p. 43.
[483] Ibid.
[484] Gamson, op. cit.

their demands. In this sense, the Special Session during November 10–13 was the critical juncture for the student movements because it decided if the institutions installed by the political elites would reflect the students' demands. The Special Session was also significant for the student movements because the newly installed institutions would be able to shape the continuity of the student movements.

For students in the first camp who supported Habibie, the Special Session's decisions reflected their preference for the gradualist approach to the transition. Other decisions reflected other demands from the students in the first camp, such as terms limits for the president and vice president, the demand for local autonomy, and the demand for the immediate general election. The students, however, failed to accomplish all of their demands, such as the prosecution of Suharto, which could be considered as partially gaining new advantages. The new advantages took shape as the MPR Decrees, but they were a foundation for students and other social groups to bring pressure on the future regime. The Special Session's decisions provided a pathway for students to orient their mobilization. As the Special Session's decisions carved a pathway towards the 1999 General Election, the students in the first camp oriented their mobilizations in supporting the election. Participation from students in the UNFREL program confirmed their support to use the election as the institution to legitimize the democratic regime.

The new advantages were different for students in the second camp. They shared some similar demands with the students in the first camp but required the People's Committee to realize their demands. The Special Session's decisions did not seem to give students in the second camp any new advantages because they wanted their demands to be realized by the People's Committee. The students even experienced state repression during November 10–13, 1998, which incited their opposition against the Special Session's decisions, despite the fact that

some of their demands were met by the decisions. The students in the second camp then oriented their mobilizations to challenge the MPR Decrees, as the decrees only represented a compromise between Habibie and the opposition figures, supported by students in the first camp. They continued their mobilizations by continuing to demand the formation of the People's Committee, but without support from political elites, their mobilizations became weaker. At this point, the students in the second camp had already experienced a decline in support from other students, because the students in the first camp had already settled for supporting the Special Session's decisions, including the 1999 General Election. Thus, the students in the second camp lacked the support that could sustain their pressure to continue pushing their demands. The fragmentation between the students in the two camps significantly weakened the effort of the students in the second camp to continue their mobilization.

The inclusion of students in the state did not occur for the students in either of the two camps because the students did not have a political partner that would help them to achieve this. The state repression in the past limited the coordination between the opposition groups and the students. The students were not prepared after the resignation of Suharto with a concrete plan of what to do after such a sudden resignation. Relying on the power of the students themselves was insufficient because, without the assistance from the opposition groups, the students could not transform their destabilizing power into a more permanent power to control and realize the agenda. The role of opposition groups in guiding the students became more important, as, without them, the students could not devise a concrete plan to infiltrate the Indonesian state. Without such a plan, the students had to accept the transitory nature of their power. The transitory nature of their power only permitted them to play the role as the initiator of change. The students successfully became the first political actors to challenge the regime. The students

played the role of the initiator of change effectively until the resignation of Suharto. Going

beyond that role, however, was impossible due to the lack of assistance from the opposition

groups.

The students from the two camps, however, had similar stances regarding their inclusion

in the state. Although the students from both camps had different opinions about who should

have led the transition, students from both camps seemed to prefer the political elites to lead the

transition. Students in the first camp accepted Habibie and the four political figures to lead the

gradualist path to democracy. For students in the first camp, students should not lead the

transition. According to Arsil:

> So we understood that students should push for the real change but not now [during the
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> transition]. [The change] would not happen when we were students…the change would
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> occur when we became the decision-makers…We should start the change from ourselves,
>
> so we must change our personality first. The change was impossible when we only
>
> change the issue or public opinions…We understood that the change must be gradual. It
>
> had to be gradual, so the gradual change would happen at the individual level, family
>
> level, societal, and state. Changing the state must start from ourselves.[485]

Arsil suggests that the students in the first camp favored not pushing to take over the leadership

of the transition because of their belief in the gradual process of change. For members of Jemaah

Tarbiyah, such as Arsil, the path to enter the state was through the formation of political parties

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[485] Fitra Arsil, op. cit.

such as the PK. Meanwhile, students in the second camp preferred to give the mandate to the People's Committee, which was supposed to be filled by pro-reform figures. This signaled that the students in the second camp also did not see themselves as ready to infiltrate the state.

The endpoint of the challenge posed by the Indonesian student movements was the 1999 General Election. This study utilizes the definition of regime transition by O'Donnell et. al. as "the interval between two political regimes."[486] According to this definition, the transition was between the fall of Suharto and the election. The Special Session decided that the transition government must hold an election in June 1999. The election played a key role in shaping the role of the students. First, it cemented the preemption path. With the election, only those who had the capacity to establish a political party who could participate in the competition to control the state. Sukarnoputri, Wahid, and Rais had the social bases for competing in the election, but the students did not have such bases. Thus, the election was a barricade between the students and the state because, without assistance from the opposition groups, the students were not able to transform themselves into a political movement to infiltrate the state. Second, the election marked the beginning of a stable situation under which protests in the street would not wield power. The students' destabilizing power decreased because the election was the main mechanism to circulate power. The return to normal democratic procedures implies that the students' destabilizing power was tied to the crisis. Only under a crisis could the characteristics of students, such as the concentrated life in dormitories, the free space of interactions in the campus, and the abundance of free time, enable them to become the initiator of change and challenge the regime. When the crisis was over, the role of students as the initiator of change

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[486] O'Donnell et. al., op. cit.

also subsided. Third, the 1999 General election functioned to supply legitimacy to the new

democratic regime. The rise of Habibie was not expected or demanded by either political elites

or the students. Prolonging his tenure would have created a government without sufficient

legitimacy to govern. The election gave the newly elected democratic regime a justification to

rule that ended the students' role as the initiator of change.

From the opposition groups' point of view, the decisions made by the Special Session

were the best outcome. The four figures were not directly involved in the confrontation with the

New Order regime. To some extent, they had occupied a position inside the New Order political

system. Regardless of the repression of the PDI, Sukarnoputri still competed in the elections

under the New Order. Rais occupied a position at ICMI until his fallout ended his relationship

with the regime in the late New Order period. Wahid never strongly opposed the regime.

Hamengkubuwono X never appeared in the opposition against the regime during the New Order.

Thus, the four figures who announced the Ciganjur Declaration were all taking moderate stances

against the regime before the regime transition, and such a political stance shaped their actions

after the fall of Suharto, exemplified by their support of the Special Session's decisions. This, in

addition to their social bases, contributed to the preemption outcome.

Meanwhile, the student movements worked as the vehicle for the political elites' choice

of the gradualist approach, which led to the preemption path. Without strong coordination and

assistance between the opposition groups and students before the regime transition, the political

elites did not have any incentive to make a strong and sustainable alliance beyond the regime

transition. The students, however, were useful for the elites as the initiator of change, through

which the political elites benefitted as long as it didn't turn into a chaotic condition that would

allow the old regime to reclaim power through coercion (i.e., the military). This is why, after the

fall of Suharto, the People's Committee was never a favorable alternative for political elites, because it would create too much uncertainty. The option for a gradual transition through an election was more beneficial for the political elites because it provided them time to prepare without having to directly face the coercive force of the military. The election helped political elites to exclude the students as the students' destabilizing power was not needed after the Special Session had decided on the election as the mechanism to transfer power to a democratic regime. The students' destabilizing power was not useful anymore.

The path to preemption was forged by the establishment of the same key institutions that swiftly excluded the students from the state. The preemption path suggested that the political elites and the election were key obstacles for the students to move beyond their role as the initiator of change. With weak coordination and assistance from the opposition groups, the students and political elites were involved in an interaction that did not result in a more stable coalition. Without a coalition to help them infiltrate the state, the students were only able to fulfill their role as the initiator of change.

Conclusion

The strong Indonesian state repression heavily impacted the level of coordination and assistance of the opposition groups to the students in the 1990s. Since the coordination between the opposition groups and the students was weak, it left the students as the only actor potentially able to oppose the regime when the crisis struck in 1997. No strong opposition groups coordinated with the students to develop and prepare for the crisis. Small opposition groups such as Jemaah Tarbiyah and PRD were influential among students. Nevertheless, their influences were more divisive than unifying. The narratives of competition among the students confirm this

argument. These narratives are a confirmation of how state repression produced a fragmentation effect, not only on the opposition groups but on the students. The repression marginalized some groups, as well as created narratives that were used to reinforce the marginalization. Students followed and reproduced the same narratives by utilizing the regime's political discourse (e.g., anti-communist) when competing with other students. Consequently, in the mid-1990s, as students employed the same divisive narratives, they reproduced the fragmentation among themselves. This same division transformed into a larger division when they mobilized in February to May of 1998. Even after Suharto stepped down, the division persisted, transforming into pro- and contra- positions on the Habibie-led transition. The Indonesian state repression from the 1960s to the 1980s had an enduring impact in the 1990s.

At the point when the students had a stark difference over their stances on the Habibie-led transition, the opposition groups had already given up on them. The opposition groups decided to follow the transition as carved out by Habibie. Especially after the Special Session agreed to hold an election, the opposition groups spent their energy more on preparing their parties to compete in the election. The students were no longer part of the political process. The students may have gotten some important parts of their agenda included in the Special Session's decisions, but they were never a part of the group that could control the implementation of their agenda within the state. Opposition groups like Jemaah Tarbiyah and PRD tried to merge with students, but while they were strong enough to mobilize students in the 1990s, they were fringe political actors compared to the other opposition groups. Their cases suggest that weak opposition groups could not coordinate and provide strong assistance to students.

Chapter Five

Comparisons

Introduction

This study seeks to explain the different types of student movement success in Guatemala and Iran as a comparison with the Indonesian student movements. This study has argued that there are two other possible types of student movement success. One path is full response. In full response, students gain access to the state, usually through the legislature, and have ongoing and powerful instruments to ensure their agenda is addressed. The other path is cooptation. The new regime coopts students during the regime transition without giving them new advantages. The cases of Guatemala and Iran exemplify these two types, respectively. Specifically, the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution shows how Guatemalan students became formally incorporated into the Guatemalan state. They also acquired new advantages given by the new regime, such as special privileges to lead reforms, especially in the education sector. In contrast, the 1979 Iranian Revolution demonstrates how the Khomeini-led regime incorporated and subdued the students without giving them a substantial role in gaining new advantages. The two cases function as a gauge of the possibilities of students' successfully implementing their agendas and demands in the wake of major regime transitions. They illuminate to what extent the different degrees of key variables (i.e., state repression, coordination, assistance) can lead to different types of student movement success.

My plan is to explain how the degree of repression, coordination, and assistance in Guatemala and Iran shaped the different types of success, in comparison to the Indonesian case. This study relies mostly on the literature on revolution and regime transition in these two

countries to do this. In both cases, this study starts by briefly describing the social backgrounds

of the two countries. This study proceeds to the episodes of state repression and how they

impacted the coordination between the opposition groups and students in both countries. This

study continues by outlining the assistance given by the opposition groups during the regime

transitions. Finally, this study explains how these factors led to the different types of student

movement success, comparing them to the experience of the Indonesian student movements in

1998–99.

Guatemala

Guatemala was a Spanish colony from the sixteenth century until its independence in

1821. After independence, Guatemala witnessed an enduring rivalry between the conservatives

and the liberals. Their main conflict concerned Guatemala's transformation from a traditional to

a modern society. This fault line of conflict occurred in almost every sector. The most

contentious issue was Guatemala's economic structure. For instance, the conservatives pushed

for a vagrancy law in 1829.[487] The law forced the unemployed indigenous population, the

Indians, to do public works. Two years later, the liberals revoked the law. They canceled

the obligatory work and exchanged it with personal services such as work in farms and mines.[488]

The liberals also successfully replaced the demand for construction work by the Indians with a

head tax.[489]

When they gained control over the Guatemalan state in the late 1890s, the liberals began

opening the Guatemalan economy, to meet the demands of the international market, especially

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[487] Dawson, 1965, p. 125.
[488] Ibid.
[489] Ibid.

for coffee. To foster the coffee economy, the regime under President Justo Rufino Barrios (1873-1885), initiated the development of a market economy through infrastructure projects.[490] Barrios needed the projects since the coffee economy required reliable infrastructures to cultivate and transport coffee to the international market. Barrios cemented the modernization of the Guatemalan economy in the 1879 Constitution. Article 20 of the constitution specifically stated that the Guatemalan state-guaranteed freedom of establishing industries; prohibition of monopolies; and restriction of special privileges.[491] Although the constitution stated the formal commitment towards the liberalization of the economy, the implementation of the constitution was inconsistent. The regime often relaxed the implementation by making exceptions for entrepreneurs. For instance, it provided fiscal incentives and tariff protections to entrepreneurs. The constitution also authorized the regime to grant quasi-monopolistic privileges to entrepreneurs who invested in new industries.[492]

The Guatemalan state further deepened economic liberalization by opening the influx of foreign capital, especially from the United States (US), which replaced the existing British and German capital. The US further entrenched its influence during the period of 1897-1921. Within this period, US investments increased from US$ 6.0 million (1897) to US$ 58.8 million.[493] The presence of three major US companies, the International Railways of Central America, the United Fruit Company, and the Electric Bond and Share of New York, represented the influence of the US in Guatemala. The presence of these three companies entrenched US influence, since they were companies in vital sectors (i.e., transportation, food, and electricity).

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[490] Ibid., p. 129; Dosal, 1987, p. 46.
[491] Ibid., p. 48.
[492] Ibid., p. 48.
[493] Ibid., p. 66.

In February 1931, while overshadowed by the devastation of the Great Depression, Guatemala was led by Jorge Ubico. A military general, Ubico successfully recovered Guatemala from the global economic depression. He improved the regime's economic capacity, guaranteeing the national credit that enabled Guatemala to recover from the crisis.[494] He continued the policy to prioritize market liberalization by suppressing the working class. He applied the vagrancy law, which coerced men without land to do hard labor. He also forced the indigenous communities to work on infrastructure projects. The salaries were kept at a low level. Meanwhile, to support the landowners, Ubico passed a law that allowed them to defend their land through their own actions.

The impact of Ubico's liberalization policy, however, was the enlargement of the new middle class.[495] The liberalization of the economy established new areas of settlements. Investments came into these new areas, spurring economic growth.[496] This economic growth necessitated the rise of small industries and service professions.[497] It also caused the development of middle-class jobs, such as service provision, managerial jobs, sales, and clerical work. To tap economic growth, the state needed to enlarge the state apparatuses. Bureaucracy and security apparatuses (i.e., the military, the police) grew under Ubico. The military officers even became a privileged group because the military also enjoyed the liberalization policy. Since the officers possessed the estates that produced the export commodities, liberalization benefited them. Ubico also militarized his tenure by inaugurating more military officers into public office.

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[494] Ibid., p. 85.
[495] Grieb, 1976, p. 525.
[496] Ibid.
[497] Ibid.

For instance, Ubico replaced civilian governors with military officers. In 1944, he commanded 80 generals who were in charge of around 15,000 men.[498]

Although economic liberalization had successfully inserted Guatemala into the world economy, it also planted the seed of the opposition groups that exploded in the 1944 revolution. The opposition groups had actually emerged in the 1920s when Guatemalan students formed the Association of University Students (AEU) to lead a revolt against the dictator Estrada Cabrera.[499] Their roles expanded after the revolution, as the revolution granted universities autonomy and the right to form a collective university government by students and the university administration. The reforms, however, stopped after Ubico rose to power. He halted the students' power by suppressing them. For instance, Ubico repressed students when they attempted to participate in the 1931 *Huelga de Dolores*, an annual student protest celebration.[500] Ubico restricted the event and publications about the event during his tenure. The students started reorganizing their movement in 1940 when the University of San Carlos' medical students celebrated the second centennial of their College. They invited students from other universities, reinvigorating old networks. The students began producing non-political publications to reach other students. The students' publication Study (*Studium*) was an example. Although Ubico restricted political publications by students, *Studium* became an arena for students to meet, act collectively, and develop a common platform to oppose Ubico.[501] The students also started discussion groups such as The Right (*El Derecho*), established on October 20, 1940.[502] This organization was clandestine in nature. Driven by law students, it sought to establish ethical

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[498] Ibid., p. 526.
[499] Petersen, 1971, p. 56.
[500] Ibid., p. 57.
[501] Ibid., p. 61.
[502] Ibid., p. 63.

principles of law students; to prepare students as cultural agents for society; and to establish and expand networks with other students.[503] The leadership of *El Derecho* would become the leader of the 1944 revolution and played a significant role in the reforms. *El Derecho* members would occupy important political positions such as secretary of public education, president of the legislature, and deputy in the legislature. Besides *El Derecho*, other student organizations such as the Medical Youth (*La Juventud Médica*), the Engineering Students Association (*la Asociacioń de Estudiantes de Ingeneriá*), the Association of Students of Natural Science and Pharmacy (*la Asociacioń de Estudiantes de Ciencias Naturales y Farmaciá*), the Association of Students of Economic Sciences (*la Asociacioń de Estudiantes de Ciencias Economicas*), and the Dental Youth (*la Juventud Odontológica*) also sprung up in the 1940s.[504] The culmination of the growth of student organizations was the revival of the AEU in 1943. The AEU's networks became the backbone of the unification of Guatemalan students in challenging Ubico.

World War II also reinforced the Guatemalan students. The war inspired students to employ democracy as the base of their demands. Values related to democracy, such as equality and justice, also permeated students' demands.[505] This made sense, as the students' demands were due to a war that propagated the battle of democracy and freedom (the Allies) versus totalitarianism (the Axis). The war also split Ubico's regime. Ubico sided with the Allies, which separated him from the German capital, especially the German planters. He confiscated land from the planters and drove them out of Guatemala. The flight of the Germans weakened Ubico

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[503] Ibid., p. 63.
[504] Ibid., p. 66.
[505] Ibid., p. 69.

since they contributed to the growth of the Guatemalan economy. Ubico's act also caused

complaints among the businessmen who were his supporters.[506]

The weakening of Ubico provoked the opposition groups to join the student

mobilizations. Lawyers, teachers, and military officers were some of the prominent social groups

that helped students. In May 1944, for instance, 45 lawyers signed a petition to force the

resignation of judges who prosecuted political prisoners.[507] At the same time, teachers pushed

their demands for a wage increase.[508] In addition, the domination of the military officers favored

by Ubico provoked grievances among the junior military officers.[509] These junior military

officers came from the *Escuela Politécnica*, the Guatemalan military academy.[510] Inspired by the

West Point Academy in the US, Ubico had started the academy to support his vision of

increasing professionalism in the military. The junior military officers were exposed to the

academy's professional values, such as meritocracy. The privilege given to the senior military

officers was at odds with what the junior military officers had learned in the academy. Their

estrangement was a turning point that pushed them to assist the student protests in 1944.

Taking the opportunity of the weakening of Ubico, students escalated their movement.

They started demanding the resignation of the deans and administrators who had become the

extension of Ubico's power at the universities.[511] For instance, in May 1944, medical students

and economics students called for the resignation of their deans. This demand developed into a

demand for the autonomy of all Guatemalan universities. Students wanted the regime to restore

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[506] Ibid., p. 71.
[507] Ibid., p. 72.
[508] Ibid., p. 72.
[509] Grieb., op. cit., p. 527.
[510] Grieb., op. cit., p. 527.
[511] Petersen, op. cit., p. 73.

the universities' autonomy, like in the 1920s. Ubico conceded to the students' demands. For

instance, he replaced the dean in the Law School. Nevertheless, his efforts only provoked larger

support for the students. In June 1944, support for the AEU grew, as students from different

departments and schools joined the opposition. Students also received support from secondary

school teachers. They sought students' help to press the regime to release their friends from

prisons and reemploy them.[512] Lawyers groups in the capital also reiterated their commitment to

supporting the AEU.

Because of the massive protests, Ubico tried to appease the critics by inviting the students

for a negotiation. Represented by his secretary, Ernesto Rivas, the regime negotiated with the

students in June 1944. Rivas agreed to some of the students' demands, such as the replacement

of the deans of the Fakultas of Law. Nevertheless, these concessions only fueled further demands

by the students for things like a reorganization of the university authorities; reforms of rules and

regulations; an expansion of technical schools for workers; the creation of schools of humanities

and education, and an Institute of Indian Studies; students' involvement in solving university

matters; freedom of expression and the press in the university; and autonomy of the

universities.[513] The expansion of their demands enraged Ubico, who froze the constitution on

June 22, 1944, prompting a deadlock. At this point, Ubico's resignation seemed to be the

inevitable outcome.

Instead of reducing student activism, the students' insistence on Ubico's resignation only

gathered more support. For instance, young professionals affiliated with the Social Democratic

Party (*El Partido Social Democrático*) supported the students by presenting a petition to the

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[512] Petersen, op. cit., p. 76.
[513] Petersen, op. cit., p. 78.

regime, signed by 311 prominent figures in Guatemala. Teachers also supported the students. On June 23, teachers and the AEU held a two-day silent protest. Middle-class residents and workers joined them on the second day. The protest had become a movement that demanded Ubico's resignation. Ubico made a last attempt to clamp down on the unified protest. On June 25, 1944, a small group of soldiers with canons arrived in the capital. A clash between the soldiers and the protestors was inevitable, and a young woman died. Ubico's failure to subdue the protestors led to his resignation at the end of June 1944.

Ubico's resignation, however, did not completely erase his influence over the successive regime. A junta consisting of three generals replaced Ubico: Federico Ponce Vaides, Eduardo Villagra Ariza, and Buenaventura Pineda.[514] They were close to Ubico, and they maintained his repressive measures against the protestors. For instance, although the junta promised a general election, it still repressed the protest and suspended the press. The junta also made a move on July 4, 1944. With the protest outside of the National Assembly, Ponce forced the members of the assembly to appoint him as the provisional president of Guatemala. This was the junta's effort to preserve its influence during the transition. Under Ponce's leadership, the junta also selected ministers who had a close association with Ubico, such as Minister of Foreign Relations Carlos Salazar; Military Commander of the Plaza General Roderico Anzueta; and Private Secretary to the Presidency Ernesto Rivas.[515]

At this point, the opposition groups and students had already formed strong coordination and developed their movement to seize the Guatemalan state. The opposition groups and students advanced this objective by forming political parties. For instance, Juan Jose Arevalo, a reformist

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[514] Grieb, op. cit., p. 532.
[515] Grieb, op. cit., p. 533.

and a professor exiled in Argentina, formed the National Renovation Party (*Partido Nacional Renovador*; PNR). The party gathered support mostly from teachers. Students also formed the Popular Liberation Front (*Frente Popular Libertador*; FPL).[516] Julio César Méndez Montenegro, the president of El Derecho, became the president of the party. The FPL joined forces with the PNR in August 1944, transforming the two parties into the Revolutionary Action Party (*Partido de Acción Revolucionaria*; PAR). The rise of the PAR marked the strengthening of the coordination between the students and opposition groups. Now, Guatemalan students were no longer the only actor at the front of the opposition against the regime. They joined forces with teachers, supporting PAR. To face the election, PAR agreed to back Arevalo as its main candidate. Meanwhile, the junior military officers had prepared themselves. They started plans to take over the current leadership, instigated by their dissatisfaction with the senior military officers. Led by Javier Arana and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, the junior military weaved connections with the alliance of teachers and students.

Ponce's ambition to retain the old regime became clearer when he approached the assembly to amend the constitution. He specifically targeted the election rule that did not allow candidates to run unless they had resigned from their current office. Ponce also mobilized the Indigenous communities to form a counter-movement against the students and workers. On National Day (September 15), he transported hundreds of Indians with machetes to the capital. He intended to use them as a counter-movement to the alliance between students and workers. The opposition also alleged Ponce was the man behind the assassination of Alejandro Córdova, the owner-editor of *El Imparcial*, a national publisher. After that, Ponce pursued Cordova's

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[516] Vrana, op. cit., p. 41.

successors to ensure they would not smear the regime and provoke the protestors. He drove out

Andrian Recinos, another candidate for the upcoming election. Ponce was eliminating his

competitors in the election.

In October 1944, the protestors increased their pressure to oust the regime. On October

19, 1944, led by Arana and Arbenz, the junior military officers assisted the opposition groups

and students by launching a coup. The next day, the young officers of the National Guard took

control of the Matamoros Barracks and San José Castle. These places were crucial for the coup

since they stored ammunitions and weapons for the military. After seizing the two sites, the

young military officers distributed some 2,000 to 3,000 weapons to troops and protestors.[517]

Arana and Guzman led the coup by commanding the state guards who held important

instruments for threatening the regime, such as weapons and tanks. The next day, the protestors

added to the pressure by protesting in the capital city. Ponce could no longer hold the regime. He

resigned and flew from Guatemala, following Ubico. Another junta led the regime, comprising

Arana, Guzman, and Jorge Toriello, a representative from the upper middle-class. After they

took over, the junta promised to hold an election and establish a constituent assembly. The

opposition groups and students had played their usual role in toppling a regime. In the election,

Arevalo won by a landslide. The junta announced he was the winner on December 19, 1944.

Arevalo incorporated students and recent university graduates as the backbone of his

tenure. For instance, he included recent graduates in filling the positions in the executive branch,

as representatives in the legislative assembly, and as delegates in the Constitutional Assembly.[518]

The students became "student-statesmen," a role they had never had before.[519] As student-

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[517] Vrana, op. cit., p. 42.
[518] Vrana, op. cit., p. 43.
[519] Vrana, op. cit., p. 44.

statesmen, they joined the Congressional Education Commission (CEC) to launch educational reforms. They issued the Decree 12 of CEC that formally praised and recognized Guatemalan universities and students for their roles during the regime transition to topple Ubico.[520] They also granted autonomy to Guatemalan universities, especially the National University. The regime formally renamed the National University as the University of San Carlos, reclaiming the university's name during the colonial era.[521] Dissatisfied with just autonomy, the student-statesmen of CEC expanded it, in line with their demands before the fall of Ubico. A university could now reach beyond the capital by establishing branches and extension programs.[522] Student-statesmen also allowed the university to arrange its own curriculum to adapt to society's needs.[523] At the same time, the regime could no longer intervene in the university's matters. The student-statesmen initiated two programs in mathematics and the humanities. The student-statesmen projected the university would produce new Guatemalan youths who would not adhere to "mediocrity, sensationalism, and mercantilism," but would instead act based on "faith, courage, and self-sacrifice."[524]

Furthermore, the Guatemalan student-statesmen assisted Arevalo in designing the new constitution by filling positions in the Constitutional Assembly and executing some key reforms. The student-statesmen filled fourteen out of fifteen seats in the Commission of Fifteen that drafted the new constitution. In their deliberations, student-statesmen carved reforms into the constitution, such as introducing limited universal suffrage, launching literacy programs, and setting up social reforms. They also initiated the National Indigenous Institute (*Nacional*

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[520] Vrana, op. cit., p. 44.
[521] Vrana, op. cit., p. 44.
[522] Vrana, op. cit., p. 44.
[523] Vrana, op. cit., p. 44.
[524] Vrana, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

Indigenista Institute), which aimed to amend the relationship between the state and the indigenous communities. In the education sector, the student-statesmen pushed education reforms as their main goal. The student-statesmen pushed the regime to build hundreds of new primary and secondary schools.[525] They also cleared the way for the returning exiled professors and students to foster the reforms by employing their knowledge and experience. The student-statesmen pushed reforms for teachers to restructure their professional credentials and reformulate their teaching methods.[526] These reforms aligned with their demands to develop and expand Guatemalan education.

The Arevalo-led regime's reception of students and the granting of new advantages represented the vital tie that the students had with the opposition groups. The teachers and the junior military officers were the two elements that elevated the Guatemalan student movements in toppling Ubico and occupying a position inside the Guatemalan state. The coalition with the teachers that resulted in the formation of the PAR increased the strength of both Guatemalan teachers and students. Their role would not have been possible without the weak state repression that provided an opportunity for the opposition groups to grow and coalesce with students. The junior military officers were another important element in the coalition. Without the military, the teachers and students would not have had sufficient firepower to take over the Guatemalan state. The military was decisive in bringing teachers and students into the state since the military had only one goal: to take over the state through the coup. It did not aim to be a force outside the state (e.g., a guerilla group). The military's objective was in line with PAR, which intended to win by election, not by the seizure of the Guatemalan state. For Arevalo, the coalition's support

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[525] Vrana, op. cit., p. 51.
[526] Vrana, op. cit., p. 51.

through the establishment of PAR and the military assistance in the October Coup was convincing evidence that the coalition would be useful for his tenure. He then included the coalition in planning and executing the reforms by giving them positions inside the state. At least until 1951, the students and opposition groups could initiate reforms reflecting their ideals. Especially in education reforms, the student-statesmen enjoyed an autonomy to revamp the education sector by expanding the reach of universities as well as restructuring curriculums and teaching methods. Although they could not initiate a whole restructuring of the Guatemalan state and society, the students' autonomy and their execution of reforms demonstrated that the regime included them and gave them new advantages.

The path of Guatemala was different from that of Indonesia. The impact of weak state repression allowed the growth of teachers and students and permitted them to form a more unified group under PAR. There were several moments of state repression, such as the suspension of newspapers and the repression of the Guatemalan Communist Party. Nevertheless, those moments did not match the repression that occurred in Indonesia. In Indonesia, state repression in the transition to the New Order eliminated the left. It not only crushed the party leadership but also destroyed its links to affiliated organizations, including the student organization (i.e., CGMI). The magnitude of destruction was also incomparable because the New Order regime launched a politicide that took approximately 500,000 lives. Furthermore, the repression continued under the New Order, debilitating the nationalists, Islamists, and the left. It left only marginal opposition groups from the left and the Islamists, who managed to form weak ties with Indonesian students in the 1980s. These ties, however, were not sufficient to face the transition since they were not able to infiltrate the state, although they aspired to do so. The previous degree of state repression in Guatemala and Indonesia set the distinct types of success

of their student movements. While the regime formally granted some of the Indonesian students' demands, it did not allow them to achieve a position inside the state, reflecting the inability of the opposition groups to support the students.

Iran

The rapid modernization of Iran started in 1925, when General Reza Khan proclaimed himself a shah (i.e., Reza Shah) after toppling Ahmad Shah, the last descendant in the Qajar Dynasty.[527] Under Reza Shah's reign, Iran transformed from a traditional society into a modern one. His modernization ignited the formation of a strong, centralized Iranian modern state. The state-building under Reza Shah focused on two components: the military and the bureaucracy. The Iranian military grew from 22,000 soldiers in 1921 to 127,00 soldiers in 1941.[528] The state bureaucracy expanded from a collection of semi-independent political communities led by noblemen in 1921 to a state with 11 ministries and 90,000 salaried civil servants.[529]

The expansion of the Iranian state occurred because of the increasing revenues from four sources: oil, expanded base of taxpayers, higher custom duties, and consumer goods taxes.[530] Oil revenues increased from £ 1,288,000 in 1921 to £ 4,000,000 in 1941.[531] The tax reforms eliminated the old tax-farms, updated old rates, tightened opium levies, and reorganized the old system of noblemen. The presence of the military greatly assisted tax extraction, since the newly initiated modern bureaucracy had to deal with the old noblemen, who resisted the extraction of their wealth. Trade revenues soared due to a higher customs rate. In 1921, Iran received only 51

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[527] Abrahamian, 2008, p. 65.
[528] Ibid., p. 67.
[529] Ibid., p. 67.
[530] Ibid., p. 67.
[531] Ibid., p. 67.

million rials, which increased to 675 million rials in 1940. The overall state income also rose

from 246 million rials in 1925–26 to 3,610 million rials in 1940–41. An estimation suggested

that 34% of the income went to the expansion of the military.[532]

Reza Shah infused the Iranian state building with his own patronage network. His method

was to place his favorites inside the expanding state networks. For instance, he restructured eight

old provinces into fifteen. For the governors of these provinces, Reza Shah placed governors-

generals, picked through the Interior Ministry. Reza Shah also accumulated vast lands collected

from the old landlords. It is estimated that by the end of his tenure, Reza Shah had gathered

about 3 million acres of land. He gathered the lands by employing state apparatuses. For

instance, he put a family in prison and freed them when they agreed to sell the land.[533] Reza Shah

also restructured the parliament (*Majles*). He designed the new parliament as a rubber stamp

institution.[534] He kept the parliamentarians as an elected position, but he screened the candidates

who could sit as the parliamentarians. He prioritized the landowners and his confidants to be the

parliamentarians. To do so, Reza Shah picked his favorites and passed their names to the

Ministry of Interior. The ministry then ensured that the elections would favor these names

through the manipulation of ballot boxes.[535] Reza Shah also culled his favorites for his cabinet.

Culturally, Reza Shah aimed to transform Iranian society. He specifically referred to

Western society as the model, although he still attempted to embrace religion as the pillar of his

power. For instance, he reformed Iranian education by building more schools and expanding

enrollment. In 1923, there were only 91,000 Iranian students, while by 1941, there were

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[532] Ibid., p. 68.
[533] Ibid., p. 72.
[534] Ibid., p. 73.
[535] Ibid., p. 73.

250,000.[536] Higher education enrollment increased from 600 students in 1925 to 3,300 by

1941.[537] Reza Shah instilled state influence in the seminaries. He selected the students who could

enroll in the seminaries and chose who could teach them.[538] He maintained the funding of the

seminaries and exempted theology students from conscription. Through cultural reform, Reza

Shah provided a place for religions, especially Islam, within the Iranian state. His reluctance to

completely sweep the Islamists from Iranian society would later create a problem for his son,

Reza Pahlavi. The Islamists would be the archenemy of the second shah.

A regime change occurred in 1941, when the British and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR) invaded the country, dividing it into Northern Iran, occupied by the USSR,

and Southern Iran, controlled by the British. Reza Shah had to give his power to his son, Reza

Pahlavi. Pahlavi maintained control over the military, although he no longer had firm control

over the bureaucracy and patronage system built by his father.[539] The new regime gave noblemen

an opportunity to reclaim their power, previously taken by Reza Khan. They reorganized under

the new regime. For example, in the 1941–53 period, 12 prime ministers who held power had

noble or upper-class backgrounds.[540] The monarch had to step aside and let the old power seize

the Iranian state. The domination of the noblemen rested on their control over *Majles*,

represented by four groups: the Freedom or Liberal (*Azadi*), the Tribal (*Fraksiun-e 'Eshayer*),

the National Union (*Ettehad-e Melli*), and the Fatherland (*Mehan*).[541] *Majles* held a strong

influence over vital matters such as passing bills, electing prime ministers and cabinets, and

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[536] Ibid., p. 84.
[537] Ibid., p. 85.
[538] Ibid., p. 85
[539] Ibid., p. 99.
[540] Ibid., p. 102.
[541] Ibid., p. 104.

terminating the tenure of prime ministers and cabinets. The power of *Majles* marginalized Pahlavi, limiting his power to just command over the military.

The marginalization of Pahlavi paved the way for brief emergences of opposition groups. For instance, while the noblemen controlled the Iranian state, the Tudeh Party was formed. The communist-leaning party was started by Iraj Iskandari, a graduate from Europe, who had been exposed to European socialist and communist movements. The party gained popularity in 1945–46. It claimed to have 50,000 core members and 100,000 sympathizers.[542] By 1945, the party led 33 affiliated unions with 275,000 members.[543] The party also gathered support from the Iranian middle-class and intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, architects, musicians, and university professors.[544] Their popularity, however, started waning in 1945–46 when the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) pressed for an oil concession in Northern Iran and supported the independence of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The USSR's move damaged the Tudeh Party. The nationalists saw that the Tudeh Party was in the same camp as the USSR, as proponents of the Leftist ideology. The Tudeh Party's leftist leanings marginalized the party from the nationalists, who saw the USSR as exercising colonialism in Iran. Furthermore, the USSR's support on Kurdistan and Azerbaijan provoked the nationalists to oppose the Tudeh Party. The nationalists perceived the USSR as attempting to break Iran. The Tudeh Party could not escape from such a charge. The regime repressed the Tudeh Party heavily in 1949, based on the accusation that they were helping the secessionist movements in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The regime and the British arranged for a revolution in Southern Iran that targeted the Tudeh Party in the provinces

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[542] Ibid., p. 108.
[543] Ibid., p. 109.
[544] Ibid., p. 110.

such as Bushire, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, and Kermanshah.[545] The regime also declared martial

law as a pretext to prosecute the Tudeh Party's leadership, members, and the party's offices.[546] In

February 1949, Pahlavi utilized an assassination attempt against him as a pretext to announce

nationwide martial law, ban the party, close newspapers, arrest more of the Tudeh Party's

members, and sentence death in absentia for the party's surviving members.[547] Although the

assassination attempt did not relate to the Tudeh Party, Pahlavi exploited the moment not only to

repress the party but also to restore his power. Pahlavi forced the Constitutional Assembly to

expand his power so that he could fill *Majles* with his favorites and recover his old estates.[548]

The fall of the Tudeh Party initiated the return of the monarch to Iranian politics.

The fall of the Tudeh Party paved the way for the nationalists. The nationalists created

the National Front, led by Mohammad Mossadegh, a coalition of political parties consisting of

the Iran Party, the Toilers Party, the National Party, and the Tehran Association of Bazaar Trade

and Craft Guilds.[549] The National Front seized power in 1951 when Mossadegh became the

Prime Minister. He mobilized Iranians to support his mission to nationalize the oil industry and

pressured *Majles* to agree to his nationalization bill. He established the National Iranian Oil

Company (NIOC) to bargain with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).[550] The negotiation

failed and ended in a takeover of the latter by the former. The takeover enraged the British,

which lost its oil supply from Iran. Mossadegh also dismantled Pahlavi's power when

Mossadegh attempted to reform the electoral law in mid-1952.[551] Mossadegh granted himself the

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[545] Ibid., p. 112.
[546] Ibid., p. 112.
[547] Ibid., p. 112.
[548] Ibid., p. 112.
[549] Ibid., p. 115.
[550] Ibid., p. 117.
[551] Ibid., p. 117.

power to appoint ministers and dismantle Pahlavi's authority over the military. With all of these reforms, Mossadegh gave his opponents reasons to topple him. On August 19, 1953, a coup occurred, supported by the alliance between the British, the US, and Pahlavi. On that day, the coup mobilized gangs from the bazaar communities and employed 32 tanks. They marched to the center of Tehran, where they engaged in a three-hour battle. In the end, the coup successfully overthrew Mossadegh, ending the nationalists' tenure. His fall opened the path for Pahlavi to restore the monarch's power in Iran.

In 1953, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the second shah, took over power from Mohammad Mossadegh by reigniting his father's modernization projects. First, Pahlavi reversed Mossadegh's nationalization project by building close ties with Western countries. He then intensified the Iranian state-building project by further expanding its state apparatuses. For instance, he increased the size of the military from 120,000 soldiers in 1953 to 400,000 in 1976.[552] In 1963, he initiated the White Revolution. The main target of the revolution was the traditional institutions, which he dismantled by launching land reforms, giving women voting rights, nationalizing forests and pastures, forming literacy corps, and establishing profit-sharing schemes in industries. The oil boom reinforced Pahlavi's revolution. It filled the state's coffer to fund those programs. As a result of the revolution, the population increased in the urban centers. The jobs in the urban centers, and the failure of the land reform, contributed to an increase in migration from rural to urban areas.[553] In Tehran alone, the population grew from 1,512,000 (1956) to 2,720,000 (1966) and reached almost 4 million approaching the revolution. The reforms also spurred the growth of the middle class twofold and the working class fivefold.[554]

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[552] Abrahamian, 1979, p. 4.
[553] Vakili-Zad, 1990, p. 7.
[554] Ibid.

The oil boom increased GNP per capita by five, from US$ 200 in the early 1960s to US$ 1000 in the mid-1970s.[555] At the same time, the reforms facilitated the growth of youth populations in urban centers.[556] By 1976, Iranians under 15 constituted 45% of the total population, and the age group 19-29 constituted 25.3% of the total population (33,078,000 million).[557] The number of university students increased under Pahlavi. In 1943–44, there were only 2,835 students, while in 1953–54, there were already 9,996 students.[558] In 1963–64, the number of students reached 24,456.[559]

Pahlavi's revolution, driven by the oil boom, planted the seeds of opposition that bloomed in 1979. His revolution had provoked some segments in society to question and oppose his tenure. For instance, the revolution attempted to redistribute land in Iranian villages, but the redistribution program only benefited the wealthy peasants.[560] This caused migrations from the villages to urban centers. As a result, the urban population became larger. It constituted 50% of the total population before the regime transition occurred in 1979.[561] At the same time, the oil boom provided Pahlavi the leeway to build an economy based on oil instead of a rural economy (e.g., agriculture). Pahlavi relied on the industry, construction, and services as his instruments to foster development. Foreign skilled workers and technicians flew to the country to fill vacancies in these sectors, filling urban centers.[562] The problem with this situation was that Pahlavi filled urban centers with his potential opposition groups. The displaced population was the victim of

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[555] Ibid.
[556] Firouzbakhch, 1988, p. 95.
[557] Ibid.
[558] Bill, 1969, p. 10.
[559] Ibid.
[560] Skocpol, 1982, p. 269.
[561] Ibid.
[562] Ibid.

Pahlavi's economic policies. Furthermore, his rise to power hurt traders and workers in the urban centers (*bazaari*).[563] They had been the main beneficiaries of Mossadegh's nationalist policies since Mossadegh protected their economic interest from foreign capital. When Pahlavi grabbed power, he paved the way for the penetration of foreign capital, exposing the bazaar to international competition.[564] Pahlavi made the *bazaari'*s economic situation worse when the guild leaders designed a tax system that put the burden on the poorest *bazaari*. Consequently, that same year, there were 300,000 cases of tax payment refusal on the part of the *bazaari*.[565]

Students became more alienated under Pahlavi. Pahlavi could not provide enough jobs for the 15,000 graduates who entered the job market in 1965.[566] Under his tenure, the Iranian state curbed student activism in universities and the regime controlled the youth and student groups. The students could not establish associations without permission from the regime.[567] Associations only emerged through the regime's initiative. For instance, the regime initiated the development of the Youth Palace, a student center in the north of Tehran. The regime constructed the place as a hub for students to gather, supported by facilities such as swimming pools and theaters. Nevertheless, the palace functioned more as an institution to surveil students, as the security police occupied its leadership.[568]

Because of state repression, students opted for underground activism to delegitimize the regime. The Islamic leftist opposition groups coordinated their resistance. The most important group was the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (*Mojahedin-e Khalq*; MEK), an Islamic

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[563] Parsa, 1988, p. 59.
[564] Ibid.
[565] Ibid.
[566] Bill, op. cit., p. 13.
[567] Bill, op. cit., p. 16.
[568] Bill, op. cit., p. 17.

left-leaning organization. The group was a reaction to that state repression in 1963 that crushed

the anti-Pahlavi protest led by Ruhollah Khomeini.[569] The group started as a discussion group

between students and former students at the Tehran University.[570] The group grew by

establishing discussion groups in other cities such as Qazvin, Tabriz, Ishfan, and Mashad.[571] In

its development, MEK adopted Islamic teachings and Marxism as the group's ideology. The

group believed that the two ideologies were compatible with the group's cause, as both the

Islamists and Marxists advocated class struggle by marginalized communities and opposed

feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism.[572] MEK launched a series of violent attacks on the

regime. On February 8, 1971, the group attacked a gendarmerie post in the village of Siahkal.

The attack claimed three of policemen's lives. The group also planned an attack for the

anniversary of the 2500 years of the monarchy in August 1971. The regime sniffed out the

group's plan, apprehending 35 members of the organization. The regime repressed the mujahedin

in the 1970s. The most important instance was the arrest of 69 members of the organization.

From the trial, the regime discovered that the organization had a close relationship with Iranian

students, as almost half of the arrestees were students.[573] Although the arrest weakened the

organization, the group survived through its underground networks, launching guerilla attacks

against the regime in the 1970s.

The opposition groups' opportunity to work against Pahlavi came in 1977 when inflation

hit Iran due to the declining revenue from oil. Pahlavi responded by increasing taxes, mainly

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[569] Abrahamian, 1989, p. 85.
[570] Ibid., p. 87.
[571] Ibid., p. 88.
[572] Ibid., p. 92.
[573] Ibid., p. 129.

targeting the *bazaari*.[574] Pahlavi also reduced bank loans to the *bazaari*, pushing them further

into crisis.[575] Instead of issuing sound economic policies, Pahlavi established the Resurgence

Party (*Hezb-e Rastakhiz*) to fight the inflation. Pahlavi declared it the only party that existed in

Iran. It then launched a propaganda campaign against the *bazaari*. The party blamed the *bazaari*

for the crisis, accusing them of profiteering from the crisis. Officially, Pahlavi issued a policy in

1975 to control prices and criminalize profiteering.[576] He returned prices to the 1974 level and

curbed the allowed profit rate at 14%. This policy enraged the *bazaari*. The regime also

provoked the workers. When the crisis hit, the regime promised to loosen political controls, but it

completely ignored the economic suffering of the workers caused by inflation.[577] Consequently,

thousands of workers from the car, steel, oil, and railway industries marched to protest the

regime's policy in August 1978. White-collar workers joined them in September 1978. The

protesters went to the streets because Pahlavi favored the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, leaving out

the middle and lower-level bureaucrats.[578]

MEK and students also mobilized. They played their conventional role as a pacesetter of

the transition, as they tested the regime's tolerance by protesting throughout 1977 and 1978.[579]

MEK mobilized students and turned universities into centers of coordination for organizing

protests. The mobilization resulted in 20 rallies and 21 class boycotts in the first few months of

the 1977–78 academic period.[580] Their intensive protests forced universities to close down by the

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[574] Parsa, op. cit., p. 63.
[575] Parsa, op. cit., p. 63.
[576] Parsa, op. cit., p. 63.
[577] Parsa, op. cit., p. 66.
[578] Parsa, op. cit., p. 66.
[579] Parsa, 2011, p. 54.
[580] Ibid., p. 55.

end of 1977.[581] By the end of Spring 1978, Iranian students had organized 128 protests in Iran's

ten largest cities.[582] The close relationship between MEK and students in the past helped them to

organize in the early period of the regime transition.

In 1978, the group led by Khomeini started gaining influence among the opposition

groups and students. The rise of the Khomeini-led opposition was owed to the expansion of its

organizational power under Pahlavi. It did not experience the level of state repression that the

nationalists and MEK had in the 1960s and 1970s. The opposition emerged in late 1963 after the

June 1963 protest failed to topple the shah. Sympathizers then rallied behind Khomeini to topple

Pahlavi from power. To support their objective, they relied on a vast network of 80,000

community mosques and 200,000 mullahs.[583] They also depended on thousands of volunteer

organizers of religious practices.[584] By 1974, they already had 12,300 religious associations and

5,000 organizations in Tehran.[585] The vast network of Khomeini's faction was gathered under

one umbrella organization, the Coalition Councils (*Hayat-ha-ye Mo'ta-lefe-ye Islami*; HMI).[586]

The organization pushed further by organizing protests, coordinating with Khomeini, and

mobilizing resources from traders to support the movement.[587] HMI spread its influence to cities

such as Qom, Isfahan, Shiraz, Dezful, Qazfin, Shahi, Kashan, Yazd, and Tabriz by utilizing the

community mosques.[588] The organization accomplished the establishment of Koran reading

clubs in the community mosques and government institutions.[589] When the regime accused

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[581] Ibid., p. 55.
[582] Parsa, 2009, p. 12.
[583] Vakili-Zad, op. cit., p. 8.
[584] Ibid.
[585] Ibid.
[586] Ibid., p. 9.
[587] Ibid., p. 9.
[588] Ibid., p 12.
[589] Ibid., p. 13.

Khomeini of being the leader of the opposition in January 1978, the regime made him the legitimate figure of the opposition. This event provoked and reinvigorated HMI, which already stood behind him. It helped to structure the opposition under Khomeini's leadership, to focus its agenda: ousting Pahlavi. The attack on Khomeini introduced the ideological-Islamic objective as the prominent objective, replacing the bread and butter demands.[590]

The rise of the Khomeini-led faction attracted students to support him. In late 1977, Khomeini was already a figure among the students. For students, he was the symbol of the opposition against Pahlavi. This was true for leftist leaning students in MEK who talked about him as a hero. Although the students had strong coordination with MEK, they altered their position to support him. The pro-Khomeini students were behind the large rally in Qom, on December 2, 1977. The rally commemorated the 40th-day mourning ceremony for Khomeini's son, Mustafa Khomeini.[591] The rally turned into a public speech condemning the regime. After the speech, the *ulamas* and students marched to the Fayziyah Seminary, a religious school closed down by the regime in 1975. The police met the protestors, and violently beat them. On December 21, 1977, similar protests occurred in Tehran and Shahr-I Rey, driven by pro-Khomeini groups. A momentous protest took place in January 1978 when the Muslim students called for the *bazaari* to strike.[592] The protest supported the *ulamas*, highlighting the pro-Khomeini leaning of the protest.

In 1978, the regime combined repression and concession to tame the growing protests. For instance, the regime repressed Islamic students in Qom, the holy city for Shiites. Around 70 students died that day due to the regime's repression, which provoked protests in other cities.

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[590] Ibid., p. 17.
[591] Kurzman, 2003, p. 310.
[592] Ibid., p. 311.

Nevertheless, the regime offered a conciliatory gesture by announcing that it would hold an election soon. Another instance was after the burning of the Rex Cinema, which took some 400 lives. Although the regime denied its involvement in the fire, the Khomeini-led faction framed the regime as the culprit. The burning provoked further protests between August and December 1978. To calm the protests, the regime appointed Jafar Sharif-Emami as Prime Minister. He revoked Pahlavi's policies, abolishing the Rastakhiz Party, canceling censorship, and giving permission for political parties to be active again. The regime, however, made a mistake when it violently repressed protestors on September 4, 1978. On Eid Mubarak, 500,000 protestors marched to downtown Tehran. Four days later, the regime announced martial law, aiming for the demobilization of the protestors. The protestors chose not to heed the warning and instead demanded the resignation of Pahlavi. A clash broke out between the protestors and the military, with sixty-four protestors dead, which only triggered greater pressure towards the regime. The regime tried to appease the protestors by ejecting Sharif-Emami from the office of the prime minister on November 6, 1978. General Gholan Reza-Azhari replaced him. The regime apologized for the rampant corruption within the regime and followed with the arrests of 100 officials.

The regime's strategy of combining repression and concession did not seem to work for calming the protestors. The protestors sensed that indecisiveness was the regime's weakness, and they seized the opportunity to keep pushing their demands for Pahlavi's resignation. The regime's indecisiveness even stimulated larger protests. On December 2, 1978, the protestors came to the streets, gathering about 2 million people. Due to the increasing pressure from the protestors, Pahlavi ended his monarchy on January 16, 1979.

Although Pahlavi appointed Shahpour Bakhtiar as the new prime minister in order to maintain his influence, his effort was futile because the opposition groups had their own candidates. The most popular was Khomeini. The Islamic groups had already imagined his rise, due to his popularity in the opposition against the regime. The networks of Islamic groups had managed to preserve his popularity since their opposition started in the 1960s. On February 1, 1979, when he flew back from his exile in France, Iranians welcomed him as a hero, even though he did not directly participate in the 1978 struggle. His networks had successfully kept his influence going during 1978. On February 5, 1979, Khomeini formed a rival government led by Mehdi Bazargan, a popular figure with MEK and the nationalists. Khomeini's act was a direct challenge and a sign of his disobedience to Bakhtiar's tenure. Khomeini continued to push and assert his power. On February 9, 1979, air force technicians assisted Khomeini's cause by siding with him. Assisted by MEK, they seized a weapon factory and distributed 50,000 weapons to the guerillas and opposition groups. This increased the opposition groups' coercive power. The military avoided a physical confrontation with the armed opposition groups. On February 11, 1979, the Supreme Military Council announced its neutrality in the conflict between Bakhtiar and the opposition groups. The council's stance paved the way for the opposition groups to seize the state.

On April 1, 1979, Khomeini declared the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He made this declaration after his camp won in a referendum to decide whether or not Iran had to install the Islamic Republic.[593] The result of the referendum was 99% of Iranians voting "yes," giving Khomeini's camp the legitimacy to install the Islamic Republic.[594] The referendum also

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[593] Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 163.
[594] Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 163.

meant the defeat of Khomeini's rivals, such as the National Democratic Front (the nationalists) and MEK, that aimed to form a democratic government. As Khomeini's faction grabbed the Iranian state, it consolidated power by building institutions to protect its tenure. For instance, on May 5, 1979, the new regime established the Revolutionary Guard. Following the Revolutionary Guard was the Islamic Republican Party and Hezbollah, by which the regime repressed the National Democratic Front and MEK. In the same month, the regime also installed the Assembly of Experts (*Majlis-e Khebregan*) to write the new constitution.[595] There were 75 members of *Majlis-e Khebregan*, drawn from Khomeini's supporters. They discussed the new constitution on August 19 and issued it on November 15, 1979.[596] Although Khomeini had declared the Islamic Republic of Iran, his camp felt that the state did not fully adopt Islamic principles. The state structure still contained democratic institutions, including the right to vote for president, the *Majles*, and provincial and local councils.[597] These rights were universal for those above 16 years old and above. Khomeini's camp opposed these institutions, although they were not able to do much to change them.

An opportunity for Khomeini to consolidate his regime came on November 4, 1979, when 400 Muslim Students Followers of the Imam's Line occupied the American Embassy in Tehran and took 50 hostages.[598] The students were protesting against the decision by the US to give shelter to Pahlavi, who had flown there to obtain cancer treatment. The hostage crisis lasted 444 days and gave Khomeini the opportunity to push the Islamization of the Iranian state further. Riding the wave of anti-America and anti-imperialist sentiment, the regime organized another

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[595] Ramazani, 1980, p. 450.
[596] Ibid.
[597] Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 166.
[598] Mashayeki, 2001, p. 291.

referendum on December 2, 1979. The purpose of the referendum was to amend the constitution. The regime attempted to fully adopt Islamic ideologies, without any concessions to other groups. They got what they wanted, as 99% of voters agreed with the new constitution after the regime enflamed the voters with anti-American and anti-imperialist propaganda. The occupation of the American Embassy by pro-Khomeini students consolidated the theocratic regime.

Up until this point, the consolidation of the regime suggested that state repression managed to nullify the nationalists and the left, but failed to dismantle Khomeini's faction. Although Pahlavi spied, arrested, and clamped down on the nationalists in the 1960s and MEK in the 1970s, state repression did not successfully destroy Khomeini's camp. The networks of mosques and *ulamas* were relatively intact. There were some events in which state repression did seem to eliminate protestors, such as the Black Friday.[599] Instead of dismantling his group, however, it only reinvigorated Khomeini's camp to press the regime. Thus, Pahlavi's uneven and weak state repression towards opposition groups contributed to the rise of Khomeini's camp as the strongest opposition group that was ready to take over the Iranian state in 1979.

Once Khomeini's camp had a strong grip on the Iranian state, it coopted the struggle initiated by the nationalists and MEK in early 1978.[600] The camp had grown in power by giving support to the opposition groups and students before the fall of Pahlavi, but it drastically altered its position after it seized the Iranian state. It repressed the nationalists and MEK, and the students who had connections with those groups. The new regime coopted the students into state-sponsored organizations. For instance, through the Organization for Mobilization of the

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[599] Black September refers to a protest on September 8, 1978 in Jaleh Square, Tehran. It occurred the day after Pahlavi declared martial law. The military shot at the protestors. The death toll is debatable as the estimates ranged from 86 to thousands.

[600] Parsa, op. cit., p. 15.

Oppressed (*Basij*), the regime incorporated students and youths into the Iranian state. As a state organ that assisted Khomeini in seizing the state, *Basij* developed its networks to perform four main functions: to support local defense; to surveil citizens; to police society; and to repress dissidents.[601] As a part of these functions, *Basij* recruited Iranians to support Khomeini. *Basij* established social organizations such as the *Basij* Neighborhood and Mosque Organization, the Tribal Basij Organization, the Worker *Basij* Organization, the Employee *Basij* Organization, and the Women's Society *Basij* Organization.[602] *Basij* also specifically set up the Students' *Basij* Organization as the organization to incorporate university students into the Iranian state.[603] Through this organization, *Basij* welcomed the students who had assisted Khomeini during the revolution.

The cooptation continued through Khomeini's initiative to close down Iranian universities in 1980. The policy was aimed at purifying and Islamizing Iranian higher education.[604] Purification refers to the cleansing of Iranian universities of faculty and students who had a close association with Pahlavi's regime, as well as those who opposed Khomeini.[605] At the same time, the Islamization of Iranian higher education meant that the regime attempted to eliminate Western influences in the teaching at Iranian universities. These Western influences included social science disciplines and the humanities.[606] In return, the regime would impose knowledge and practices based on Islamic values.[607] To accelerate the purification and Islamization of the universities, the regime created an institution consisting of seven members of

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[601] Golkar, 2012, p. 457.
[602] Ibid.
[603] Ibid.
[604] Sobhe, 1982, p. 275.
[605] Ibid.
[606] Ibid.
[607] Ibid.

the Cultural Revolution Staff.[608] The staff would direct the purification and Islamization

programs. The staff also formed the University Crusade, tasked with carrying out the programs at

the university level.[609] The University Crusade selected Crusade Councils comprising three

members: a professor, a student, and a member of the university.[610] Due to a lack of coordination

with the university, however, the Management Council of the University replaced the Crusade

Councils. The Management Council of the University instead recruited four faculty members,

two students, and a staff member. They had to prove their devotion to Islam and Khomeini

before the council selected them to be part of the Management Council of the University.

The purification and Islamization programs of the universities did not stop at the

university management level. They also revamped the curricula and university recruitment. The

Management Council of the University established five permitted subjects: humanities and social

science, agriculture, engineering and technology, medicine, and basic science.[611] The

Management Council of the University specifically aimed to control the teaching of the

humanities and social sciences due to their potential to disseminate Western influences. They

also replaced law and economics with Islamic law and Islamic economics.[612] In terms of faculty

recruitment, the Management Council required faculty members to fulfill academic and moral

criteria. Besides scientific qualifications, the faculty members had to demonstrate their obedience

to Islamic values and to the regime. Failure to do so would lead to rejection and reeducation.[613]

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[608] Ibid.
[609] Ibid., p. 276.
[610] Ibid., p. 277.
[611] Ibid., p. 277.
[612] Ibid., p. 277.
[613] Ibid., p. 278.

The Iranian cultural revolution confirmed the success of Khomeini's camp in coopting the students and opposition groups. The incorporation of youths and students into social organizations such as *Basij* affirmed that the new regime saw them as a potential force for backing its tenure. Nevertheless, the regime attempted to mandate its participation in the new regime based on the regime's objectives. Khomeini's camp directed students and youths to support the new regime, rather than allowing the return of their role as a social force that might constantly criticize the regime, like under Pahlavi's tenure. The regime also restructured Iranian universities to achieve this objective. They allowed students to continue their education and activism, as long as they adhered to the regime and obeyed Islamic values. The Iranian cultural revolution's targeting of higher educations was an instrument ensuring that Iranian students were on course to support the regime. The regime's treatment clearly curbed Iranian students. Although the regime absorbed them into the state, the students did not gain substantial advantages, apart from being a part of the regime. The leftist groups and students were completely excluded by the regime from the state. In this way, Iranian students were on the path of cooptation.

Comparing Iran to Indonesia, Iran posed a case where the students gained a position inside the state but without yielding new advantages. The weak state repression towards Khomeini's camp allowed it to develop coordination with the students. Utilizing the networks of mosques and *ulamas* under HMI, Khomeini's camp managed to forge solidarity with the Iranian students under Pahlavi's tenure. When the regime was collapsing, Khomeini's camp was ready to seize the state. The nationalists and the left were not as prepared. The nationalist and leftist opposition groups had to endure heavy state repression, although it did not match the Indonesian state repression towards the PKI during the 1965–67 period. They also were not successful in

developing networks to communities and students. This was in contrast to Khomeini's camp, which successfully capitalized on the networks of mosques and *ulamas* to support its objective in seizing state power. Khomeini's camp grew stronger than the other opposition groups. Based on this organizational power, Khomeini's camp controlled the transition from Bakhtiar. Khomeini's camp was also able to incorporate students as a part of the new regime. The weak state repression had allowed Khomeini's camp to develop an organization that could control students, starting before the transition. Thus, after the resignation of Pahlavi, the consolidation of power by coopting students was an easy task for Khomeini's camp. In Indonesia, the lack of coordination of the opposition groups and students impeded them from forming a force that could infiltrate the state. The opposition groups opted for the election, in which students were not a significant political actor. Thus, in contrast to Iran, opposition groups without strong coordination with students left them outside the state after Suharto's resignation.

Conclusion

Situating Indonesia with Guatemala and Iran shows that the impact of state repression in the past was influential for the types of success gained by student movements. In Guatemala, weak state repression allowed for strong coordination and assistance between PNR, the junior military officers, and students. Before the fall of Ubico's regime, workers and students could join forces, merging their own parties, PNR and FPL, into PAR. The junior military officers who assisted PAR were also decisive for helping the coalition to seize the Guatemalan state. The students played an important role in igniting the protests, although they would not have gotten far without their coordination with workers and the military. Arevalo's regime gave them an important position inside the state, with the authority to execute education reforms. The path of

the Guatemalan students was full response. In Iran, weak state repression on the Khomeini-led camp allowed them to expand their networks of mobilizations through mosques and *ulamas*. The networks reached into Iranian universities, deepening the coordination between the opposition groups and students before the regime transition in 1979. From the beginning, Islamic student movements were a part of the larger opposition in challenging Pahlavi. The nationalist and leftist opposition groups and students, however, did not experience the same path. Pahlavi had already weakened them through state repression, exemplified by the repression of the National Front, the Tudeh Party, and the mujahedin. When the transition occurred, Khomeini's camp was the group most ready to capture the Iranian state. The inclusion of students in the state, however, follows the cooptation path. Since Khomeini had already built an opposition that was centralistic in its organizational structure (i.e., obeying Khomeini as an imam), his regime incorporated the students as a part of his power base without giving any new advantages to them. He also ditched the left, regardless of their assistance to him in pressuring the regime in 1977 and 1978.

Guatemala and Iran are contrasts to Indonesia in the way that strong state repression in Indonesia managed to hamper the coordination and assistance of the opposition groups to students in seizing the state. Although there was the growth of leftist and Islamic opposition groups in the 1980s that managed to infiltrate Indonesian universities, they were fringe movements. Thus, in 1998–99, there were no opposition groups with a strong relationship with students that intended to collectively seize the Indonesian state with the students. This situation left Indonesian students alone at the outside of the Indonesian state during the transition. The new regime still passed some policies in the People's Assembly Special Session in November 1998 that were important because they became the backbone of reforms in the subsequent decades. Nevertheless, without a position inside the state, the students could not control the

reform process as the Guatemalan students had. The impact of heavy state repression in

Indonesia's past contributed to the missed opportunity to seize the state in 1998–99.

Conclusion

Indonesian student movements during the 1998–99 regime transition give some key theoretical and practical lessons. The theoretical lessons speak particularly to the literature on student movements during regime transitions. First, using Gamson's notion of success, this study argues the term "success" provides a better way to analyze what students do during the transitions. The literature has produced a variety of understandings on student roles during transitions, but there has been no consensus on what to investigate. Thus, the application of "success" would specifically orient the discussion to focus on the success of students during the transition moment. Moreover, the application of "success" conveys the success of the Indonesian student movements was only one particular type of success, which can be compared to other cases, especially those of Guatemala and Iran. The Indonesian trajectory defies the popular understanding that highlights the heroism of students during regime transitions.

The elements of success (i.e., acceptance, new advantages) assist in dissecting the varieties of success of student movements that the existing literature has not greatly explored. The concepts of acceptance and new advantages allow us to focus on the political positions held by students after the transition and the degree of realization of their agenda. Consequently, they help us to differentiate different types of success: that students could only partially achieve the manifestation of their agenda without controlling the process (Indonesia); gaining a position inside the state and overseeing the realization of their agenda (Guatemala); or acquiring a position inside the state but not having their agenda realized (Iran).

Second, this study argues that the Indonesian case, and its comparison with Guatemala and Iran, shows the importance of unpacking state repression as a concept. This study's proposal was to differentiate the degree of state repression in shaping the success of students. In addition to economic policies, legitimation, and political conflicts inside the state, the state-centered literature has highlighted state repression as a crucial factor in explaining student movements during regime transitions. Nevertheless, the inability to differentiate the degrees of state repression has inhibited understanding the various impacts of state repression on student movement success. Acknowledging the different degrees of state repression will help to identify which degree of state repression potentially destroys opposition groups and students' mobilizing structures. The different successes of students exemplified by Indonesia, Guatemala, and Iran, due to the different degrees of state repression, underscore the significance of differentiating the degree of state repression. Furthermore, highlighting the importance of differentiating the level of state repression helps to temper an over-emphasis on factors such as economic policies, state legitimation, and political elite conflicts as the determinants of student movement success. These factors might matter in weakening the regime, but they do not explain clearly how the state shapes the potential power of opposition groups and students during transitions. State repression provides an alternative way to understand the influence on the potential power of opposition groups and students because it directly decides the continuity of opposition groups, with the trajectory depending on the degree of state repression.

Third, this study asserts that the analysis of Indonesian student movements has unpacked how organizational factors function under state repression. The organizational approach has strongly emphasized factors such as ideologies, networks, and trust. The case of Indonesian student movements demonstrates that the Indonesian state repression shaped how these factors

worked. For instance, the strong state repression in the 1970s and 1980s towards Indonesian Islamic groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah pushed Jemaah Tarbiyah to not directly express their political views in public. In attracting support, Jemaah Tarbiyah disseminated only the Islamic aspects related to individual piety, rather than airing overtly political demands. Jemaah Tarbiyah expanded its networks to Indonesian universities instead of gathering support from the public. Its targeting universities anticipated the strong state repression, as gathering public support would have created more risk for Jemaah Tarbiyah activists who had just initiated their movement. The state repression also influenced trust development among Indonesian students. This study has illustrated how, especially in the 1990s, state repression created fragmentation among Indonesian students before the transition period came in 1998–99. State repression of the left led Muslim students to frame leftist students as communists, regardless of the students' lack of connection to the PKI. Based on these examples, this study contends that state repression is a crucial variable for the organizational approach in underscoring the significance of its explanations.

Fourth, this study maintains that the examination of the Indonesian case can provide some valuable lessons to student movement activists. This study argues that state repression influences the degree of coordination and assistance between opposition groups and students. Thus, students cannot determine their own success, as it depends heavily on the extent to which state repression weakens the opposition groups. However, students can still have a degree of freedom in deciding with whom they want to coordinate. This study further argues that to gain maximum impact during regime transitions, student activists should focus on coordinating with state-oriented opposition groups. This study contends that student activists should disregard the belief that students themselves are an agent of change. The evidence suggests that no gains are

accrued from this conviction. The cases of Indonesia, Guatemala, and Iran show that the coordination and assistance from the opposition groups can make a big difference when a regime falls. Thus, students should break the taboo, and coordinate with and ask for assistance from opposition groups, such as political parties, the military, or rebels. Student activists must accept that they are not as strong as they think. They have the capacity to disrupt and provoke a larger movement when the crisis comes. Nevertheless, when a regime falls, relying on that capacity is not enough since students will meet their limitations when they are not in coordination with opposition groups. Without early coordination, there will be no later assistance from opposition groups, especially in infiltrating the state. The case of the Indonesian student movements affirms this argument.

This study also strongly asserts that student activists should anticipate more state repression and its impact on their existing coordination with opposition groups. This study believes it is unwise to expect the state to employ soft measures to opposition groups and students. Anticipating strong state repression, student activists can establish an organizational structure that avoids state repression, while in time, they may be able to expand their organization. The experience of Jemaah Tarbiyah in mobilizing students in Indonesian universities in the 1980s demonstrates the possibility of building a movement under heavy state repression. The challenge is to devise an organizational structure that can function to protect students from state repression and, at the same time, gather support. Jemaah Tarbiyah students exemplified such a practice, although they were late in initiating their movement. The experience of Khomeini's faction in Iran epitomized a better version of this strategy, although their success was owed to weak state repression towards their movement. The experiences of Jemaah Tarbiyah and Khomeini's faction suggest that opposition groups and student activists could utilize

universities as their cover to build a movement. As long as they are aware not to start with a direct confrontational movement to oppose the regime, doing so gives them a better possibility of fostering their movement. The Islamic opposition groups and students in Indonesia and Iran suggest that forming small groups, such as study groups and Koran reading groups, can be a useful strategy to protect a new movement from state repression and expand it gradually. Initiating such a movement early is necessary, since building a new movement requires time and resources, especially under heavy state repression.

This suggestion, however, does not guarantee that a strategy of infiltrating universities will always be successful. State repression destroys just as it provides the opportunity for opposition groups and students to launch their movement. The Indonesian left epitomized this situation. Although the Indonesian left attempted to organize students in the 1980s, the impact of heavy state repression in the 1960s was just too much. The continuation of state repression in the 1980s added a challenge to the Indonesian left's ability to mobilize students. The left was not so successful in developing a coherent alliance with students. The left's case confirms that at its greatest degree, state repression ends activists' ability to build a successful movement. For the left, state repression was successful in killing the movement.

Fifth, this study notes that some further investigations could improve our understanding of student movement success during regime transitions. This study proposes that future research could come up with different elements that constitute success to gauge the impacts of student movements. For instance, research could identify the level of success at different levels of the movement, such as the group and the individual levels. Group level success could refer to the success of the activists in developing their movement, in comparison with other movements. For instance, future studies could investigate the relative success of Jemaah Tarbiyah-affiliated

student movements compared to the leftist student movements in building their organizations. Such a study may be useful to analyze further the influence of the organizational power of opposition groups and students after the fall of a regime. Meanwhile, success at the individual level could open an investigation on identity transformation from students to state politicians, such as that experienced by Guatemalan students. The identity transformation under a rapid transition might force students to play a role that is unusual for them. Fulfilling that role could decide the further outcomes of student movements after they seize a new position inside the state. This topic merits further investigation, beyond only analyzing the capture of state power.

Another future direction of research could be adding other cases of student movements during regime transitions. The experiences of students in Nicaragua (1978–79), South Korea (1987), and Egypt (2011) are other instances of the success of student movements. Adding these cases for comparison should give a better understanding of the different trajectories of success that students might take after they contribute to bringing down a regime. Furthermore, this study would suggest supplementing the range of cases by contrasting successful and failed cases. Failed cases refer to the failure of student movements to topple a regime. In such cases, the emphasis could be on finding the impact of the coordination between opposition groups and students after the failure. This trajectory would bring additional cases into the conversations, such as those of Mexico (1968), Thailand (1974), Myanmar (1988), and China (1989–91). Researchers might ask to what extent the failure to topple the regime alters students' relationship with opposition groups, or what is the possible variety of students' roles after their failure to oust a regime. In short, adding cases, positive and negative, could meaningfully further our understanding of the roles of students during regime transitions.

Another future area of research might incorporate a subnational comparison, especially if the student movements occur in different regions during the transition. The case of Indonesian student movements, for instance, occurred in different cities. Due to limited time, this study could not make comparisons between the cities in which opposition groups and students launched their protests in 1998–99. Comparing different cities could bring new insights into how state repression affects opposition groups in different places. This notion proceeds from the assumption that state capacity is uneven across different times and places. Thus, state repression could have different impacts on the relationship between opposition groups and students in different locations within a single country.

Appendix
Party Shares of Cabinet Posts, 1945-1998
(Author's Calculations)

Cabinets	Political Parties	Seats
Sjahrir 1 (Nov 1945 - Mar 1946)	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	7
15 Positions	Non-Party	5
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	2
	Masjumi	1
Sjahrir 2 (Mar 1946 - Oct 1946)	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	6
16 Positions	Masjumi	4
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	3
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	1
	United Women of Indonesian Republic (Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia)	1
	Youth Congress Body	1
Sjahrir 3 (Oct 1946 - Jun 1947)	Masjumi	8
32 Positions	Non-Party	8
	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	6
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	4
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	2
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	1
	Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI)	1
	United Women of Indonesian Republic (Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia)	1
	Youth Congress Body	1
Sjarifuddin 1 (Jul 1947 - Nov 1947)	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	7
30 Positions	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	7
	Non-Party	5
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	4
	Masjumi	1
	Catholic Party	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)	1
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	1
	Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI)	1

	Youth Congress Body	1
Sjarifuddin 2 (Nov 1947 - Jan 1948)	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	7
37 Positions	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	7
	Masjumi	6
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	4
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	4
	Non-Party	4
	Catholic Party	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)	1
	Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI)	1
	Youth Congress Body	1
Hatta 1 (Jan 1948 - Aug 1949)	Masjumi	5
16 Positions	Non-Party	5
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	3
	Catholic Party	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	1
Emergency (Dec 1948 - Jul 1949)	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	3
11 Positions	Non-Party (NP)	3
	Masjumi	2
	Catholic Party	1
	Great Indonesia Party (Parindra)	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
Hatta 2 (Aug 1949 - Dec 1949)	Masjumi	5
19 Positions	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	5
	NP	4
	Catholic Party	2
	Teacher's Association of the Republic of Indonesia (PGRI)	1
	Great Indonesia Unity Party (PIR)	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
Susanto (Dec 1949 - Jan 1950)	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	5
12 Positions	Masjumi	2
	Catholic Party	2
	Non-Party	2
	Teacher's Association of the Republic of Indonesia (PGRI)	1

Halim (Jan 1950 - Sep 1950)	Masjumi	3
14 Positions	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	3
	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	3
	Non-Party	2
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	1
	Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI)	1
RIS Cabinet (Dec 1949 - Sep 1950)	Non-Party	8
15 Positions	Masjumi	3
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	3
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
Natsir (Sep 1950 - Apr 1951)	Non-Party	5
18 Positions	Masjumi	4
	Great Indonesia Unity Party (PIR)	2
	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	2
	Catholic Party	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Democrat Party	1
	Great Indonesia Party (Parindra)	1
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	1
Sukiman (Apr 1951 – Apr 1952)	Masjumi	5
20 Positions	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	5
	Great Indonesia Unity Party (PIR)	3
	Non-Party	2
	Catholic Party	1
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Democrat Party	1
	Great Indonesia Party (Parindra)	1
Wilopo (Apr 1952 - Jul 1953)	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	4
18 Positions	Masjumi	4
	Non-Party	3
	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	2
	Catholic Party	1
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	1
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Great Indonesia Party (Parindra)	1

Sastroamidjojo 1 (Jul 1953 – Aug 1955)	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	4
20 Positions	Great Indonesia Unity Party (PIR)	3
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	3
	Indonesia People's Association (SKI)	2
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	2
	Progressive Union (PP)	1
	National People Party	1
	Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI)	1
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	1
	Great Indonesia Party (Parindra)	1
	Non-Party	1
Burhanuddin Harahap (Aug 1955 - Mar 1956)	Masjumi	4
23 Positions	Great Indonesia Unity Party (PIR)	3
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	2
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	2
	Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI)	2
	National People Party (PRN)	2
	Indonesian Labor Party (PBI)	2
	Great Indonesia Party (Parindra)	2
	Democrat Party	1
	Catholic Party	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Indonesian Youth Republic (PRI)	1
Sastroamidjojo 2 (Mar 1956 - Mar 1957)	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	6
25 Positions	Masjumi	5
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	5
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	2
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	2
	Catholic Party	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Union of Islamic Education	1
	Non-Party	1
Djuanda (Apr 1957 - Jul 1959)	Non-Party	12
24 Positions	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	4
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	3

	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	1
	Military	1
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	1
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Indonesia People's Association (SKI)	1
Sukarno 1 (Jul 1959 - Feb 1960)	Non-Party	16
39 Positions	Military	10
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	3
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	2
	Masjumi	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	2
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	2
	Great Indonesia Party (Parindra)	1
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	1
Sukarno 2 (Feb 1960 - Mar 1962)	Non-Party	15
40 Positions	Military	13
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	3
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	3
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	2
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Masjumi	1
Sukarno 3 (Mar 1962 - Nov 1963)	Non-Party	22
57 Positions	Military	16
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	4
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	4
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	3
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	3
	Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI)	1
	Muhammadiyah	1
Sukarno 4 (Nov 1963 - Aug 1964)	Non-Party	24
69 Positions	Military	16
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	7

	Proletarian Party (Murba)	6
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	4
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	4
	Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI)	2
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	2
	Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Indonesian Party (Partindo)	1
Sukarno 5 (Aug 1964 - Feb 1966)	Non-Party	28
95 Positions	Military	27
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	15
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	6
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	6
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	3
	Indonesian Party (Partindo)	3
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	2
	Muhammadiyah	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	2
	People's Youth (PR)	1
Sukarno 6 (Feb 1966 - Mar 1966)	Military	33
108 Positions	Non-Party	31
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	17
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	7
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	5
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	4
	Muhammadiyah	3
	Indonesian Party (Partindo)	3
	Indonesian Teachers' Association	1
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	People's Youth (PR)	1
	Consultative Body of Indonesian Citizenship (Baperki)	1
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	1
Sukarno 7 (Mar 1966 - Jul 1966)	Military	35
89 Positions	Non-Party	26
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	12

	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	7
	Muhammadiyah	3
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	2
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Indonesian Party (Partindo)	1
Sukarno 8 (Jul 1966 - Oct 1967)	Military	13
32 Positions	Non-Party	9
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	3
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	2
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	2
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Muhammadiyah	1
Suharto 1 (Oct 1967 - Jun 1968)	Military	9
24 Positions	Non-Party	8
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	2
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	1
	Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI)	1
	Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)	1
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	1
	Muhammadiyah	1
Suharto 2 (Jun 1968 - Mar 1973)	Non-Party	10
27 Positions	Military	10
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	2
	Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo)	2
	Proletarian Party (Murba)	1
	Indonesian Moslem Party (Parmusi)	1
	Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII)	1
Suharto 3 (Mar 1973 – Mar 1978)	Non-Party	16
27 Positions	Military	8
	Murba	1
	PPP	1
	PDI	1
Suharto 4 (Mar 1978 – Mar 1983)	Military	16
35 Positions	Non-Party	15

	Functional Groups (Golkar)	4
Suharto 5 (Mar 1983 - Mar 1988)	Non-Party	24
42 Positions	Military	13
	Functional Groups (Golkar)	5
Suharto 6 (Mar 1988 - Mar 1993)	Non-Party	27
44 Positions	Military	13
	Functional Groups (Golkar)	4
Suharto 7 (Mar 1993 - Mar 1998)	Non-Party	26
45 Positions	Military	10
	Functional Groups (Golkar)	9
Suharto 8 (Mar 1998 - May 1998)	Non-Party	26
37 Positions	Military	6
	Functional Groups (Golkar)	5

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