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Understanding Refugees' Political Knowledge: A Study of Urban Refugees in Uganda

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Abstract:

Regardless of where refugees are hosted, they require political knowledge of rights, restrictions, responsibilities, and the governance actors and processes who decide and uphold these. This knowledge enables refugees to comply with national laws, benefit from rights and protections, avoid rights-based exploitations and harms, and pursue life with dignity in exile. Yet, do refugees have this knowledge? Further, what determines variation in knowledge outcomes and what are the barriers for knowledge obtainment? Finally, are there effects of having or lacking this knowledge?

I answer these questions by analyzing variation in refugees' political knowledge in Uganda—a nation that UNHCR, scholars, legal experts, and humanitarian providers praise as a model nation for hosting refugees. Specifically, they commend that Uganda permits recognized refugees the rights to free movement, to formal and informal economic opportunities, and to basic social services of healthcare and education on par with citizens. Moreover, Uganda allows refugees the choice to reside in rural refugee settlements where they receive humanitarian provision, or to forego formal provision and self-settle in urban areas.

Through original ethnographic and survey data, I find that despite Uganda's generosity, refugees are unevenly aware of their rights and opportunities. Refugees in different urban areas and of different urban status¹ have statistically significant differences both in the number of rights they enumerate, as well as the content of these rights. Refugees additionally demonstrate inconsistent understandings of which governance actors provide for their rights. This dissertation argues that refugees' rights-based expectations vary because of their experiences with material provision and support that is given to refugees in settlements but denied to refugees in cities. Variation also occurs due to the unequal presence of state and non-state actors to promote rights knowledge. This

¹ Urban status refers to whether a refugee resides strictly in an urban area or whether a refugee splits their time between an urban area and a refugee settlement. I refer to this latter group as “quasi-urban” refugees.

significantly includes the presence or absence of refugee-led organizations (RLOs) to promote refugee rights. Finally, I theorize that regardless of one's location or urban status, refugees' ability to acquire political knowledge is impeded by an inability to determine what role politics or political knowledge holds in their daily lives. The data suggests many refugees hold an enduring and negative conceptualization of politics, with the result that even concepts of rights or governance become taboo and off limits.

This dissertation also analyzes newspaper and archival datasets to document the effects of political knowledge, or lack thereof, on critical outcomes in refugee daily life. Specifically, this dissertation addresses outcomes of how refugees with different knowledge levels express their rights-based grievances and seek redress for violated rights, as well as how knowledge engenders broader outcomes of refugee precarity or resilience. Analysis identifies distinct trends in each outcome among refugees with lower and higher rights-based political knowledge. In general, refugees are better able to articulate and address their grievance demands to stakeholders able to help when they have more political knowledge. Likewise, refugees with higher political knowledge were on average more able to secure more resilient outcomes after a shock or exploitation.

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Preface:

In this dissertation, I reposition the analytical lens from a “top-down” assessment of Uganda’s perceived generosity in refugee hosting to instead engage a “bottom-up” assessment of rights, protections, and opportunities through refugees’ experiences. This inquiry was motivated by exploratory research in Kampala, Uganda in 2016. At that time, I met numerous refugee leaders and spent extensive time meeting displaced community members at various refugee-led organization (RLO) offices and refugee-led churches. In this initial research, I struggled to reconcile my expectations for refugees’ rights with the diversity of refugee outcomes I observed. Simply stated, given the prevalent external representations of Uganda’s generous *de jure* refugee hosting structure replete with its unique allowances for urban refugeehood and its emphasis on refugee self-reliance, I anticipated thriving urban refugee communities composed of empowered individuals who knew of and who could claim their extensive rights. The reality was much more complex. While some refugees succeeded in gaining rights for formal sector employment or to pursue post-secondary education, many more struggled to access their most basic rights to physical protection and security, to be treated equally alongside Ugandans in national social services of primary education and healthcare, to register their businesses and RLOs, or to avail themselves without discrimination to procure safe, adequate housing.

My research agenda began to take shape through these initial field observations and through continued relationships with refugee community leaders and RLOs. Immersing in refugee-dense community spaces, I observed that refugees not only couldn’t access their rights, but also noted that many seemed unaware these rights existed. In casual conversations, many individuals strongly insisted that Uganda was restrictive, rather than generous, in providing

rights. They shared heartfelt and compelling personal histories of discrimination, harassment, and exclusion rather than experiencing equality, empowerment, or integration.

I inquired among my refugee colleagues to see how they understood the gaps I observed between Uganda as a generous host versus many of their displaced peers' inability to access their rights. Time and again, leaders explained that many in their communities lacked rights-based and protective knowledge that could help bolster daily life outcomes, reduce vulnerabilities and precarity, and that could help refugees secure available economic, social service, and integrative outcomes. Moreover, I observed how these leaders spent their days responding to refugees' urgent requests for assistance, including for food lodging, medicine, and child school fees, among other critical survival needs—all areas, in my opinion, where refugee outcomes could be strengthened if individuals knew of their rights, knew the processes through which to access their rights, and if they knew of the various actors involved in their rights and protection.

Throughout these exchanges, my research eventually expanded to have three complementary and interconnected aims. The first aim is to establish what urban refugees throughout the country knew about their rights, including how they distinguished between rights for refugees within and outside of the settlements. My second research aim is to explore variation in refugee knowledge outcomes, as well as to consider barriers for knowledge formation. My third research aim is to contribute towards an evidence-base of why it matters whether refugees hold or lack this knowledge.

In developing my research, I owe a large debt of gratitude to my refugee interlocutors and RLO staff for their collaboration in both designing the research question and agenda, and for their facilitation to mobilize interviews and focus groups required to answer these questions.

List of Abbreviations:

CARA	Control of Alien Refugees Act of 1960
CRCU	Congolese Refugee Community of Uganda / Réfugiées en Communauté Congolais Ouganda
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (2018)
DM	the Daily Monitor (Ugandan newspaper)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
GCR	The Global Compact on Refugees
GoU	Government of Uganda
GRN	Global Refugee Network
HRD	Human Rights Defender
IAU	InterAid Uganda
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INGO	International nongovernmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRRI	International Refugee Rights Initiative
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Services
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NoSSCOU	Network of South Sudanese Civil Society Organizations in Uganda
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NV	the New Vision (Ugandan newspaper)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPM	Government of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister
PK	Political knowledge
PRS	Protracted refugee status
RAD	Refugee Aid and Development Approach
RCO	Refugee community-based organization
ReHoPE	Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (2017)
RLO	Refugee-led organization
RLP	Refugee Law Project
RRP	UNHCR's Refugee Response Plan
SCAU	Somali Community Association in Uganda
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SRS	Self-reliance strategies
UN	the United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program
WRC	Women's Refugee Commission
YARID	Young African Refugees in Integral Development
YSAT	Youth Social Advocacy Team

Dedication:

I dedicate this book to my U.S. and Ugandan-based families, and to all the displaced persons who so generously and openly shared their experiences with me.

I owe each of you a debt of profound gratitude.

Understanding Refugees' Political Knowledge: A Study of Urban Refugees in Uganda

Table of Contents:

<i>Abstract:</i>	2
<i>Acknowledgments:</i>	4
<i>Preface:</i>	7
<i>List of Abbreviations:</i>	9
<i>Dedication:</i>	10
<i>List of Tables and Figures:</i>	14
Chapter One. Refugee Political Knowledge: What it is and why it matters.	15
1.1 Introduction:	15
1.2 Theorizing Political Knowledge: What it is and what it does for Refugees	18
1.2.1. Theorizing what is refugees' political knowledge:	18
1.2.2. Theorizing What Political Knowledge “does” for citizens and non-citizens:.....	21
1.3 Variation in global refugee rights and governance:	23
1.4 Theorizing Variation in Refugee Political Knowledge Learning:	28
1.5 Research Design:	33
1.5.1. Ethnographic Research Methods:	34
1.5.2. Archival Research Methods:.....	39
1.6 Looking Ahead	40
Chapter Two. Case and Context: Uganda as a refugee hosting state.	45
2.1 Introduction:	45
2.2 Refugee Governance and Rights in Uganda:	48
2.2.1 The <i>de jure</i> Context: Rights, Restrictions, and Responsibilities for Refugees in Uganda.....	48
2.2.2. Uneven <i>de jure</i> Policy Implementation.....	51
2.3 The <i>de facto</i> context: Variation in Governance by Location and Refugee Nationality	55
2.3.1 Considering Rights and Governance Based Across Hosting Cities:.....	56
2.3.2 Variation in Political Knowledge Based on Refugee Nationality:.....	62
2.4 Conclusion:	70
Chapter Three. Explaining Variation in Refugees' Political Knowledge Outcomes	72
3.1 Introduction:	72
3.2 Variation in Refugees' Political Knowledge Outcomes	75
3.2.1. Refugee Understandings of their Rights:	76
3.2.2. Analysis in Content of Refugee Rights:.....	79
3.2.3. Refugee Understandings of Governance Responsibilities:	83
3.3 Explaining Variation in Political Knowledge Outcomes:	88
3.3.1. Effects of material safety nets on political knowledge outcomes:	89

3.3.2	Effect of state and non-state governance actors on political knowledge:	92
3.3.3	Effects of refugee-led support on political knowledge:	96
3.4	Conclusion:	100
<i>Chapter Four. Politics as “taboo”: Refugees’ Barriers to Acquiring Political Knowledge.... 102</i>		
4.1	Introduction:.....	102
4.2	Quantitative Analysis: Refugees’ Ease to Learn Rights:.....	104
4.2.1.	Integration as Effecting Knowledge Learning	106
4.2.2.	Exogenous Governance Actors as Effecting Rights Learning	108
4.2.3.	Endogenous Refugee Support as Effecting Rights Learning	109
4.3	Qualitative Assessment: Refugee-Identified Barriers to Knowledge Formation:.....	111
4.3.1	Barriers to Refugee Political Knowledge Formation:	111
4.3.2.	Limited or no Barriers to Learn Political Knowledge:.....	116
4.4	Refugees’ Political Aversion as Preventing Rights Learning: Quantitative Findings	117
4.4.1.	Mixed Methods and Findings:	117
4.5	Refugees’ Political Aversion as Preventing Rights Learning: Qualitative Findings.....	122
4.5.1.	Refugee Understandings of “Politics”	123
4.5.2.	Barriers to Learning Political Knowledge due to Negative Understandings of Politics	127
4.5.3.	Barriers to Learning Political Knowledge due to Negative Understandings of Politics	134
4.6	Conclusion.....	138
<i>Chapter Five. The Impacts of Refugees’ Political Knowledge on Grievance Expression Tactics and Targets..... 141</i>		
5.1	Introduction:.....	141
5.2	Dataset and Methodology:.....	144
5.2.1	Case selection and coding:	145
5.2.2	Identifying Political Knowledge in Dataset Events:	147
5.3	Refugee Political Knowledge and Tactical Choice: Comparing Refugee Response to the Same Grievance	150
5.3.1.	Quantitative Analysis:.....	151
5.3.2.	Qualitative analysis:	154
5.4	Political Knowledge to Influence Demand Precision and Targets of Refugee Demands:.....	166
5.4.1.	Variation in demand precision	167
5.4.2.	Variation in refugee target selection:	174
5.5	Conclusion:	179
<i>Chapter Six. How Refugees’ Political Knowledge Affects Vulnerability and Resilience. 182</i>		
6.1	Introduction:.....	182
6.2	Political Knowledge Mechanisms to Engender Vulnerability and Resilience:.....	186
6.3	Data, Measurement, Methodology:	189
6.3.1.	Case Selection and Analysis:	189
6.3.2.	Methodology and limitations:	190
6.3.3.	Coding and Measurement: Political Knowledge, Vulnerability, and Resilience:.....	191
6.4	Findings and Analysis:.....	193
6.4.1.	Exploitation, Risk, and Harm:.....	197
6.5	Political Knowledge and Host Country Decision-making:	209

6.5.1. Political Knowledge and Strategies that Produce Vulnerability:.....	209
6.5.2. Political Knowledge and Strategies that Produce Resiliency:	212
6.7 Conclusion:	218
<i>Chapter Seven. Conclusion and Policy Implications</i>	222
7.1 Introduction:.....	222
7.2 Contributions: Assessing my Three Research Goals:.....	226
7.3 Limitations and Implications for Policy and Research:	234
7.3.1. Limitations:.....	234
7.3.2. Policy Implications:.....	236
<i>Non-Archival References:</i>	241
<i>Newspaper and Archival References:</i>	257
<i>Appendix One. Biographical Data for Surveyed Refugees</i>	263

List of Tables and Figures:

Figure 1 Average number of Rights Listed by Gender and Nationality	77
Figure 2: Average Rights Listed by Nationality & Location, and by Urban Status & Location ..	78
Figure 3 Who Decides Refugee Rights in Uganda	84
Figure 4: Likelihood to go for help by Hosting City	98
Figure 5: Ease to learn rights, disaggregated by nationality and hosting city	110
Figure 6: Political Sentiment Categories and Coding	119
Figure 7: Comparing Political Sentiment Scores	121
Figure 8: Political Sentiment by Age and Length in Uganda	122
Figure 9: Average Political Knowledge per Grievance Expression Tactic	152
Figure 10: Refugee’s Chosen Tactic to Respond to Grievances,	136
Figure 11: Average Demand Precision Disaggregated by Tactic and by Demand Category	169
Figure 12: Average Target Precision Per Tactic and Demand Category	175
Figure 13: Theorizing a Relationship Between Political Knowledge, Resilience, and Vulnerability after Shocks	189
Figure 14: The Relationship of Political Knowledge to Vulnerability or Resilience	194
Figure 15: Average Political Knowledge by Outcome Category	196
Table 1: Demographic Composition of Survey Participants	36
Table 2 Most Common Responses to “What rights do refugees have in Uganda?”	80
Table 3 Most Common Responses to “What rights do refugees have in Uganda?” By Refugee Nationality	81
Table 4: What rights do refugees have in Uganda?” by urban status and city:	82
Table 5 Top Three Mode Responses of “Who is Responsible to Help” by nationality:	85
Table 6: Top Three Responses for “Who is Responsible to Help” by city and urban status	87
Table 7: Regression Analysis Results: Ease to Learn Rights	107
Table 8: Refugee Likelihood to Seek Assistance and their Ease to Learn Rights	108
Table 9: Grievance Expression Tactics	147
Table 10: Political Knowledge Dimensions, Measurement and Aggregation	150
Table 11: Descriptions of Resilience or Vulnerability Outcome Categories	193
Table 12: Average PK per Outcome Category and Coding Descriptions	197

Chapter One. Refugee Political Knowledge: What it is and why it matters.

“We don’t have many rights. They tell us that we can work, start a business, go to school, or do everything. But it’s *not* true.”

- Congolese refugee in Kampala (Survey October 2, 2019. ID 021019-6)

“Our rights are many! We have the rights for health, education, for food and security, we can go to church, and move freely.”

- Congolese refugee in Mbarara (Survey August 26, 2019. ID Mb42).

1.1 Introduction:

As people forced to flee their country due to conflict, persecution, and human rights violations, refugees generally arrive in a state where they lack citizenship that may otherwise provide rights and protections necessary to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.¹ Moreover, many of the world’s refugees arrive in states that restrict their rights to move freely, to seek wage-earning employment, and to integrate into hosting communities. These restrictionist trends that deny rights have constrained non-citizen refugees’ ability to pursue and achieve a dignified life—often resulting in the stagnation of refugees’ skills, capacities, and expertise.

Not all states, however, are restrictive in granting rights and protection to the displaced. Former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Filippo Grandi has praised Uganda, a state in East Africa, as a model for hosting refugees (Clayton 2018; Hughes 2017).

¹ Article 1.2 of the 1967 United Nations Protocol removes the temporal and geographic restrictions of the 1951 Convention on the Status of the Refugees definition, thus, defining a refugee as, “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion

Scholars, legal experts, and humanitarian practitioners laud Uganda for extending progressive refugee rights despite its economic status as a developing country.² To wit, scholars contend that some refugees in Uganda have achieved higher economic, social, and integrative outcomes than displaced persons in other African countries³ precisely because of the rights Uganda grants. These include the right to choose residence in or out of rural refugee settlements, to move freely, to allow refugees to pursue economic opportunities, and to access basic social services of healthcare and education on par with citizens.

Yet undergirding this expansive rights-based framework and the attribution of positive outcomes to it, are three strong assumptions: that refugees hosted within Uganda 1) know about their rights; 2) know the processes to secure these rights; and 3) know of the relevant governmental, non-governmental, and intergovernmental actors who provide rights-based assistance and protection. Even the most robust refugee rights regime is to no effect if refugees lack political knowledge, which I define as one's understanding of rights, restrictions, responsibilities and the governance actors and processes who decide and uphold these. I ask: do refugees in Uganda understand their rights and, if so, how? Why do refugees often acquire inconsistent rights-based understandings? Do the displaced have the requisite knowledge to take advantage of available opportunities as they navigate life in their hosting state? How does holding political knowledge affect refugees' lives?

Rather than maintain the assumptions that refugees know and can enjoy rights, I evaluate them and answer questions about the causes, prevalence, and effects of knowledge among

² Legal reviews of Uganda's passage and implementation of the Refugees Act 2006 and its 2010 Regulations by Sharpe and Namusobya (2012) and Addaney (2017) overall find that Uganda honors many of its international commitments for refugees through domestic legislation. For examples of international institution praise of Uganda's refugee hosting, see World Bank Report (2019). Finally, see Coggio (2018),

³ For comparative studies of refugee economic outcomes in Uganda, see Büscher (2011), Omata and Kaplan (2013), Betts, Bloom, Kaplan and Omata (2017), and Monteith and Lwasa (2017). For perspectives of refugee integration outcomes in Uganda, see Kigozi and Lamb (2015), Kreibaum (2015), and REACH (2018).

refugees. Through survey analysis, I find that most refugees in my sample demonstrate limited political knowledge, if any. Very few refugees demonstrate high knowledge. Additionally, surveys reveal that refugees hold divergent expectations of their rights and of the actors and processes through which to activate their rights depending on the *de jure* governance features they encounter in Ugandan cities and settlements, as well as the *de facto* implementation of rights across these governance modes. Surveys additionally demonstrate how political knowledge is mediated by refugees' individual and collective understanding of "politics" and the acceptability of politics in their daily lives.

While rights-based political knowledge is critical for anyone in a territory, this knowledge serves non-citizens, including refugees, in ways that both align and diverge from citizens. Additionally, obtaining this knowledge carries additional stakes for displaced non-citizens, including refugees and asylum-seekers because of their precarity—a term which Banki (2013, 3) defines as, "the extent to which an individual is vulnerable to removal, deportation, or detention because of his or her legal status and/or possession of documentation, or lack thereof, in the host country." Moreover, the distinction between limited and high political knowledge, I argue, explains three critical outcomes for refugees' well-being. First, a lack of knowledge impacts refugees' ability to access their rights, services, provisions, and protection. Second, a lack of knowledge impacts their ability to know how or from whom to seek rights-based and protection support, or to seek justice for violated rights. Finally, refugees who lack rights-based knowledge may be more likely to fall victim to exploitation or harm when they seek rights they do not have, such as a perceived 'right' for resettlement.

This dissertation repositions the analytical lens from a "top-down" assessment of Uganda's perceived generosity in refugee hosting to instead engage a "bottom-up" assessment of

rights, protections, and opportunities through refugees' lived experiences. Among its contributions are to advance a definition of political knowledge that is appropriate for refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless individuals, and other non-citizen groups. This reconceptualization acknowledges the relevance of political knowledge for vast global population segments that are often under-acknowledged if not overlooked entirely. Finally, a reconceptualization offers analytical advantages to explore how this knowledge engenders outcomes ranging from the expression of grievances to the production of resilience or vulnerability in response to common shocks, threats, exploitations, and harms that refugees encounter globally. In approaching this study, I aim to build a theoretical and empirical argument of *why* it matters whether refugees hold political knowledge and to draw from research to propose practical ways to approach knowledge dissemination to improve outcomes for refugees displaced to Uganda and elsewhere.

To meet these objectives, in coming sections, I assess theories and definitions of political knowledge and political knowledge formation to establish their applicability and limitations to understand refugees' political knowledge. Next, I theorize why variation in hosting states' *de jure* responses to forced migration crises has symbolic and practical implications for the rights and protections refugees may expect in these states.

1.2 Theorizing Political Knowledge: What it is and what it does for Refugees

1.2.1. Theorizing what is refugees' political knowledge:

Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993, 1180) identified that there is not a generally accepted definition of political knowledge or measurements thereof. Chief among the reasons for definitional contestation is the lack of conceptual clarity and theoretical boundedness between political knowledge and related concepts such as political information (Lane and Sears 1964),

political expertise (Converse 1964), or political sophistication (Luskin 1987: 1990; Guo and Moy 1998; Owen 2008). Conceptualizations also alternatively view political knowledge as an independent variable activated for routine political behaviors like voting or as a dependent, outcome variable. As an example of the later, Rapeli (2014, 2) defined political knowledge as, “knowledge, that is, correct factual information pertaining to politics.” Similarly, Milner (2002, 53) stated it is, “political knowledge that is (presumed to be) accurate.” However, the notion of political “facts” is contentious, and scholars have questioned if politics, political opinion, and political knowledge can ever be objective truth or only subjective (Rapeli 2014, 9). Likewise, Bullock and Luskin (2011) posit that knowledge can be correct to a matter of degree ranging from incorrect to partially to fully correct.

In this study, political knowledge represents an outcome comprised of three components: the rights, restrictions, and responsibilities that a group believes they have, and the actors and processes that they believe are responsible to decide and uphold these. Per Grabska and Mehta (2008, 12) rights are “the basis of access to resources and commodities upon which real claims can be made. They also entail an element of justice, and this legal protection in principle can provide grounds for redress in cases of accountability failures...” Haddad (2003, 2) identifies four categories of rights: claims-rights, liberty-rights, power rights, and immunity rights. Across typologies, rights are interactions between a rights-holder and a duty-bearer and establish the parameters of which actions are and are not permissible. For refugees, rights also encompass the social services, material, or financial provision they may justifiably expect state or non-state INGO actors to provide. I build from these understandings to consider rights as a broad concept that concomitantly permits identification of restrictions, responsibilities, and obligations.

Next, governance, broadly construed, refers to the actors that decide these rights, restrictions, and obligations. Moreover, governance actors protect rights and provide justice when rights are violated. The IOM defines migration governance as, “The combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (sub-national, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States’ approaches with regard to migration in all its forms (2019, 138).” Arnold-Fernández (2019, 188) describes refugee governance as the “rules in place,” that are the “primary determinants of refugee’s ability to live safely, move freely, work, and access state and private services (education, healthcare, banking and justice among others).” Global migration governance thus subsumes complex and intersecting decision-making processes that occur at the international, regional, national, and local levels, as well as at the level of international organizations such as the UNHCR. Finally, governance encompasses complex considerations of the *de jure* codified legal commitments and their *de facto* implementation.

For many citizens in liberal democratic nations, governance structures are stable and knowable because states are the primary actor to decide citizen rights. In contrast to citizens, refugees’ rights are meted out by a dizzying number of UN agencies, state, and non-state INGO actors (Haddad 2008; Betts 2009; 2011; Betts and Loescher 2011). Crisp and Slaughter (2009) argue that a host state is often only minimally involved in refugee governance and that states sub-contract responsibilities to UNHCR and international NGOs (iNGOs) as a “surrogate state.”⁴ Per Haddad (2002; 2008), refugees are “between sovereigns” wherein their governance occurs at an uncomfortable intersection of two differently positioned legal regimes—that of a state whose rights are predicated on exclusion and an international humanitarian rights regime built on

⁴ Crisp and Slaughter (2009) describe UNHCR as a surrogate state as it encroaches into areas traditionally subsumed under responsibilities of a sovereign state. See also Kagan (2011, 1).

inclusion.⁵ The result of being between sovereigns is a less stable and less knowable governance structure as governance actors change across locations and over time.

Finally, political knowledge is attentive to governance processes. Biehl (2015) characterizes processual knowledge—such as decision-making processes for asylum or distribution eligibility—directly impact refugees’ lives. This knowledge can empower individuals to both know how decision-making processes work, as well as enable an individual to see where they stand vis-à-vis these processes. Per El-Shaarawi (2015), lacking processual knowledge can create emotional and psychological distress for already vulnerable individuals who must attempt life and livelihood strategies in the face of legal precarity.

Cumulatively, each constitutive definitional component captures areas that are broadly applicable to citizens and non-citizens.

1.2.2. Theorizing What Political Knowledge “does” for citizens and non-citizens:

While my definition of political knowledge extends to displaced and non-displaced persons alike, the ways in which refugees operationalize this knowledge both aligns and diverges from how citizens use this knowledge. For example, everyone requires political knowledge to know their rights, opportunities, and protections; to remain in compliance to local laws; and to know how to obtain rights-based protection. However, beyond these similarities, I identify three ways in which political knowledge operates differently for noncitizens.

First, an established literature contends that citizens in liberal democratic states require political knowledge to engage in political behaviors, including to differentiate between political

⁵ Haddad describes state rights as exclusive because they are rooted in sovereign territorial membership where an individual is, in theory, clearly a member or a non-member. Members have distinct rights to which non-members may be excluded. International human rights regimes are not rooted in territorial sovereignty and rights protection cannot be excluded. See also Isin (2008).

parties and candidates, and to not vote against one's interests (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Hoffman 2012). Yet in most states, non-citizens, including refugees and asylum seekers, lack authorization to participate in systematic political behaviors of voting, joining a political party, or running for elected office. These actions are reserved exclusively for citizens. Refugees are blocked from influencing the political processes that decide their rights, restrictions, and legal protections.⁶ In essence, not only have refugees been forced out of their country because of politics, they are now excluded from formal political behaviors, from political processes, and from politics writ large. Rather than requiring political knowledge to facilitate in routinized political behaviors, refugees require political knowledge to avoid legal or social sanction of going beyond their rights and restrictions, and to avoid exploitation.

Second, while political knowledge may facilitate a citizen's social, economic, or political integration, as non-citizens, refugees are largely barred from this integration. Instead, refugees can only pursue temporary integration. Their ability to remain in a host nation is contingent upon legal considerations beyond their control. Moreover, refugees are often in a temporal limbo (Lori 2019). They do not know when, or if, they will receive a durable solution of voluntary return to their home country, permanent integration into their hosting country, or resettlement to a third country. Of the approximately 26 million global refugees displaced in 2020, 5.4 million were displaced for more than ten years. An estimated 2.2 million were displaced for over 35 years (Devictor 2020). Refugees in a state of limbo must navigate rights, protection, and opportunities while simultaneously negotiating their legal and temporal precarity.

Third, political knowledge functions differently for refugees because they occupy an institutional and legal position between sovereigns. As expounded by Haddad (2002, 22),

⁶ See Omata (2017, 108-9) who clarifies that refugee status should not deterministically deny refugees their political rights as these rights are supported in international human rights doctrine. See also Arendt (1973).

“Refugees are (therefore) anomalies in the system of nation-states and challenge the assumption that all individuals belong to a territory. Indeed, refugees do not fit into the citizen-state-territory trinity, but are forced, instead, into the *gaps between nation-states*” (emphasis added). Malkki (1995, 6) describes refugees’ liminal position between sovereigns as falling outside the “national order of things.” This status in-between sovereigns impacts both how governance and decision-making occurs, as well as impacts refugees’ ability to hold governance actors to account. As McConnachie describes (2014, 12), “having been placed at the intersection of different governing bodies, refugees suffer from a simultaneous absence and surfeit of statehood... they lack territorial citizenship, but they are subject to the exercise of sovereign authority by the host government and aid organizations.”⁷

While citizens influence their government and hold negligent leaders to account through systemic political behaviors, refugees largely lack direct representation when policies are made for and about them. Additionally, many of the actors who decide laws and administer refugee policies, which importantly include the UNHCR and iNGOs, are not elected. Per Verdirame and Mehta (2004, xvii), “having arrogated powers from states, international actors constitute an exogenous apparatus that has acquired effective control over refugee policy and is not subject to the checks and balances that ordinarily constrain state bureaucracies, at least in liberal democracies.” In sum, even as hosting states demand refugee adherence to local laws, the displaced lack authorization to influence or change these laws.

1.3 Variation in global refugee rights and governance:

⁷ From the full quote by McConnachie (2014, 12), the “intersection of different governing bodies,” refers directly to “the host state and international institutions.”

How state, non-state, and UN actors establish and implement governance structures critically informs the rights, opportunities, protections, provisions, and restrictions refugees may enjoy in a hosting state. As such, a study of refugees' political knowledge requires a grounded, context-specific assessment of a host state's relevant rights-based and governance structures.

A preliminary method to differentiate national refugee governance responses is to see whether a state has ratified the two primary international refugee conventions—the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter referred to as the 1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol—and to examine what ratification implies in practice. Per Addaney (2017, 226), in ratifying the 1951 Convention, states need only acknowledge the substantive rights of non-discrimination, freedom of religion, access to courts, and *non-refoulement*.⁸ Beyond these customary international law principles,⁹ states have vast leeway to incorporate or reject other convention principles. For example, they decide whether to permit refugees the right to movable and immovable property (Art. 13), to seek wage-earning employment (Art. 17), self-employment (Art. 18), public education (Art. 22), or to move freely (Art. 26). The UN Conventions do not mandate refugee confinement to camps or settlements and states choose where refugees can legally reside (Art. 26). Finally, states can enact reservations or declarations to clarify their commitments and ensure that refugee hosting suits its national interests and capabilities.¹⁰ In

⁸ Per UNHCR (2007), *non-refoulement* is the legal expectation that nation-states, “shall not expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any matter whatsoever to the frontiers of the territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

⁹ Customary international law refers to legal norms and principles to which all nations are beholden regardless of treaty signatory status. Nations cannot place reservations or declarations on treaty components considered as customary international law. Ibid.

¹⁰ Per the UN, declarations are, “often deliberately chosen to indicate that the parties do not intend to create binding obligations but merely want to declare certain aspirations.” A reservation, “is a declaration made by a state by which it purports to exclude or alter the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state. A reservation enables a state to accept a multilateral treaty as a whole by giving it the possibility not to apply certain provisions with which it does not want to comply.” See United Nations (2020): Treaty Collection, “Glossary.”

signatory countries, the reservations and declarations are often the *de jure* foundation for refugees' rights, restrictions, and responsibilities. In 2022, 148 countries have signed either the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol.¹¹

Beyond international treaties, geographic sub-regions may generate coordinated governance responses to forced migration. Examples include the Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment of Refugees of 1966 and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa which coordinate state responses in Asia-Pacific and African regions, respectively. The regional agreements are non-binding. It is not evident that these governance arrangements produce substantive rights-based protection in refugees' daily lives (Davis 2007; Sebastien 2016; Yahya and Muasher 2018).

States may also voluntarily accede to regional and international human rights treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Regionally, the East African Community and Economic Community of West African States have drafted legal instruments recognizing African's economic, social, and political rights, including those displaced from their home country. These treaties affirm certain rights are non-excludable. However, these treaties are "soft law" and do not deterministically result in *de facto* rights protection for either citizens or non-citizens because they are non-binding and non-enforceable.¹²

¹¹ See UNHCR (2020), "States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol."

¹² For a distinction of hard and soft law, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (2020) defines these terms as, "soft law is used to denote agreements, principles and declarations that are not legally binding. Soft law instruments are predominantly found in the international sphere. UN General Assembly resolutions are an example of soft law. Hard law refers generally to legal obligations that are binding on the parties involved and which can be legally enforced before a court." See also Sandvik (2011, 12).

Perhaps most importantly, states can domestically enact national legislation to affirm their regional and international treaty commitments. The *de jure* national governance response is arguably the most direct signifier of refugees' rights, restrictions, and obligations. Per Cantor and Chikwanha (2019, 186), "(the) focus on national law is useful also from a practical perspective, as States usually apply national rather than international law to refugees in practice... national law arguably offers a more productive starting point for the enquiry than international law." Some states, including many in the Middle East and Asia Pacific Regions, forego creation of national legislation and instead implement ad hoc responses facilitated through complex memorandum of understanding (MoU) (Kagan 2011). In these instances, states ascribe UNHCR or iNGOs responsibility for refugee protection and provision rather than undertake these burdens. In comparing national refugee governance throughout Africa, 46 of 54 nations, including Uganda, have created domestic refugee laws.¹³

A final form of governance unique for displaced populations occurs at the organizational level and are UNHCR refugee response plans (RRPs). Per the UNHCR, a RRP is, "a UNHCR-led, inter-agency planning and coordination tool for large-scale or complex refugee situations... RRP present the inter-agency response strategy and the corresponding financial requirements of all partners to ensure the coherence and complementarity of the humanitarian response (UNHCR 2020e)" RRP are policy documents that include complex needs assessments for a designated displaced population and their host communities; delineate a response strategy and set its priorities; and specifies an implementation plan for partnership and coordination. Although the UNHCR's RRP promote refugee rights, UNHCR emphasizes that the host state is the primary duty-bearer to establish and uphold refugee rights (UNHCR 2020c).

¹³ Per Cantor and Chikwanha (2019), Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tunisia, Libya and Eritrea do not have domestic refugee legislation.

The rights-based protection offered through UN Conventions, regional and international rights treaties, domestic policy, and UNHCR RRP do not, however, consistently produce tangible rights and protection for refugees. For example, in a review of 20 countries that host approximately 70 percent of the world's refugees, Ruaudel and Zetter (2016, iii) found that most restrict refugees' right to work, which forces refugees to work in potentially exploitative and largely informal economic markets. Likewise, a report by Asylum Access (2015, 4-5) found that despite 85 percent of UN Convention signatories' commitment to refugees' right to employment without reservation, in practice, most nations have considerable *de facto* barriers to employment. Finally, in a study of 15 nations, 45% had a total legal bar to refugees' formal employment, and other nations restricted employment through expensive work permits or through blocking refugee movement from refugee camps, among other barriers (Loescher 2001).

Likewise, few countries permit refugees the right to legal urban residency. Per Kaiser (2006), Agier (2008), and Addaney (2017), some states prefer the displaced reside in camps or settlements to more easily identify and control refugees. In a comparative review of African countries' allowance for refugee freedom of movement, Maple (2016) found that 27 African states predominantly host refugees in camps. Of these 27 states, 10 nations fully restrict refugees' freedom of movement.

This section provides a minimal framework from which to assess the *de jure* and *de facto* rights-based and governance frameworks the displaced may differently encounter across hosting context. The *de jure* hosting context critically provides a formal guide to what protections, opportunities, restrictions, or provisions a refugee may expect. Attention to the *de facto* implementation, including assessment whether hosting states honor their commitments for rights-based provision, illuminates both why refugees' political knowledge may diverge from

“the rules on the books.” Inconsistent implementation also suggests why refugees within the same hosting state may develop inconsistent rights-based expectations.

1.4 Theorizing Variation in Refugee Political Knowledge Learning:

Refugees require political knowledge of their rights and protection, however limited, to mitigate their risks of physical, economic, sexual, or psychological exploitation by those who would take advantage of their vulnerabilities; to bolster their likelihood to benefit from relevant opportunities and protections; and to ensure that they know from whom and how they may receive available protections and provision. Despite the high stakes of holding this knowledge, hosting states rarely engage in systematic efforts to promote political knowledge to refugees. In this section, I contrast citizens’ political knowledge learning that occurs under “normal” times of political stability to refugees’ political knowledge learning that occurs during “abnormal” times of conflict and forced displacement. Three models differently consider whether new knowledge learning is possible for refugees: a resistance to change model, an exogenous exposure model, and an endogenous exposure model.

Among contemporary studies of political knowledge and its formation, most focus on political knowledge learning that occurs in liberal democratic countries in times of political stability. During these “normal” times, scholars identify several mechanisms that promote political knowledge. Mechanisms include formal education provided by state institutions (Beck 1977, Luskin 1990, Grönlund and Milner 2006, Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2016), knowledge promoted by mass communication and media (Chaffee et al 1977, Hoffman 2012, Adman and Strömblad 2018), and peer effects from family, co-workers, teachers, or other social groups (Hyman 1969, Owen 2008, García Castañón 2013). In contrast, forced migration represents a

rupture of stability, including political stability. These identified mechanisms may not similarly function to promote political knowledge for refugees as their education, employment, and social networks are often severely disrupted by displacement.

Notwithstanding these disruptions, three models theorize whether forced migrants can adapt previously held knowledge or acquire new knowledge when prior knowledge is inadequate. In the first model, pre-migration beliefs are resistant to change, and migrants fail to acquire new political knowledge. White et al (2008, 268) summarize, “the conventional wisdom is that early political learning deeply conditions later political learning, and so the expectation is that citizens have difficulty adapting to radically different political environments.” This is particularly so when new information contrasts with prior political expectations or experiences (Merelman 1986).

As aligns with the resistance to change model, refugees fail to acquire political knowledge because of numerous barriers. Per Adman and Strömblad (2018, 249), barriers include, “not knowing language well enough, social isolation, information overload, difficulty identifying reliable sources, and no spare time/ energy when trying to establish a life in a new country.” García-Castañón (2013) reminds new arrivals are simultaneously navigating social, cultural, linguistic, and other challenges that impede or deprioritize political knowledge obtainment. Refugees with experiences of migration-related trauma may face additional barriers (Jacobsen 2006; Crisp, Morris, and Refstie 2012). One ramification is that some refugees fail to gain political knowledge because they must focus on daily subsistence and survival.

Although these identified barriers are relevant for many of the world’s refugees, these theories do not adequately capture the persistent barriers that refugees encounter. Populations who have fled human rights abuses, often committed by the very states that were to uphold their

rights, struggle to rebuild trust to political institutions and political actors while in exile. Refugees' trust-based relations may further erode over time, particularly as refugees enter protracted refugee status whereby there is no envisioned durable solution to end one's exile.¹⁴ Finally, some refugees have been displaced multiple times or to multiple nations in search of safety. Repeat exilic experiences may erode trust, as well as erode one's self-perceptions of a subject of rights as the individual moves further from stable state-based protection.

In contrast to the resistance to change model, two models suggest that political knowledge formation or adaptation is possible. The second model, an exogenous exposure model, finds that institutional and government actors can habituate immigrants with relevant political knowledge and political norms over time (White et al 2008, 269). Studies of long-term integration outcomes for resettled refugees find that knowledge learning must consider not just the efforts of the individual learner, but of the systemic efforts by governments and institutions to promote knowledge to new society members. As such, governance actors have a decisive role to educate new members on their rights, responsibilities, and restrictions (Ager and Strang 2004; 2008; Lichtenstein and Taintor 2016).

Embedded within exposure models are several assumptions that do not hold equally for all refugees in Uganda. First, the exposure model expects that governance actors are present to impart political knowledge; and concomitantly expects that the refugees are either knowledgeable of or able to access these actors. These assumptions do not hold as hosting locations in Uganda have an uneven presence of governance actors that promote knowledge, with some locations having no such actors present. Further, for many refugees, including those in

¹⁴ Per Crisp (2005), UNHCR qualifies protracted displacement to refer that a refugee has lived outside of one's country of citizenship for more than five years and that there is no identified durable solution through which to terminate refugee status.

Uganda, there is not systematic provision of political knowledge, leaving refugees to independently seek this out.

Additionally, knowledge learning through exposure privileges the length of time one spends in a new nation.¹⁵ Scholars predict that new society members gain knowledge over time as they become integrated into their new environment, specifically through forming a breadth and depth of relationships to citizen populations (Ager and Strang 2004; 2008). Yet, due to their temporal limbo, many refugees are unable to integrate resulting that they are neither exposed to nor acquire this information.

Finally, in contrast to the exposure model that emphasizes external efforts to transfer knowledge to new members, a third model incorporates endogenous (internal) considerations that may promote political knowledge. Among other variables, the endogenous model privileges personal motivations and within-group social networks. García-Castañón (2013 & 2018), Tafoya (2014), and Tafoya et al (2019) find that established family and kinship networks often politically socialize new arrivals. In a study of informal migrants in Bangkok, Palmgren (2012) found that migrants were better able to navigate Thailand's tricky migration restrictions when they were supported by established migrant networks. While these examples demonstrate migrants' will and capacity to share political knowledge, other scholars note that some migrants block knowledge transfer. For example, Owen (2008) considers that not all migrants wish to assimilate to or adopt a foreign political culture. Weissberg and Joslyn (1977) note that parents may intentionally not pass political knowledge to their children as they find their past knowledge or experiences as undesirable.

¹⁵ Although White et al (2008, 269) contend that empirical findings of the effects of time on knowledge are inconsistent.

White et al (2008) identify that only some migrants can successfully transfer their prior political knowledge and adapt to a new context. Meanwhile, Black (1982) and Black et al (1987) contend that immigrants who were previously politically active can draw from their past experiences and apply these experiences to a new context. These scholars consistently cite an individual's motivation as among the key determinants of political knowledge accumulation (Luskin 1990; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Adman and Stömlad 2018). Tafoya (2014) hypothesizes that individuals who know they are in a precarious legal position may be incentivized to increase political knowledge, particularly when breaking laws poses a higher threat of detention or deportation. However, Pantoja and Segura (2003) and Neuman et al (2018) identified that threat can be a motivation both towards and away from political knowledge.¹⁶

The endogenous model allows that refugees may lack a personal motivation to seek political knowledge. I argue in Chapter 4 that many refugees lack motivation to see this knowledge because they have experienced a broken relationship to politics that makes political knowledge learning taboo. Simply stated, many refugees find political topics of rights and of governance actors and processes as appropriate only for citizens. Furthermore, processes of displacement may additionally impede refugees' trust-based relationships to other displaced persons. For example, refugees fleeing civil conflict may be distrustful of their co-nationals (UNHCR 2018a). When refugees cannot access social networks, they may risk not obtaining political knowledge from other migrants as predicted by the endogenous model.

Existing theories of political knowledge and its formation provide valuable insights to capture why only some refugees are able or willing to adapt their existing political knowledge in

¹⁶ Neuman et al (2018, 626) acknowledge the disparate results produced by emotions, stating, "Emotional responses to real world events are varied and complex... responses are derived from varying perceptions, identities, and past experience."

a new context. Although they are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, each model provides different mechanisms that promote or impede political knowledge formation. Building on these works, my theory identifies critical elements that are largely absent from existing explanations. First, there is insufficient recognition of refugees' persistent barriers to acquire political knowledge. These barriers specifically include refugees' legal and temporal precarity, which is compounded by an inability to transition one's temporary membership to a permanent status. Second, these theories do not capture the complexity of how refugee governance is negotiated by an expansive number of state and non-state actors, including UNHCR and INGOs. Finally, the processes of displacement often erode refugees' trust towards politicians and political institutions such that they no longer self-consider as a person of politics or rights. I expand these theories in Chapters 3 and 4.

1.5 Research Design:

To evaluate refugee political knowledge, the barriers to knowledge formation, and the effects of having or lacking this knowledge, I incorporate four primary methods of data collection: (1) a survey administered to urban and quasi-urban refugees, (2) focus groups with refugee-led organization (RLO)¹⁷ staff and founders and other refugee leaders; (3) expert interviews with RLO leaders, refugee human rights defenders (HRD),¹⁸ other refugee leaders; and interviews with representatives of Ugandan government and international NGO staff

¹⁷ Existing literature also terms refugee-led organizations as refugee community organizations (RCOs). Torfa (2019) uses the term refugee-led organization (RLO), while Pearl and Zetter (2000), Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter (2006), and Betts, Easton-Calabria, and Pincock (2018) use the term refugee community organization (RCO). I use the terms RCO and RLO interchangeably because both capture refugee-led initiatives for service provision and rights guidance, among other types of direct refugee-to-refugee support.

¹⁸ The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004, 2) defines a human rights defender as, "a term used to describe people who, individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights."

members; and (4) two original datasets that I created through review of Ugandan and international press sources and from refugee-generated letters and documents. I discuss each in turn, as well as discuss the mixed qualitative and quantitative methods used to analyze collected data.

1.5.1. Ethnographic Research Methods:

Surveys:

I conducted 209 surveys with urban and quasi-urban refugees in three Ugandan cities- Mbarara, Gulu, and Kampala using a “snowball” recruit method (Atkinson and Flint 2001). Recruitment was non-random and was facilitated predominantly by existing personal connections to RLO staff, refugee pastors, and refugee community leaders. As a non-refugee and non-African ‘outsider’, I built trust with my recruitment partners by having open dialogues on the development of my research topic and envisioned methods, and discussed my intended research outputs, including how I believe refugees can use my produced data for their own advocacy efforts. My intention to recruit through refugee leaders was to leverage existing trust-based relationships among displaced groups, particularly among vulnerable sub-communities including the LGBTQ refugee population. To avoid reinforcing power imbalances within or between refugee communities, I partnered with a several RLOs and leaders to obtain as broad a research sample as possible.¹⁹

All persons invited for research participation gave verbal and written consent. I conducted surveys in English and French and used the assistance of refugee translators for other

¹⁹ See MacKenzie et al (2007), Clark-Kazak (2020), and Fox et al (2020) for analyses of the risks in refugee survey recruitment. See Jacobsen and Landau (2003) for a discussion in the trade-offs in refugee research methodology and the ethical necessity for researchers to clearly identify their research methods.

languages including KiSwahili, Kirudi, Lingala, Somali, Dinka, Nuer, and Arabic.²⁰ Survey transcription and analysis were conducted using Qualtrics. No audio recordings were made per ethical guidelines agreed by ethical research boards – the IRB at Northwestern University and UNCST in Uganda.²¹

The surveys established baseline information from the refugees' perspective on the rights they have, who decides these rights, barriers to obtaining rights-based information or redress for violated rights, and other related topics. In contrast to existing literature that primarily focuses on urban refugees that live in the capital of Kampala, research was intentionally expanded to survey urban refugee populations in other cities. Gulu in the North and Mbarara in the West are economic and governance hubs in their respective districts. These cities are closer to refugee settlements and to national borders of refugee-producing states, but they have fewer institutional actors to whom refugees can turn for assistance.

Of my 209 survey respondents, the majority were displaced from four countries- D. R. Congo (100), South Sudan (58), Somalia (24), and Burundi (18) with additional respondents from Sudan (5) and Eritrea (4). The high recruitment of Congolese and South Sudanese refugees is appropriate as these two groups represent approximately 90% of refugees in Uganda. Congolese refugees are nearly 50% of the registered urban refugee caseload in Kampala, followed by refugees from Somalia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and elsewhere (REACH 2018, 93-4). The average length of displacement in my sample was 5.6 years with a range of 2 to 19 years.²² The mean respondent age was 36.7 years and participants

²⁰ I owe a large debt of gratitude to Northwestern University KiSwahili Professor Peter Mwangi for his kind assistance translating my survey.

²¹ My IRB authorization number is STU00209843 and my research authorization from the UNSCT is SS305ES.

²² Several interview respondents anecdotally mentioned that they have been displaced numerous times to Uganda. In these cases, the length of displacement is the current rather than cumulative length.

ranged in age from 18 to 70 years. All interviews were conducted in person between July and October 2019. Figure One displays the demographic profiles of my research participants.

Appendix 1 provides additional demographic details for survey respondents.

		<i>Kampala</i> (n=124)	<i>Mbarara</i> (n=44)	<i>Gulu</i> (n=41)
<i>Sending State</i>	DRC	56	44	-
	South Sudan	17	-	41
	Somali	24	-	-
	Burundi	18	-	-
	Other	9	-	-
<i>Urban Status</i>	Urban	105	13	33
	Quasi-Urban	19	31	8
<i>Gender</i>	Male	62	19	17
	Female	55	25	24
	Non-binary	7	-	-

Table 1: Demographic Composition of Survey Participants

For purposes of analysis, I compare refugees by their national origin and by research location. This produces seven groups for comparison: Congolese refugees in Mbarara, South Sudanese refugees in Gulu, and five nationality groups for refugees in Kampala. The four largest national groups, the Congolese, South Sudanese, Somali, and Burundi refugee groups are considered separately, while the Sudanese and Eritrean refugees are considered jointly due to their small sample size.

Refugee Leader Interviews and Focus Groups:

Next, I conducted semi-structured meetings with over 25 RLO staff and founders. All but one RLO was in Kampala. The majority were informal and unregistered organizations that provide ad hoc integrative support through language or vocational instruction, spiritual guidance,

and cultural support to co-national or co-ethnic refugee community members. Other organizations were formally registered, have paid staff members, and provide more consistent programming, such as vocational and language training. Some registered RLOs provide services to both refugees and Ugandan citizens. Few organizations described their interventions specifically as efforts for rights-based training and advocacy. One organization specialized in providing material support, and legal and physical protection to LGBTQ refugees.

I also conducted three focus groups with refugee leaders in each research location. In Kampala, focus group participants included three male Congolese committee members of the Refugee-Led Organizations Network (RELON), a consortium of approximately 15 diverse RLOs from eight national backgrounds.²³ Each RELON member represented an individual RLO. In Gulu, I held a focus group with two South Sudanese leaders, one of whom identifies as a pastor. In Mbarara, the focus group was attended by six representatives of the Congolese Refugee Community of Uganda (CRCU), the only identified RLO in Mbarara Town. Many of these participants identified as pastors. Finally, I held a virtual focus group with a consortium of RLO staff representing three Congolese RLOs in Nakivale Refugee Settlement near to Mbarara.

The focus groups and refugee leader interviews centered on themes of political knowledge and its purpose or appropriateness in refugees' lives; the barriers and opportunities for knowledge formation; and discussion of the roles of UNHCR, state bureaucracies, international NGOs, and refugee networks to promote rights across locations. The semi-structured format of these meetings permitted me to gather additional data beyond the survey questions. For example, refugee leaders explained why refugees across cities may hold different understanding of rights and governance. Refugee leaders further discussed and debated the

²³ RELON membership provided through private communication on 08/06/2020.

contradiction of the value of political knowledge to promote refugees' integration outcomes, rights, and protections, while highlighting refugees' wariness towards politics.

I undertook comprehensive notes manually during interviews and focus groups which were transcribed in Microsoft Word after each meeting's conclusion. Meeting notes were uploaded into Qualtrics and subsequently analyzed using qualitative coding and text analysis.

Expert interviews and field observations:

I conducted approximately 15 expert interviews with Ugandan government and NGO representatives during field research from June to September 2016 and from June to October 2019. Despite numerous attempts, I was unable to interview a representative from UNHCR. Interviews were conducted with representatives from InterAid, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), and several international NGOs including the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and the American Refugee Committee (now renamed Alight). Interviews were done to learn about formal refugee governance structures, to question about any barriers to refugees learning or claiming their rights, and other related topics. Similar protocols were used for notetaking, coding, and analysis as used for refugee expert interviews and focus groups.

Finally, I conducted field observations by spending several days a week in refugee-dense neighborhoods in Kampala, and to a lesser extent in Gulu and Mbarara. At the request of refugee leaders in Kampala, I attended numerous meetings of refugee ethnic groups and attended refugee-hosted "Know Your Rights" campaigns, as well as other refugee-led meetings and events. Through participation in these meetings and from field observations, I gained knowledge on refugees' daily lives, with attention to problems refugees encountered and how they sought

redress for rights-based concerns. I took extensive notes during these observations and events. My field observations and event participation enabled me to gain deeper contextual knowledge of refugees' daily lives, but did not inform theory building or become a unique data source.

1.5.2. Archival Research Methods:

Original Datasets:

To assess how a change in refugees' political knowledge influences critical outcomes of refugee rights-based, political, and non-political grievance expression outcomes, including whether knowledge produces precarity or resiliency for refugees, I analyzed two original datasets that I created from a review of two Ugandan English-language daily newspapers, the *New Vision* and *The Daily Monitor*, from 2014-18; a review of Ugandan and international news sources through LexusNexus from 2009 to the present; and from refugee letters and documents shared through public WhatsApp refugee leaders' forums and shared through public social media accounts. The archival datasets did not contribute towards theory building but allow me to test various aspects of my theory. My ability to analyze and make sense of the datasets was strongly enabled by the contextual knowledge I gained throughout in-country experiences.

To create the dataset, I conducted an extensive review in 2016 of the archival collections at Kampala's Centre for Basic Research (CBR), an NGO dedicated to conducting research and disseminating findings on social issues of importance in Uganda. The staff at CBR meticulously curate Ugandan print media on many topics, including on Uganda's refugee hosting, and on the development, implementation, and criticisms of Ugandan human rights and refugee policies. The collections include extensive original print copies and digitized collections with archives dating

from the late 1990s to the present. Most archives at time of research were print and organized thematically into binders. To locate articles, I manually read each article in all relevant binders.

As a supplement to CBR's collections, I conducted an archival review at Northwestern University's Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies.²⁴ This library houses a comprehensive collection of the *New Vision* and *The Daily Monitor* publications, with daily editions available for 2014-2018. There were limited periodicals missing for each publication. As these sources are not digitized, I manually flipped through each newspaper edition for any article that discusses refugees hosted in Uganda. Finally, I broadened the data range beyond the physical copies of available newspapers through use of LexusNexus and search functions at each newspaper's website. When I identified a physical article from either CBR or Northwestern's collections, I scanned a digital copy alongside digital copies of the LexusNexus articles into NVivo for qualitative coding and text analysis. I downloaded coding results to Excel for quantitative summary and analysis.

Collectively, these archival collections provide valuable insight on Uganda's challenges and successes of refugee hosting. The archives additionally provide evidence of refugee and host community relations, evidence persistent funding shortfalls to provide for refugees, and give general information and context on refugee influxes.

1.6 Looking Ahead

This book is organized as follows. Chapter two provides the requisite background knowledge on Uganda as a refugee hosting state, my research sites, and about the displaced

²⁴ I am grateful to the phenomenal library staff and university archivists for their support. I owe a large debt of gratitude to Jeannette Moss, Florence Mugambi, and Peter Burtch for their kindness, including Peter's generosity helping me navigate library carts almost comically overflowing with newspapers.

population this country hosts. I review Uganda's *de jure* refugee governance structures and its *de facto* implementation across its two modes of refugee hosting—rural settlements and urban self-settlements—and identify a third and under-studied mode of refugee hosting where refugees split their time between these two modes. I refer to this third group as “quasi-urban” refugees. The chapter provides an overview of my three Ugandan research cities Mbarara, Kampala, and Gulu. Finally, it provides background and context for Somali, South Sudanese, Congolese, and Burundian refugees hosted in Uganda, as well as describe how the state's response towards these refugees has changed over time. This contextual review documents Uganda's uneven rights-based and protection space that occurs despite its uniform, domestic refugee hosting structure.

Chapter three analyzes original survey data and demonstrates variation in significant political knowledge outcomes, including uneven expectations of rights, opportunities, protections, and uneven expectations of the governance actors and processes that provide these. While gender and nationality affect political knowledge outcomes, the most significant factor driving variation in outcomes is location. I argue that the observed variation in political knowledge outcome is mediated by two considerations: (1) the “governance mode” which captures how knowledge is mediated by features unique to each of Uganda's two distinct modes of refugee governance (rural settlements or urban residence); and (2) by “urbanity” which captures distinctions across these modes. To fine tune why urban status and location are significant to engender divergent outcomes, I identify three variables how location impacts political knowledge: (1) that the presence or absence of formal safety nets of material provision impacts knowledge as I argue refugees are likely to state as a right the support that they receive rather than enumerate rights as listed in the Refugees Act, 2006 or in relevant refugee policy; (2) that the variation in state and non-state actors across locations impacts refugees' understanding

of governance; and (3) that the presence or absence of refugee-led rights support such as refugee-led organizations (RLOs) and human rights defender (HRD) networks.

Chapter four incorporates original findings from refugee survey and focus groups to enumerate the barriers that refugees identify to learning about their rights. These barriers include logistical and language-based barriers, lack of trust towards institutional actors that refugees believe hold political knowledge, and barriers of trauma. Beyond these barriers, I contribute that many refugees struggle to learn political knowledge about their rights simply because this knowledge is “political.” Due to their past, negative political experiences in which refugees were forced from their homes because of politics, political actors, and processes, or because of political persecution, “politics” for refugees becomes a monolithic and taboo concept that is neither relevant nor appropriate in their daily. Furthermore, many refugees fail to disentangle the boundaries of “politics” or adjudicate which “political actions” are acceptable. Refugees instead lump all topics of governments, governance, and even rights as off-limits and political topics, and view these topics as undesirable or even dangerous. This political aversion represents an additional barrier to obtain rights-based political knowledge.

Chapter five analyzes an original archival dataset to evidence how political knowledge influences three outcomes associated with how refugees in Uganda express rights-based, protection, and provision grievances. Comparing refugee responses to a shared underlying grievance reveals broader trends in how refugees with lower or higher political knowledge differently selects tactics for grievance expression (e.g., selection of letter writing, attending a meeting with governance actors, protest, or even illegal actions of property destruction). Second, the chapter identifies trends in how refugees with different knowledge levels articulate and justify their claims. Refugees with higher knowledge were more capable to justify their demands

in law. Third, the chapter examines trends in how refugees with inconsistent knowledge choose the state and non-state actors to whom they make their demands. Individuals with higher knowledge more frequently addressed claims to actors empowered to assist.

Chapter six analyzes how political knowledge affects refugees' wholistic vulnerability and resilience as they make livelihood strategies in their host country, and as they decide whether, when, and how to return to their home country. Comparing cases where refugees exhibit lower or higher political knowledge assesses how knowledge produces divergent outcomes. A focus on resilience and vulnerability is warranted because many displaced persons globally are susceptible to numerous forms of exploitation. However, refugees are unequally able to respond to these exploitations. They are unequal in their capacity to evade negative shocks, respond to shocks, or recover after a shock. Thus, I explore how political knowledge may enable refugees' resilience in the face of potential risks. In general, I find that refugees with higher knowledge avoid certain forms of exploitation and harm, including resettlement scams. They are more able to craft livelihood strategies that take advantage of available rights and protection than do refugee with lower knowledge.

In the concluding chapter, I reflect upon my three interconnected research aims: (1) to establish variation in urban refugees' political knowledge in Uganda, including to understand the rights, opportunities, and restrictions refugees believe they hold, as well as how they understand the governance actors and processes that support their rights; (2) to theorize why refugees develop such diverse political knowledge outcomes; and (3) to contribute towards an evidence-base of why it matters whether refugees hold or lack this knowledge. The chapter assesses how this work's theoretical and empirical findings contribute towards, complement, or challenge

existing academic literatures. Next, it discusses limitations of this dissertation and its implications for future research. The chapter concludes with practical and policy implications.

Chapter Two. Case and Context: Uganda as a refugee hosting state.

“Uganda’s refugee policy is an inspiration for the region and the wider world,”

- Ban Ki-Moon, former Secretary General of the United Nations¹

“We refugees don’t have any rights because we’re not citizens. For citizens, rights pass through their government, but we don’t have any government. For us refugees, we are just under UNHCR and OPM, so we don’t have rights.”

- A 30-year-old female South Sudanese refugee in Gulu, Uganda (Survey September 25, 2019. ID Gulu092519-1).

2.1 Introduction:

The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol enumerate the minimum rights and protections that states should provide to forcibly displaced persons, including to asylum seekers and refugees. Yet despite aspirational international standards, sovereign states retain autonomy to establish domestic responses to forced migration crises. Mencütek (2019, 9) describes these responses as refugee governance, a term defined as, “the amalgamation of a more or less formal set of policies, programmes and structures that states formulate and implement in cooperation and interaction with multiple actors in order to manage entry, reception/ protection, integration, and exit of cross-border forced migrants.” How states establish governance responses to refugees critically establish the *de jure* criteria of which asylum applicants receive protection; codify the rights, restrictions, and responsibilities afforded if asylum is granted; and clarifies which state, non-state, or UN actors are responsible for refugee rights, protection, and provision.

¹ The United Nations’ Secretary-General in his message to “Uganda’s Transformational Approach to Refugees and Host Communities,”

Per some scholars, national policy is the most significant form of protection and rights for the displaced because it interacts with and affects refugees' daily lives even more directly than do regional or international law and policy. For example, Arnold-Fernandez (2019, 189) finds, "while refugees may be subject to a range of governance frameworks, those at the national level are most often the primary source of strictures that bound refugees' lives and determine refugees' power to create their own life paths following the trauma of displacement." However, these formal considerations only tell one part of the story as Landau and Amit (2014, 534) contend, "legal status and documentation have only limited practical protection effects." As such, one must consider both the *de jure* legal environment as well as the *de facto* structural-institutional constraints to assess whether refugees can access their intended rights and protections.

This dissertation is situated at the intersection of a state's *de jure* refugee governance structures and their *de facto* implementation, which informs how refugees differently acquire political knowledge. This chapter provide a roadmap of these *de jure* and *de facto* contexts. To contextualize the *de jure* context, I describe Uganda's rights, restrictions, and responsibilities for refugees, as well as the complex arrangement of state and non-state actors tasked to decide and administer them. Rather than duplicate efforts of existing scholarship which provides detailed histories how Uganda has gradually expanded refugee rights and protections,² I focus on Uganda's innovations and incentives to promote its two overarching and complementary goals of refugee self-reliance and integration into host communities. Uganda has created an expansive *de jure* refugee rights regime as it diverged from three global restrictionist governance trends: to restrict refugees' access to wage-earning employment or entrepreneurial activities, to restrict

² See Sharpe and Namusobya (2012), UNHCR and the World's Banks (2016), Addaney's (2017) for legal assessments whether Uganda's refugee policies align with its international treaty commitments; and Hovil's (2018) review of Uganda's refugee policies stemming from its pre-colonial refugee governance to the present.

refugees' freedom of movement, and to confine refugees to refugee camps.³ Despite these advancements, Uganda has struggled to fully achieve its hosting goals. Chiefly, Uganda has made limited progress to secure durable solutions for refugees, has failed to localize refugee policy and decision-making, and lacks incentives for urban refugee hosting.

This chapter proceeds in two sections. First, the chapter provides context on each research location. Urban areas are not homogenous and have divergent *de facto* governance implementation. They differ in the state and non-state actors present to provide rights knowledge. As proposed by exogenous models of political knowledge formation, these external-to-refugee actors play a pivotal role to sensitize new arrivals with relevant information and integration support. Likewise, as proposed by endogenous models of political knowledge formation, cities additionally vary in refugee social capital networks, including refugee-led organizations (RLOs) that may share information on rights, restrictions, and responsibilities to their fellow displaced.⁴ Finally, each city varies in its *de facto* governance, with only Kampala having governmental offices to directly support refugees and ensure their rights and protections.

Next, the chapter contextualizes each of the four primary refugee populations in this study: Burundians, Congolese, Somali, and South Sudanese. Focus is given to why refugees from different sending states may be displaced to Uganda, with some groups experiencing cyclical, repeated displacement.⁵ Pre-displacement experiences may affect how displaced persons understand rights and governance, including why they differently develop trust-based relationships towards state and non-state actors who provide their rights. Finally, groups differently develop social capital networks in exile, which may bolster or impede refugees'

³ See chapter one for further discussion of global refugee governance trends and variation in global refugee hosting.

⁴ See chapter one for expansion on the endogenous and exogenous models of political knowledge learning.

⁵ Repeated displacement refers that a group has fled to a nation of exile and returned to their home country, only to be displaced again. This phenomenon is also referred to as cyclical displacement.

ability to learn political knowledge. The review of the *de jure* and *de facto* contexts provides the basis for analysis in subsequent chapters.

2.2 Refugee Governance and Rights in Uganda:

A study of refugees' political knowledge requires a grounded assessment of the *de jure* governance hosting structures as well as of their *de facto* implementation. Cumulatively, the dual considerations of the *de jure* and *de facto* facilitates identification of which rights, protections, and restrictions refugees may expect; the processes to activate their rights; and the state, non-state, and UN actors tasked to ensure rights and protections. This section illuminates these aspects in the Ugandan case study, but the analytical framework to consider potential gaps between the *de jure* and *de facto* contexts may be adopted for any hosting country.

2.2.1 The *de jure* Context: Rights, Restrictions, and Responsibilities for Refugees in Uganda

Three restrictionist trends predominate in global hosting: that countries restrict refugees' rights to free movement, to gainful employment, and to urban residence with the result that many displaced are confined to rural, isolated refugee camps. Despite its status as an economically developing nation with over 40% of its population living under the international poverty line of USD \$1.90 per day,⁶ Uganda has rejected these trends and established progressive and generous rights for refugees.⁷ Uganda has expanded rights from its pre-independence refugee legislation of

⁶ Statistic from World Bank (2020b) "Poverty and Equity Brief". Per Coggio (2018, 3) Uganda ranks 163 of 188 nations on the Human Development Index. See United Nations Development Project, UNDP, (2014) and Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2014) Census 2014 for detailed economic, infrastructural, and other poverty indicators.

⁷ Per Sharpe and Namusobya (2012, 571) the distinction of refugee from asylum seeker matters because, "the rights framework applicable under the Refugees Act... applies only to formally recognized refugees, leaving asylum seekers with no specific protections beyond those provided by human rights law more generally."

the 1955 Control of Refugees from the Sudan Ordinance and the 1960 Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA) to legislate and enact the Refugees Act, 2006 and the Refugee Regulations, 2010.

The current *de jure* codification of rights marks a sharp departure from its prior, deficient legislative approach. For example, scholars criticize Uganda's first comprehensive refugee regulations through CARA as violating refugees' human, economic, and social rights. Although CARA specified limited rights for refugees to remain and offered protection against *refoulement*, it confined refugees to remain in settlements while restricting free movement and choice of residence (Mujuzi 2008). CARA even included outlandish stipulations that allowed the Ugandan government to use a refugee's vehicle without compensation; to arbitrarily slaughter or otherwise dispose of refugee livestock; and to detain refugees without trial on suspicion of any offence.⁸

In replacing CARA and enacting the Refugees Act, 2006, Uganda rejected regional and global trends that confine refugees into camps (Maple 2016). In lieu of camps, Ugandan districts donate gazetted land to create refugee settlements (Zakaryan 2018). While passive observation suggests Ugandan refugee settlements resemble refugee camps, they are functionally different because they are integrated into, rather than separated from, host communities. Additionally, Uganda codified refugees' right to free movement. This allows refugees a choice to reside in settlements or to self-settle into other urban or rural areas (GoU 2006, Article 30). Finally, to reduce dependency on international aid, Uganda grants refugees the rights to seek formal employment and to engage in entrepreneurial activities. To facilitate employment access, the Refugees Act establishes mechanisms to honor refugees' prior professional and educational qualifications (GoU 2006, Article 29 sections e (iii), e (iv), and e (v)).

⁸ See Uganda: Control of Alien Refugees Act, Cap.64 of 1960 Articles 9 and 19 on refugee detention, Article 16 on "Requisition of vehicles," and Article 10 on "disposal of animals belonging to refugees."

Most significantly, Article 28 of the Refugees Act, 2006 pledges that “every refugee is entitled to the rights and shall be subject to obligations provided for or specified in (a) the Geneva Convention; (b) the OAU Convention; and (c) any other convention or instrument relating to the rights and obligations of refugees to which Uganda is a party.” The Act expressly acknowledges several of its international and regional treaty obligations, and enumerates refugees’ rights to remain in Uganda, to non-discrimination, to movable and immovable property, to access courts, and to religious expression (GoU 2006, Part V).

Although healthcare is not explicitly mentioned in the Refugees Act, Uganda has committed to refugees’ healthcare through implementing its Self-Reliance Strategies (SRS) (Meyer 2006, 25). The country has a long-term goal to integrate refugees into eight sectors of local governments: health, education, community services, agricultural production, income generation, environmental protection, water and sanitation, and infrastructure (UNHCR and GoU 1999, 3). Scholars and legal analysts generally interpret the commitment to refugee inclusion into healthcare as connoting a right for healthcare.⁹

However, there are legal ambiguities regarding vital services and rights that are under-defined in the Refugees Act. For instance, legal analysts have highlighted that the Act is imprecise whether refugees require authorization from settlement commandants to leave gazetted settlement areas. It is additionally unclear what forms of authorization, if any, refugees require for formal sector employment (Werker 2007; Kigozi 2015a; UNHCR and World Bank 2016; Addaney 2017). Although scholars concur that Uganda does not enforce requirements for refugees to leave settlements, refugees often struggle to enter the formal economic market due to

⁹ See Meyer (2006); World Bank (2016), Hovil (2018, 5), O’Callaghan and McGuinness (2019), and Idris (2020). See also Addaney (2017) who cites Article 7(2) of the Refugee Regulations, 2010 as providing access for HIV-positive refugees to receive care alongside nationals.

employer confusion what permissions are needed (Kigozi 2015, 2). While the Ugandan Registration Bureau in conjunction with the Ugandan immigration office facilitate granting work permits, refugees and employers alike find the processes of permit obtainment opaque (IRC 2019, 9). Finally, while the Act accords refugees’ rights to moveable and immovable property, there is no guidance whether refugees have a right to obtain loans, open bank accounts, or receive financial services. In place of a national directive, individual banks and financial institutions arbitrarily make these determinations.¹⁰

Like citizens, refugees have corresponding restrictions and responsibilities that accompany their rights. For example, per Article 29(g), refugees have a right to form associations, but they are forbidden from forming political associations. Article 35 (a & b) sets forth refugees’ duties to comply with all Ugandan laws and regulations, as well as to conform with, “measures taken for the maintenance of public order.” Finally, Article 35(d) prohibits refugees from engaging in, “any political activities with Uganda, whether at the local or national level.” Importantly, however, neither the Refugees Act, 2006 nor the Refugee Regulations, 2010 provide a definition of politics or of what actions constitute as political.

Thus, even with comprehensive *de jure* policy commitments, many rights-based considerations—including access to banking or definitional precision of politics and political behaviors—are under-specified.

2.2.2. Uneven *de jure* Policy Implementation

Despite uniformity in Uganda’s *de jure* governance policies, uneven *de facto* policy implementation influences the extent to which refugees can consistently access rights, service

¹⁰ UNHCR report (2019a, 75), clarifies refugees have a right to open a banking account with their official Ugandan-issued refugee identification, but further states that banks may require additional documentation.

provision, or opportunities. To make the case that uneven implementation occurs, this section examines Uganda's programmatic efforts for policy implementation, as well as examines their successes and deficiencies.

Since the 1990s, Uganda has promoted refugee self-reliance to benefit the displaced and reduce the burden on host communities through the Refugee Aid and Development Approach (RAD) of the 1980s and 90s, and the 1999 Self-Reliance Strategies (SRS). The RAD and SRS policies acknowledge the frequent long-term nature of asylum, the difficulties to secure durable solutions, and acknowledge the need to prevent refugees' economic and educational stagnation during exile (Meyer 2006; Hovil 2018). Through enacting these policies, Uganda affirmed its commitments to expansive refugee rights in order that the displaced can continue to develop and use their skills rather than become dependent on international aid. Yet undergirding these policies is an assumption that refugees know these policies and can access the temporary integration and economic, educational, and other livelihood outcomes these policies promote. Neither the RAD, SRS, or subsequent policy implementations entailed national-level or systematic efforts to promote this knowledge, leaving refugees to independently seek out knowledge of their rights and of the policies that uphold them.

Among the pragmatic methods Uganda uses to achieve its SRS goals is a 70:30 principle which dictates that 30% of all non-food aid, including healthcare and education services, donated for refugees supports local host communities (IRC 2018; Coggio 2018). For example, while 70% of internationally donated funds for education or other development projects go directly to serve displaced communities, 30% of funds are earmarked for similar host community development projects (Van Lear 2019, 13-14). Uganda promotes this principle to reduce refugee and host

community tensions that arise when the displaced receive international care and provision that economically disadvantaged citizens cannot access.

To date, however, SRS policies have fallen short of expectations, and have largely failed to integrate public service delivery (Crawford et al 2019, 7; O’Callaghan and McGuinness 2019). Kreibaum (2015) found that, overall, Ugandans living near settlements sometimes benefited more from living in refugee hosting districts than did the displaced. However, she also found that despite the benefits, many Ugandans subjectively hold negative perceptions of refugee hosting, including a prevalent belief that the Ugandan government prioritized refugees over citizens (Kreibaum 2015; Zakaryan 2018). Additionally, despite efforts to integrate public services, citizens continue to seek healthcare from governmental facilities while refugees are much more likely to seek services from INGOs (Depio, Ahaibwe, and Kasiry 2018). Despite the intended goals of integrated service delivery, the *de facto* governance for refugees and citizens’ service provision remains separate. Across my three research locations, social service provision for refugees and host communities alike is limited, with many individuals unable to obtain healthcare, education, or social services regardless their legal status.

Finally, scholars suggest financial rationale to explain why SRS policies have floundered. For example, Easton-Calabria and Omata (2018) allege that self-reliance is rooted in neoliberal economic principles with the effect that refugees are unduly burdened to support themselves. They contend that SRS requires increased direct investment by stakeholders, not less, if refugees are to overcome market constraints and compete alongside locals (Grabska and Mehta 2008, 17-18). Quote, “the self-reliance discourse for refugees is used to further a motive by UNHCR and the international community to disengage from the burden of the long-term provision of aid to

refugees... This rhetoric frames refugee self-reliance in a wholly positive light, thereby ignoring the potential protection challenges it engenders (Easton-Calabria and Omata 2018, 1467).”

Other analysts attribute funding shortfalls as contributing to Uganda’s inability to fully offer the refugee rights it has codified. The state has also experienced an extreme uptick in the numbers of displaced it hosts alongside historically low levels of international financial support. For example, a 2016 Refugee Solidarity Summit that aimed to mobilize 2 billion USD to overcome budget deficits secured only 524 million in pledges (O’Callaghan et al 2019, 31). In 2017, the operating budget for refugees in Uganda was only 29% funded (IRC 2018, 10). Likewise, 2018 efforts by the Ugandan Government (GoU) and UNHCR to respond to the emergency needs of hundreds of thousands of displaced South Sudanese received only 16% of the requested funding (O’Callaghan et al 2019, 31). The GoU cannot afford to fill the gaps as it already expands a large proportion of its national budget towards refugee protection.¹¹

Finally, the 70:30 principle applies only to rural areas that provide gazetted land for refugee settlement creation. There are not comparable, systematic benefits for urban refugee hosting. There is no incentive structure for local actors in urban areas to know or honor national commitments towards refugees. Local government actors might errantly insist that refugees return to settlements rather than provide rights and services. Further, without consistent top-down knowledge instruction on refugee rights, local business owners, healthcare administrators, and educators may fail to grant refugees their rights to these opportunities.

Beyond the budgetary shortfalls, scholars identify that the central government must invest resources to establish stakeholder communication and coordination structures across hosting areas. Research suggests that progress in decentralization and in coordination has not fully

¹¹ Per Coggio (2018, 5), “In 2016, Uganda total expenditures on refugee response amounted to the equivalent of 46 percent of the national education budget or 62 percent of government health expenditures.”

occurred. Crawford et al (2019, 2) contend that among the key challenges to implement Uganda’s refugee policies are “the exclusion of key actors (such as communities and local authorities), insufficient financial support from the international community and the limited engagement of the private sector.” Most succinctly, O’Callaghan and McGuinness (2019, 29) find “To date, coordination of refugee affairs has been largely managed with limited or no involvement of district and local government, despite the Ugandan system of decentralized governance.” The lack of coordination may further erode local politicians and governance actors’ ability to know and honor refugee rights. This is particularly so when local institutional capacity is strained and when local bureaucracies receive inadequate financial and material support to expand public services to either citizen or refugee populations.

In sum, the balance between how rights are codified in national laws and policies and how they are implemented have the potential to create protection and rights gaps for refugees. Although Uganda implemented RAD and SRS policies to bolster refugees’ rights, social services, and protections, many refugees, particularly those who stay in urban areas, struggle to achieve these outcomes. The chronic budget shortfalls, low institutional capacity to provide services, lack of local stakeholder sensitization on refugee rights, and lack of incentive structures for urban refugee hosting arguably all contribute to inconsistent refugee access to rights, opportunities, and protections.

2.3 The *de facto* context: Variation in Governance by Location and Refugee Nationality

Forthcoming empirical chapters assess refugee political knowledge outcomes by disaggregating refugees of different location, urban status, and nationality. This section provides

background and context for each fieldwork location of Kampala, Gulu, and Mbarara, and for refugees who flee from different states.

2.3.1 Considering Rights and Governance Based Across Hosting Cities:

While Uganda's uniform refugee policy grants all recognized refugees the same rights, restrictions, and responsibilities, the ways in which governance actors administer rights, protection, and service delivery varies across locations. The *de facto* governance varies depending on the hosting mode of rural settlement or urban self-settlement, as well as changes depending which settlement or city. As aligns with endogenous and exogenous theories of political knowledge formation, each hosting area has a different composition of state, non-state, and refugee-led actors that may conduct political knowledge instruction on rights and governance. Although my analytic focus is on refugees who stay at least partially outside of settlements, I contextualize how governance, rights, and stakeholder support differ whether a refugee stays in or outside settlements. In part, this is done because quasi-urban refugees move between both structures. Their experiences and distribution within a settlement may inform their expectations of rights and provision outside this structure. I then illuminate factors of governance, rights, and stakeholder support across each fieldwork location.

Perhaps the clearest distinction of rights and distribution that varies across locations is that refugees in settlements receive agricultural land, seed, and tools, as well as limited food, cash, or material assistance. While there is not a formal mandate to exclude systematic food and material provision to refugees outside of settlements, urban-based refugees are largely ineligible for routine aid distribution (Hovil 2018). Second, as aligns with UNHCR's Urban Policy of

2009, refugees outside of settlements do not have distinct delivery structures for education, healthcare, or other social services (UNHCR 2009, article 113).

Beyond *de facto* differences in service provision, the actors responsible for refugee governance change based on the refugee's location. *De jure* governance for all refugees is administered by the GoU's Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) as dictated by the Refugees Act, 2006¹² and as re-affirmed through the Act's implementation policies.¹³ In practice, however, GoU's role to administer refugee protection or provision is limited. Per analysis by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (2017: 5) "the government's responsibility stops at the provision of land." The report outlines that for refugees in settlements, the GoU coordinates with UNHCR and international implementing partners for issues beyond land procurement, including for service delivery, protection, and provision. The composition of state and non-state actors involved in governance changes across each settlement and varies over time. Per the 2018-2020 country refugee response plan (RRP), at least 107 individual implementing partners were engaged in Uganda's refugee response (UNHCR 2019, 38).

Refugees in Kampala:

Kampala is the only city for which UNHCR has statics on registered refugee populations. As of 31 December 2019, UNHCR registered 76,531 urban refugees in Kampala. This is approximately 4.55% of Kampala's total population, producing a refugee to citizen ratio of roughly 1 to 22.¹⁴ The urban refugee caseload in Kampala was 35.01% Congolese, 29.69%

¹² The Refugees Act, 2006 obligated the Government of Uganda to establish an Office of Refugees. This office is currently under the purview of the Office of the Prime Minister, under the Minister for Disaster Preparedness, Management and Refugees.

¹³ For example, the SRS and CRRF (2019) state that the Government of Uganda through the OPM is the lead body for coordination and implementation.

¹⁴ Statistics from UNHCR "Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal", updated 31 December 2019. Accessible at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga>.

Somali, 17% Eritrean, 5.87% from Burundi, and 4.9% from South Sudan, with smaller numbers from other sending states.¹⁵

As Uganda's capital, Kampala is the national site of executive, legislative, and judiciary organs, which importantly includes the Government's OPM Department of Refugees. The capital also hosts the national headquarters for many INGOs, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR and its implementing partner InterAid Uganda (IAU). IAU was the UNHCR Uganda's sole implementing partner for urban refugee assistance from the mid-1990's until 2019 (Kaiser 2000; Lytinen 2013). IAU, along with INGOs the Refugee Law Project (RLP) and the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) provide rights-based and protection support. Other INGOs, such as the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) and the Danish Refugee Council provide support to refugees including ad hoc and limited financial and material support. Finally, Kampala hosts numerous refugee-led organizations (RLOs) and national and ethnic associations, such as the Congolese Refugee Community of Uganda (CRCU) and the Somali Community Association of Uganda (SCAU). Many of these entities provide essential integrative and rights-based support to asylum seekers and refugees.

Despite these potential supports, Kampala's formal economy and social service infrastructure are under-developed. Kampala's city limits and population have rapidly expanded over the past several decades due to rural-urban migration and natural population growth without corresponding increases in institutional or infrastructural capacity to expand services, rights, and protection.¹⁶ Among the impacts of this largely unplanned population growth are, "insecurity of tenure, low levels of physical planning, lack of an integrated transport system, poor

¹⁵ Statistics from UNHCR "Uganda – Refugee Statistics September 2019- Kampala", created 1 October 2019. Accessible at <https://m.reliefweb.int/report/3339233>.

¹⁶ See Vermeiren et al. (2012), and Goodfellow (2013). Per UN Habitat (2016, 26), Kampala was envisioned to host 300,000 people but currently has a population of almost 2 million, p. 26.

environmental management, unplanned settlements, spiralling poverty exacerbated by high unemployment, poor infrastructure for markets, water and health service systems and housing, and increased crime, congestion and pollution (UN Habitat 2016, 26).”

Rapid influxes of urban refugees have additionally strained the city’s institutional capacity for healthcare, education, water, and sanitation (Lyytinen 2013). With the passage of Uganda’s Refugee Act, 2006 and enactment of refugees’ legal right to urban residence, the urban refugee caseload in Kampala tripled between 2007 to 2010 from 10,768 to 35,072 (WRC 2011, 4). The urban refugee population today has ballooned again to almost 100,000 in 2017 (Pathways 2020, iii). Most urban refugees in Kampala integrate into slum-like communities with impermanent housing structures, low sanitation, and shortages of government-provided healthcare and education (WRC 2011, 7).

In general, and regardless of citizenship status, most residents in Kampala, particularly those in slum-like communities, struggle to access basic services and fail to acquire formal sector employment. However, studies underscore how refugees face additional barriers and achieve these outcomes at lower rates than do citizens. Studies additionally affirm that urban refugees often face amplified protection challenges relative to citizens. These challenges are particularly noted for the LGBTQ refugee community, female-headed households, and unaccompanied minors (REACH 2018).

Refugees in Mbarara and Gulu:

In contrast to Kampala, the urban refugee populations of Gulu and Mbarara are not well-researched or understood. Existing scholarship on urban refugees in Uganda predominantly

focuses on those in Kampala with scant attention to self-settled refugees in other areas.¹⁷

UNHCR (2018, 32-3) acknowledges this dearth of information stating, “While the situation of refugees in Kampala is well understood, this is not the case for refugees in other towns and cities of Uganda.” This knowledge gap is significant because while refugees have legal authorization to reside where they choose, little is known about the populations or about specific protection needs of urban refugees outside the capital. For example, there are not published estimates of refugee population size or composition in either city. Thus, my research contributes important new data on often-overlooked refugee communities in Gulu and Mbarara.

I strategically consider refugees in other urban environments because small and medium-sized cities, such as Mbarara and Gulu, already are and will continue to grow in importance as refugee-hosting locations. For refugees transitioning from settlements to urban areas, small and medium-sized cities are less expensive and easier to navigate than the expansive urban sprawl in the capital. Additionally, their geographic proximity to settlement allows for more time and cost-efficient return to the social and material safety nets settlements provide. Per Omata and Kaplan (2013, 14), some refugees prefer to live in these smaller urban areas to allow periodic return for distribution, to access kinship or family support, or to enable select family members to pursue educational or economic opportunities.

Although proximate to settlements, there are few INGOs and very limited humanitarian support for refugees in either Mbarara or Gulu.¹⁸ There are not refugee desks or government bureaucracies present to respond to urban refugees or to sensitize local actors on refugee rights.

¹⁷ Among the studies of non-settlement refugees who reside outside of Kampala are Loiacono and Silva Vargas (2019) who examine economic and market outcomes among urban refugees in Kampala and Mbarara. Other studies, such as the Omata and Kaplan (2013), Kigozi and Lambe (2015), Betts, Chaara, Omata, and Sterck (2019) reference refugee travel to Mbarara, Gulu, or other urban areas for refugee economic activity, but they do not examine these refugee groups in depth.

¹⁸ The Refugee Law Project has a satellite office in Gulu, but I could not confirm services provided to urban refugees in Gulu.

Notwithstanding the limited support available in these towns, Mbarara and Gulu attract urban refugees because of their regional importance. Mbarara is the largest urban area in the Mbarara District and is the district's main municipal, administrative, and commercial center. Similarly, Gulu is the commercial and administrative center of Gulu District. These cities have more advanced educational, healthcare, and employment opportunities than are available in refugee settlements. However, these opportunities are fewer than in Kampala. Both districts have strained governmental education with higher on average pupil to teacher ratios,¹⁹ fewer healthcare systems,²⁰ and other lower developmental statistics.²¹

Next, Gulu and Mbarara are both nearer to other national borders and to refugee settlements than is Kampala. Gulu is approximately 65km from the border of South Sudan, and near to Lamwo, Adjumani, Arua, and Moyo Districts which each district large numbers of Sudanese refugees.²² Mbarara is near to the borders of Tanzania (70km), Rwanda (70km), and the D. R. Congo (110km);²³ and is approximately 65km from Nakivale, Kyaka II (170km) and Rwamwanja Settlements (150km). Refugees in Kyaka II and Rwamwanja Settlements are overwhelmingly from D.R. Congo. Of the approximately 110,000 registered refugees in Nakivale, approximately half are from D. R. Congo, but the settlement also hosts sizable populations from Burundi and Somalia, with smaller numbers from other African states.²⁴

¹⁹ Per the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (2014) National Population and Housing Census, the pupil to teaching ratio in government-sponsored primary schools is 98:1 in Gulu, 80:1 in Mbarara, and 67 in Kampala.

²⁰ Ibid. In 2012-13, there were 73 public and private healthcare facilities in Gulu over 11,715.5 square kilometers and 58 healthcare facilities over 10,019 square kilometers in Mbarara compared to 1,392 public and private health facilities over 197 square kilometers in Kampala.

²¹ Per Rafa et al (2017), the GDP per capita is \$599 in Gulu, \$1013 in Mbarara, and \$2655 in Kampala. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2017) found that household dwellings in Gulu and Mbarara were far less likely to have permanent walls, roof, or flooring than housing in Kampala. Only 34.1% of households in Gulu have electricity compared to 56.8% in Mbarara and 82.5% in Kampala.

²² As of 31 December 2019, Adjumani district hosted 210,904 refugees and Lamwo District hosted a further 52,079. <https://reliefweb.int/map/uganda/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-uganda-uganda-refugee-response-31-december-2019>

²³ All distances are measured "as the crow flies" and assessed through Google Maps

²⁴ Statistics from UNHCR "Uganda- Refugee Statistics April 2019- Nakivale" published 1 May 2019. See <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/69449.pdf>.

Finally, Gulu hosted Ugandans displaced by its 20-year civil war. Branch (2013, 3156) describes the city as developing from a “humanitarian economy,” where roads, infrastructure, and economic development occurred from the influx of INGOs arriving in this city to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs. Additionally, Uganda’s Northern districts, including Gulu District and Gulu town, have historic trade, social, and cultural interactions to South Sudan. Although there are significant differences between refugee and citizen populations across this border, many South Sudanese refugees have an increased ability to integrate into Gulu owing to these historic relations than do Congolese refugees hosted in Mbarara town. The French-speaking Congolese refugees do not have shared linguistic traditions to the Ankole population in Mbarara who speak English, Runyankole, and other local dialects.

In sum, although all urban refugees enjoy the same *de jure* rights, opportunities, and governance, their experience with governance actors present, service provision offered, and access to material support is inconsistent across locations. Distinctions in *de facto* governance and provision influence refugees’ political knowledge outcomes. For example, individuals who cannot access protective support through governance actors may deny having rights to protection. Similarly, refugees who interact with different consortia of state and non-state actors may develop inconsistent expectations of who *should* provide for their rights and protections.

2.3.2 Variation in Political Knowledge Based on Refugee Nationality:

In existing studies, nationality is frequently considered as a salient causal factor to explain variation in refugee economic,²⁵ social and integrative,²⁶ and other outcomes associated

²⁵ See also Buscher (2011) Monteith and Lwasa (2017), and Loiacono and Silva Vargas (2019). See extensive studies by the Refugee Economies Programme at the University of Oxford, <https://www.refugee-economies.org/>.

²⁶ For comparative studies of refugee outcomes in Uganda, see Women’s Refugee Commission (2011). Büscher (2011) considers nationality and its relationship to vulnerability outcomes. Betts et al (2016) study on refugee

with refugee vulnerability or daily life in Uganda. The comparative logic of these studies suggest that nationality may likewise be significant to explain variation in refugees' political knowledge outcomes. This section broadly examines each of the four primary sending states to question how refugees' home country experiences influence how refugees engage, or not, in rights-based learning in a host country; how they understand rights or systems of governance; and how they differently develop trust towards governance actors who decide, uphold, and protect rights. Refugees of differently sending states may further have unequal integrative capacity as facilitated by shared linguistic or cultural ties with their hosts. Social ties can permit refugees to feel a sense of belonging, including political belonging, to their host community and polity. Finally, refugee national groups vary in the presence and location of other co-ethnic or co-national populations who can instruct on rights-based political knowledge.

The following sub-sections additionally provide historical context on the country conditions that produce outward forced migration, including cyclic and repeated exile to Uganda or other refugee hosting states. Where possible, the section incorporates each nationality's RRP which summarizes relevant home country conditions and outlines hosting goals. These goals range from initial emergency response to longer-term integration or preparation for home country return. RRP's illuminate the *de jure* experiences refugees may have with rights and protections as conditioned by that community's trajectory to remain in or integration into their host society. Finally, this section provides historical information on refugee social networks and presence in Uganda, including where each nationality is predominantly hosted within Uganda.

Refugees from South Sudan:

economic outcomes provides comparative information on social capital and integrative support among Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian Somali, Ethiopian, Eritrean, and South Sudanese refugees.

The state of South Sudan achieved independence from the Republic of Sudan in June 2011 following a largely peaceful referendum. Preceding independence was a tumultuous history of two prolonged civil wars, from 1963-72 and from 1983-2005. At the cessation of the second civil war, the Northern and Southern regions of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which permitted most Sudanese refugees in Uganda and throughout the region to return (Rolandsen et al 2015). Peace, however, was short-lived and conflict reignited in the newly independent South Sudan in 2013. Though the state has signed a series of peace agreements, these have failed to stem the outflow of refugees. At its peak, 37,491 refugees fled to Uganda in only one month. In this month, one week alone had a sustained rate of over 4,000 vulnerable asylum seekers crossing the border per day for 7 consecutive days. In 2017, asylum rates had decreased from this peak, but remained high with an average of more 1800 South Sudanese refugees entered Uganda per day (Robinson 2017).

Sustained out-migration refugee trends continued throughout 2018, 2019, and into the present. In addition to conflict, South Sudanese have fled their state due to climate-induced environmental crises, famine, and flooding. The most recent Uganda RRP anticipates continued influx of refugees from South Sudan until, “the prospects for a sustainable peace become more tangible” (UNHCR Uganda RRP 2019, 9). In part, forced migration from South Sudan continues because the country has failed to develop viable, political institutions or power-sharing agreements necessary for peace. A 2020 United States Institute of Peace study found that among South Sudanese survey respondents, many had low confidence in their political leaders to resolve the ongoing conflict (Pospisi et al 2020).

Currently, South Sudan represents the largest refugee population displaced in Uganda. The majority of the nearly 890,000 South Sudanese refugees reside in settlements nearer to the

South Sudan border with only a small percentage residing in Kampala.²⁷ Scholars have identified South Sudanese refugee communities outside of settlements in Adjumani and other Northern Uganda districts, but relatively little is written about these communities (Kigozi and Lambe 2015b). As noted, some among the South Sudanese refugee community may have higher capacity to integrate into Ugandan society because of historic cross-border social and economic ties. For example, Kaiser (2006, 2008, and 2010) found that some South Sudanese refugees of Kakwa, Acholi, and Madi ethnicity were able to leave the settlements because they leveraged their existing social capital connections to co-ethnic Ugandans. In addition to their external connections to some Ugandan ethnic communities, the South Sudanese refugees internally are coordinated through the Network of South Sudanese Civil Society Organizations in Uganda (NOSSCOU), as well as other networks.

Refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

Among the complex drivers of forced migration from Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) over the past several decades are systemic political unrest, localized violence by armed groups, intercommunal conflicts, and other security challenges, including an Ebola outbreak beginning in late 2018 (UNHCR 2019c). Conflict events include the First (1996-7) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars, military operations in the Eastern portion of the country since 2008, and post-election violence in 2011 (Autesserre 2010; Stearns 2011; 2022). Scholars, including Lyytinen (2013; 2017), identify that many among the Congolese refugee community have enduring reduced trust towards political and institutional actors that arise from decades of political insecurity and conflict in their home country.

²⁷ Per UNHCR (2020). “Uganda- Refugee Statistics, May 2020- Kampala,” there are 4,289 urban South Sudanese in Kampala

Individuals forced from DRC have sought asylum in multiple neighboring countries, including Uganda. Unlike the South Sudanese refugee community, the Congolese largely do not share linguistic or cultural ties to their Ugandan hosts. Refugees from the DRC are the second largest population hosted in Uganda, with 418,258 registered refugees (UNHCR 2020 “Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal”). An estimated Congolese 25,000 refugees reside in Kampala (UNHCR “Uganda- Refugee Statistics, May 2020-Kampala). In this city, the Congolese have established a dense web of formal and informal support networks, including the Congolese Refugee Community in Uganda (CRCU), refugee-led churches, and ethnic-based support through a proliferation of RLOs. The CRCU launched a satellite office in Mbarara around 2019 to support refugees who reside there. Congolese refugees reside in refugee settlements are primarily in Nakivale, Kyangwali, and Kyaka II Settlements, but small numbers reside in other settlements. Although there are formed organizational networks such as the CRCU, scholars note that leadership among the Congolese refugee community is contested. Scholars further identify barriers within the diverse Congolese community to develop inter-ethnic trust (Russell 2011; Lyytinen 2013; 2017).

The Ugandan response to Congolese refugees has fluctuated between encouraging voluntary repatriation to anticipating new arrivals. The most recent Ugandan RRP articulates expectations of increased refugee outflows from DRC owing to generalized violence by armed actors, political and sectarian violence, food insecurity, and from disease outbreaks. The plan anticipates only minimal voluntary returns (UNHCR 2020, 10-11 “Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal”).

Refugees from Somalia:

It has been nearly three decades since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991 that led to a mass exodus of Somali citizens. Since that time, the state has struggled to stabilize. Although some Somalis have returned, upwards of 760,000 remain displaced outside of Somalia with over 40,000 registered in Uganda. Of these, an estimated 27,000 reside in Kampala (UNHCR, n.d. “Horn of Africa Somali Situation”). As a result of protracted displacement, generations of Somalis have been born outside their home country.

The Somali community in Uganda is comprised of refugees, economic migrants, and Somali diaspora who have since obtained Ugandan citizenship. The Somali community first established itself in Uganda in the early 20th century after the British army stationed Somali soldiers in Kampala, Jinja and Tororo (Monteith and Lwasa 2017; Iazzolino and Hersi 2019). After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, many Somali refugees sought shelter in neighboring Kenya. However, as Kenya tightened restrictions that negatively impacted refugees’ freedom of movement, economic rights, and access to urban residence, many left Kenya to seek asylum anew in Uganda—a state that does not share a border with Somalia. After the passage and enactment of Uganda’s Refugee Act, 2006, the Somali refugee population increased five-fold from 8,239 to over 41,000 between 2008 to 2017, with 43% of these arrivals self-settling into Kampala’s Mengo and Kisenye neighborhoods (Iazzolino and Hersi 2019, 372). New arrivals, both to settlements and to urban areas, potentially receive integrative support through expansive social networks, including through formal support by the Somali Community Association in Uganda (SCAU).

Although Uganda does not have a current, designated RRP for displaced Somalis, the regional trend is to encourage voluntary repatriation. In 2017, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) convened a summit on the theme of “durable solutions for Somali

refugees and reintegration of returnees in Somalia.” IGAD delegates cited partial normalization of the country’s security situation, including parliamentary elections and the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo”. The crux of the Summit and the post-participation statement affirms the goal of repatriation and integration of displaced Somalis to Somalia. This goal is supported by UNHCR who currently advocates for voluntary repatriation from hosting countries in Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Yemen, among others

Refugees from Burundi:

Like the South Sudanese refugee community in Uganda, a significant portion of Burundian refugees have been displaced more than once. Per Uvin (2009, 12) over half of the Burundian population (52%) has fled their home at least once since 1993. Like its neighboring country Rwanda, Burundi has experienced conflict between ethnic Hutu and Tutsi including a failed 1972 Hutu uprising against the Tutsi-dominated government; a resumption of conflict in the late 1980s; and a civil war that lasted from 1993 to 2005 (Vervisch et al 2013; Natulya 2019). At the end of the civil war, approximately half a million displaced Burundians returned home by 2010 (IRRI 2016, 12). However, in 2015, Burundians sought asylum again after political violence related to the election campaign of President Pierre Nkurunziza. Although the majority fled to neighboring Tanzania, Rwanda, and DRC, a sizable number bypassed these states to seek asylum in Uganda (RRI 2017a; 2017b). A report by IRRI found that while, “most Burundians flee to neighbouring countries... those that came to Uganda often made a deliberate decision based on information provided by other asylum seekers, often friends or family, who were on their way to Uganda or already there (IRRI 2017a, 18).”

In contrast to Somali community members who are described as coming to Uganda for co-ethnic and co-national support, Burundians are described as evading hosting states with large Burundian populations. For example, per Büscher (2011, 41) the Burundian refugee community in Kampala is, “widely dispersed... there are high levels of suspicion and mistrust within the community based on previous associations and potential acts committed during the genocide in Burundi.” Some Burundians expressed fears of Imbonerakure spies and suspicion of other displaced Burundians that push them further from their home country.²⁸ Notwithstanding potentially strong inter-community distrust that results from pre-displacement experiences, Burundian refugees have formed RLOs to promote cultural integration and peacebuilding in exile. One such organization is the “Mirror Group” which was founded by Bella Nshimirimana, a social worker who was named Uganda’s 2017 “Refugee Woman of the Year (Fallon 2017).”

The Burundian refugee population in Uganda in July 2020 was 48,274, with an estimated 4,500 refugees reside in Kampala (UNHCR 2020, “Uganda- Refugee Statistics, May 2020-Kampala”). Reports by IRRI noted that some displaced Burundians were reticent to return until the 2020 Burundian general elections (IRRI 2017a; 2017b). In recognition that post-2015 insecurity had reduced, Uganda ended prima facie status determination for Burundians seeking asylum in June 2017 with the effect that claimants would instead undergo individual refugee status determination from the Ugandan Refugee Eligibility Committee (UNHCR 2018b, 74). A UNHCR report (2019c, 11-12) cites, “the return of refugees remains high on Burundi’s agenda, but its capacity to absorb returns is low... (and) no Burundian refugees in Uganda have so far

²⁸ As cited in IRRI (2016, 20), the Imbonerakure are, “the ruling party’s youth wing, in reality the Imbonerakure function as a security apparatus.” The report details that this group is comprised of militia members and that many Burundians perceive this group as a security threat. As evidence of this fear, the UNHCR (2018a, 10) reported Burundians’ fear at, “the presence of various armed actors in the DRC and rumours of both armed opposition and government of Burundi agents elsewhere in the region.”

expressed any intention to return home.” The refugee population in Uganda is thus expected to remain more or less stable barring a change of conditions within Burundi.

2.4 Conclusion:

On one hand, the *de jure* rights, protections, opportunities, and restrictions that refugees may expect in a hosting country are determined by whether and how a sovereign state commits to regional or international rights-based treaties, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as through the codification of domestic legislation. On the other hand, the *de facto* implementation of these commitments contextualizes why refugees’ experiences with rights and protections may vary across sub-national hosting locations, across different modes of refugee governance (e.g., urban self-settlement or rural settlements), and for persons from different sending states. The gap between the *de jure* and *de facto* context illuminates refugees’ unique legal and institutional position between sovereigns, which in turn creates challenges for refugees to acquire political knowledge, to claim their rights, or to seek redress for rights-based violations. These challenges are conditioned by the hosting state in which they reside, as well as *where* within that state they settle.

While this chapter provides the baseline information on the *de jure* and *de facto* context of Uganda, the analytical model used to assess these contexts can be adapted for other hosting states. The analytical model holds utility in states that have and have not enacted international, regional, and domestic commitments to uphold the civil, social, economic, political, or human rights of displaced persons. All persons, displaced and non-displaced, have fundamental rights through international human rights doctrine. Additionally, all displaced persons are protected by the vital customary international law principle of *non-refoulement*. Thus, whether a refugee is

hosted in a generous rights context like that in Uganda, or in a country with restrictive rights and protection, all refugees and asylum seekers have rights and protections to which they may avail.

However, the supporting processes and actors to ensure these rights will vary across context.

Chapter Three. Explaining Variation in Refugees' Political Knowledge Outcomes

“We reaffirm and will fully protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status: *all are rights holders.*”

- United Nations' *New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants* Art. 5

“Every refugee is entitled to the rights and shall be subject to obligations provided for or specified in— (a) the Geneva Convention; (b) the OAU Convention; and (c) any other convention or instrument relating to the rights and obligations of refugees to which Uganda is a party.”

- Uganda: *The Refugees Act, 2006* Part 5 Art. 28

3.1 Introduction:

Uganda affords generous rights, opportunities, and protections to displaced individuals who seek safe haven within its territory. Yet how do refugees themselves understand these rights? Specifically, do refugees have adequate rights-based information needed for host-community integration; to achieve self-reliance through the economic, educational, healthcare, or other social service opportunities Uganda allows; or have knowledge of governance actors and processes that provide their legal and social protection? In analyzing original survey data collected from 209 refugees in three Ugandan urban areas, I find that most refugees have overall limited political knowledge. When prompted, most refugees named only few rights that Uganda grants them, and nearly one third of respondents failed to name any rights at all. Similarly, refugees expressed uncertainty who decides their rights. They were uncertain which state, INGO, UN, or refugee leadership actors were responsible to help in vital areas of daily life. This

includes uncertainty who should assist with refugee education, healthcare, banking or financial access, and material provision. Responses to these questions not only varied, but many refugees replied that there is *no one* responsible to help them. Thus, rather than experience Uganda's refugee hosting as generous, many refugees were unaware of their rights and protection.

Moreover, many felt alone and unsupported to pursue a dignified life in Uganda.

What explains why refugees develop this uneven and inconsistent rights-based political knowledge even within the same hosting state? While survey analysis revealed differences in political knowledge outcomes across refugee genders and nationality, trends in survey responses became sharpened when findings were disaggregated by location. Refugees who reside solely in urban areas held different expectations of rights and governance than did those who split residence between a city and a settlement as "quasi-urban" refugees. Political knowledge additionally varied across cities.

The observed variation in political knowledge outcomes is mediated by two considerations: (1) the "governance mode" which captures how knowledge is mediated by features unique to each of Uganda's two distinct modes of refugee governance (rural settlements or urban residence); and (2) by "urbanity" which captures distinctions across these modes. This chapter attends to three variables that are inconsistently present across hosting contexts: the presence or absence of formal safety nets of material provision; presence of intervening state and non-state actors to provide rights-based guidance; and presence of refugee-led rights support to offer rights guidance, including to fulfill this role when governance actors are not present. Refugee-led rights support includes formal and informal refugee leadership structures, refugee-led organizations (RLOs), and refugee human rights defenders (HRDs). Variation in individual

variables and aggregate variation in the configurations of variables shape how refugees understand their rights, as well as shapes who refugees hold responsible for rights provision.

First, material provision, such as food rations, clothing, and shelter, affects refugees' political knowledge because they are more likely to understand as rights what they receive rather than know rights as enumerated under Ugandan legal instruments. Refugees who receive food rations or other distribution will be likelier to cite these provisions as rights than will individuals who do not receive them. Second, refugees' unequal exposure to state, non-state, and UN actors influences to whom they attribute governance responsibility for critical protection and provision. Despite the centrality of the Ugandan Government (GoU) to determine refugee rights, refugee respondents seldomly attributed the government as responsible for this. Instead, they ascribe governance responsibility to actors they know and with whom they interact, such as UNHCR or INGOs. Third, the presence of refugee-led rights support affects political knowledge because these actors work independently or in tandem with governance actors to promote rights. When external governance actors are either not present or are distrusted by refugees, RLOs and refugee HRDs directly protect, support, and provide rights guidance to their fellow displaced. Refugees who interact predominately with refugee-led structures may attribute them as responsible to perform governance roles on par with or more than other actors.

To support my arguments, this chapter is organized as follows. Section one presents original data findings on political knowledge outcomes to demonstrate how refugees differently understand their rights, and the governance actors who decide and protect these. Findings are disaggregated across numerous considerations, including by gender, national origin, urban status (e.g., strictly or quasi-urban refugees), and hosting location. Next, I analyze findings by distinctions in governance mode and urbanity to explain divergent outcomes. In considering the

governance mode, strictly urban refugees generally inhabit one governance structure while quasi-urban refugees are simultaneously exposed to multiple distinct structures. In considering urbanity, the data reveals distinctions between Uganda's *de jure* and *de facto* refugee hosting contexts across cities. The conclusion provides a framework to replicate a study of political knowledge outcomes across other hosting locations within Uganda or in other hosting states.

Throughout this chapter, the analytical lens is shifted from a “top-down” assessment of Uganda's perceived generosity in refugee hosting to instead engage a “bottom-up” assessment of rights, protections, and opportunities through refugees' lived experiences. The analysis demonstrates why refugees who cannot access rights, opportunities, or protections may fail to believe they have them. Analysis additionally captures why refugees' *de facto* expectations of governance actors or processes to secure rights may misalign with *de jure* governance delineations. Finally, the analysis underscores the importance of location and of governance distinctions across locations to produce inconsistent political knowledge outcomes among refugees within the same hosting state.

3.2 Variation in Refugees' Political Knowledge Outcomes

Scholars, humanitarian practitioners, and the UNHCR has praised Uganda for its generous rights and social service provision to displaced persons hosted within its sovereign territory. Article 28 of Uganda's Refugee Act, 2006 confers all rights as, “provided by (a) The Geneva Convention; (b) the OAU Convention; and (c) any other covenant or instrument relating to the rights and obligations of refugees to which Uganda is a party.” Articles 29 through 34 further grant extensive protection, social, economic, property, social service, and human rights to recognized refugees. As discussed in Chapter two, this *de jure* allotment of rights far exceeds the

often-restrictive rights other Sub-Saharan African nations provide. Yet, in analyzing survey data, the displaced rarely perceived Uganda as a generous host.

This section provides general and disaggregated survey findings to document how refugees understand their rights and the governance actors responsible to provide these rights. These responses demonstrate which of Uganda's generous rights refugees are aware of, as well as suggest rights-based and protection areas of which they are unaware. Responses additionally demonstrate uncertainty among refugees for governance responsibility in six critical areas of daily life: (a) education, (b) healthcare, (c) to assist refugee victims of violence or crime, (d) to clarify refugee rights, (e) provide material assistance, and (f) to provide financial assistance such as access to bank accounts or loans. Their responses underscore how displaced persons frequently decenter the Ugandan state as responsible for governance provision and instead attribute responsibility to other actors. Moreover, refugees frequently denied any actor assists. The inconsistent responses affirm that refugees may be unaware both of available rights and protections, as well as unaware how to achieve them.

3.2.1. Refugee Understandings of their Rights:

i. Analysis in Number of Enumerated Rights:

Quantitative analysis in the number of rights refugees listed establishes that refugees are unevenly aware of their rights. The number of enumerated rights is significant as it suggests that some refugees may hold more political knowledge of rights and protection than do others. Disaggregating findings is useful to illuminate which refugees have and which refugees lack vital political knowledge to bolster their integrative or self-reliance capacities. Regardless of refugee gender, age, nationality, location hosted, or urban status as strictly or quasi-urban

refugees, most held only limited knowledge of their rights. Nearly 1 in 5 respondents declared they do not have any rights (37/209) and an additional 28 were uncertain if refugees have rights or failed to name any rights. Refugees who denied having rights or who failed to name rights represent approximately 30% the research sample (65/209). The 162 respondents who listed rights cited on average slightly under 2 rights (1.89). Figure one displays the average number of rights as disaggregated by refugee nationality and gender.




Figure 1 Average number of Rights Listed by Gender and Nationality

The difference in average number of rights listed by refugees from different sending states was only slight. For example, of the four primary nationalities surveyed, Burundian refugees listed the highest number of rights (2.14) while Congolese refugees listed the fewest rights on average (1.86). However, distinctions became sharper when considering responses by nationality and gender. Refugees who identified as male enumerated significantly more rights

than did those who identify as female, with men listing 1.89 rights and women listing only 0.45. Gender non-binary refugees listed the highest number of rights at 2.214 rights.

Variation in the number of stated rights became sharper when findings were disaggregated by location and urban status. Refugees in Kampala cumulatively listed more rights on average did those in Mbarara and Gulu (2.11 v. 1.51). Refugees in Mbarara listed the fewest rights (0.98). Refugees who split time between a city and settlement listed fewer rights than did refugees who stay only in urban areas (2.05 to 1.55). Figures two displays these findings.




Figure 2: Average Rights Listed by Nationality & Location, and by Urban Status & Location

A t-test difference in means determines whether these differences in are statistically significant. It allows identification whether the average number of listed rights of one grouping is significantly different from the score of another group, rather than different due to chance. T-tests comparing refugees who stay in and outside of the capital and comparing strictly and quasi-

urban refugees were both statistically significant.¹ T-test results were additionally significant when strictly comparing average responses by respondents who identified as female to those who identify as male, but significance did not hold when comparing gender and nationality together. T-tests comparing averages of any nationality to the overall average were not significant. These results suggest that factors rooted in location may be significant to explain the observed variation in this knowledge outcome.

3.2.2. Analysis in Content of Refugee Rights:

More significant than the number of listed rights, however, is how refugees describe the content of their rights. In total, refugees listed 29 perceived rights that range from rights to material provision of food, clothing, clean water, or housing; to social, cultural, and economic rights including rights to marry, and to cultural and religious expression; as well as rights to education, healthcare, free movement, and the right to seek formal sector employment. Less commonly, refugees stated a right to life or a right for third-country resettlement. In limited responses, refugees stated obligations to avoid politics and a duty to follow Ugandan laws. Table two displays the fifteen most common rights that refugees listed.

¹ From t-test results comparing the difference in means refugees in Kampala listed 2.11 rights while refugees outside of Kampala listed 1.51 rights. The p-norm is significant at 0.0133. Refugees who stay strictly in urban areas listed 2.05 rights and quasi-urban refugees listed 1.55. The p-norm of these differences is significant at 0.0481.

Q20- What Rights do refugees in Uganda have?	Total Responses	209
	education	66
	work (employment)	64
	for food	49
	healthcare	44
	peace, security, and protection	45
	free movement	42
	right to remain	21
	right for help	14
	be treated like Ugandans	13
	identity card	9
	stay in settlements	9
	to live	12
	expression (free speech)	6
	liberty	6
to marry	4	
resettlement	4	

Table 2 Most Common Responses to “What rights do refugees have in Uganda?”

Table three displays the top five responses by refugee nationality. Regardless of nationality, all groups listed the rights to study (education) and to healthcare as among their top five responses. Additionally, three of the four primary nationality groupings cited both the right to work and the right to security or protection among their top responses.

Nationality	Top Responses, by number and percentage
Congolese (100)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to food: 40 (40%) 2. Right to work: 35 (35%) 3. Right to study: 29 (29%) 4. Healthcare: 28 (28%) 5. Security/Protection: 27 (27%)
South Sudanese (58)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Refugees have no rights: 23 (39.66%) 2. Free movement: 16 (27.59%) 3. Right to study: 15 (25.86%) 4. Healthcare: 7 (12.07%) 5. Security/Protection: 7 (12.07%)
Somali (24)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to study: 13 (54.17%) 2. Right to work: 11 (45.83%) 3. Security/ protection: 11 (45.83%) 4. Free movement: 4 (16.67%) 5. Healthcare: 3 (12.5%)
Burundi (18)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to work: 9 (50%) 2. Right to study: 5 (27.78%) 3. Free movement: 5 (27.78%) 4. Healthcare: 4 (22.22%) 5. Right to remain: 4 (22.22%)

Table 3 Most Common Responses to “What rights do refugees have in Uganda?” By Refugee Nationality

Given the similarities in responses by refugees of differently nationalities, I disaggregated refugee rights responses by their urban status and by their location as within and outside of Kampala. In so doing, a more nuanced picture emerged. Results are presented in table four.

		Q3: Where do you currently live? - Selected Choice				
		Total	Strictly Urban	Split Time	G & M	Kampala
Q20 - What rights do refugees in Uganda have?	Total Count	209	151	58	85	124
	Education	66	53***	13	18	48***
	Work (employment)	64	48	16	14	50***
	Food	49	21	28***	33***	16
	Healthcare	44	29	15	17	27
	Security or protection	45	30	15	15	29
	Free movement	42	32	10	23***	19
	no rights	37	32**	5	24***	13
	right to remain	21	15	6	7	14
	i don't know	14	12**	2	3	11**
	right for help	14	10	4	3	11**
	be like Ugandans	13	10	3	2	11**
	cannot work	10	8	2	1	9***
	identity card	9	9***	0	1	8**
	go to settlement	9	3	6***	4	5
	Rights depend on the refugee	6	5	1	0	6***
	expression (free speech)	6	4	2	1	5
	liberty	6	5	1	2	4
	resettlement	4	2	2	1	3
	avoid politics	3	3	0	0	3

Estimations performed using R. * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

Table 4: What rights do refugees have in Uganda? by urban status and city:

In general, refugees who stay strictly in urban areas were more likely to mention rights to education and rights to identity cards than were their counterparts who split time between a city and a settlement. Strictly urban refugees were also more likely to respond they don't know if refugees have rights or to deny that refugees have rights. Likewise, refugees who are quasi-urban and split time between locations were more likely to say that refugees have rights to food and to go to settlements. In comparing responses among those in or outside of the capital, refugees in Kampala were more likely to state perceived rights to education, to work, to remain, to have an identity card, to receive material assistance, and to be treated like Ugandans. Those in Gulu and Mbarara were more likely to cite perceived rights to food and to free movement, as well as to say that refugees do not have any rights.

Statistical analysis using t-test difference in means were employed to determine whether differences between respondents of different location and of different urban status was statistically significant. Statistically significant tests are highlighted in table four. These tests reveal, for example, that it was statistically significant that refugees who routinely return to settlements were more likely to cite a perceived right to food than did their strictly urban peers.

Likewise, it was statistically significant that refugees in Kampala cited a right to work more than did their peers in other hosting locations.

In assessing both the number of cited rights and the content of cited rights, refugee nationality and gender have been insufficient measures to capture why refugees differently construct their understandings of available rights, protections, and opportunities. While differences exist across these groupings, discernable trends are not immediately clear. Recall, the average number of listed rights did not vary greatly among refugees of different nationalities. Additionally, there was sizable overlap in which rights refugees from different host states listed. In contrast, disaggregating responses by location and urban status revealed clearer patterns in responses between these groups. These findings support an argument that location is significant to influence how refugees in Uganda understand their rights.

3.2.3. Refugee Understandings of Governance Responsibilities:

Next, how do refugees understand who decides their rights? Figure three displays how refugees differently ascribed responsibility to Ugandan state, non-state, U.N. agencies, or other actors to determine refugees' rights.




Figure 3: Who Decides Refugee Rights in Uganda

In general, despite the Government of Uganda's (GoU) centrality to decide refugee rights, most refugees did not credit the government either as fully or partially to determine their rights. Only 30 refugees, or 14% of respondents, attributed the Government as fully able to so decide. In de-centering the state, over half of all refugees ascribed responsibility to decide refugee rights and protection solely to UNHCR. Six refugees stated it is the displaced who alone determine what they can or cannot do, and four respondents stated that international NGOs decide this. How refugees understand governance decisions to determine refugee rights, restrictions, and responsibilities varied whether a refugee as strictly or quasi-urban, and further varied depending in what city a refugee stayed.

Finally, which state or non-state governance actors do refugees hold responsible to assist in six governance areas pertinent to their daily life: education, healthcare, material provision, financial assistance, response to victims of crime, and who is responsible to clarify refugee rights? Table five displays the top responses by nationality for whom refugees find responsible to assist in these critical areas.

Governance Area	Congolese (100)	South Sudanese (58)	Somali (24)	Burundi (18)
Clarify rights	UNHCR (66), GoU (26), and RLO/Refugee Leader (9)	UNHCR (21), GoU (21), RLO/Refugee Leader (15)	OPM/ LC1 (9), UNHCR (5), RLO/Refugee Leader (5)	UNHCR (13), GoU (8), iNGO (4)
Education	UNHCR (63), GoU (19), and No one helps (13)	UNHCR (42), GoU (11), and iNGO (11)	UNHCR (12), RLO/Refugee Leader (6), and No one helps (3)	UNHCR (14), RLO/Refugee Leader (4), and GoU (3)
Healthcare	UNHCR (66), GoU (15), and iNGO (14)	UNHCR (35), iNGO (11), and No one helps (9)	UNHCR (9), RLO/Refugee Leader (5), and No one helps (4)	UNHCR (14), iNGO (7), RLO/Refugee Leader (3)
Violence (Crimes)	GoU (63), UNHCR (48), RLO/Refugee Leader (8), and iNGO (8)	GoU (49), RLO/Refugee Leader (10), and UNHCR (5)	GoU (17), UNHCR (3), and No one helps (2)	GoU (19), UNHCR (10), and iNGO (6)
Material Goods	UNHCR (70), No one helps (16), and iNGO (15)	UNHCR (44), iNGO (6), and GoU (5)	No one helps (10), UNHCR (5), and GoU (4)	UNHCR (11), iNGO (5), RLO/Refugee Leader (4)
Financial Help	No one helps (46), UNHCR (21), and GoU (20)	No one helps (30), GoU (17) and UNHCR (7)	No one helps (10), UNHCR (5), and GoU (4)	No one helps (9), GoU (6), and UNHCR (4)

Table 5 Top Three Mode Responses of “Who is Responsible to Help” by nationality

As with assessment of other political knowledge outcomes, responses varied depending on refugee nationality, location hosted, and urban status as strictly or quasi-urban. In analysis of top responses by refugee nationality, all groups considered UNHCR as chiefly responsible for education and healthcare. Additionally, the Congolese, South Sudanese, and Burundian refugees found UNHCR as responsible for rights clarification and material goods provision. Finally, all groups cited the GoU as responsible for assistance to refugee victims of crime or violence and cited that no actor is responsible to help refugees in financial areas of banking or loans.

Like the analysis of which rights refugees believe they hold, patterns of how refugees understand governance responsibilities become slightly sharper when results are disaggregated by their hosting location and urban status. Table Six displays these results.

Governance Area	Top responses Mbarara and Gulu	Top Responses Kampala	Top Responses Quasi-urban	Top Responses Strictly Urban
Clarify rights	UNHCR (45.88%), Refugee leaders/ RLOs (15.29%), GoU (14.12%)	UNHCR (42.74%), GoU (20.16%) and no one helps (9.68%)	UNHCR (50%), GoU (17.24%), and Refugee leader/RLO (10.35%)	UNHCR (41.72%), GoU (17.89%), Ref leader/ RLO (10.6%)
Education	UNHCR (56.47%), UNHCR & partner (8.24%), and no one helps (7.06%) <i>GoU at 3.529%</i>	UNHCR (51.61%), No one helps (15.32%), iNGOs (8.87%) <i>GoU at 3.26%</i>	UNHCR (43.1%), UNHCR & partners (12.07%), refugee leader/ RLO (8.6%) <i>GoU at 6.9%</i>	UNHCR (57.62%), no one helps (13.91%), iNGO (8.61%) <i>GoU at 3.97%</i>
Healthcare	UNHCR (61.18%), iNGOs (10.59%) and no one helps (8.23%) <i>GoU at 7.059%</i>	UNHCR (48.39%), No one helps (16.13%) and iNGOs (11.29%) <i>GoU at 7.26%</i>	UNHCR (48.28%), iNGOs (10.35%) and no one helps (10.35%) <i>GoU at 8.62%</i>	UNHCR (55.63%), No one helps (13.91%) and iNGOs (11.29%) <i>GoU at 6.62%</i>

Violence (Crimes)	GoU (58.82%), UNHCR (20%), and UNHCR & GoU in partnership (5.88%)	GoU (36.29%), UNHCR (23.39%), and “I don’t know” (8.87%)	GoU (48.28%), UNHCR (25.86%), tied ref. leader & “I don’t know” (each 6.9%)	GoU (44.37%), UNHCR (20.53%), UNHCR & partner (13.25%)
Material Goods	UNHCR as responsible (78.82%), and no other response was more than 4 <i>GoU at 4.71%</i>	UNHCR (41.94%), no one helps (19.36%), and iNGO (15.23%) <i>GoU at 3.23%</i>	UNHCR (60.35%), GoU (6.9%), refugee leader/RLO (5.88%)	UNHCR (55.63%), No one helps (15.23%), and iNGO (13.71%)
Financial Help	No one helps (55.29%), GoU (16.47%), and UNHCR (9.41%)	No one helps (41.94%), UNHCR (19.36%), and GoU (12.9%)	No one helps (43.1%), refugee leader/RLO (13.8%), UNHCR (12.07%) <i>GoU at 10.35%</i>	No one helps (49%), UNHCR (16.56%), and GoU (15.89%)

Table 6: Top Three Responses for “Who is Responsible to Help” by city and urban status

Overall, quasi-urban refugees were more likely to identify governance actors to assist in all areas while strictly urban refugees frequently expressed no one helps refugees across these areas. Additionally, quasi-urban refugees identified as refugee leaders and RLOs as chiefly responsible to assist in all areas save for healthcare provision, while strictly urban refugees identify refugee-led actors as responsible only to assist in rights clarification. Results further varied when comparing refugees who stay in and outside of Kampala. For example, in each category, refugees who in Kampala stated they either did not know who assists or stated that no one assists. In areas of rights clarification, healthcare, education, and provision of material goods, refugees in Mbarara and Gulu identified UNHCR as more responsible to assist than did those who stay in Kampala.

Throughout this section, refugees varied greatly in the number of rights they listed, in the content of how they described their rights, and varied in indicating the actors they hold responsible for deciding rights and for rights assistance. While refugees from different sending states and of different genders had inconsistent political knowledge, patterns of these differences became sharpest when survey responses were disaggregated by factors rooted in location. For instance, although knowledge learning as measured by number of listed rights was low for all refugees, those residing in Kampala consistently identified more rights than did their peers in other cities. Location variables also resulted in a non-random distribution of *which* rights refugees identified and of who they hold responsible for these provisions. While national background, gender, or other demographic variables may hold causal significance in political knowledge outcomes, my findings consistently identify location as meaningful to produce variation within my sample. Coming sections expound a relationship between location and political knowledge outcome variation.

3.3 Explaining Variation in Political Knowledge Outcomes:

I incorporate a sub-national research approach to identify why location produces inconsistent political knowledge outcomes among refugees in my research sample.² This section identifies three variables as significant to explain why refugees in one area acquire political knowledge differently than do refugees in another area. These variables are (1) the presence or absence of formal safety nets of material provision; (2) variation in state and non-state actors to

² Giraudy et al. (2019: 7) define sub-national research as, “a strategy of social science inquiry that focuses on actors, organizations, institutions, structures, and processes located in territorial units inside countries, that is, below the national and international levels.”

provide rights-based support to refugees; and (3) presence of refugee-led rights support to facilitate in political knowledge dissemination.

3.3.1. Effects of material safety nets on political knowledge outcomes:

The first variable that explains divergence in refugee political knowledge outcomes is the presence or absence of material distribution. I argue one's understanding of rights will be conditioned upon the material distribution they receive. Rather than understand material distribution—such as the provisioning of food, clothing, household, or sanitation items—as a selective function of humanitarian governance, displaced who receive these items may believe they have a right to receive donated items. Those who have consistently received aid items are likely to expect future aid distributions. In contrast, refugees who do not receive donated items, or who only receive aid distribution periodically, are more likely to consider this provision as a gift rather than as a right. Considering governance mode and urbanity allows an assessment on how material provision influences knowledge outcomes.

Uganda is an apt study to explore the effects of aid distribution on refugee perceptions of rights as the country's two distinct governance modes differently offer or deny material provision. In settlements, newly arrived refugees receive emergency humanitarian distribution that often includes food, housing materials, and basic sanitation and hygiene items. Similarly, INGOs provide refugees in settlements with routine food, financial, or material support, as well as provide healthcare, education, and other social services. Refugees in urban areas receive no comparable distribution and must pursue social services alongside their Ugandan hosts. Quasi-urban refugees who move between these governance modes often seek expanded economic opportunities outside of the settlements but return to settlements to collect food or other rations.

Table four documented that refugees in different locations and of different urban status had statistically significant understandings of the rights that Uganda affords them. As explained by differences in governance modes whereby refugees in different locations receive different support, quasi-urban refugees were over three times more likely to state that refugees in Uganda have a right for food distribution than did strictly urban refugees (48.28% v 13.91%). Strictly urban refugees are unlikely to cite food as a right because very few receive this support. Similarly, more than one in ten quasi-urban respondents (6/58) remarked that they have a right to return to settlements while fewer than one in fifty strictly urban respondents (3/151) noted this.

Overall, strictly urban refugees who are largely ineligible for any material or financial support from either Ugandan state bureaucracies or from INGOs stated that refugees have no rights considerably more frequently than did those who return to settlements for provision (21.19% v. 8.62%). In lieu of citing a right for food, agricultural land, or the right to obtain livestock, strictly urban respondents cited rights as the services and opportunities required to achieve self-reliance. This includes that they more frequently responded that refugees have a right to work, to have an identity card, and that refugees are permitted freedom of movement than did those who return to settlements.

Considering urbanity is additionally instructive to describe why refugees in and outside of Kampala have inconsistent expectations of rights. In part, respondents in Mbarara and Gulu were more likely to respond that refugees have a right for food and a right to return to the settlement than did refugees in Kampala. This is perhaps unsurprising as unlike Gulu and Mbarara, Kampala is not proximate to any refugee settlements, making routine travel for material distributions or settlement-based healthcare both fiscally and temporally prohibitive. Refugees reported in surveys that one-way transit from Kampala to a settlement to cost on

average 39,235 UGX—more than double the rate from Mbarara to a settlement and a 56% increase of travel costs from Gulu.³ These fees are exceptional for most refugees in the country as almost 70% subsist on less than 2,000 UGX, or less than 60 U.S. cents, per day.⁴

Few respondents in Kampala stated they currently split time between city and settlement. The majority who do so anecdotally noted they travel between city to settlement to visit family, receive healthcare services, or to expand supply chain and business networks. Very few mentioned returning for material or food provision and stated that the value of goods received was lower than the cost of transit. In comparison, over 70% of refugees in Mbarara and almost 20% of refugees in Gulu self-described as currently residing in both city and settlements. In these cities, refugees anecdotally shared being in urban areas for work or to enroll older children in secondary education while other family members remained in a nearby settlement to collect rations.⁵ Thus, those who returned to settlements identified distribution as a right more so than did respondents who stay strictly in urban areas.

Beyond perceived rights for food or material provision, survey participants in Kampala were statistically more likely to state that they have a right to study, to be treated like Ugandans, and have a right to work. Among my research sample, those in Kampala were the most likely to report having paid employment in either the formal or informal economy.⁶ That displaced

³ At the time of research, the exchange rate of the US dollar (USD) to Ugandan shilling (UGX) was 1: 3730. Thus, the price estimates for one-way travel to the settlements was approximately \$4.99 from Mbarara, \$6.71 from Gulu, and \$10.52 from Kampala.

⁴ See Pathways Development (2020), p. vii. Per this report, 69% of refugees in their study live on less than UGX2,000 per day per person. They find that when discounting food assistance, this number increases to 80% of refugees fall short of a 2,000UGX per day threshold.

⁵ This accords with a recent Norwegian Refugee Council (2019) study. which found that 11% of surveyed refugee households across ten settlements has at least one family member residing in an out of settlement urban or rural area.

⁶ Nearly 23% of refugees in Kampala reported having paid employment, compared to 18% in Mbarara and under 3% in Gulu.

individuals in Kampala reported a right to work more than did refugees in other areas reinforces a governance mode's effect when refugees cite as a right what they know or can obtain.

Finally, the variation in formal material provision produces inconsistent refugee expectations of which governance actors, if any, are responsible to ensure refugees have food, clothing, and other items required for basic survival. Recall from Table Six that respondents in Gulu and Mbarara overwhelmingly identified UNHCR as solely responsible to assist with this provision. In Kampala, the top three responses to the question who is responsible to help with material provision were: UNHCR (41.94%), that no one helps (19.36%), and that iNGOs are responsible (15.23%). In comparing responses between strictly and quasi-urban refugees, those who return to settlements attributed UNHCR as responsible slightly more than did strictly urban refugees. Overall, strictly urban refugees responded that no one is responsible to help at a rate three times that of quasi-urban refugees (15.23% v. 5.17%). These findings support my argument that refugees who perceive material provision as a right also have higher expectations that a governance actor is responsible to provide this right. Those who do not receive this provision are statistically more likely to deny this as a right and to deny that any governance actor must guarantee any material provision.

In sum, refugees' differential experiences with material goods provisions informs how they understand provision as a right, as well as understand which governance actor, if any, is responsible to so provide.

3.3.2 Effect of state and non-state governance actors on political knowledge:

The second variable explaining divergence in refugees' political knowledge outcomes is the different configuration of state and non-state governance actors present to assist refugees.

The unequal presence of these actors across hosting locations influences how refugees understand who is responsible to fulfill vital refugee governance functions, such as to ensure that refugees receive education, healthcare, and physical protection. Recall from chapter one that there is a tension. While host governments retain a power to determine refugee rights, the displaced often interact more with UNHCR and INGOs who advocate for their rights and who provide humanitarian aid. Yet despite the centrality of the hosting state to determine its *de jure* refugee rights, restrictions, opportunities, and responsibilities, surveyed refugees routinely deemphasized the Ugandan government as responsible for deciding rights and for enacting governance roles. What explains this?

In considering governance mode and urbanity, I argue that respondents frequently diminish the GoU as responsible for refugee governance because they have only minimal interaction to the state and its bureaucracies in their daily lives. Instead, refugees attribute responsibility to actors they know and with whom they interact more frequently. Refugees in different locations experience inconsistent *de facto* governance arrangements because Uganda has yet to achieve its long-term goal to end parallel service delivery for refugees and to fully integrate social services for the displaced into its local and national delivery structures.⁷ As a result, quasi-urban refugees who return to settlements are more likely to interact with non-state and NGO actors for healthcare, education, and material goods provision than they are to interact with state bureaucracies. Their interactions in settlements in turn influence their governance expectations even when they are outside of the settlement. Those who stay only in urban areas similarly develop their governance expectations based on the actors with whom they interact, but these actors vary across cities.

⁷ See chapter two.

Table six documents variation in how refugees residing in different locations ascribe governance responsibility in six areas of daily life. As aligns with Crisp and Slaughter's (2009) theory of UNHCR as a "surrogate state," many respondents self-considered as under the care and responsibility of UNHCR rather than under the care of the Ugandan Government. Regardless of urban status or location, refugees attributed UNHCR as primarily responsible to clarify rights, and to provide education, healthcare, and material goods. Respondents frequently conveyed this sentiment in surveys by remarking, "refugees are under UNHCR," or that "UNHCR is like our father." Other refugees downplayed the position of the Ugandan state to make decisions for refugees, stating, "The government partners with UNHCR, but they don't make decisions. They are only a partner" (Survey September 27, 2019. ID Gulu092719-3).

Despite the Government's primacy to establish rights, few credited the GoU as either primarily or partially responsible to clarify their rights (37/209). Only thirty individuals (14.35%) stated that the Government solely decides their rights. Moreover, nearly three out of four strictly urban and nearly four out of five quasi-urban refugees failed to ascribe the government as responsible to assist in rights guidance at all, answering instead that the displaced should seek this help from UNHCR or from refugee leaders and RLOs. Of the six governance areas, survey participants only attributed the GoU as responsible to assist refugee victims of crime or violence. Respondents ascribed INGOs as responsible to help with healthcare, education, and material provision at rates equal to or above the government. Those in Kampala found that NGOs, and not the government, are responsible to provide material help and ensure access to banking and loans.

Refugees also deemphasized the government's role to assist in healthcare and education. Across urban areas, refugees identified UNHCR or that "no one helps" to guarantee their right to education more frequently than they responded that the government is responsible. Likewise,

across urban areas, they responded that UNHCR, INGOs, and that “no one helps” in healthcare at rates higher than the government. The findings on healthcare and education warrant particular attention. While all recognized refugees in Uganda have the *de jure* rights to access basic healthcare and primary education on par with nationals, there are no parallel structures for these services in urban areas. From this view, the GoU is solely responsible to absorb urban the displaced into these social service infrastructures. Yet my findings demonstrate that many disidentify the state as responsible for these areas.

Considering urbanity also provides leverage to explain why respondents across different cities have inconsistent governance expectations. Respondents who stay in Kampala were most likely to cite INGOs as responsible to assist in various areas of rights and protection than did those who stay in other cities. Recall that Kampala is the urban area where refugees have the most exposure towards and interactions with INGOs. Furthermore, Kampala-based respondents were less likely to attribute governance responsibility to UNHCR than did refugees in other areas. In part, those who stay in Gulu and Mbarara can more easily travel to settlements where UNHCR has a strong presence through bureaucratic offices. Perhaps ironically, although UNHCR has its national headquarters in Kampala, refugees cannot easily access its compound and are instead referred to seek assistance at InterAid Uganda. Due to an inability to routinely access UNHCR for assistance, refugees in Kampala have lower expectations of UNHCR as responsible to assist with their rights and governance than do refugees in Mbarara and Gulu.

Finally, urban refugees were statistically more likely to report that no one is responsible to help in governance areas than did quasi-urban refugees. This demonstrates distinctions by governance mode in two ways. On one hand, quasi-urban refugees may seek help from INGO and UN actors by returning to the settlements while strictly urban refugees feel unsupported and

on their own. On the other hand, this finding may be evidence of the enduring mistrust that displaced persons feel towards governance actors. One ramification is that even if governance actors are present, refugees may be hesitant to ascribe responsibility for their protection and provision to actors who they do not trust.⁸

Analysis illuminates how refugees largely ascribe responsibility to non-state actors rather than to the Ugandan state for critical areas of their rights and governance. Through considering governance mode and urbanity, refugees instead attribute responsibility to the actors they know or can access.

3.3.3. Effects of refugee-led support on political knowledge:

The third variable explaining divergence in refugees' political knowledge outcomes is the presence of refugee-led support. Refugee-led initiatives, including RLOs and refugee HRDs are potentially impactful in all locations. Yet they are particularly so when state and non-state actors are not present to disseminate rights-based knowledge. Refugee-led initiatives impact outcomes because refugees gather and circulate relevant political knowledge to their communities. This includes experiential knowledge gained from successfully enrolling children into schools, by receiving healthcare services, or by gaining employment. This also includes passing knowledge on governance actors and processes of how to avoid resettlement schemes or to avoid undue bribes. Finally, government and INGO actors disseminate knowledge through a 'phone tree' model of contacting refugee leaders with expectations that shared information will trickle down

⁸ For additional information on strained trust-based relationships between urban refugees in Kampala towards UNHCR, see Sandvik (2011:17). See also Lyytinen (2013, 17), and Hyndman (2000) and Hynes (2003) who find that refugees' trust to UN agencies often decreases over time.

to others. Refugees can turn to these external actors to clarify knowledge and combat rumors for provision, opportunities, or resettlement that can predominate among displaced communities.

However, the presence of refugee-led rights support to promote political knowledge is uneven across locations. While each of my three research locations had national and ethnic social networks, as well as extensive networks of refugee-led churches and religious support, only Kampala has a significant presence of HRDs and formally registered RLOs. In contrast to other networks, only RLOs and HRDs identified as promoting rights and providing rights-based consultation. National, ethnic, and religious groups instead identified as providing non-political economic, social, integrative, and spiritual support.

To isolate how refugee-led initiatives influence variation in knowledge outcomes, I identify, in part, that refugee leaders, RLOs, and HRDs can effectively disseminate knowledge because they have an established social media presence with dedicated groups on Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and other platforms. Additionally, several RLOs in Kampala have physical offices in refugee-dense communities to enhance their visibility. Many have registered as NGOs with Uganda's Ministry of Internal Affairs. Perhaps more significantly, however, refugee actors can promote political knowledge because they are often well known to and are more trusted by their communities than are other external governance actors. Figure four displays refugee responses to their likelihood to seek help from various actors as a proxy to capture the often-high trust towards refugee leaders and RLOs




Figure 4: Likelihood to go for help by Hosting City

Overall, refugees in Mbarara had the highest likelihoods to seek assistance from RLOs and a refugee leader. Refugees in both Kampala and Mbarara signaled that they were more likely to seek help from these refugee-led support than they were to seek help from any other actor. Finally, refugees in Gulu were most likely to seek help from a co-national or co-ethnic leader but had very low likelihood to seek assistance from an RLO. This is perhaps unsurprising as I did not identify any registered RLOs in Gulu.

Beyond their meaningful roles to promote knowledge, data supports that the presence of refugee-led initiatives and RLOs also influenced how displaced communities understand governance responsibilities. For example, in analyzing table six, refugees in several instances cited refugee leaders and RLOs as more responsible to assist in governance areas than they did state or non-state NGO actors. Respondents in Kampala identified RLOs and their ethnic or

national leaders on par with or as more responsible than the GoU to ensure refugee education, healthcare, and to provide material help. Respondents in Mbarara and Gulu held their leaders as more responsible to clarify their rights than governmental actors. Across cities, respondents attributed more responsibility to their leaders than to INGOs for rights clarification and to help victims of crime or violence. Overall, survey participants in Kampala more frequently credited RLOs as responsible for governance roles than did displaced persons in Gulu and Mbarara. Considering urbanity provides partial explanation for this finding as Kampala has a higher prevalence of RLOs and HRD support than other urban areas.

Finally, I found limited evidence of effect of governance mode by comparing survey responses among strictly and quasi-urban refugees. Overall, strictly urban refugees only attributed meaningful governance responsible to RLOs and refugee leaders to clarify their rights, with slightly over 10% of respondents so indicating. However, quasi-urban respondents identified these refugee community actors as among the top three actors for governance responsibility in four of the six governance areas: rights clarification, education, material goods provision, and financial help. Quasi-urban respondents furthermore identified RLOs as more responsible than INGOs and GoU for both financial assistance and for education.

That refugees attributed governance responsibility to refugee community actors is particularly telling because the Ugandan government does not contract with RLOs or refugee leaders as governance actors in any area of refugee rights or protection. Furthermore, neither refugee leaders nor RLOs are empowered to formally influence the rights that they have. Refugees are not consulted when the government creates *de jure* memorandum of understanding for refugee governance, protection, or provision.

3.4 Conclusion:

Most surveyed refugees in Uganda have only limited political knowledge of their rights, restrictions, responsibilities, and protections. Several respondents struggled to name any of the social, cultural, economic, and other rights that Uganda affords them. On average, respondents listed fewer than two rights and over one in ten (15%) couldn't list any rights. Nearly one quarter of respondents denied that refugees have rights. Refugees additionally varied to whom they attribute responsibility for their rights. Rather than experiencing Uganda as a generous host, most refugees experienced rights as limited. They felt unsupported and alone to sort out their livelihood options and expressed difficulties to secure what was needed for a dignified life.

Refugees' political knowledge outcomes as measured by the rights they listed and the state, non-state INGO, or UN actors they deemed responsible largely diverged from *de jure* political knowledge as expressed by Uganda's Refugee Act 2006, its 2010 Refugee Regulations, and through relevant RRP. When disaggregating knowledge outcomes by demographic and location-based variables, patterns of how outcomes grouped together became clearest when considering *where* in the country a refugee was hosted. Most succinctly, a refugee's *de facto* expectation of rights and of who should provide them was mediated by different exposure to material provision, to different configurations of governance actors, and to inconsistent presence of refugee-led rights supports. My findings suggest that inconsistent rights implementation across locations is powerful to influence how refugees understand their rights.

Refugees' political knowledge matters. In part, holding knowledge of economic, social, cultural, and protection rights, coupled with processual knowledge to activate these rights, may empower refugees to achieve available rights and protections. Lacking knowledge of these rights and lacking processual knowledge may in turn generate further barriers to rights obtainment.

Findings suggest that many displaced are under-informed of expansive rights Uganda provides to them. Instead, they identify as rights only as material or social service provision they receive. This study also suggests many surveyed refugees lack accurate political knowledge that empowers them to pursue economic, educational, healthcare, or other social service outcomes. Many refugees did not hold adequate knowledge of governance actors or processes that provide legal or social protection.

Scholars and humanitarian practitioners may apply my framework that considers the divergence of the *de jure* and *de facto* rights context to study political knowledge of refugees in additional hosting areas within and beyond Uganda. Specifically, analysts can take as a starting point the *de jure* refugee governance framework to identify a state's commitments to refugee rights made at the national, regional, or international levels. Scholars can additionally consider the extent to which there is *de facto* implementation of these commitments at either the national or sub-national levels. This framework permits analysis of both what political knowledge refugees hold, as well as analysis why variation in knowledge outcomes occur.

Chapter Four. Politics as “taboo”: Refugees’ Barriers to Acquiring Political Knowledge

“Refugees are humanitarian issues and not political. When you become a refugee, you leave politics and rights totally.”

- South Sudanese refugee in Gulu (Survey September 23, 2019. ID Gulu0923198).

“When people try to learn their rights, they are blocked. It is because UNHCR and government don't want you to know them. If you know them, then you can claim them, and they don't want this.”

- Congolese refugee in Mbarara (Survey August 27, 2019. ID Mb54).

4.1 Introduction:

Despite Uganda’s uniquely generous allotment of rights and protections to the refugees it hosts, refugees’ political knowledge of their rights was overall low among surveyed refugees. If global observers recognize and laud Uganda for granting rights to refugees, why do refugees themselves not recognize the same? What are the barriers that refugees encounter to acquire this vital knowledge?

Existing studies enumerate numerous barriers for political knowledge acquisition for both citizens and non-citizens. For everyone in a territory, barriers range from a lack of interest in ‘politics’ (Luskin 1990) to socio-economic or educational considerations (Neuman 1986; Grönlund and Milner 2006; Dolan 2011). Among the limited studies which question whether and how barriers for knowledge learning are distinct for non-citizens, scholars identify logistical and language-based challenges (Leal 2002; Wong and Tseng 2008; Tafoya 2014); lack of trust to institutional actors, particularly to uniformed protection actors and state bureaucrats (Zolberg et

al 1989; Daniel and Knudsen 1995; Hynes 2003; and barriers from trauma (Pantonja et al 2001; and Pantoja and Segura 2003). These studies provide an analytical basis from which to question why knowledge learning may or may not occur. They posit learning occurs over time, particularly as individuals develop social and economic integration, and as they are exposed to knowledge instruction by actors within and outside of refugee communities.

However, in analyzing a range of original data including refugee surveys, expert interviews with refugee leaders and governance stakeholders, and focus groups held with refugee leaders, refugees had enduring barriers to learn about their rights that extend beyond explanations offered in these theories. While existing theories allow identification of some barriers refugees commonly experienced to gain political knowledge—such as not speaking the same language as their host community, not knowing where to go for knowledge instruction, or a lack of trust to actors who provide this knowledge—the theories inadequately account for why many refugees persistently find knowledge learning difficult even as they achieve social or economic integration. These theories additionally inadequately capture why some refugees avoid seeking rights-based knowledge and fall to explain why some refugees deny even having rights.

To better understand why knowledge learning remains difficult, I identify that many refugees struggle to learn rights-based knowledge simply because they consider rights and rights-based knowledge as “politics” or “political.” As individuals forced to flee their homes because of politics, many refugees consider politics as a taboo concept that is often neither relevant nor important in their daily lives. Regardless of refugee nationality or the research location within Uganda, data reveals that many refugee respondents hold a strong, enduring political aversion. They reiterated that politics—whether considered as elections, voting, making rules for a country, or as a system of rights and governance—are not for refugees. Rather, respondents

clarified only citizens can engage in or benefit from politics, including a frequent reiteration that only citizens have rights. Many respondents expressed a view that they forfeited their 'right to have rights' when they left their country of citizenship to seek asylum.

This political aversion in turn impacts both how refugees seek political knowledge and how refugee leaders attempt knowledge instruction. On one hand, refugees deprioritize this knowledge and instead focus on survival and their daily needs. On the other hand, refugees avoid political knowledge that could paradoxically help them craft viable livelihood and coping strategies to bolster their social, economic, and integrative outcomes. As a result of their enduring political aversion, long-staying refugees frequently struggle to acquire political information over time and fail to transmit knowledge to newer arrivals. Similarly, new arrivals struggle to acquire formal political knowledge from established refugee communities.

To support my arguments, this chapter proceeds in five parts. Section two provides results from quantitative analysis to establish that most surveyed refugees find learning political knowledge difficult. Section three incorporates qualitative analysis to examine how survey data aligns with barriers to knowledge formation that are commonly cited in existing literatures. Sections four and five argue that refugees' enduring political aversion has effects for how displaced persons acquire or fail to acquire political knowledge. Identifying the effects of political aversion allows a more nuanced consideration why refugees persist to find knowledge learning difficult in ways that are under-anticipated in existing theories.

4.2 Quantitative Analysis: Refugees' Ease to Learn Rights:

Refugees' ease to learn about their rights is operationalized as a five-point scalar variable. Possible responses range that learning rights is extremely difficult (-2) to extremely easy (+2),

with a neutral score of zero representing that learning rights is neither easy nor difficult. In total, 80 refugees responded to this optional survey question, with half (40/80) responding that it is extremely difficult for refugees to learn about their rights. Only 22 refugees stated that it is somewhat or extremely easy to learn this information. The average refugee scored response was -0.76 indicating that surveyed refugees find it somewhat difficult to acquire political knowledge on their rights. Given that few refugees describe political knowledge as easy, what are the barriers to knowledge obtainment? Why do most refugees describe learning as difficult?

As examined in chapter one, existing literatures and theories identify several mechanisms through which non-citizens can acquire political knowledge and conversely posit why learning may not occur. Mechanisms through which knowledge learning may be possible can be loosely organized into three groupings: (1) knowledge learning through social and community integration; (2) knowledge learning through linkages to exogenous actors, such as state, non-state, and UN governance actors; and (3) knowledge learning through endogenous linkages to other displaced persons. Yet what is the relationship of these mechanisms to effect refugees' reported ease or difficulty to learn about their rights? This section provides quantitative data findings, including OLS regression results, to answer this question. OLS regression permits analysis whether a change in one variable produces statistically significant change in a designated outcome. For example, OLS regression can contrast whether a change in length of time spent in the Ugandan host nation results in refugees finding it overall easier or harder to learn political knowledge.

The quantitative findings overall demonstrate that most refugees persistently encounter difficulties to learn about their rights, even when they achieve marginal social or economic integration, or when they can access refugee and non-refugee rights supports.

4.2.1. Integration as Effecting Knowledge Learning

Theories of refugee integration, including their political integration, suggest that integration is bolstered over time through forming viable and cross-cutting relationships to host community members. Relationships are formed through formal sector employment,¹ children school enrollment alongside nationals,² or through forming friendships and civic (civil society) associations.³ Leal (2002) finds that political integration, which I extend to include knowledge learning, may become easier when an individual feels a sense of belonging or desires to remain in a new country.

My survey captures five integrative variables: one's length of time in country (measured in years), their formal sector employment status, expressed level of comfort to live daily life in Uganda, comfort to seek help from a Ugandan national, and desire to remain in Uganda if possible. OLS regression allows evaluation of a potential relationship between each of these five variables to a refugee's ease to learn about their rights. For example, OLS allows assessment if there is a statistically significant relationship that learning about rights becomes easier with more years spent in the hosting nation, with formal sector employment, or with increased comfort to be or desire to remain in Uganda. The ability to seek help from a Ugandan citizen is a way to gauge social connections to the host community and allows analysis if knowledge learning becomes easier with these social ties. The regression results are displayed in Table Seven.

¹ For more on the relationship between formal education and political socialization/ integration, see Galston (2001) Sapiro (2004). For more on the relationship of formal sector employment as a mechanism to promote political socialization/ integration, see Beck (1977) and Abrego (2011) who identifies that migration and work experiences can inform their "legal consciousness." See chapter one for further discussion.

² See Garcia Castañon (2018).

³ See Hyman (1959), Owen (2008), García Castañon (2013).

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Refugees' Ease to Learn Rights:</u>	
	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>P-value</u>
Length in Uganda	0.068	0.176
Employment Status	0.22	0.597
Comfort in Uganda	0.175	0.133
Ability to seek help from a citizen	0.058	0.588
Desire to Remain	1.139	0.025**

Table 7: Regression Analysis Results: Ease to Learn Rights

Of these five considerations, rights learning only became easier when refugees expressed a desire to remain in Uganda. However, respondents who wished to remain in Uganda were very limited and represented roughly 10% of the total sample (21/209). Beyond a refugees' stated desire to remain in Uganda, none of the other tested variables were statistically significant. Refugees with formal sector employment did not find learning about their rights to be easier than those without formal employment.⁴ Additionally, refugees with stronger ties to their host community or who felt more comfortable in their community did not find learning rights-based knowledge easier than those who felt uncomfortable.

Finally, studies of refugee integration, including their political integration and ability to learn their rights, suggest that integration and learning outcomes increase over time. I used OLS regression to explore whether refugees' ability to learn their rights became easier over time as these studies suggest. Although I found that refugees' ease to learn their rights did become easier with each additional year in exile, the change was very slight, and the relationship was not statistically significant. There was less than a 0.1 difference from year to year, with refugees'

⁴ Thirty-seven of 209 surveyed refugees self-described as having formal sector employment.

stated ability to learn their rights becoming easier at an average of only 0.068 per year.

Moreover, regardless of the length of time in exile, refugees on average still expressed that it was either somewhat or extremely difficult to learn about their rights.

Findings suggest that refugees continue to experience barriers to learn about their rights even if they achieve social or economic integration into their host nation.

4.2.2. Exogenous Governance Actors as Effecting Rights Learning

Next, theories of exogenous knowledge transfer find that governance actors, such as state bureaucracies, NGOs and civil society organizations, and UN agencies, often play an important role in promoting necessary political knowledge on rights and restrictions to refugees.⁵ Survey data allows evaluation whether refugees' ease to learn rights increases when they can access various institutional actors. I incorporate OLS regression to explore whether refugees' likelihood to seek assistance from UNHCR, Ugandan government, NGOs, or religious institutions resulted in a greater ease to learn their rights. Results are shown in Table Eight.

<u>Governance Actor</u>	<u>Refugees' Ease to Learn Rights:</u>	
	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>P-value</u>
UNHCR	-0.08	0.506
Government of Uganda (OPM)	0.232	0.05*
Local government actors	0.225	0.122
International NGOs	0.153	0.18
Religious Institutions	0.103	0.389

Table 8: Refugee Likelihood to Seek Assistance and their Ease to Learn Rights

⁵ See Castles et al (2002), Sigona (2005), Ager and Strang (2004 & 2010), and Lichtenstein and Taintor (2016). See chapter one for further discussion of the exogenous theories of knowledge transfer.

Analysis reveals only one relationship was statistically significant. Refugees who were more likely to seek help from OPM were also more likely to find it easier to learn about their rights. However, refugees who were more likely to seek assistance from UNHCR, local government officials (LC1), international NGOs, and religious institutions did not find it easier to learn about their rights than did refugees who avoid seeking help from these actors. These findings illuminate how many refugees continue to encounter difficulties to gain political knowledge even when they seek this assistance from the governance actors that they hold responsible to clarify and promote refugee rights.⁶

Although it is out of the scope of this project to assess why these difficulties persist, scholars including Lyytinen (2013) and Hynes (2013) find that refugees may have enduring and problematic trust-based relationships with institutional and governance actors. Refugees may thus hold actors responsible to give rights-based guidance but lack required trust to approach them. Refugees may also be dissuaded from accessing these actors due to logistical difficulties. For example, UNHCR's office in Kampala is located in an upscale neighborhood far from the communities where most refugees reside. The office is not accessible by *matutus*—Kampala's public transportation fleet of passenger vans. Refugees in Kampala also have difficulties accessing UNHCR's implementing partner InterAid because it regulates appointments by refugee nationality such that displaced can seek assistance only on designated days.⁷

4.2.3. Endogenous Refugee Support as Effecting Rights Learning

⁶ Recall, that, overall, surveyed refugees consistently identified UNHCR and the Government of Uganda's Office of Prime Minister (OPM) Department of Refugees as chiefly responsible to promote and clarify their rights.

⁷ At time of field research, InterAid was UNHCR's sole implementing partner for urban refugees.

Finally, per theories of endogenous knowledge transfer, co-national or co-ethnic community members may sensitize new arrivals about their rights and the processes to access them.⁸ In a long-term study of resettled refugees' integration, Lichtenstein and Taintor (2016: 3) terms these individuals as “navigators” who can guide a new arrival, “through confusing legal, social, and cultural systems.” Likewise, Garcia Castañon (2013, 2018a and 2018b) describes the pivotal role of family members, including family that has arrived earlier, to facilitate in integration, including political integration, and to promote rights-based knowledge. Figure Five displays the average ease to learn rights of each refugee nationality across my three Ugandan refugee hosting locations.




Figure 5: Ease to learn rights, disaggregated by nationality and hosting city

Only the Somali refugee community found it neither easy nor difficult to learn rights, and the remaining nationalities found learning rights to be somewhat or extremely difficult. These

⁸ See Leal (2002), Palmgren (2012), Tafoya (2014), Tafoya et al (2019)

findings suggest that refugees experience strong, enduring barriers to learn about their rights. These barriers are observed across refugee nationality and hosting location. Future research is required to explore this finding.

Throughout quantitative analysis, refugees' ease to learn about their rights did not substantially change as they socially and integrated into their hosting communities. Nor did endogenous exposure to co-national communities or exogenous exposure to governance actors significantly ease rights learning.

4.3 Qualitative Assessment: Refugee-Identified Barriers to Knowledge

Formation:

In surveys, refugees expressed 24 unique barriers they encountered to learn about their rights. Several of these refugee-identified barriers correspond to barriers identified by scholars who theorize non-citizen political knowledge learning. These barriers include difficulties to learn from not speaking the local language, not knowing where to go for knowledge instruction or insufficient instruction, lack of trust to governance stakeholders, and trauma, among others. This section expands how refugees believe these barriers impede their rights learning. While these barriers are commonly acknowledged in existing literatures, they are insufficient to fully capture refugees' pervasive and persistent barriers to learning political knowledge.

4.3.1 Barriers to Refugee Political Knowledge Formation:

Barriers of Logistics and Insufficient Instruction:

In total, 24 of 80 refugees stated that they struggle to learn about their rights either because they don't know where to go for this information or because there is a dearth of rights'

instruction. Ten refugees cited language barriers as preventing knowledge acquisition.

Additionally, slightly over one fifth responded instruction is limited, or stated that no one teaches on their rights (17/80). For example, a Sudanese refugee in Kampala stated bluntly, “No one teaches us this” (Survey October 1, 2019. ID 11019-3). A Burundian refugee also in Kampala explained, “We need someone to explain our rights to us. Even when we arrive up to now, there is no program to teach us this. We just can’t know” (Survey September 5, 2019. ID Y09054).

Ten refugees expressed further uncertainty from which actor they should seek rights knowledge. Many refugees, especially those outside of Kampala, questioned if any actor in their city provides this knowledge. Per a Congolese refugee in Mbarara, “some refugees lack knowledge on how to learn their rights- they are ignorant. It can be hard even to find websites to learn about what rights refugees have” (Survey August 21, 2019. ID Mb15). Refugees across cities and national backgrounds cited barriers to learn rights because of insufficient teaching or uncertainty which actor provides this knowledge. However, the lack of consistent instruction was the most frequent barrier cited by Congolese refugees.

Finally, other refugees clarified that the source of knowledge instruction is inconsistent across locations. A South Sudanese refugee in Gulu explained, “I don’t think learning about your rights is easy, because you don’t even know how to ask about this. In the camp, maybe you go to a refugee leader. But in the city, maybe you go to the government or to an LC1 (local council). It is just hard” (Survey September 27, 2019. ID Gulu092719-4). In a focus group with Congolese refugee representatives, a leader affirmed that location is indeed significant. He described, “In Kampala, there are many organizations and service providers. Refugees there can pick where to go to ask about rights. In the settlements, refugees just have UNHCR. They only know what UNHCR gives them. For them, UNHCR is the government, and it doesn’t teach rights” (Focus

group in Mbarara, Uganda on August 22, 2019). Yet even in the capital, a refugee leader reflected that Kampala is a vast urban area and stated, “many refugees just don’t know how to navigate the city.” He added that refugees often pay bribes to access governance actors and even then, fail to get rights-based knowledge when they obtain appointments (Interview with RLO founder in Kampala September 13, 2019). Intervening and welcoming governance actors may advise refugees on their rights. Yet knowledge learning remains difficult when actors are either not present or when refugees struggle to access them.

Interviews with governance stakeholder reveals whether they believed it is easy or difficult for refugees to learn their rights. Some actors, including three NGOs with headquarters in Kampala and UNHCR’s implementing partner for urban refugees InterAid Uganda (IAU) espoused that learning rights should be easy because they disseminate knowledge to urban refugee leaders.⁹ These non-refugee actors shared an expectation that knowledge trickles down from leaders to broader displaced communities. The IAU representative self-identified that her organization is chiefly responsible to ensure refugees have political knowledge on their rights and restrictions. However, even IAU expressed that this can be difficult because not all refugee nationalities have clear leadership structures, and because some refugee communities—specifically the Congolese community—are believed to have contested leadership. In Gulu, an INGO who provides services to refugees in nearby settlements but not to refugees in Gulu town expressed only limited knowledge on who are the RLOs or refugee religious networks present. This organization identified constraints to liaise with refugees directly to share rights-based knowledge or to provide rights-based counsel (Interview with INGO in Gulu September 27,

⁹ Author interview with international NGOs in Kampala from August to October 2019. Author interview with InterAid Uganda on 09/13/2019.

2019). I was unable to locate any refugee governance actors in Mbarara, which may underscore refugees' limits to locate political knowledge from governance actors in all urban areas.

Lack of institutional trust towards governance actors:

Next, 22 of 80 refugees signaled an inability to pursue rights and protection knowledge because they lacked confidence in or distrusted state bureaucracies, NGO actors, or UNHCR officials who they believe hold this knowledge. For some, the lack of confidence emerged when they approached governance stakeholders for rights guidance but failed to receive it. A Somali refugee in Kampala expressed mistrust by stating, "Every time you go to a refugee office or official, they just waste your time. You go to the office, but you need to come back again and again. It is just hard to learn your rights" (Survey September 12, 2019. ID Ss09121). A second refugee in Kampala echoed, "Sometimes you call UNHCR and they don't pick. Other times you go to the offices and have to keep coming back so it's hard" (Survey September 2, 2019. ID H09023). In Gulu, a South Sudanese refugee advised, "there's no easy way to ask these questions about rights. We can go through our leaders, and they try to go to OPM, but even they don't always get answers" (Survey September 24, 2019. ID Gulu092419-3).

Refugees who identified as staff or volunteers in RLOs also described an inability to learn about rights from governance actors due to a lack of trust. For example, seven RLO members mentioned UNHCR and six mentioned the Ugandan Government's OPM when questioned about learning their rights. In all but one instance, the responses were negative. Per one Congolese RLO member in Mbarara, "The government and UNHCR puts limits on refugees to learn rights. They don't work with us. They don't want us to know our rights because then we could make noise and claim the rights" (Survey August 27, 2019. ID Mb52).

Additionally, while RLOs, chiefly those in Kampala, sometimes formed viable relationships with NGOs like the Refugee Law Project, Jesuit Refugee Services, and the International Refugee Rights Initiative, they often struggled to form relationships and learn about rights from the Ugandan Government, UNHCR or InterAid—actors who refugees primarily hold responsible to teach their rights. Through surveys, 22 RLO representatives in Kampala self-reported the strength of their relationships with other RLOs and with external governance actors. In ranking these relationships, RLOs had the highest trust-based relationships towards other RLOs, then to UNHCR and to INGOs. They had the overall lowest trust-based and working relationships with the Government of Uganda.¹⁰ Like other refugees who are not RLO staff, these refugees shared a sentiment that their organizations are blocked from directly accessing these stakeholders to learn about or advocate for refugees' rights.

In focus groups with refugee leaders in Mbarara and Gulu, leaders emphasized their barriers to interact with and form trust towards governance actors because these actors simply are not present. Leaders reiterated that refugees must return to settlements to access either UNHCR or INGOs for information on rights and protection. Yet staff members of CRCU Mbarara noted barriers to get knowledge even in settlements. Per one leader, “UNHCR cannot allow refugees to know all of the things about their rights... They don't post that refugees even have the right to education because there are few spots. They lie about resettlement and how to seek this.” CRCU staff further expressed frustration and lack of trust because many had to bribe translators or desk officers to get appointments to question about their rights or services (Focus group with CRCU on August 22, 2019). In Gulu, a South Sudanese leader explained that refugees there have low

¹⁰ In surveys, RLO staff were asked to rank their current relationship with other RLOs, with UNHCR, with iNGOs, and with the Government of Uganda on a scale of -2 to +2, representing extremely negative to extremely positive. The average relationship to other RLOs was 1.15 while the relationship to the Ugandan Government was 0.647.

trust to Ugandan government actors because they don't interact with the government and instead turn to other refugees for help. He stated, "refugees have only limited interaction with the law. They know the government only to get married or to get permission to return to South Sudan to bury our refugees who have died in Uganda. They don't know them for rights" (Focus group with South Sudanese refugee leaders on September 27, 2019).

However, in one interview, the director of an INGO described refugees' lack of trust as exaggerated. He shared that refugees and refugee leaders perhaps unfairly over-emphasize the lack of political will in Uganda to honor refugee rights while under-emphasizing the lack of capacity. This director stressed that rights for social services of education and healthcare are tricky areas where state institutional capacity is under-developed to serve even its citizens. To explain, he compared Uganda's capacity for refugee hosting and provision to an elastic band that is at the breaking point. The director reminded that Uganda expects urban refugees to be self-reliant and expressed concern that many refugees hold unreasonable expectations for services and provisions that are unavailable outside of settlements. He proposed refugees need to act as partners to fill gaps in their right and protection as the few actors who support urban refugees are stretched thin (Interview with INGO director in Kampala on August 14, 2019).

4.3.2. Limited or no Barriers to Learn Political Knowledge:

Although most refugees enumerated substantial barriers to acquire rights knowledge, 22 refugees found that this knowledge is either somewhat or extremely easy to obtain. Nearly half of Somali respondents to this question (5/13) stated that learning knowledge should be easy. However, most non-Somali respondents who stated learning right should be easy provided caveats. One Burundian refugee highlighted that some rights are easier to learn than others,

saying, “NGOs can give you some advice about rights. The major problem is learning about the right to employment (Survey on September 5, 2019. ID Y09055).” In Gulu, a refugee described, “It depends on the refugee’s condition, and on what the rights question is. But for most rights, it should be easy (Survey on September 23, 2019. ID Gulu0923192).” Only six refugees stated that they don’t know any barriers for refugees who wish to learn their rights to do so. The caveats provide insights that learning rights are often easy only for some or require that an individual knows where to seek out rights-based information.

4.4 Refugees’ Political Aversion as Preventing Rights Learning: Quantitative Findings

While survey, expert interview, and focus group findings identify barriers of political knowledge acquisition that are commonly identified in studies of non-citizen, including refugee, political integration, these barriers are insufficient to capture why knowledge learning remains so difficult. I argue that refugees’ political aversion and anti-political sentiment are often fundamental, enduring barriers for refugees to acquire rights-based political knowledge. Refugees’ aversion to politics has lingering effects for how refugees understand rights, pursue rights knowledge, or claim rights in their host country.

4.4.1. Mixed Methods and Findings:

Mixed quantitative and qualitative data analysis supports that how refugees understand politics, as well as understand the appropriateness of politics or political behaviors, has implications for whether they pursue and acquire rights-based political knowledge. Qualitative coding and content analysis identifies how refugees differently define politics and describe what

politics means for displaced.¹¹ Responses were grouped into three categories to indicate whether the refugee overall held a negative, neutral, or positive sentiment towards politics. From this qualitative analysis, quantitative scoring was assigned to create a “political sentiment” score that ranged from extremely negative to extremely positive (scored -2 to + 2). See Figure Six for expanded coding descriptions of the aggregate negative, neutral, and positive political sentiment categories.

Aggregate Category (Number of observations)	Negative (104)		Neutral (77)	Positive (28)	
Individual Category (Number of observations)	Extremely neg. (60)	Somewhat neg. (44)	Neutral (77)	Somewhat pos. (2)	Extremely pos. (26)
Score	(-2)	(-1)	(0)	(1)	(2)
Common coding themes, words, or phrases.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Politics as reason for exile - Politics are forbidden - Negative descriptions such as politics are “conflict,” “dangerous,” or “bad” - Mentions risks for refugees who engage in politics - Normative statements against refugee political action 		Definitional answers of politics. Responses of “don’t know” or prefer to not say.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statements that indicate positive potential of politics (e.g., unity, public services, good governance) - Statements of positive outcomes from refugee political advocacy - Statement that there is no distinction in refugee v. citizen politics 	

¹¹ Pearlman (2016) provides a compelling example on how individual narratives offer a lens through which to identify collective understandings of politics among displaced communities. Her work underscores how processes of displacement can impact individual and collective political subjectivity, including whether the displaced embrace or avoid politics and political expression.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statements that refugees lack capacities (knowledge) for politics - Statements that indicate no interest in politics, or that politics are irrelevant for refugees 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statements that politics are relevant for refugees - Other positive statements about politics or potential of politics to produce societal good
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Figure 6: Political Sentiment Categories and Coding

Of 209 responses, the average political sentiment score was -0.5264 which indicates that refugees hold an overall negative view of politics. Only 28 of 209, or just under 10% of refugee respondents, held a somewhat or extremely positive view of politics. Over 25% of all respondents held an extremely negative view of politics (60/209). Most refugees reflected that politics, however defined, is off limits for refugees and is appropriate only for citizens. Other refugees, however, described conditions where politics intersects meaningfully, and even positively, with their daily lives. Others described only a temporary break with politics—describing politics as important in their pre-displacement lives or suggesting they intended to continue with politics or political behaviors after displacement ends. Among these, a limited number of refugees spoke of politics as not just a cause of displacement, but also as a potential solution to enable a return to their home country. Finally, several refugees self-described the importance of politics to provide for their rights—albeit often with caveats that refugees cannot enjoy all rights that citizens enjoy.

Summary quantitative statistics were performed to explore variation in the average political sentiment score of refugees of different gender identity, urban status (strictly in urban areas or quasi-urban refugees who split time between city and settlement), hosting location,

nationality, employment status, or status as a refugee-led organization staff or volunteer. No group held an average positive political score. Thus, regardless of grouping, all refugees had an overall negative political sentiment score, indicating a pervasive anti-political sentiment that holds across surveyed refugees.

Next, quantitative analysis using t-test difference in means were conducted to determine whether the differences in average political sentiment scores between groupings was statistically significant. A t-test difference in means allows determination whether a political sentiment score of one grouping is significantly different from the score of another group, rather than being different due to chance. For example, this test is appropriate to determine whether the difference between the average political sentiment score of strictly urban refugees (-0.4967) and the average score of quasi-urban refugees (-0.6034) is statistically significant. Figure Seven displays the average political sentiment scores and t-test difference in means results for refugees of different gender identity, urban status, hosting location, nationality, formal sector employment status, and status as staff or volunteer within an RLO.

Figure #. Comparing Political Sentiment Scores				
Groupings by Gender				
Grouped by Female				
	<u>Female</u> (n=99)	<u>Not Female</u> (n=110)*	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.5364	-0.5152	-0.1202	Not significant
SD	1.1938	1.3429		
Grouped by Male				
	<u>Male</u> (n=92)	<u>Not Male</u> (n=117)**	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.5	-0.547	0.2663	Not significant
SD	1.3708	1.178		
Grouped by Urban Status				
	<u>Quasi-Urban</u> (n=58)	<u>Strictly Urban</u> (n=151)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>

Mean	-0.6034	-0.4967	-0.5457	Not significant
SD	1.337	1.2376		
Grouping by Urban Area				
	<u>Kampala</u> (n=124)	<u>Not Kampala</u> (n=85)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.5081	-0.5529	-0.8099	Not significant
SD	1.3524	1.1287		
Groupings by Nationality				
Comparing Congolese v. Not				
	<u>Congolese</u> (n=100)	<u>Other Nat.</u> (n=109)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.71	-0.3578	-2.0280	p > 0.05
SD	1.2414	1.2658		* (0.0438)
Comparing S. Sudanese v. Not				
	<u>S. Sudanese</u> (n=58)	<u>Other Nat.</u> (n=151)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.2586	-0.6291	1.9102	Not significant
SD	1.0355	1.3297		
Comparing Somali v. Not				
	<u>Somali</u> (n=24)	<u>Other Nat.</u> (n=185)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.2917	-0.5568	0.9669	Not significant
SD	1.1602	1.2761		
Comparing Burundian v. Not				
	<u>Burundi</u> (n=18)	<u>Other Nat.</u> (n=191)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.66667	-0.5131	-0.4920	Not significant
SD	1.81497	1.2046		
Employment Status				
	<u>Not</u> (n=172)	<u>Employed</u> (n=37)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.55233	-0.4054	0.6407	Not significant
SD	1.2296	1.4232		
Staff of Refugee-led Organization (RLO)				
	<u>Not Staff</u> (n=179)	<u>Staff</u> (n=30)	<u>t-value</u>	<u>Prob & significance</u>
Mean	-0.48604	-0.76667	1.1265	Not significant
SD	1.2558	1.30472		

*Not female is inclusive of male and gender non-binary

**Not male is inclusive of female and gender non-binary

Figure 7: Comparing Political Sentiment Scores

Only one of ten t-test results were significant. These findings underscore the ubiquity of a negative political sentiment score about politics that persists across displaced communities in the Ugandan case study. Finally, refugees' average political sentiment score was calculated by age and length of time in Uganda. Figures Eight displays refugees' average political sentiment score by age and by number of years spent in Uganda.




Figure 8: Political Sentiment by Age and Length in Uganda

Neither grouping of age nor time in Uganda had an overall positive sentiment towards politics. These findings go against expectations within theories of political integration and political knowledge formation which expect learning to become easier over.

4.5 Refugees' Political Aversion as Preventing Rights Learning: Qualitative Findings

While instructive to illuminate the pervasiveness of refugees' political aversion, quantitative findings are limited to address three foundational questions. First, what are these understandings of politics that in turn engender a political aversion among diverse refugee communities hosted in Uganda? Second, in what ways does political aversion affect refugees' ability to acquire critical political knowledge on their rights, restrictions, opportunities, and protections? Third, how does a political aversion affect how refugee leaders attempt rights-based knowledge instruction? Qualitative analysis of surveys, expert interviews, and focus groups with refugee leaders sheds light on these important questions.

4.5.1. Refugee Understandings of "Politics"

How refugees define and understand politics holds implications for whether refugees pursue rights-based and political knowledge. Perhaps most starkly, the data reveals that many refugees have enduring barriers to acquire rights-based political knowledge simply because they view this knowledge as "political." Through qualitative coding to a survey question which asked refugees to define politics, I identified nearly 30 unique definitional responses. Among these diverse responses, two general trends emerged that underscore how refugees' strong and enduring political aversion undermines their ability to pursue rights knowledge and to self-identify as persons of rights. First, refugees avoid politics, political behaviors, and rights-based political knowledge in exile when they attribute politics as the root cause of their displacement. Second and relatedly, refugees develop a political aversion in exile because they believe politics, including rights, are only for citizens.

Political Aversion because "politics" is the cause of displacement:

Most fundamentally, refugees' political aversion is rooted in their assertion that politics, politicians, or political institutions are directly responsible for their displacement. Per a Burundian refugee, "Politics is something that brings conflict. Politics made us refugees. It has destroyed our peace" (Survey October 3, 2019. ID 031019-5). A Congolese refugee similarly expressed, "Politics just kills people. Refugees cannot do politics. Ever. We left because of politics" (Survey September 9, 2019. ID H09093). In total, nearly 40% of Burundian respondents (7/18) and slightly under 10% of Congolese respondents (9/100) echoed that politics produced their displacement.

Twenty-one respondents reiterated that they lost their rights to engage in politics once they were pushed from their country because of politics. A South Sudanese refugee staying in Gulu described, "Refugees are humanitarian issues and not political. When you become a refugee, you leave politics and rights totally" (Survey September 23, 2019. ID Gulu0923198). In Kampala, a Burundian refugee emphatically stated, "Maybe we have some rights, but we don't have any right to be political" (Survey October 3, 2019. ID 031019-1). Finally, per a Somali respondent, "Politics is not for refugees because politics made (us) refugees. Before, politics was voting. Now, politics for refugees is just waiting and trying for resettlement" (Survey September 11, 2019. ID Ss09116).

More impactfully, however, was that numerous respondents straightforwardly traced how the negative "politics" that caused their displacement in the past generates residual effects for their present political behavior. These effects include a present inability to have or discuss rights. For example, a Congolese refugee in Mbarara described, "Politics is the work that a government does... to take care of people of its country. In DRC, we were free to move and free to have expression but not here. We don't have permission to do these things now. There are no rights.

This changed when we left due to politics” (Survey August 22, 2019. ID Mb23). Likewise, a Burundian refugee clarified, “For refugees, we came because of politics so for us we don’t do politics anymore. We cannot even discuss our rights, this is politics” (Survey August 15, 2019. ID Y08153). Perhaps the clearest articulation of how political aversion that results from displacement manifests into barriers to learn rights was given by a young Somali refugee. Quote, “when pushed out of their country, they (refugees) are not even aware that they have any rights to learn about. There is no awareness” (Survey September 11, 2019. ID Ss09114).

Thus, throughout responses, many among those who identified politics as the cause of their displacement concomitantly developed an enduring aversion to politics. This political aversion resulted in a view that having, seeking, or claiming rights was no longer possible.

A View that Politics is only for citizens:

Additionally, refugees overwhelmingly found that politics—and its composite pieces of bureaucracies, systems of governance, formal party politics, or rights and protection—are relevant for and available only to citizens. In total, over 40% of refugee respondents (84/209) declared that there are no “politics” for refugees. As a result of their political exclusion, many refugees developed a political aversion and considered seeking or promoting rights-based knowledge as political behaviors that are off-limits and inappropriate.

In total, eighty-four refugees stressed that politics are only for citizens and never for refugees. In survey analysis, Somali and South Sudanese stated that refugees are excluded from politics as among their top answers to the question, “what is politics for refugees.” Roughly 70% of Somali (17/24) and over 40% of South Sudanese refugees (24/58) responded that politics are only for citizens and never for refugees. Congolese and Burundi refugees likewise noted that

only citizens can engage in politics, but at lower response rates.¹² Although refugees in each research city responded that politics are only for citizens, refugees in Mbarara were least likely to give this response, with only 4 of 44 so responding. Instead, the most common responses among Congolese refugees in Mbarara were that they didn't know what politics could be or if politics had any relevance for refugees (16/44).

As a result of their political exclusion, several refugees stated they are precluded from even having rights. Ten refugees justified their exclusion from seeking this knowledge because they are “foreigners” or non-citizens. Of these ten, nine were from South Sudan with eight staying in Gulu and one in Kampala. A respondent in Gulu simply stated, “There are no rights for refugees... We cannot know rights because we are not citizen” (Survey September 27, 2019. ID Gulu092719-5). Another refugee reflected, “it is difficult to know rights because this country has its own rights for citizens. Refugees are treated like a foreigner. They don't give you access to know rights” (Survey September 23, 2019. ID Gulu0923198). That South Sudanese refugees in Gulu, a city near to the border with South Sudan, expressed a distinction between citizen and foreigner is perhaps telling. Despite historically shared cultural, economic, and social ties between various ethnic groups that live on both sides of the South Sudan and Ugandan borders, the refugees most frequently identified their ‘outsider’ or non-citizen status as their primary barrier to learning their rights. Rather than facilitate an ease to learn rights, the shared historic ties seemed to cement an outsider status where refugees felt excluded from having rights.

Beyond South Sudanese refugees, other nationalities also noted that refugees do not have rights due to their non-citizen status. A Somali refugee staying in Uganda for 12 years said, “Governments work to guarantee the rights of people. And they work to make rights better. But

¹² Sixteen percent of Congolese and four percent of Burundian respondents cited that politics are only for citizens.

this is just for citizens and not for refugees. We do not even have rights” (Survey September 11, 2019. ID Ss09115). Another refugee from Burundi shared, “For refugees, a big problem is that they (the government) say that we have rights. But we know we don’t!” (Survey September 5, 2019. ID Y09052). These refugee articulations that deny the displaced as persons of rights echo my findings presented in chapter three where 37 urban and quasi-urban refugees similarly declared that only citizens have rights.

4.5.2. Barriers to Learning Political Knowledge due to Negative Understandings of Politics

How do refugees’ negative views of politics, including that politics is the cause for their displacement and that politics are forbidden for non-citizens, create barriers for acquiring political knowledge? First, some refugees avoid seeking this knowledge because they identify this as a taboo behavior that carries punitive risks. Second, respondents described pressures to avoid politics due to a belief that “bad” refugees engage politics, including making rights-based claims, while “good” refugees evade these behaviors. Finally, refugees feel blocked from knowing or discussing rights. For some, this pressure comes from external governance actors, such as from the Ugandan Government, UNHCR, or from iNGOs. For others, the pressure to avoid rights is produced within refugee communities, as occurs when the displaced encourage each other to avoid sensitive political topics of rights to instead focus on daily live.

Risks of Refugee Political Behavior:

First, refugees’ political aversion and anti-political sentiment impeded their ability to seek or claim rights because many identified these as inherently political behaviors that carried

punitive risks. Congolese refugees in Kampala were most likely to express views that refugees face risks for attempting politics, including claiming their rights (11/56). Per a young Congolese refugee in Kampala “Politics is too dangerous. If you want to die or go to jail, then talk about politics” (Survey October 1, 2019. ID 021019-6). Another Congolese refugee staying in Kampala similarly described risks by stating, “the refugee who brings himself into politics—he’s just trying to kill himself. There’s no purpose to get involved. It’s a crime and there’s nothing for refugees to do with politics” (Survey August 13, 2019. ID Y08131). A third Congolese refugee summarized, “There are not any good rights for refugees... If you have refugee status, you cannot (act politically). It’s not important for us to be in politics because for refugees it’s a crime and you go to jail. This is for all politics. Politics of Uganda, of your country, and of everywhere” (Survey August 9, 2019. ID 4Y20809).

Beyond threats of imprisonment or legal sanction, refugees further described additional negative responses they encountered while attempting to claim their rights. A refugee in Gulu stated, “We don’t have this ability to act in politics. We can’t express ourselves or our views. We just stay under UN and OPM. When you try to get your rights, you are not even treated like a person” (Survey September 25, 2019. ID Gulu092519-6). Another South Sudanese refugee shared, “If you talk about politics, no one listens. And talking about politics just creates insecurity for you, even if you talk about the government- whether here or whether where you came. You just shouldn’t do this” (Survey September 23, 2019. ID Gulu0923197). Throughout these responses, refugees reiterated that the displaced must avoid potentially political behaviors to avoid legal and social sanctions.

Refugee perceptions that “Bad” Refugees are Political and the “Good” are not:

To further explore the effects of how political aversion detours some refugees from seeking political knowledge, I asked survey participations to describe how they believed the Ugandan government or its citizens would describe a “good” versus a “bad” refugee. The responses enabled me to further distinguish how refugees interpret the boundaries of which behaviors, including political behaviors, are appropriate in their daily lives. To wit, many refugees distinguished between the “good” or “bad” based on behaviors, specifically including whether refugees knew their rights and complied with Ugandan laws.

Among the most common responses, 45 refugees identified that the “good” know their rights and follow local laws, or conversely said that the “bad” do not know rights or break the law. Other descriptions of a “good” refugee include that they are grateful to their hosts and do not make demands (23/209) and that they avoid politics (9/209). Conversely, “bad” refugees fail to know their rights-based restrictions and act beyond the rights Uganda allows, including that they try to claim rights only citizens have (5/209). Sixteen refugees directly described that a “bad” refugee is bad because they protest or engage in politics. These responses illuminate a further manifestation of refugees’ political aversion and political exclusion. While many described a necessity to follow the laws, they drew clear lines to totally evade “politics,” political behaviors, and political processes and systems that make the laws. For some, this included even seeking rights-based knowledge as refugees found this is appropriate only for citizens.

Congolese and Burundian refugees were most likely to find that “bad” refugees engage in politics or protest, with 11% of Congolese (11/100) and over one quarter of Burundians so responding (5/18). To elucidate why “bad” refugees are bad because of political behaviors, a Congolese refugee in Uganda for 11 years characterized, “The bad doesn’t attend to the laws or their rights. For example, some refugees do politics and we are not supposed to” (Survey August

13, 2019. ID Y08135). A LGBTQ refugee in Kampala interpreted that beyond being “bad” because of gender or sexual identity, “The good refugee doesn't enter politics, and doesn't talk about politics from DRC, Uganda, or anywhere. The good refugee respects the laws” (Survey August 2, 2019. ID aN2A3107). Likewise, a Burundian refugee described, “Near elections, the bad refugees will go to marches or protests with Ugandans. They try to enter politics. This is very bad. We should not even look at this politics” (Survey August 16, 2019. ID Y08051).

While many refugees spoke vaguely about politics and political behaviors, several refugees expressly listed discussing home or host country politics or discussing refugee rights as taboo behaviors. A young Congolese refugee who identified as occasionally discussing politics with other refugees, but never with Ugandan citizens, shared, “Bad refugees are those who complain about their rights. They want their rights. They even protest” (Survey August 13, 2019. ID Y08133). A Burundi refugee who identifies as gender non-binary discussed the tensions that gender and other minorities need their rights to stay safe, but that they cannot get this information. They said, “The Government doesn't like refugees who talk about their rights—they send those refugees to settlements. But I am not safe there” (Survey July 26, 2019. ID aN2KS). Another refugee who moves between Kampala and a refugee settlement stated clearly, “Good refugees don't talk politics or intervene in politics” (Survey August 5, 2019. ID H50805).

Beyond discussing rights, other refugees clarified that the Ugandan government and its citizens dislike refugees who demand their rights, or who ask for more than they are offered. One urban refugee simply stated, “the bad disturbs their hosts and asks their rights for free” (Survey October 2, 2019. ID 021019-6). In Mbarara, a refugee described, “In the camps and in the cities, the bad refugee is the one who protests and doesn't want what is offered” (Survey August 23, 2019. ID Mb33). Additionally, in Mbarara, another Congolese refugee shared, “The bad refugee

is the one who needs to be like a citizen. Meaning they don't behave like they are a refugee. They try to get rights like citizens” (Survey August 23, 2019. Mb31).

Governance stakeholders, in part, affirmed a frustration with refugees who demand rights that are difficult to access in Uganda, regardless of citizenship or legal status. For example, the director of an INGO that provides English-language and vocational training to urban refugees in Kampala expressed frustration that refugees fail to know the limits of their rights, particularly the limits to access formal sector employment and government-provided healthcare and education. The director stressed that many disadvantaged Ugandans likewise struggle to access their own rights, and shared it is unreasonable for refugees to expect more than their citizen counterparts (Interview August 14, 2019). A second INGO staff member likewise lamented many refugees cannot differentiate rights from provision, and that most refugees don't understand that having rights requires a duty-bearer to uphold their rights (Interview June 21, 2019). In these and other stakeholder interviews, INGO staff cited that host communities sometimes experience frustration when they perceive refugees as receiving services or provisions citizens cannot access.

Finally, the data reveals tensions that although “good” refugees felt they should know their host community's laws, they encountered barriers to learn these because of their political aversion. In general, refugees struggled to decipher which political behaviors a “good” refugee could engage. They debated whether a “good” refugee could seek out their rights. Barriers also resulted from a perceived political exclusion as they were denied access to the political processes and institutions that create or uphold rights. While the “good” refugee should acquire political knowledge, it was often the “bad” refugee who sought rights information, attempted claiming rights, or who advocated for citizen-based rights.

Blocked from knowing or discussing rights:

As a final way to observe how refugees' political aversion impedes learning political knowledge, 12 of 80 refugees expressed a view that governance actors, including the Ugandan Government, UNHCR, and INGOs actively block them from learning their rights. Feeling blocked from acquiring knowledge was the second most frequently noted barrier cited by South Sudanese respondents and was also frequently cited by Congolese refugees. No Somali and only one Burundian respondent gave this answer. A refugee in Gulu detailed, "to be honest, we are blocked from knowing. There are middlemen who block us even from knowing our rights. Even if we go to Kampala or the settlements for this, we can't go directly to UNHCR or to OPM" (Survey September 27, 2019. ID 092719-2). In his response, "middlemen" refer to NGO bureaucrats who refugees accuse of charging bribes to enter offices. Overall, refugees outside of Kampala expressed a sentiment that they were blocked at higher rates than did refugees in the capital city, with nine of the twelve who cited this being in either Gulu or Mbarara.

Other refugees voiced that governance actors dissuade refugees from discussing politics and rights. Per a respondent in Gulu, "We cannot do politics. This is only for citizens. The government can't allow us to do politics because this could make them look bad. This is why we can't talk even to media to expose our problems or talk politics. We just need to be quiet" (Survey September 27, 2019. ID 092719-1). Another South Sudanese respondent shared, "Politics for refugees is just to talk to UNHCR if we have a problem, otherwise there is no politics. But we cannot even do this. We really can only go to UNHCR for food distribution but not for our rights or other help" (Survey September 24, 2019. ID Gulu092419-8).

Four refugees alleged governance actors block refugees from learning or discussing rights to prevent them from claiming their rights. In Mbarara, a Congolese refugee theorized,

“when people try to learn their rights, they are blocked. It is because UNHCR and the government don’t want you to know them... Because, if you know them, then you can claim them. And they don’t want this” (Survey August 27, 2019. ID Mb52). Another Congolese refugee in Kampala concurred, stating, “They (the government) don’t want you to know your rights because if you know them, then you can try to claim them. This causes problems” (Survey August 7, 2019. ID Aa09041). A third Congolese refugee stated governance actors avoid rights instruction because, “the government acts like everything is a favor and not a right. They don’t train on rights because they want us to think everything is just a favor” (Survey September 4, 2019. ID 3Aa30807).

Not all pressures to avoid discussing political or learning rights came from external actors, however. Several refugees described internal pressures from other refugees against discussing politics. Per a refugee in Kampala, “Refugees can just not do anything. Politics is just anything, it is even talking about any government. For me, I try to talk sometimes about politics of DRC (home country), but I cannot” (Survey August 13, 2019. ID Y08133). A South Sudanese refugee in Gulu described, “Politics is hard for refugees... They can only monitor and watch what is happening. They can follow the affairs of their country only but cannot do anything. They watch but cannot speak about this” (Survey September 27, 2019. ID Gulu091319-3). A Congolese refugee in Kampala succinctly summarized refugee pressures to discuss politics with other refugees. She described, “I think it is better if refugees avoid politics because there is nothing for them... You should know that there is no point to discussing politics with refugees. Sometimes we don't talk politics because if people left their homes for political reasons, talking about this brings trauma” (Survey August 2, 2019. ID Y40802).

Finally, refugees diminished the significance to seek rights knowledge because they cannot claim them. Three refugees explained that learning rights isn't a priority for refugees. Per a Somali refugee, "We just focus on living... I don't think about my rights" (Survey September 12, 2019. ID Ss09126). A Congolese refugee likewise summarized, "Refugees are just focused on surviving, and they don't know how to learn their rights" (Survey August 12, 2019. ID H2822). Seven refugees further clarified that even if they had knowledge, it is of limited utility because they face obstacles to claim their rights. Per a refugee in Mbarara, "Sure, maybe you can know your rights, but you cannot get them!" (Survey August 23, 2019. ID Mb34). Another refugee in Kampala echoed, "Learning rights is mostly hard because even if you can learn them, you can't claim your rights" (Survey September 5, 2019. ID Y09053).

In sum, whether pressures originated from within or outside of refugee communities, many refugees felt blocked from seeking information on their rights. In some instances, refugees felt pressure to focus on their daily life. This is significant because I argue the de-prioritized rights-based information could paradoxically provide protective information on refugees' opportunities and protections, and potentially bolster their outcomes while in exile.

4.5.3. Barriers to Learning Political Knowledge due to Negative Understandings of Politics

Finally, refugees' political aversion also impacted how refugee leaders, refugee human rights defenders (HRDs), and refugee led organizations (RLOs) instructed their fellow displaced on refugee rights, restrictions, and responsibilities. Although analysis revealed several mechanisms how political aversion affected leaders' rights-based work, I examine two of the most salient. First, refugees' political aversion created barriers for refugees who conduct rights-

based advocacy, including rights instruction, because they felt they must de-politicize their efforts. Nearly all interviewed leaders denied their rights-based instruction or rights-based intervention as a political and attempted to decouple rights from politics. These leaders, activists, and interventionists instead grounded their work in a belief that refugees have rights, and a belief that their legal status as non-citizens cannot deny access to rights. Second, leaders struggled to know the boundaries of “politics” in their rights-advocacy and instruction because they encountered inconsistent responses by governance actors towards their rights-based work. They characterized stakeholder responses to their rights-based education and advocacy as inconsistent, ranging from tacit acceptance to overt encouragement to even strong-armed punishment. Many leaders perceived that the rules and acceptability for teaching rights shifted depending their teaching or advocacy tactics, as well as depending on which right they focused. This section expounds how political aversion impacts effects to teach about rights.

Barriers to Decouple Rights from Taboo Politics:

Several refugee rights instructors cited a root cause of their difficulty to teach rights as their broader communities enduring mistrust of politics, and mistrust of political institutions and actors who decide rights. Like others, many who teach rights described fleeing to Uganda because of political persecution. Per a Burundian refugee, “We are all here because of political issues... and now to learn rights to hard. Some refugees fear rights because of politics, but it would be better if all refugees could learn their rights. Rights give us a chance here” (interview with RLO founder on August 15,2019). A Congolese leader likewise stated, “We came because of politics. We cannot trust it. Even me, I am not a politician. But we have to look to rights. Rights can help make us equal” (Interview August 20, 2019).

In effect, those who teach about rights, restrictions, and responsibilities under Ugandan or international refugee law have a unique challenge to decouple rights from politics. All leaders in interviews denied that their work is political. One Congolese RLO worker in Mbarara stated, “Our organization helps refugees in many ways, but we cannot use the title of politics. We can only defend the rights of refugees. We have to be careful, because you can get arrested from politics. Plus, politics is why we are refugees, we cannot do politics” (Interview August 24, 2019). Per a leader in Gulu, “Many refugees here feel that they don’t have any rights because they are refugees. This is an extensive problem, but we know there are rights. But besides refugees, there is no one here, no UNHCR, no InterAid, and no OPM for rights-based protection or right teaching. But refugees should know they have rights” (Interview September 27, 2019). Finally, a RLO founder from D. R. Congo described, “Refugees have rights and can even influence their rights. We can work to claim any rights. We refugees have the right to live a normal life, just like anyone else” (Interview July 26, 2019).

While leaders affirmed that refugees’ political avoidance doesn’t preclude the displaced from having rights, there was a tension that this political avoidance creates barriers for their rights instruction.

Barriers To Teach Rights Because of Inconsistent Stakeholder Response:

Refugee leaders also experienced barriers in rights-based work, including rights instruction, because they were unsure which advocacy efforts are apolitical and permissible versus which efforts are political and denied. To elucidate this point, leaders shared their inconsistent responses from governance actors towards their rights advocacy that ranged from tolerance to punishment. Among the punitive responses, four leaders were arrested or threatened

with arrest for demanding or teaching rights, with one HRD stating he has been arrested over fifteen times for his advocacy (Interview June 27, 2016). Four additional leaders described losing access to multi-sectoral stakeholder meetings, or being threatened with removal for meetings, for supposedly disrupting gatherings to demand their rights. Finally, two leaders described either being threatened with removal from a city to a settlement or threatened with removal from a settlement for their rights advocacy.

To theorize why these punitive responses occurred, a team of RLO volunteers in Mbarara decried that UNHCR and NGOs sometimes retaliate against refugees who teach rights or seek their rights. One volunteer suggested, “these people (UNHCR) don’t teach about rights, and this is strategic. They say we should stay out of rights and politics. There is push against even teaching rights because they cannot let us know all of refugee rights” (Interview August 22, 2019). A second Congolese refugee and RLO founder in Kampala cautioned, “refugees should work for their rights, but many are not sensitized about their rights. However, refugees really need to be careful in this. It can be very bad if you speak out against UNHCR. It is like politics to speak out. They can punish for this” (Interview August 5, 2019).

Even when leaders did not experience punishment, they questioned whether governance actors were committed to supporting refugees who train others about their rights. On one hand, leaders felt unsupported because no interviewed RLO staff or HRD acknowledged receiving financial support from UNHCR or the Ugandan Government for rights instruction or promotion. On the other hand, some leaders felt they lacked genuine support for their rights advocacy, including even when they were invited to attend multi-sectoral meetings on refugee rights and protection. An RLO founder who advocates for LGBTQ refugee rights communicated dismay after participating in one such meeting by saying, “We hear about efforts for refugees to be

involved in getting their rights, but we only ever have fake consultations (with UNHCR). There is no genuine progress. Even now, no one takes our rights seriously. We try to work together to teach rights, but there is no support from UNHCR or anyone” (Interview September 4, 2019). A Congolese refugee leader in Mbarara similarly described frustrations to work with stakeholders on refugee rights, stating, “Refugees have intelligence and capacity, but UNHCR pushes us away. They don't want to work with us about rights and they don't want refugees to know their rights” (Interview August 27, 2019).

Overall, very few leaders described positive experiences or receiving external support in teaching about refugee rights. Leaders additionally experienced lingering frustrations to claim rights they know they have. For example, a Burundian leader shared that his organization had received rights’ training from an INGO. He shared, “learning rights is only easy when NGOs advertise or train leaders about this. But even then, we have problems to teach rights because we cannot get our rights, especially our right to employment” (Interview September 15, 2019).

Rather than receiving support that they anticipated from governance actors, including from UNHCR, INGOs, and the Ugandan Government, many RLO staff and HRDs encountered pushback for their rights-based advocacy and instruction. In some instances, this pushback resulted that some refugee leaders questioned whether it was permissible or forbidden to even teach rights. Their desire to engage only in apolitical work and to evade punitive responses for actions that were potentially political in turn created barriers for refugees to de-politicize and promote fundamental refugee rights knowledge.

4.6 Conclusion

While all individuals, regardless of citizenship status, can encounter barriers to acquire political knowledge, this chapter illuminates among the barriers that may be unique to non-citizens, including refugees. As aligns with existing studies of refugee political integration—which includes how refugees acquire political knowledge—surveyed urban refugees described learning about their rights as difficult when they didn't speak the same language as their host community, when rights instruction was limited, and when refugees lacked trust towards those who provide this instruction. However, my original findings also diverge from expectations set out in existing theories of non-citizen political integration. In my survey sample, refugees experienced enduring barriers to learn their rights even after achieving marginal economic integration and after developing social ties to their hosts. Furthermore, rights learning did not become easier over time. This suggests other fundamental barriers exist for refugees to acquire vital political knowledge.

To answer the underlying question what these fundamental barriers are, I identify refugees' pervasive and enduring political aversion as a powerful force that pushes many refugees away from seeking political knowledge. As their lives have been severely and negatively impacted by politics, political persecution, or by political actors and processes that denied them their rights in their home country, many displaced persons hold lingering distrust to an ill-defined politics. In surveys, most refugees struggled to define 'politics' or discern the boundaries of which potential topics or behaviors are 'political.' Refugees perceived politics, political behaviors, governance structures, and rights not as sources of protection, but as taboo and forbidden.

How refugees understand politics and its appropriateness in their daily lives matters because it has consequences for whether and how they seek or acquire rights-based political

knowledge. One consequence of finding “politics” as taboo is that rights learning was overall low among refugees in my sample. Moreover, many surveyed refugees denied even having rights, insisting instead that only citizens have rights. The understanding of politics held further consequences for how refugee leaders, RLOs, and refugee HRDs attempted rights instruction.

Finally, in switching from a top-down lens that lauds Uganda’s refugee hosting structures as generous to conduct a bottom-up analysis reveals among the reasons refugees feel unsupported in their country of exile. Chiefly, I identify a harmful cycle whereby refugees may fail to know and subsequently claim their rights and protections because they feel excluded from rights. Rights-based instruction may thus need to creatively decouple rights, protections, and governance from approaches used for citizens. In the conclusion chapter, I propose ways to partner with refugee leaders and RLOs to promote relevant political knowledge and to overcome barriers for knowledge formation.

Chapter Five. The Impacts of Refugees’ Political Knowledge on Grievance Expression Tactics and Targets.

“I am an officer of government and I do the work of government. I will not be threatened by activists who are not clear on what they want. You must not abuse the hospitality afforded to you.”

- David Apollo Kazungu, Commissioner for Refugees in the Government of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister responding to refugee demands (Ssejjoba 2017).

“The Ugandan government should know that all refugees are entitled to equal rights like the host community (Ugandan citizens).”

- Ter Manyang, human rights defender, and National Coordinator of Network of South Sudanese Civil Society Organizations in Uganda (“Uganda: SIM Card Scam,” SSSN 2019).

5.1 Introduction:

Regardless of one’s citizenship status, all individuals require political knowledge. In past chapters, however, original data documented that political knowledge among surveyed refugees in Uganda was low. How does political knowledge, including limited or no knowledge, affect refugees’ political behaviors in how they express rights-based and protection grievances? This chapter presents three arguments of how political knowledge impacts refugees’ grievance expression, including which demands they make, as well as how and to whom grievances are expressed.

First, this chapter argues that variation in political knowledge influences the rights-based, social service, and protection demands refugees make, particularly when refugees consider these

demands as guaranteed rights rather than as non-guaranteed gifts. An analysis of refugee demands sheds light on how the displaced understand and navigate rights-based and protection areas that are unclear under national, regional, or international law, such as perceived rights for third-country resettlement or for food and material support. Second, this chapter argues that political knowledge influences variation in the tactics refugees choose to express their demands. On one hand, refugees may choose among diverse tactics from writing letters, attending public forum, making legal claims through courts, or turning to protest or even illegal actions of property destruction as aligns with their preferences or resource capacities. On the other hand, their tactic choice may indicate processual knowledge of how governance decision-making occurs as refugees strategize tactics to advance their goals. Finally, political knowledge informs the state, non-state, or U.N. actors to whom refugees make their demands. These choices further reveal how the displaced understand governance responsibilities for their rights and provision.

To explore the relationship between refugees' political knowledge and their political behaviors of grievance expression, I analyze an original dataset of 117 refugee grievance expression events identified through a comprehensive review of two Ugandan English-language daily newspapers, the *New Vision* and *The Daily Monitor*, from 2014-18; a review of international news sources through LexusNexus from 2009 to the present; and from refugee letters shared through public WhatsApp refugee leaders' forums and shared through public social media accounts.¹

Qualitative and quantitative analysis are employed to compare refugee responses to shared underlying grievances. In general, refugees with lower and higher political knowledge differently articulated and justified their demands, selected different tactics for grievance

¹ See chapter one for further discussion on this dataset's creation, as well as discussion of general benefits and limitations of using archival datasets as a research methodology.

expression, and alternated in the governance actors chosen to hear their demands. For example, refugees with higher knowledge were more likely to express grievances through non-transgressive action, to justify their claims in law, and to address them to governance actors empowered to respond to their requests. Conversely, refugees with lower knowledge more frequently selected grievance expression tactics that incurred unintended and largely negative consequences from governance actors (e.g., protest, property destruction or other illegal actions). Refugees with lower knowledge made vague requests for assistance, and often without specifying any actor to provide help.

A focus on these non-electoral political behaviors is significant because refugees in many hosting states, including in Uganda, are prohibited from routinized political behaviors of voting, running for public office, or joining a political party.² Notwithstanding these prohibitions, refugees engage in a range of informal political actions as they respond to rights-based, protection, and provision challenges encountered in daily life. This chapter aims to contribute by exploring how variation in political knowledge influences refugees' critical decision-making to seek their rights and opportunities, to respond to resource deficiencies, and to seek assistance for violated rights. How refugees make demands and to whom are useful heuristics to capture how refugees enact their political knowledge into observable behaviors as they pursue a dignified life. The chapter additionally sharpens an understanding of what political knowledge is and how it operates for non-citizen and displaced persons. Finally, throughout analysis, this chapter

² Tafoya (2014: 2) identifies non-electoral political participation available to immigrants, including, "political learning, discussion, organization, and other informal activities that have no citizenship requirements." Likewise, Leal (2002: 361) identifies seven forms of non-electoral political participation ranging from wearing a button in support of a political candidate to donating money to a campaign. Reichert (2016: 223) similarly defines unconventional political participation as, "a broad range of less institutionalized and usually less time-intensive or committed political participation located outside political parties (e.g. attending a non-violent political protest march) that often deal with rather narrow social or political issues or aim at solving a certain political problem."

underscores that rights-based and political knowledge is a form of protection for refugees as they face resource limitations, legal precarities, and quotidian challenges in exile.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section two describes the events dataset and the criteria for case inclusion. The methodological appropriateness to use an events dataset to study political knowledge and the effects of knowledge for grievance expression is also discussed. Subsequent sections present data findings of how political knowledge impacts refugee tactical choice to express demands, impacts how refugees articulate and justify their demands, and impacts the actors that refugees select to address their demands towards.

5.2 Dataset and Methodology:

Due to Uganda's total prohibition against refugee political behavior, there are ethical concerns to ask refugees potentially sensitive questions about whether and how they express their grievances.³ Analyzing secondary sources, such as newspaper articles and publicly available refugee-drafted letters, provides a viable alternative to empirically evaluate grievance expression and demands for rights in ways that reduce risks for refugee research participants. Additionally, unlike survey questions that capture how a refugee may theoretically respond to rights-based, resource, protection, or other deficiencies, the secondary sources capture grievance responses as they occurred. The distinction between a theoretical and actual response is significant as refugees may be disincentivized from discussing their political behaviors in surveys with an unknown researcher (Hynes 2003; Mackenzie et al 2007; Sigona 2014). Refugees may be dissuaded from honest discussion because of a "social desirability bias"

³ Per Article 35(d) of Uganda's Refugee Act, 2006, "Subject to this Act, a recognized refugee shall not engage in any political activities within Uganda, whether at local or national level." As discussed in chapters one and four, the Refugees Act does not define politics or enumerate which actions may be considered political.

(Krumpal 2013, 2027-8) or due to refugees' own "preference falsification" (Kuran 1991, 17).

Biases occur when an individual feels inhibited to openly discuss their true opinions or actions, producing a disjuncture between what one says and what one does.

5.2.1 Case selection and coding:

To explore how political knowledge influences political behavioral outcomes associated with refugee grievance expression and requests for grievance redress, I analyze an original dataset of Ugandan national and international press sources, and refugee-drafted letters. In total, archival review of these sources identified 117 unique dataset cases of refugee grievance expression that occurred from 2009 to the present. Grievance expression events resemble political claims-making events, which the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements describes as (2013, 1), "the process of performing or articulating claims that bear on someone else's interest... Political claims-making entails both the formulation of a political demand with a specific content (the claim), and the public staging of this demand (claims-making)."

There are three minimal criteria for a data source's inclusion as a grievance event: (a) that refugees make a political or non-political grievance demand, (b) that refugees express the grievance through a tactic, and (c) the event occur after 2009 as this year represents the implementation of Uganda's Refugee Act of 2006. After identifying events for inclusion, each event was coded for the grievances that spurred refugee action, the actors to whom refugees expressed their demands, and the tactics refugees used to express grievances. When possible, coding also captured responses by governance actors. Finally, each event was coded for evidence of refugee individual or collective political knowledge. I present each coding in turn. The coding

procedure for political knowledge is presented separately due to the complexity to conceptualize and assess this variable.

First, while refugees expressed many grievances, most grievances centered on daily necessities of humanitarian distribution and food aid (39/117). Less frequently, refugee grievances included allegations of exploitation, abuse, rape, or other physical harm (8/117). In rare cases, refugees bemoaned under-representation in governance and decision-making in their host state or exclusion from peacebuilding in their home country (6/117). Similarly, refugees expressed their demands to a plethora of United Nations, governmental, and NGO actors. Most commonly, however, refugees addressed their demands towards the Government of Uganda (GoU), including its Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and Ministries of Health and Education, (36/117) and to UNHCR (22). Less commonly, refugees sought redress or assistance from foreign governments and embassies (5), and from INGOs (12). Forty-six of 117 sources did not specify any actor to whom refugees addressed their claims.

Analysis identified seven distinct grievance expression tactics: demands (petitions), letters, mass mobilizations (protest), illegal actions including property damage, public forums, stakeholder meetings, and legal action. Table Nine expands and defines each grievance expression tactic. Many events in the dataset document that refugees used numerous tactics to air grievances or make a demand. As such, Table Nine also documents the number of occurrences for which refugees used each tactic as the primary means for grievance expression, as well as document the total number of occurrences per each tactic.

Tactic Type	Occurrences as primary tactic (total use)	Definition
Grievance expression with demand (petition)	Primary use: 44 (Total use: 53)	These are statements made by refugees for a right or service. The action are statements only and are unaccompanied by any other identifiable action.
Letters	Primary use: 31 (Total use: 31)	Letter by refugees or refugee-led organizations (RLOs) that were shared through publicly available sources like refugee blogs and social media.
Mass demonstrations	Primary use: 16 (Total use: 19)	A mobilization by refugees, often with large numbers of participants. Expressions include protests, mobilizations, sit-ins and occupations, and non-cooperation to governance demands, among other expressions.
Illegal Action	Primary use: 12 (Total use: 16)	These actions violate Uganda law or policies. Examples include property destruction, physical harm, and illegal exit from settlements
Public Forum, including refugee rights training	Primary use: 7 (Total use: 11)	Refugee participation in spontaneous or planned public fora for rights-based purposes, including to make demands or to instruct others on refugee rights.
Stakeholder Meeting	Primary Use: 4 (Total use: 9)	Participation by refugees or RLOs with stakeholders who govern, administer, fund, or otherwise support refugees in Uganda.
Legal Action, inc. whistleblowing	Primary Use: 3 (Total use: 3)	Refugee efforts result in legislative action against external to refugee actors.

Table 9: Grievance Expression Tactics

In most events, the only observed outcome of grievance expression was simply that refugees made demands. In limited events, refugees went beyond making demands and responded to an underlying concern through self-provision of a right, service, or protection. Most events focus only on grievance expression and do not permit analysis whether refugees succeeded or failed to achieve their demands.

5.2.2 Identifying Political Knowledge in Dataset Events:

While other codes, such as expression target and tactic are relatively straight forward, political knowledge is a complex and multi-faceted concept (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Milner 2002; Grönlund and Milner 2016). To determine refugees' level of political knowledge within events, I analyze four indicators: (a) refugee statements of their rights, restrictions, and responsibilities; (b) refugee statements on the source of these, such as Uganda's Refugee Act, 2006 or relevant Ugandan refugee policies, as well as regional or international refugee or human rights treaties; (c) refugee statements on the state or non-state actors who decide or uphold these; and (d) other knowledge indicators, such as refugee statements that express knowledge of national or international decision and policy-making that impacts the displaced; proposed or actual changes to refugee governance in Uganda; or home country politics or security assessments that impact refugees' decisions to remain in Uganda or return.

The four indicators are appropriate dimensions to capture non-citizen refugee political knowledge as each refers to an aspect of rights and governance in their host state rather than refers to political knowledge dimensions relevant only to citizen's electoral behavior. The first three indicators correspond directly to my definition of political knowledge as one's understanding of rights, restrictions, responsibilities, and the state and non-state actors who decide and uphold these. The fourth dimension correspond to measures and indicators used in studies of citizen and non-citizen political knowledge, and in studies of political knowledge as a catalyst for political actions. For example, Hoffman (2012:1) describes that political knowledge refers to electoral and non-electoral components, including to current issues and events. Grönlund and Milner (2016: 389) consider the "working of the institutions of the political system and rules of the game," as relevant political knowledge components. Finally, Neuman (1986: 196-7) finds that political knowledge encompasses, "both what the government is and what it

does.” Neuman clarifies that “what the government does,” includes, “people’s ongoing attention to politics and the mass media, and hence their knowledge of current events.”

Assessment of political knowledge first considered each dimension as a yes/no binary and then disaggregated each dimension as scalar to indicate low, moderate, or high political knowledge. A composite score was assigned through consideration of both the number of political knowledge dimensions expressed and the accuracy of information stated.

The category no observable political knowledge occurs when there are no statements to indicate knowledge in any of the dimensions. The category low political knowledge occurs when refugee statements indicate knowledge in one or more dimensions, but no dimension is fully correct. This occurs when a refugee enumerates perceived right(s) that are not codified by refugee law and policy, such as the ‘right’ to resettlement or ‘rights’ to service provision. The category of moderate political knowledge occurs when statements indicate knowledge in one or more dimensions, and at least one dimension is fully correct. These knowledge statements may contain minimal errors. The aggregate category is reduced from moderate to low when there is more than one error. The category of high political knowledge requires that a refugee demonstrate knowledge in at least two dimensions. In contrast to moderate political knowledge, the dimensions will be generally correct and free from errors. If an event has incorrect responses even in one dimension, the aggregate score is reduced from high to moderate. It is unlikely that many dataset events will exhibit high political knowledge. See Figure Ten for expansion on political knowledge dimensions and aggregation, and treatment of incorrect information.

Political Knowledge (PK) Dimensions	No PK	Low PK	Moderate PK	Advanced PK
1. Statements on rights, responsibilities, restrictions (3 R's)	No statements.	Enumeration of rights not guaranteed by refugee law or policy, such as the "right" to resettlement.	Must identify at least one right guaranteed by law or policy but may additionally enumerate unclear rights.	Refugees correctly enumerate the 3 R's that refugee laws provide. There are no unclear rights.
2. Statements on source (basis) of 3 R's	No statements.	Refugees indirectly cite the source, including by citing rumors or lived experience.	Refugees cite laws and policies as the source but do so with errors.	Refugees correctly cite national, regional, or international refugee law and policies.
3. Statements on the roles of state and non-state governance actors	No statements on governance actor responsibility.	Refugees cite a governance actor but wrongly describe its role.	Refugees demonstrate partial knowledge on a governance actor's role.	Refugees correctly identify an actor and its responsibilities.
4. Other PK statements: including on home country conditions, or statements on refugee policy and decision-making	No statements	Rumors or vague statements on proposed changes unsupported by any factual information	Knowledge is either incomplete, contains rumors or inaccurate information	Factual enumeration on the current situation and clear articulation of how proposed changes will impact refugee outcomes or processes. Statements are without errors.
Treatment of incorrect statements	N/A	Low PK may include errant statements.	More than one errant statement will reduce the category of "moderate" to "low".	An observation that otherwise qualifies as high PK is reduced to moderate if incorrect responses.
Aggregation	<u>Minimum threshold:</u> There are no responses that show knowledge in any dimension.	<u>Minimum threshold:</u> There is a response for at least one PK dimension but the response is not fully accurate or is incorrect.	<u>Minimum threshold:</u> there must be responses to at least two dimensions, with one dimension fully correct.	<u>Minimum threshold:</u> There must be responses to three PK dimensions with at least two dimensions current. There should be no incorrect statements.

Table 10: Political Knowledge Dimensions, Measurement and Aggregation

5.3 Refugee Political Knowledge and Tactical Choice: Comparing Refugee Response to the Same Grievance

This section presents quantitative and qualitative findings to highlight trends in the relationship between political knowledge and three primary outcomes: refugees' choice of tactics to express a grievance, the level of clarity in how refugees articulate their demands; and variation in how refugees justify their selection of state and non-state actors for their grievance expression.

5.3.1. Quantitative Analysis:

Analysis of refugees' grievance expression tactics offers valuable insights on how vulnerable displaced persons seek assistance when their rights are violated, as well as demonstrates how they pursue rights-based, material, financial, or other life-sustaining support and opportunities. This is significant because many refugees in Uganda experience extreme resource, rights-based, and protection grievances. Whether in rural settlements or in urban areas, many refugees struggle to access minimum food and nutritional sustenance, and basic material or economic security.⁴

What then is the relationship between a refugees' choice of tactic to express a grievance and their level political knowledge? Quantitative analysis establishes that refugees' average political knowledge varied widely across grievance expression tactics. The average political knowledge for each tactic is displayed in Figure Nine.

⁴ See chapters one and two for discussion on institutional capacity across my urban research locations.




Figure 9: Average Political Knowledge per Grievance Expression Tactic

From quantitative summary analysis, refugees displayed the highest political knowledge when they pursued grievance redress through courts and legal action, when they attended public forums, and when they attended meetings with governance stakeholders. Refugees displayed the lowest political knowledge when they engaged in illegal actions, including property destruction, and why they participated in mass demonstrates (protests).

To further demonstrate a relationship between different knowledge and tactic section, Figure Ten displays different tactics refugees selected to respond to the same underlying grievance. This figure captures variation in tactic responses to four of the most common grievances observed in the dataset: grievances related to their humanitarian provision, to seek rights they are afforded under law (e.g., rights to healthcare, education, or physical protection), to demand governance actors be held accountable for alleged harms towards refugees, and demands

for perceived rights that refugees do not have under Ugandan or international law, such as demands for third-country resettlement. Tactic selection is disaggregated by refugees with lower knowledge (inclusive of no and low political knowledge categories) and higher knowledge (inclusive of moderate and high knowledge categories).

Grievance: Humanitarian Provision (39)	
Level of Political Knowledge	Grievance Tactic
Lower Knowledge (34)	- Grievance with petition (21) - Mass mobilization/ protest (7) - Illegal action (4) - Other (2)
Higher Knowledge (5)	- Letter (4) - Other (1)
Grievance: Right Under Law (23)	
Level of Political Knowledge	Grievance Tactic
Lower Knowledge (18)	- Grievance with petition (7) - Mass mobilization/ protest (6) - Illegal action (1) - Letter (4)
Higher Knowledge (5)	- Public forum (2) - Letter (2) - Other (1)
Grievance: Stakeholder Accountability (14)	
Level of Political Knowledge	Grievance Tactic
Lower Knowledge (10)	- Letter (3) - Mass mobilization/ protest (2) - Illegal action (2) - Grievance with petition (2) - Public Forum (1)
Higher Knowledge (4)	- Legal action (3) - Public Forum (1)
Grievance: Right Not Under Law (9)	
Level of Political Knowledge	Grievance Tactic
Lower Knowledge (7)	- Letter (3) - Grievance with Petition (2) - Illegal Action (1) - Mass mobilization/ protest (1)
Higher Knowledge (2)	- Letter (2)

Figure 10: Refugee's Chosen Tactic to Respond to Grievances,

In comparing responses made by refugees with lower and higher knowledge, trends in tactic selection emerge. For example, some tactics, such as participating in a public forum, stakeholder meeting, or pursuing redress through legal action, were more likely to occur when refugees had higher political knowledge. Other tactics, such as expressing a grievance without engaging in further action, participating in an illegal action, or participating in a mass demonstration (protest) occurred more frequently when individuals had lower political knowledge.

While quantitative analysis is instructive to identify distinctions in average political knowledge across grievance expression tactics, and to identify trends in how refugees with different knowledge differently select tactics, it doesn't explain *why* these differences occur. Thus, why do some refugees with lower understanding of their rights, restrictions, responsibilities, and of the state and non-state governance actors who decide these choose different grievance expression tactics than do refugees with more knowledge? Qualitative analysis, including close analysis in the text of each dataset case, helps to answer this question.

5.3.2. Qualitative analysis:

Qualitative analysis that compares disparate refugee responses to a shared underlying grievance permits exploration in the relationship between political knowledge and tactic selection. Forthcoming analysis focuses on refugee demands for humanitarian provision and demands for accountability by state, non-state, and U.N. governance actors. Focus is given to refugee demands for humanitarian provision as this was the most common demand made in the dataset (39/117). Demands for stakeholder accountability were the third most common demand (14/117). Additionally, demands for humanitarian provision are instructive to demonstrate

refugee understandings of their rights for life-sustaining food and material support. Demands for stakeholder accountability likewise are instructive to demonstrate refugee understandings of state or non-state actors' responsibilities to provide rights and protections.

Across cases, refugees with lower knowledge frequently experienced unintended and negative consequences that resulted from their tactic selection, including retaliatory social service or distributional disruptions. Having higher knowledge enabled refugees to avoid these punitive responses. These comparisons highlight how political knowledge facilitates inconsistent tactic selection, and underscores why tactic selection is important.

Refugee tactical choice to demand humanitarian provision:

Rights to humanitarian provision, including a right to food, are particularly opaque areas of international responses to refugee and forced migration crises. For example, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OCHCR) (2010: 3) cites as a “common misconception,” that the “right to food is NOT the same as a right to be fed.” OCHCR clarifies that that the right to food does not require a government or external body to provide food, but distinguishes that this right is, “primarily the right to feed oneself in dignity. *Individuals are expected to meet their own needs, through their own efforts, and using their own resources,*” emphasis added. The OCHCR report further elaborates that the duty of states is simple to ensure that individuals can access food (p. 23), and that states must ensure food is available, accessible, and adequate (p. 2).

Oliver and Ilcan (2018: 440) argue that refugee hosting states, including Uganda, mischaracterize their commitments to promote refugees' right to food as assistance and fail to acknowledge their responsibilities towards displaced populations. Although international

organizations, including the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, and UNHCR often play important roles in providing emergency and humanitarian food relief to the globally displaced, these authors stress that refugees do not have an entitlement to food. They summarize, “there is no guarantee that aid will be adequate to meet refugees’ most basic needs,” p. 449. While refugees hosted in Uganda have a right to self-provide for their immediate survival needs, they do not have a right to food under national, regional, or international law. The tensions of whether food and humanitarian distribution are a gift or a right makes it unclear whether displaced have a legal right to make demands for this provision.

As documented in chapter three, survey findings uphold that many urban and quasi-urban refugees in Uganda struggle to differentiate if humanitarian provision, including food, is a right or a gift. In total, nearly a quarter of survey respondents stated they have a right to food. Roughly two-thirds of respondents ascribed responsibility to UNHCR and its implementing partners to ensure this provision. Analysis in the variation of grievance tactics refugees select to demand humanitarian or food aid thus complements my survey analysis in two ways. First, this analysis permits further assessment how refugees understand a critical yet ambiguous right that is of critical importance to their survival and well-being. Second, it allows assessment how variation in their political knowledge informs refugee decision-making as they respond to hunger, food insecurity, and other basic survival needs.

Of the demands for humanitarian provision, the vast majority (35/39 or 89.74%) of demands were made by refugees with no or low observed political knowledge. This includes refugees did not demonstrate knowledge on whether they have a right to food, knowledge of processes or decision-making in determining distribution, or demonstrate knowledge of which actors are responsible to ensure timely or adequate aid distribution. Nearly half of all observed

mass demonstration tactics (7/16) and 33% (4/12) of all observed illegal action tactics occurred when refugees demanded humanitarian provision. Governance actors, including Ugandan police, frequently responded swiftly with arrests and other punitive responses. In contrast, refugees with more knowledge selected alternative tactics and avoided these harsh responses. Yet, what explains these trends in why refugees with higher or lower knowledge differently selected tactics to make demands for food and other humanitarian provision?

Several dataset events describe how refugees with low political knowledge engaged in grievance expression tactics that in turn produced severe and negative consequences. For example, refugees in Omugu Refugee Reception Center who had no discernible political knowledge accused humanitarian implementing partners of providing insufficient food aid. Driven by hunger and by their concerns over delayed distribution, refugees “rioted” and “rampaged,” physically attacked NGO staff, disarmed a Ugandan police constable, took aid workers hostage, and ransacked NGO food stores (The Observer 2018. “Refugees in Arua Riot Over Food, Disarm Police Guard”). Refugees stole food items and committed property destruction in at least three other incidents. This includes in 2018, when refugees in Bidibidi Refugee Settlement Camp rioted for more than two hours, destroyed ten UNHCR and OPM vehicles, and destroyed office furniture in an NGO compound from frustration of insufficient food rations. Remarkably, the article notes that this was the “sixth time that refugees have rioted this year (Ariaka 2018).” In Nyimaji Settlement, refugees protested and then even burnt their tents to symbolize their anger over their precarious living situations (Eye Radio 2017. “Uganda: S. Sudanese Refugees Protest Ration Cuts). In Arua District, refugees attacked data collectors who were researching their situation after the WFP reduced food aid by half (Okello 2018). In a final example, refugees protested inadequate food by blocking all roads in and out of Nakivale

Settlement to prevent police from stopping their protests (Ntale 2009). As a result of their dangerous and destructive tactics to demand food aid, many refugees suffered harms.

Several of these disruptive events occurred after food and other humanitarian distribution was delayed or when rations were reduced. Andie Lambe, the then executive director at the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) in Kampala, succinctly described that the lack of communication on changes to distribution coupled with a lack of refugee empowerment to mitigate the effects of these changes as generating refugee anger. Lambe stated, “the refugees are dependent on handouts due to the lack of alternatives for them to support themselves. *When rumors of rations being permanently cut or stopped altogether are combined with actual cuts and without clear explanation being given for this, tensions will increase and it is not unreasonable for refugees to voice their disquiet,*” emphasis added (Okiror 2017). After a separate refugee protest over food ration changes, Titus Jogo, a refugee desk officer in the OPM acknowledged the protests but blamed them as occurring due to a “miscommunication” between OPM, UNHCR, WFP, and refugee leaders.

The quotes by IRRI Director. Lambe and OPM desk officer Jugo illuminate Neuman’s (1986, 196-7) argument that individuals require political knowledge to make sense of current events. Political knowledge of relevant procedures that govern distribution, knowledge of distribution changes or delays, and knowledge of refugee rights to engage in income-generating activities may help refugees to avoid disruptive and illegal actions. To prevent the harms of rumors, refugees need systematic information on distribution changes. Furthermore, refugees require knowledge of their entitlements under law to prepare for distribution changes, including knowledge of refugees’ right to income-generating employment, freedom of movement or residence outside of camps, and other legal rights to empower the potential resilience of refugees

who may be capable to enter Uganda's economic markets. Perhaps most pointedly, knowledge of the actors involved in decision-making may reduce refugee violence towards humanitarian workers who distribute rations but who do not have authority to decide what individuals receive.

Refugees with lower political knowledge also engaged writing letters and making grievance statements, among other tactics, to demand humanitarian provision. Yet across these tactics, refugees also lacked knowledge of who provides assistance and were unaware processes to pursue help. As described by a refugee camp chairperson named Erias Byaruhanga, "we used to get food from government, but it is now two months and nothing is forthcoming. We have given up and decided to look for other ways of survival (Kimbowa 2016)." In another event, elderly refugees described their unique vulnerabilities and challenges to secure food. The elderly refugees despondently cited their lack of opportunities to pursue livelihoods to supplement their inadequate food rations (Buyondo 2016). While refugees didn't experience stakeholder pushback or overt harms from making their demands, there is no evidence they had relevant political knowledge to pursue their claims.

In several newspaper articles, OPM, UNHCR and humanitarian providers justified reduced food rations because of donor funding shortfalls and mass refugee influx. In one event, UNHCR and OPM, "advised refugees to use the little food given sparingly," and recommended that refugees support themselves through other means (Mukumbozi 2017). However, these governance actors did not provide rights-based knowledge to refugees on how to supplement their decreased rations or provide guidance for their self-reliance.

Throughout the analysis where refugees demanded humanitarian provision, a lack of political knowledge on rights, governance processes and governance actors often coincided with tactic selection that inhibited resilience or even directly produced legal or physical harms to

refugees. In several events, refugees with low knowledge violated Ugandan law and pursued their demands through extreme and illegal actions of property destruction, physical harm to refugee governance and NGO actors, and theft. Where appropriate, I juxtaposed how having more political knowledge may have enabled refugees to either select a different tactic or empowered refugees to otherwise pursue life-sustaining food and material aid through their rights to employment and self-reliance. The remainder of this section draws from two dataset events whereby refugees with high political knowledge demanded humanitarian provision. Their knowledge of rights, governance processes, and governance actors facilitated selection of alternative tactics which in turn mitigated harmful, punitive responses for their demands.

First, in response to reduced distribution and resultant food insecurity, an RLO called the Youth Social Advocacy Team (YSAT) in Rhino Settlement liaised between refugees and UNHCR, WFP, and other distribution actors to clarify distribution changes. YSAT educated fellow refugees about forthcoming distributional changes. One of YSAT's Community Based Mobilisers team member explained how the RLO educated other refugees on, "where to collect food, when, and how much each person or family or get." The organizer also describes that YSAT teams used an "arsenal of tools to make sure everyone has access to this information." The tools included going door to door, broadcasting messages in public spaces with a megaphone, and using creative arts and theatre for community education. Critically, the RLO taught refugees on their rights, and empowered vulnerable refugees through livelihood trainings to bolster refugee preparedness and resilience to changes in aid. Per the mobiliser, "we (YSAT) create awareness both before and during the food distribution. We let refugees know what services we offer... and also talk to them about how to protect themselves from sexual exploitation and abuse, which may arise as a result of the ration cuts (Jal Dak 2020)."

In a separate response, refugees in Rhino Refugee Settlement requested UNHCR and OPM to resume providing clean water to the settlement and the surrounding region. In their efforts, refugees demonstrated a higher knowledge of Uganda policies to integrate host communities and refugees together. They appealed for resumed water and supply distribution because the camp's location is unsuitable for drilling boreholes. Finally, refugees demonstrated political knowledge in the actors involved in governance and decision-making. The article describes that Michael Wani, the vice chairperson of the Refugee Welfare Council, used his knowledge of governance actors to make targeted demands through Uganda's community governmental bureaucracies, including the office of the Resident District Commission.

In both instances, YSAT's and Council leader Wani's higher political knowledge enabled different responses to food reductions and humanitarian provision concerns. In the first instance, YSAT's organized actions as an RLO known to both humanitarian implementing partners and to refugees enabled them to educate other refugees on their rights, including their right to employment. Additionally, and as suggested by Lambe of IRRI, YSAT leveraged its working relationship with stakeholders to clarify changing distribution protocols and sensitized refugees on how these changes could impact them. Similarly, rather than pursue protest or other disruptive tactics, Wani's advanced knowledge enabled him to take meaningful steps to contact the appropriate stakeholders to make the clean water issues known and to seek redress.

Refugee tactical choice to demand stakeholder accountability:

Although Uganda has garnered international praise and attention for its generosity in hosting refugees, the state has also suffered scandals associated with its refugee management. In response to these scandals, several UNHCR and its implementing partner InterAid, OPM, and

NGO staff were officially dismissed or otherwise reprimanded. For instance, after a scandal that alleged massive funding impropriety and mismanagement in 2018, UNHCR recalled its country representative to Uganda, Mr. Kantande (Draku 2018) and OPM suspended its Commission for Refugees, Mr. Apollo Kazungu, along with three other staff members (Okiror 2018). After the scandal donor countries including Germany and the United Kingdom froze their funding to UNHCR Uganda (Okiror 2019). Yet, under-explored in reporting on these scandals, however, is how refugees themselves understand and pursue accountability from actors they perceive to exploit refugees or otherwise violate refugee rights.

The archival dataset contains 14 events where refugees' primary grievance was to demand stakeholder accountability, as well as ten additional events where accountability was a secondary demand. In events where refugees primary aim was to request stakeholder accountability, refugees expressed these grievances using six different tactics. Comparing events by refugees of different knowledge levels elucidates how their understanding of rights and governance produced different tactical selection to demand accountability.

Like the events where refugees demanded humanitarian provision, refugees with lower knowledge more frequently engaged in disruptive tactics to demand accountability than did refugees with demonstrated higher knowledge. Refugees who used disruptive or illegal tactics were often met with heavy-handed responses by governance actors. For example, refugees sought accountability from a police officer they accused of killing an asylum seeker named Andrew Byiringiro. Upwards of 500 "irate refugees" mobilized with "pangas, hoes and stacks" and physically attacked the accused officer (Tumushabe 2011). The heated incident only calmed after riot police from Mbarara town, some 25 miles away, were dispatched. Per newspaper reporting, the refugees were driven by rumors of how Mr. Byiringiro tragically died. They did

not know how to confirm the nature of Mr. Byiringiro's perishing. More significantly, there is no evidence that the mobilized refugees knew how to otherwise pursue accountability, such as to use courts, legal systems, or other justice mechanisms to investigate the allegations.

In a second event, refugees stopped a meeting between UNHCR and InterAid in Kampala to present allegations of staff impropriety. Among the refugees who "stormed" into the meeting, some displaced persons claimed they were forced to pay bribes to apply for asylum status, and others alleged paying bribes to obtain appointments to request services, resettlement, or financial support. One Congolese refugee alleged that InterAid charged refugees upwards of 300USD to obtain refugee status and upwards of 1,000USD to be resettled to a third country. Another claimed that InterAid Uganda failed to distribute promised funds for his medical treatment (Malaba 2012). Rather than receive and listen to these complaints, a UNHCR official dismissed the claimants and advised them to follow proper procedures to make formal complaints. In the end, individuals with sincere concerns for their own exploitation lacked procedural knowledge to have their concerns heard.

However, not all refugees are unaware of the formal procedures to demand accountability. Data contains evidence of three instances where refugees pursued accountability through Ugandan formal and informal justice systems, including through courts. In a 2017 event, refugees collectively brought allegations of police misconduct to Ugandan legal authorities. The refugees accused police and senior OPM officials of abducting and returning refugees to their home country for a fee. Refugees provided authorities with names and details of these cases; and named refugees who were missing or feared dead. The unnamed group of refugees worked with a Ugandan attorney Gideon Tugume and his organization 'The Human Rights Defenders Association Uganda' to file their legal claims (Kwesiga 2017). In so doing, refugees

demonstrated high knowledge of their rights, including their protection against refoulement and their right for security, as well as demonstrated their political knowledge of how to legally pursue justice against alleged unethical and unlawful actors.

In a second example, a consortium of refugee HRDs drafted a letter documenting perceived injustices committed by governance actors against vulnerable refugees. Among the litany of their allegations were claims that police at Old Kampala Police Station charged asylum seekers bribes to register as refugees;⁵ allegations of OPM and other stakeholders' complicity or direct involvement in a resettlement scandal; and allegations that the Refugee Eligibility Commission unjustly denied Rwandan asylum applications. After documenting allegations, the drafters outlined past steps they had taken in pursuit of justice, including meetings with bureaucratic officials at OPM's Department of Refugees. They highlighted past efforts by refugee leaders and RLOs to draft a letter during Uganda's Universal Periodic Review (UPR)—a United Nations review of the human rights conditions of member states—to assess refugees' ability to enjoy their rights. The UPR report likewise chronicled allegations of stakeholder misconduct, particularly allegations that refugees are forced to pay bribes during refugee status determination processes.⁶

In these letters, refugees with higher knowledge made targeted recommendations how the Ugandan Government, UNHCR and its implementing partners could improve human and refugee rights for displaced persons in Uganda. They called for Uganda to implement the recommendations from its UPR, specifically calling for Uganda to protect the work of refugee

⁵ When asylum seekers enter Uganda, they may seek refugee protection at various entry points along the border. If refugees self-settle to Kampala, refugees must report to the Old Kampala Police Department in central Kampala to apply for asylums.

⁶ The refugee drafted submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review for the Republic of Uganda may be downloaded from <https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=2743&file=EnglishTranslation>.

HRDs to document and seek justice for refugees; and requested that the government renew commitments to prosecute those who violate refugee rights, including prosecuting governmental and NGO officials implicated in the UNHCR funding scandals (Refugee letter dated January 14, 2019).

Throughout letters, refugee drafters demonstrated high knowledge across several political knowledge dimensions. They referred to their rights, and cited the Refugees Act, 2006 and various Ugandan policies, including the self-reliance and settlement transformation policies, that provide these rights.⁷ The refugees justified that their grievances result from gaps between their *de jure* rights and their *de facto* enjoyment of rights. Finally, the refugees correctly identified numerous governance actors capable to decide and secure various refugee rights.

In the limited available examples, refugees who had higher knowledge chose different tactics than did refugees with lower knowledge. As a result, refugees with more knowledge chose grievance mechanisms, including filing legal cases in Ugandan courts, writing letters, and peaceably attending stakeholder meetings to discuss complaints. Refugees with lower knowledge more frequently used illegal tactics and mass mobilizations to demand accountability. Refugees with more knowledge selected tactics that allowed them to clearly articulate their allegations of stakeholder malfeasance, and they justified their claims by citing relevant rights, laws, and policies. With advanced knowledge of governance processes and actors, refugees with more knowledge not only demanded accountability, but also proposed recommendations to achieve their rights and protection. Analysis further documents patterns in different tactic selection logics across other expressed grievances.

⁷ The refugee drafters cite these policies as the “self-reliance policy,” and the “settlement policy.”

5.4 Political Knowledge to Influence Demand Precision and Targets of Refugee

Demands:

How does political knowledge impact the precision and targeting of their demands? First, political knowledge produces variation in the demand precision of how refugees articulate and justify their claims. In the archival dataset, refugees with lower knowledge more frequently made vague demands for help and assistance, while refugees with higher knowledge made precise claims for economic, social, and other rights that Uganda affords them under its laws and policies. Secondly, political knowledge produces variation in the target selection of the state and non-state actors to whom refugees direct their grievances. Refugees with lower knowledge more frequently failed to specify an actor in their demands while refugees with higher knowledge specified governmental bureaucracies, humanitarian organizations, and their staff.

This section incorporates quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the relationship between political knowledge to demand precision and target selection. Quantitative analysis demonstrates a statistically significant relationship between political knowledge and these outcomes. Qualitative analysis bolsters identification in the mechanisms of how inconsistent refugee political knowledge produces outcome variation.

How refugees articulate and justify their demands, and how they select governance actors to make these demands are useful to capture the types of political knowledge a refugee holds, as well as to capture the effects of this knowledge. For instance, when the content of refugee demands is vague, this suggests that people may be unaware of rights and protection. Similarly, refugees who either fail to name a stakeholder in their claims, or errantly justify their chosen target, may not have the adequate knowledge of governance actors to secure rights, protection, and provision. These analyses collectively contribute to a central dissertation aim to discern

whether refugees have adequate knowledge political knowledge to secure available rights, protections, provision, and opportunities afforded them by their hosting state.

5.4.1. Variation in demand precision

Analysis of refugees' demand precision illuminates how refugees understand their rights and entitlements. Coding of demand precision was done manually and considered two criteria: (1) whether refugee demands were imprecise or clear; and (2) whether and how refugees justified their demands. In general, the highest scores were assigned when refugees made a precise demand for rights and protection that Uganda affords refugees in its refugee hosting laws and policies, and when refugees justified their demands by citing these laws or policies. Mid-range scores were awarded when refugees made precise demands but did not offer justification for their demands. Lowest scores were assigned when refugees made imprecise demands. Twelve archival events received a negative score. These negative scores occurred when refugees demanded a right that is barred under Ugandan law, such as demands for Ugandan citizenship or when refugees demanded relocation to a new country of asylum.

Quantitative Findings:

Quantitative analysis allows assessment of the statistical relationship between variables, as well as allows assessment of the average precision by tactic and by demands. Specifically, OLS regression analysis permits an assessment whether an increase in political knowledge on average impacts the precision of how refugees articulate their demands. Regression analysis found a statistically significant relationship between political knowledge and demand precision such that as political knowledge increased, the clarity in how refugees articulated and justified

their demands also increased.⁸ Next, statistical analysis confirms that, on average, some outcomes have higher demand precision values than others. Refugees had the highest demand precision when they engaged in tactics of legal action (0.75). Refugee tactics of illegal action (0.138) and mass demonstrations (0.238) had much lower precision. Furthermore, refugees most clearly articulated their demands and justified these demands under law and policy when they requested rights guaranteed by law (0.559) and when they requested accountability against governance actors that refugees accused of misconduct (0.435). Refugees were least likely to justify their claims under law or policy and to make only vague claims when they requested humanitarian provision (0.217) or a right they are not guaranteed under law (0.15). Figure Eleven presents the average demand precision for all tactics and demand categories.

⁸ Using Stata, I found a statistically significant relationship that with an increase in political knowledge, there is a 0.377 increase in demand precision. The relationship is significant at $p > 0.01$. However, the R squared was low, making these models inappropriate for prediction or causation.




Figure 11: Average Demand Precision Disaggregated by Tactic and by Demand Category

While instructive to show differences in average demand precision, quantitative assessment does not advance understanding in *why* this outcome variation occurs. Qualitative analysis, however, adds leverage to answer this question. A focus on demand precision matters because it may indicate how refugees understand their rights and entitlements.

Qualitative Findings:

Comparing demands made by refugees with lower and higher political knowledge elucidates the mechanisms of how an increase in political knowledge enabled refugees to justify their claims more articulately. Due to limitations in the dataset, it is not possible to isolate the extent to which knowledge alone produced variation in refugee articulations. Nevertheless, the

data meaningfully captures trends in the relationship between political knowledge and demand precision, as well as illuminates why demand precision matters.

First, refugees with lower political knowledge sometimes justified their claims with errant knowledge of their rights. In other instances, refugees were spurred to make rights-based claims after hearing rumors of distribution or resettlement opportunities. In these instances, refugees requested rights they don't have. For example, in three cases, refugees demanded rights to resettlement, to claim asylum in another country, and demanded not to share social services with their host communities. In the first case, a single mother and her children slept for four nights outside of UNHCR's offices in Kampala where she demanded immediate resettlement. She justified her claims by saying that in 2009, "an American went to my Refugee Settlement and took must refugees to America, but I missed my chance" (New Vision 2017. "Family of Ten Camps at UNHCR Offices"). The vulnerable woman didn't demonstrate knowledge in how resettlement decision making occurs or know how to appeal her resettlement denial. She put herself and her family in physical danger from sleeping in the open outside of UNHCR.

In a second event, a group of 16 Congolese refugees demanded to leave Uganda and seek asylum in Kenya. Among these refugees, one described life in Uganda as like a prison and another member threatened suicide if forced to remain (Eninu 2017; Wanyama 2017). The refugees seeking relocation did not exhibit any political knowledge. The refugees failed to leave Uganda in pursuit of improved living conditions. They were arrested and ultimately returned to the settlement they fled.

In a third event, refugees in Northern Uganda violently fought with their hosting community because the refugees did not want to share social services of healthcare and education. The refugees accused nationals of encroaching on their resources. The tensions

subsided only after local police used tear gas. The report described that these altercations have occurred before (Warom, Aligo, and Aluma 2014). Although refugees do have rights for healthcare and education, Ugandan policies explicitly require that refugees and host communities share these resources.

These examples are representative of broader dataset events where refugees often shared heartbreaking stories of their struggles to subsist, to educate their children, and to secure basic needs. Across events where refugees had lower political knowledge, they justified their actions as necessary to survive, but they did not enumerate any specific rights or protections they have. In the above three cases, refugees failed to achieve their desired outcomes and instead experienced increased suffering and physical harm. Advanced political knowledge may help refugees to avoid harms and promote more effective advocacy for their rights, protection, and provision.

In five additional events, refugees demanded changes to migration governance, including demands for their direct refugee representation in decision-making, as well as demands for changes in stakeholder responsibility. However, across these events, refugees consistently had low political knowledge of how governance and decision-making occur. For instance, after the 2018 scandals in Uganda's refugee management, a refugee human rights defender wrote two letters to demand change. In the first letter, they claimed UNHCR fails to protect refugees and demanded UNHCR be replaced by another unnamed institution (Refugee letter March 4, 2019). They further described Uganda's refugee hosting as a "business," where corrupt actors exploit, "refugee misery in order to milk money from the International Community and ... donors around the world." In the second letter, they demanded that the United States immediately stop funding UNHCR and instead demanded donor funds go strictly to refugees. Quote, "We do reiterate our

observation that money given to UNHCR Uganda is not necessary money given to refugees and in such a situation there is a need to clarify what that money will do, who will be the beneficiaries, (and) how much will be spent on each person” (Refugee letter April 18, 2020).

In these letters, the author demonstrates knowledge of current events and on the human rights situation of refugees in Uganda. Yet, they had low and often errant knowledge of refugee governance, including how global funding for refugees is raised and administered, and had low knowledge in the delineation of responsibilities among governance stakeholders. As a result, the author demanded dramatic restructuring of refugee governance that would likely undermine rather than improve refugee protection.

To further demonstrate a relationship in how different knowledge levels produces variation in how refugees articulate and justify their claims, I compare demands for rights afforded under law including education, and for demands not guaranteed under law, such as for humanitarian provision. In examining refugee demands for their codified right to education, refugees with lower knowledge frequently only bemoaned insufficient educational opportunities. In contrast, refugees with higher knowledge demonstrated knowledge of this right and of the governance actors who provide education. In several cases, individuals used their knowledge to propose practical and programmatic ways Uganda can foster refugee educational inclusion. For instance, during the #RiseUpForRefugees Forum, organizer Donnas Ojok articulated that educated refugees are better able to contribute to Ugandan’s economic development and to be less reliant on aid. Ojok appealed refugees without education would suffer as they leave Uganda. He justified that education is not only a right, but he assessed the effects of educated and uneducated refugees to strengthen his claims. Finally, Ojok stated that the “political and social will in Uganda therefore provides a conducive environment for refugees to be more resilient and

innovative,” and he called for more educational investment to enable refugees to benefit from this institutional environment (Ojak 2018; The New Vision 2018. “Urban Refugees Want Free Education”). In a separate event, Congolese refugee children proposed that refugees should enjoy their right to education and petitioned refugee inclusion into Uganda’s Universal Primary Education initiatives (Tajuba 2014).

Increased political knowledge also had an effect in how refugees demanded humanitarian provision. In a letter by a Congolese refugee addressed to NGOs who provide food in settlements and addressed to OPM Department of Refugees, the author justified his demands for urban refugees to receive food because there is no legal basis to provide food only to displaced in settlements. He cited provisions under the Refugees Act, 2006 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that permit refugees’ a choice in residency to justify his demands. In effect, they argued that denial of food to urban refugees is an illegal and arbitrary choice which punishes refugees for living outside of settlements. Although refugees in Uganda do not have a codified right for food, the letter is a compelling example that demonstrates how increased political knowledge bolsters refugees’ justification for their advocacy (Refugee letter January 1, 2019).

Throughout analysis, lower knowledge had ramifications for how refugees expressed and justified their demands. When refugees had errant political knowledge, they made claims for rights they do not have. In other cases, refugees with low or errant knowledge made demands for governance change that would arguably endanger rather than secure refugees’ rights-based protections. In contrast, when refugees had higher knowledge, they more effectively justified their demands by citing rights they have under law and citing the laws and policies that undergird their rights. In several instances, refugees used their advanced knowledge to identify

programmatic and practical interventions to achieve their goals. These findings suggest that higher knowledge may permit refugees to make their claims more adeptly.

5.4.2. Variation in refugee target selection:

Next, political knowledge also impacted how refugees justified their target selection of state, non-state, and U.N. actors to whom they addressed their claims. Like demand precision, target selection is a heuristic to gauge how refugees understand which governance actors are responsible for rights, protections, and provision. Target selection was manually coded and assigned a value from 0 to 1. Targets are imprecise and assigned lower scores when they lacked a clear referent for demands. Lower scores were also assigned when refugees failed to provide justification for their selection or when refugees gave errant statements on refugee governance actors. Higher scores were assigned when refugees cited (a) a bureaucracy, organization, or individual involved with refugee governance, and (b) provided a justification for their selection.

Quantitative Findings:

Regression analysis reveals a statistically significant relationship that with increased political knowledge, there was a corresponding increase in refugees' clarity and justification of target selection.⁹ In general, refugees had the clearest articulation and justification of a chosen state and non-state actor when they demanded stakeholder accountability (0.6) and demanded rights they are afforded under law (0.461). Refugees had the lowest when they demanded humanitarian provision (0.233) and when they demanded rights not offered under law, such as demanding resettlement (0.313). Additionally, the selection logics were clearest when refugees

⁹ Using Stata, I found the relationship is significant at $P > 0.01$.

used tactics of legal action (1) and public forums (0.886), and logics were lowest when refugees made grievance claims but used no other efforts (0.243), engaged in illegal actions (0.267), and used mass demonstrations to make demands (0.269). Figure Twelve displays the average target precision for each grievance expression tactic and demand category.




Figure 12: Average Target Precision Per Tactic and Demand Category

Across all events, over half of demands made by refugees with no observable political knowledge failed to signify a state, non-state, or refugee-led governance actor targeted by their claim (34/62). In contrast, all demands made by refugees with partial and high political knowledge had an identifiable actor to whom they made their demands.

Through analyzing refugees' demands, there are several instances which suggest that refugees with no observable political knowledge addressed their demands to actors because of proximity or access, rather than because they had knowledge of what an actor does. For example, in several newspaper articles, refugees shared grievances with visiting foreign delegates. When Japanese donors visited Bidibidi Settlement, refugees cried out that their names had been removed from food distribution lists during a recent biometric registration process (Ariaka 2017). The root of the problem is that the refugees needed their biometric registration updated, an outcome that the Japanese donors cannot provide. In another case, representatives of the FAO visited South Sudanese refugees in Adjumani Settlement to distribute seeds and farming implement. During the visit, refugees cried out to the FAO for more land for agricultural production. Ugandan local and national governments negotiate land-sharing agreements to donate land to refugees, the FAO does not. In both instances, refugees sought support for their needs, but aired concerns to actors not capable to provide for their requests.

Political knowledge additionally influenced to whom refugees demanded fundamental rights for social services, and for physical security and protection. Recall that although refugees have a right for social services like healthcare and education, they often fail to access these rights because of institutional limitations. Likewise, regardless of where in Uganda a refugee resides, existing literature documents that refugees experience physical, sexual, and emotional insecurity that results from their refugee status. However, these protection and security risks are not equal, and are substantially higher for female-headed households, and refugees of gender, sexual, and (dis)ability minorities (WRC 2016; REACH 2018). Given that these are common rights and protection challenges for refugees, it is important to assess whether refugees know from whom to seek assistance in these critical areas.

First, the data contains six events where refugees demanded healthcare and education. The demands for social services occur across all observed knowledge levels from none observed to high knowledge. In a letter written by an RLO leader, an author with no observable political knowledge alleged that the current healthcare structure for refugees in Uganda is akin to a “death sentence.” He bemoaned UNHCR and its implementing partners are unable to provide sufficient referrals for refugees to obtain specialist treatment or treatment for chronic conditions; and he describes Uganda’s healthcare and education limitations as, “similar to capital punishment.” In this letter, they made passionate pleas for changes in healthcare delivery to bolster refugee outcomes, yet they demonstrated errant understand of refugees’ rights. Moreover, they exhibited only limited and often errant knowledge of the governance actors responsible to secure these rights. The letter has no salutation. They alternatively called for the “refugee regime,” and “all actors from the civil society and the non-government organizations, the development partners and the whole society,” to redress grievances (Refugee letter December 7, 2017).

In a second event, refugees with partial knowledge appealed through their elected camp commandant Jolly Kebirungi to request increased education and vocational training in Kyangwali Settlement. The refugees failed to state that education is a right, but effectively described how education is administered at the settlement. Furthermore, the refugees described that despite Ugandan investments across the district to improve educational access for refugees and citizens alike, that nearby schools fall below government standards. In this event, refugee’s knowledge of their rights is under-informed, but they demonstrated knowledge in the governance processes. The refugees leveraged this knowledge and directed their requests towards actors involved in educational decision-making (Okello 2019).

Data reveals a difference in target selection when refugees of higher and lower political knowledge sought protection against physical and sexual abuse. In response to increasing incidents of rape and domestic violence at Nakivale Refugee Settlement, refugees with no observable political knowledge demanded they, “want something done expeditiously to bring an end to these crimes.” While the article described, there were not victim statements that indicate who refugees hope will intervene and no statements of specific actions the intervener should take (New Vision 2016. “Rape and domestic violence worry Nakivale refugees”). Likewise, an RLO called CODHO reported that refugees throughout Uganda experienced rape, beatings, and other abuse at the hands of other refugees and by their Ugandan host community.¹⁰ The article reported that some of the abused refugees initially sought counsel from UNHCR but failed to receive adequate support. The article does not mention refugee knowledge of their rights, including rights to report their victimization to Uganda police or to receive support through legal channels (CODHO 2018). Both articles reported that many refugees suffer in silence; and noted that when refugees experienced a grave personal violation, they lacked basic knowledge how to proceed or knowledge where to go for help.

In some events, refugees with higher knowledge were able to precise their target selection and more effectively intervene and seek assistance for refugee security concerns. For instance, when physical violence occurred between refugees of different ethnicities that escalated to violence between refugees and their host community, a consortium of South Sudanese RLOs called NoSSCOU appealed to the Government of Uganda to intervene and restore calm. NoSSCOU representatives enumerated refugee grievances and insecurities that had escalated the underlying community tensions, including refugee’s inability to enjoy their rights to free

¹⁰ CODHO is the acronym in French for “Committee of Observers of Human Rights.”

movement, to safety, and rights to movable property. NoSSCOU demanded assistance from named Ugandan security apparatuses to quell current tensions. To prevent future violence, and to prevent future violence, NoSSCOU pledged to work with Ugandan security agencies to promote inter-refugee and refugee-host community non-violent conflict resolution. Their response was facilitated by their high political knowledge, including their demonstrated efforts to know and interact with on-the-ground governance actors near settlements to promote refugee rights and to de-escalate tensions.

Throughout this analysis of archival dataset events, refugees with higher political knowledge were more explicit in how they selected governance actors to address their claims, as well as more articulate in their justifications why. Refugees with high knowledge rooted their claims in understanding of governance actors and processes. When refugees lacked knowledge, they were imprecise in their target selection and sometimes failed to target any actor at all. The lack of clarity in rights and governance structures impedes refugees' capacity to precise their demands and select a recipient for demands. In comparing the limited effects of refugee demands with higher target precision, some refugees may be better able to secure their rights and protections, including critical protection from physical, sexual, or other abuse, if they had increased political knowledge of governance actors and of where to seek help.

5.5 Conclusion:

This chapter argues that political knowledge impacts how refugees express their grievances. To examine the relationship between political knowledge and refugee non-electoral political behaviors, I analyzed trends in how having lower or higher political knowledge influenced key outcomes associated with how refugees make their demands. These trends

include refugee tactic choice, their demand precision in how they articulate and justify demands, and the governance actors refugees targeted to make their demands.

In general, the data revealed that refugees with higher knowledge selected different tactics to make demands than did refugees with lower knowledge. The difference in tactical selection was significant as refugees with lower knowledge were more likely to make demands with tactics that evoked a punitive response from governance actors, that strained refugee-host community relations, or that resulted in distributional and social service disruptions. In contrast, refugees with advanced political knowledge selected less disruptive tactics that in turn mitigated these harmful efforts. These findings suggest that having expanded political knowledge may enable refugees to avoid punitive responses and bolster their advocacy efforts to secure their rights and protections.

Analysis further identified trends in how refugees with lower or higher political knowledge differently articulated and justified their demands, and in how they differently selected governance actors to whom to address these demands. With lower knowledge, refugees more frequently demanded rights that they do not have. They sometimes failed to claim available assistance, in part, because they did not know processes to access aid or know governance actors capable to assist with protection and provision. In contrast, refugees with higher knowledge more articulately justified their claims and target selection. They rooted their demands in rights afforded by Ugandan national and international refugee laws. They directed their demands to actors towards relevant actors able to intervene. In limited instances, individuals leveraged their higher knowledge to propose policy and programmatic efforts to advance refugee rights. Some refugees with higher knowledge further formed refugee-led organizations to educate other refugees on their rights, including to promote accurate knowledge of changes to humanitarian

provision such that the displaced could form alternative livelihood and coping strategies. In rare cases, these organizations supplemented for existing deficiencies by directly providing services.

Although my archival dataset is not appropriate to isolate the extent to which political knowledge independently influenced refugee political behaviors outcomes of grievance expression, analysis meaningfully captures several mechanisms how having more knowledge can benefit refugees. It is necessary to acknowledge that even with enhanced political knowledge, many refugees in Uganda and globally will continue to face rights, protection, and provision challenges because of their insecure legal status, and because of the institutional and structural limitations of their hosting state. Nonetheless, analysis suggests that increased knowledge of rights is beneficial as refugees pursue rights-based and protection opportunities. With higher knowledge of governance processes, refugees may differently select grievance expression tactics and in turn evade negative or punitive outcomes. Similarly, advanced knowledge of governance actors may permit refugees to make demands more effectively to stakeholders empowered to help them achieve their aims. Simply stated, heightened political knowledge can help refugees to both know what their rights are and how to activate them, as well as enable them to know limits to their rights and avoid negative or punitive responses.

Chapter Six. How Refugees' Political Knowledge Affects Vulnerability and Resilience.

“Many of the world’s refugees are unable to establish and maintain independent livelihoods because they cannot exercise the rights to which they are entitled under international human rights and international law,”

- Jeff Crisp (2003, 3)

“Nowadays, the vast majority of the world’s refugees live in limbo in the Global South, unable to return home yet lacking the rights needed to successfully integrate into their host states.”

- Easton Calabria and Omata (2018, 1461).

6.1 Introduction:

Scholars frequently underscore how refugees have heightened vulnerabilities even in contrast to other marginalized citizen populations. They theorize that vulnerabilities arise from physical and psychological traumas that occur before, during, and after displacement from one’s country (Jacobsen 2006; Crisp, Morris, and Refstie 2012), and from an insecure legal status between sovereigns (Haddad 2002, 22; Malkki 1995,6; Betts et al 2017b), among other factors (Zhukov 2014; Bank et al 2016; Lichtenheld 2020). As people who have been forced to flee their home and their country due to conflict, persecution, or other human rights violations, refugees frequently arrive in a new country where they lack a secured citizenship status that may otherwise provide rights, protection, and social or educational support required to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. To what extent can rights-based political knowledge enable refugees to achieve more resilient outcomes to shocks, risks, exploitations, and harms, as well as enable

refugees to take advantage of existing rights, opportunities, and protections? Under what conditions does lacking this knowledge produce more vulnerable outcomes for refugees?

To distinguish between the two concepts of resilience and vulnerability, UNHCR (2017, 3) defines resilience as, “the ability of individuals, households, communities, national institutions and systems to prevent, absorb and recover from shocks, while continuing to function and adapt in a way that supports long-term prospects for sustainable development, peace and security, and the attainment of human rights.” Similarly, the IOM (2019, 229) defines that in context of migration, “vulnerability is the limited capacity to avoid, resist, cope with, or recover from harm. This limited capacity is the result of the unique interaction of individual, household, community, and structural characteristics and conditions.”

Both concepts substantively acknowledge two components. First, that an individual is exposed to or experiences a shock,¹ and secondly, that this shock has short- or long-term effect(s) for that individual. For simplicity, vulnerability and resiliency are considered as antonyms. Building from UNHCR’s and IOM’s definitions, this chapter considers an outcome as “vulnerable” when refugees experienced exploitation and harms that may have otherwise been avoided with more rights-based knowledge. Vulnerability outcomes occur when refugees fail to achieve rights, protections, and opportunities because they are unaware of them. Conversely, an outcome is “resilient” when refugees avoid negative vulnerability outcomes or mitigate vulnerability effects because of their rights-based knowledge.

To explore the relationship of political knowledge towards vulnerability or resilience, I analyze an original dataset created from a review of Ugandan and international newspaper

¹ UNHCR (2017, 3) adopts the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) definition of a shock, which is described as, “a sudden event with an important and often negative impact on the vulnerability of a system and its parts. Shocks represent significant negative (or positive) impacts on people’s means of living and on the functioning of a State”.

articles and refugee-drafted letters. In brief, the dataset contains cases that demonstrate political knowledge and refugee decision-making in three primary areas: (a) vulnerability or resilience as refugees responded to potential exploitation, risk, and harm, (b) vulnerability or resilience that resulted from host country decision-making, including livelihood and coping strategies, and (c) vulnerability or resilience as refugees made decisions about whether, when, and how to return to their home country.

Analysis focuses on shocks, risks, exploitations, harms, and decision-making processes that are commonly experienced by refugees globally. For instance, focus is given to third-country resettlement schemes because this is a particularly unclear area of refugee rights. The formal decision-making processes and actors involved in determining which among the world's vulnerable refugees are granted or denied resettlement are notoriously opaque (Ozkul and Jarrous 2021, 2). Additionally, while third-country resettlement is one of the recognized durable solutions to end refugee status, refugees do not have a right for resettlement (UNHCR n.d. "Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement). Likewise, focus is given to refugee responses to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) because of its ubiquity among displaced populations.² Finally, this chapter focuses on host country decision-making that captures quotidian experiences shared by refugees in all hosting states. These include decision-making and strategies for child school enrollment; for pursuing income-generating activities through formal or informal economic activities; and for securing lodging, food, and other basic needs.

² Per the UNHCR (2021), "It is estimated that one in three women will experience sexual or physical violence in their lifetime. During displacement and times of crisis, the threat of GBV significantly increases for women and girls." See <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/gender-based-violence.html>.

For studies on SGBV and its prevalence among displaced communities, see Women's Refugee Commission (2011 & 2016), Büscher (2011), Kwiringira et al (2018), and the World Bank (2020a).

Qualitative and quantitative analysis are employed to compare refugee responses to common shocks and opportunities. Overall, refugees with lower knowledge were more vulnerable to certain risks than were refugees with higher knowledge. For example, refugees with limited or no knowledge on third-country resettlement sometimes paid onerous fees for resettlement consideration. Refugees with more processual knowledge avoided these exploitative attempts. Additionally, refugees achieved vulnerability when they leveraged processual knowledge to seek support following physical or gender-based violence.

Finally, refugees with higher knowledge worked to bolster positive, resilient outcomes among their larger displaced communities through acquiring and disseminating rights-based information through community events, dialogues, and trainings. Refugees also founded refugee-led organizations (RLOs) that taught English, provided livelihood and skills trainings, and otherwise intervened to combat prevalent barriers that impede refugees from actualizing their rights. Although the data contains cases where refugees experienced vulnerability and hardships despite holding advanced knowledge, the data demonstrates that, on average, as refugees' political knowledge increased, they experienced more resilient outcomes. This finding supports that even within a constrained institutional environment, political knowledge can empower refugees to avoid certain risks, harms, and exploitations, or to mitigate their effects.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. Section one describes the theory. Section two introduces the original dataset of newspaper articles and refugee-drafted letters with a focus on case selection criteria, as well as coding criteria for political knowledge, vulnerability, and resilience. Section three describes the mixed qualitative and quantitative methods used to analyze how political knowledge influences vulnerability or resilience outcomes. Section four presents empirical findings to underscore how political knowledge enables some refugees to be resilient

against various exploitations, risks, and harms; how political knowledge impacts refugees' host country decision-making; and how political knowledge influences refugee decision-making for home country return.

6.2 Political Knowledge Mechanisms to Engender Vulnerability and Resilience:

I draw from existing research to propose four mechanisms that explain why having or lacking rights-based political knowledge promotes either more resilient or more vulnerable risk mitigation outcomes for refugees: differentiation, utilization, mitigation, and diffusion through advocacy. First, *differentiation* refers to whether individuals can discern between the rights, protections, services, and provision they are allowed or excluded. For example, like Wall et al. (2017) and Vera Espinoza (2018), in my data, refugees with lower rights-based and political knowledge fell victim to exploitative attempts that promised resettlement because they wrongly believed refugees have a 'right' to be resettled. Second, *utilization* captures how refugees with higher knowledge of their rights and opportunities in turn employed that knowledge to select safe and viable livelihood and coping strategies. Refugees who lack this knowledge may instead select risky or even illegal livelihood strategies such as nonpermitted cross-border strategies (Ryan 2018). Third, in building from Rosenberg and Bakomeza (2017) and Tipler and Gates (2019), *mitigation* represents how refugees with increased knowledge evaded a harm or mitigated its effects because they knew how to seek available protections; knew how to report attempted gender-based, sexual, physical, and other forms of violence; or knew the processes for rights-based redress offered by their hosting state. Fourth, in drawing from Easton-Calabria (2016) and McQuaid (2016), *diffusion through advocacy* refers to the mechanisms whereby displaced persons leveraged their knowledge to promote resilience by teaching others on their

rights; by forming refugee-led organizations (RLOs) to address community deficiencies; or otherwise promoted resiliency through rights-based advocacy.

In general, this assessment differs from existing scholarly efforts that seek to identify among the individual, household, community, or structural-institutional factors that cause variation in refugees' vulnerability or resilience. At the individual or household level, scholars find a refugees' age, gender (Ferris 2007; WRC 2009, Büscher 2011), sexuality (Alessi 2016; Edström and Dolan 2019; Alessi et al 2020; Nilsson et al 2021), household status (i.e., child or female-headed household), discrimination, prior education, employment status, number of wage earners in a household, and mental, physical, or other disability status (Crock et al 2014; Walton et al 2020), among other considerations may make some refugees more vulnerable than others (Brown et al 2019; Leeson et al 2020, 87). Further, scholars find that some refugees experience heightened vulnerability risks when they do not speak the same language(s) as their hosts (WRC 2011), or when traumas inhibit refugees' ability to integrate or to seek protection (Slobodin and de Jong 2015).

In considering how household- or community-level factors can reduce refugee vulnerabilities, Landau and Duponchel (2011) and Tippens (2019) identified that refugees with more social networks and social capital more successfully weather shocks when group members share resources, care for impacted members, and collectively prepare for future challenges. Büscher (2011), Lyytinen (2013), Lyytinen and Kullenberg (2013), and Lauterbach (2014 and 2019) emphasize that refugee religious networks and churches are also significant sources of protection, support, material provision, and even sources of knowledge diffusion. Finally, at the structural-institutional level, scholars assess market opportunities, the presence or absence of development programmes, and refugee access to social services as contributing towards refugee

vulnerability or resilience (UNHCR 2005, Annex 1.7). The structure-institutional considerations vary both across (Addaney 2017) and within states as they vary in their desire or capacity to implement their codified rights (Sandvik 2011).

These comprehensive individual, community, and structural-institutional considerations cumulatively advance an understanding why some individuals are more vulnerable against exploitation than others. However, existing studies rarely consider how political knowledge influences refugees' responses towards exploitation. At the individual level, exclusion of political knowledge obscures whether a different outcome might have been possible with more knowledge. At the community level, political knowledge may be another form of social capital that individuals use to protect and support in-group members. Finally, at the structural-institution level, exclusion of political knowledge overlooks how refugees themselves understand the gap in the *de jure* and *de facto* contexts, and how they navigate the gaps between these.

The present study thus focuses on vulnerability and resilience as *effects* rather than focuses on their *causes*. In essence, the starting point of my analysis is refugees' response to a shock or opportunity. This as a valid starting point for two reasons. First, due to limitations in my secondary data sources, there is not consistent individual or household-level data needed to assess resilience or vulnerability prior to a shock or opportunity. Second, my case selection criteria allow comparison of outcomes within a relatively stable structural and institutional context. Although risk and opportunity are not equally distributed among refugees, I assume that most refugees will experience some forms of exploitation, risk, and harm, as well as experience opportunities for rights and protection while in Uganda. Figure Thirteen summarizes the mechanisms of how variation in political knowledge can create uneven vulnerability or resilience outcomes.




Figure 13: Theorizing a Relationship Between Political Knowledge, Resilience, and Vulnerability after Shocks

6.3 Data, Measurement, Methodology:

6.3.1. Case Selection and Analysis:

To support my arguments in the relationship of political knowledge towards vulnerability and resilience, I analyzed an original dataset that I created from the same archival review sources discussed in chapter five. From this extensive review, sources capture variation in three outcomes: (a) vulnerability or resilience as refugees responded to potential exploitation, risk and harm, (b) vulnerability or resilience that resulted from host country decision-making, including livelihood strategies; and (c) vulnerability or resilience that refugees experienced from decision-

making oriented towards their home country, including decisions about voluntary return. The three criteria for case inclusion include: (a) cases demonstrate refugee decision-making in one of the three outcomes; (b) demonstrate resilience or vulnerability; and (c) that the event occurred after 2009 as this date reflects the enactment of Uganda's Refugee Act, 2006 and allows for outcome comparison within a relatively consistent legal context. As in chapter five, despite the public nature of refugee-drafted sources, all refugee sources are kept anonymous.

From closely reading all potential newspaper articles and refugee letters, 79 cases meet the criteria as appropriate for analysis: 22 cases of refugee response to actual or potential shock that resulted in exploitation, risk, harm, or its avoidance; 42 cases of refugee in-country livelihood and coping strategies; and 15 cases of refugee home-country decision-making.

6.3.2. Methodology and limitations:

Mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis illuminates why some refugees with higher political knowledge mitigated the negative effects of risks, harms, and exploitations, or achieved rights, opportunities, and protections more than did refugees with lower political knowledge. Quantitative analysis, including linear regression, permits identification whether there is a relationship between political knowledge and vulnerability or resilience outcomes. Statistical analysis also demonstrates the average levels of political knowledge within each outcome category. While quantitative analysis is instructive and appropriate for these measures, quantitative methods are not appropriate to identify causal mechanisms in this data in how an increase in knowledge may shift outcomes from more vulnerable to resilient. Qualitative methods, including qualitative text analysis, allow this assessment.

6.3.3. Coding and Measurement: Political Knowledge, Vulnerability, and Resilience:

Each case was coded for indicators whether political knowledge was high or low, and whether an outcome indicated overall vulnerability or resilience. Cases were also coded for location of event occurrence and coded for evidence of how refugees learned their political knowledge.

Coding Political Knowledge:

This chapter incorporates the same coding and assessment for refugees' individual or collective political knowledge that was used in chapter five. Recall, political knowledge is a multi-faceted concept measured according to the degree that refugees' statements reference four primary indicators: (a) refugees' rights, restrictions, and responsibilities; (b) the source of these rights, such as Ugandan or international refugee law; (c) the state and non-state actors who decide rights; and (d) indications of other political knowledge, such as refugee governance and decision-making processes or statements of home-country politics that impact refugees' repatriation decisions. Each dimension was first assessed as a yes/no binary and then assessed as scalar from no observed to high knowledge. Finally, the dimensions were aggregated into composite categories of no observable, low, moderate, or high political knowledge by considering the number of knowledge dimensions expressed and their accuracy. See Figure Ten in chapter five for expansion on political knowledge dimensions and aggregation, and treatment of incorrect information.

Coding Resilience and Vulnerability:

For simplicity, outcomes are considered as either overall vulnerable or resilient. To make this determination, I manually coded within my dataset for key words and phrases that signify

each outcome. In general, words and phrases indicating vulnerability included descriptions of immediate survival needs and demands for help; descriptions of short- or long-term trauma, financial harm, and mental or physical violence, including death; and descriptions of legal or social sanctions. Other indicators of vulnerability included key words such as “vulnerable,” “harms,” “victim,” “scandal,” and “scam.” Key words and phrases were normatively negative.

In contrast, words and phrases indicating resilience were normatively positive. They indicated that refugees mitigated negative effects of or evaded risks, harms, and exploitation, or that refugees secured rights and protections. Examples of these words and phrases included “rights training or sensitization,” “intervention,” “empowerment,” and “violence reduction or prevention.” Other indicators of resilience included when refugees requested meetings to clarify rights or to receive rights-based trainings. Finally, resilience is observed when external governance actors, including NGOs or UNHCR, recognized refugee’s rights-based efforts.

Resilience and vulnerability outcomes are coded as scalar ranging from -3 for high vulnerability to +3 for high resilience. A score of 0 is neutral. Resilience and vulnerability were each coded as high (+/- 3), medium (+/- 2), or low (+/- 1). Variation in the level of vulnerability or resilience captures the degree to which refugees either evaded exploitation, risk, harm, or mitigated the effects thereof. This includes assessment whether refugee interventions through rights sensitizations reduced effects of trauma, mental or physical violence, financial or other harms. Table Eleven provides definitions and examples of the key words and phrases used to code of each vulnerability or resilience category.

Resilience/Vulnerability (score)	Description <i>Coding: Examples of key words and phrases</i>
High Resilience (+3)	Refugees received recognition or intervened through service provision, rights instruction, or protection to strongly mitigate against exploitation, risk, or harm. In rare cases negative outcomes associated with vulnerability are evaded outright. <i>Coding: praise for efforts, acknowledgments and awards.</i>
Medium Resilience (+2)	Refugees intervened through service provision, rights instruction, or protection to moderately mitigate against exploitation, risk, or harm or empowered refugees to claim rights. Cases demonstrate an immediate positive effect, including increased knowledge or reduced violence and exploitation. <i>Coding: empowerment, violence prevention or intervention, advocacy, rights sensitization, and statement of acquired knowledge.</i>
Low Resilience (+1)	Refugee actions have limited immediate or observable effect to mitigate against vulnerability. This includes that refugees educate on rights or to avoid common scandals, harms, or other negative effects. <i>Coding: sensitized to rights, statements that request rights guidance including requests for call lines or meetings</i>
Neutral	In general, the case indicates that refugees are neither better nor worse off after an actual or potential shock. <i>Key words and phrases: N/A</i>
Low Vulnerability (-1)	A demonstrated negative physical, emotional, financial, or other harm that results from inadequate or errant political knowledge on governance processes, rights or protection-based support. <i>Coding: “victim,” “scam,” statements of refugees’ fear; requests for help, statements of short-term shock, trauma, physical or mental harm</i>
Medium Vulnerability (-2)	Cases demonstrated a moderate degree of harm or punitive response. Cases may involve “gray-areas” where coping strategies and actions are discouraged but not illegal. In other cases, refugees experience social sanctions. <i>Coding: “victim,” “scandal,” insecurity; indicators of social sanctions; threat of future legal action; trauma, mental, or physical harm with lingering effects</i>
High Vulnerability (-3)	Refugee experienced extreme physical, emotional, or financial harms, including death. In limited cases, I found high vulnerability results from violating Ugandan national or international refugee law or policy. <i>Coding: illegal, arrest, bodily harm, police response, death</i>

Table 11: Descriptions of Resilience or Vulnerability Outcome Categories

6.4 Findings and Analysis:

OLS regression permits analysis whether a change in one variable produces statistically significant change in a designated outcome. For example, OLS regression can examine whether an increase in political knowledge shifts outcomes from vulnerability towards resilience. Regression findings establish a correlation that, in general, with an increase in political knowledge, refugees experienced more resilience than vulnerability. The r-squared value, which shows the strength of this relationship, is moderate at 0.702. This finding suggests that there is correlation but not causation, meaning that political knowledge may be a significant causal factor alongside other factors. Figure Fourteen displays the relationship of political knowledge and resilience or vulnerability outcomes.




Figure 14: The Relationship of Political Knowledge to Vulnerability or Resilience

Although Figure Fourteen displays a general relationship that an increase in political knowledge shifts an outcome from vulnerability towards resilience, there are several outliers. Outliers represent instances where refugees had political knowledge, but still experienced vulnerability outcomes because of prevalent institutional-structural deficiencies. Outliers additionally occurred when refugees had limited knowledge of rights but not processual knowledge to claim them.

As a second method to document the relationship between political knowledge and vulnerability or resilience outcomes, cases with higher and lower political knowledge were compared across three outcome categories (a) exploitation, risk, and harm, (b) host-country decision-making, and (c) home-country decision-making. Lower knowledge includes no observed knowledge and low knowledge scores, and higher knowledge includes partial and high knowledge scores. Figure Fifteen displays the average political knowledge political knowledge and disaggregate this average into lower and higher knowledge categories.




Figure 15: Average Political Knowledge by Outcome Category

Refugees demonstrated the lowest average political knowledge in dataset cases where refugees were exposed to exploitation, risk, and harm. Political knowledge was slightly higher in cases that examined refugee host country decision-making. Political knowledge was highest in cases that looked to home country decision-making, including decisions of whether and when to return. Yet disaggregation among lower and high knowledge presents a more complex story. For example, these findings identify refugees with lower knowledge often had very low knowledge.

While quantitative analysis suggests a relationship whereby an increase in rights-based political knowledge may allow refugees to secure more resilient outcomes relative to other refugees who lack this knowledge, this analysis does not illuminate the causal connections, or

mechanisms, in how or why this relationship occurs. Qualitative methods, including qualitative text analysis, allows identification of these mechanisms. Table Twelve brings together quantitative and qualitative findings for vulnerability and resilience outcomes. This table documents average political knowledge scores and describes among the empirical mechanisms in how knowledge engendered disparate outcomes.

	Shocks or Opportunities in daily life (No.)	Vulnerability or Resilience (No.) Avg. Political Knowledge (PK) Scored from 0 to 1	Coding Descriptions: Empirical support for the Outcomes
Responses to exploitation, risks, and harms	Response after sexual and gender-based violence (9)	Resilience (3), PK 0.6	Violence prevention & intervention, rights training, education of Ugandan law and justice systems, rights-based empowerment, prevent child marriages
		Vulnerability (6), PK 0.03	Harmful cultural practices (child marriage), inability to access medical treatment or legal protection, fear of retribution or deportation for reporting violence, forced sex to gain refugee documents or material provision, survival sex after abuse
	Response to resettlement or other scams (9)	Resilience (2), PK 0.7	Whistleblowers call for corruption investigation, advocacy against corruption
		Vulnerability (7), PK 0.0904	Knowledge clarification, payment of high fees for scam participation, refugee protests/sleep outside UNHCR to demand help, refugee arrest, false land documents & precarity
Response to other exploitation including bribes (4)	Resilience (0), PK N/A	N/A	
	Vulnerability (4), PK 0	Bribes and extortion for services and documentation that should be free	
Refugee decision-making in host country	Refugee Self-Provision (10)	Resilience (9), PK 0.561	Refugees launch educational programs, receive recognition as “refugee woman of the year” and other recognitions, rights promotion, combat rumors, counselling, and other service provision
		Vulnerability (1), PK 0	Ugandan police and refugee governance actors decry refugee actions for self-protection
	Livelihood strategies, including cross-border activities or selling food items (16)	Resilience (3), PK 0.667	Advocacy, clarify food distribution information, livelihood interventions to overcome distribution changes
		Vulnerability (13), PK 0	Refugee statements they don’t know how to overcome food distribution changes, illegal cross-border economic activities, sale of vital humanitarian and food aid that refugees cannot otherwise secure, refugee protest
Refugee Non-Food Advocacy and Intervention (15)	Resilience (11), PK 0.552	Refugee-led organizations form, give keynote addresses, participate in stakeholder meetings, and otherwise advocate for refugee rights; advocacy for elderly, disability, or women’s rights empowered by knowledge of international rights doctrine	
	Vulnerability (4), PK 0	Refugees ask for rights and assistance without knowledge of rights or of who provides these, refugee advocacy or pleas to actors (individuals) unable to assist	
Refugee responses to origin country		Resilience (7), PK 0.925	S. Sudanese refugees with knowledge of home country peace talks and political updates educate others on the these, empower refugees to know options of potential return & processes how, and refugee advocacy for direct involvement in home-country political decision-making.
		Vulnerability (8), PK 0.206	Refugees lack knowledge how to safely return and try to self-smuggle to origin country; lack relevant knowledge to know whether home country conditions are amenable for return; do not know how to claim rights in Uganda and try to ‘escape’ to other refugee host nations.

Table 12: Average PK per Outcome Category and Coding Descriptions

6.4.1. Exploitation, Risk, and Harm:

In total, 22 dataset events of letters and articles described among the numerous forms or exploitation, risk, and harm that refugees experience in Uganda. These include exposure to physical, emotional, or SGBV, and to resettlement and other schemes. In many instances, exploitations resulted in undue financial, physical, and psychological suffering. Comparing cases

where refugees held overall higher and lower knowledge supports argumentation that some harmful outcomes may otherwise have been avoided with increased rights-based and protection knowledge. Likewise, some harms may have been reduced with increased knowledge of the governance actors and processes that secure their protections, rights, and provide help for violated rights. For example, through the mechanisms of utilization and mitigation, my findings underscore how refugees with enhanced rights-based and processual knowledge achieved more resilient outcomes after experiencing SGBV because they knew how to report victimization and knew how to pursue justice through courts. Similarly, through the mechanism of differentiation, refugees understood that there is not a guaranteed right for resettlement. They used this knowledge to avoid expensive and damaging schemes that falsely promised them resettlement to a third country. Importantly, my cases document how refugees intervened and promoted resilience to other displaced persons through rights-based instruction and advocacy. These refugee-led efforts demonstrate the mechanism of diffusion through advocacy.

To tease out the relationship between political knowledge to vulnerability and resilience, I now focus on refugee responses to SGBV and exploitation, and responses to resettlement and other schemes.

Refugee Responses to SGBV and Exploitation:

How does having rights-based and political knowledge influence refugees' responses after SGBV? A focus on responses to SGBV is warranted because it is a common form of violence that refugees experience globally. The World Bank (2020) estimates that, "81% of Uganda's 1.4 million refugees are women and children, who are at high risk of gender-based violence (GBV), including sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), rape, forced and child marriage,

and intimate partner violence (IPV).” Yet, at the same time and despite the high rates of violence, refugee victims frequently avoid reporting this violence, and particularly underreport sexual exploitation and violence committed by NGO and UNHCR staff, or by state bureaucrats and security officials. A report by the Women’s Refugee Commission, WRC, (2016, 22-23) found among victim’s motivations to avoid this reporting were fears that so doing could draw attention to their insecure legal status, could disqualify their resettlement consideration, or could even jeopardize their asylum status. The report found that victims additionally avoided reporting because of doubts their claims would be properly investigated.

Although the WRC report highlights among the perceived negative outcomes that may result from reporting SGBV, reporting hesitancy may also indicate victims’ lack of knowledge of their rights to protection. Refugees may specifically be unaware of their rights to report violations committed by governance actors who are tasked with their security and unaware of their rights to access courts and other forms of legal protection. Finally, refugees may not know reporting violence should not produce retaliatory impacts against their asylum or resettlement eligibility.

Comparable to the cited global trends, the dataset documented pervasive SGBV, including rape across urban areas and in settlements, and included allegations UNHCR, NGO staff, and Ugandan security actors sexually abused refugees or participated in sex and human trafficking rings. Victims experienced wide-ranging psychological, emotional, and physical harms. In extreme cases, victims’ harms were amplified when families chose cultural practices of marrying child rape victims to their abusers rather than seek justice through courts. Although most articles suggest refugees held only limited rights-based and protection knowledge, other articles detailed how refugees with higher knowledge engaged diffusion through advocacy and

enacted rights-based interventions to break violence cycles and support SGBV victims. In these cases, refugees translated their knowledge of Ugandan law and of international human, women's, and children's rights into purposeful efforts. Their utilization and mitigation efforts sensitized others to report violations and to end SGBV. Qualitative analysis describes both how lacking critical rights-based political knowledge impeded their resilience against violence while having knowledge helped bolster more resilient outcomes.

To expose why some refugees are more vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse, Ugandan journalist Frederic Musisi conducted an extensive undercover investigation in Kampala. He discovered that UNHCR and Ugandan police knew of sex trafficking of refugee women and girls. He documented, "some OPM, police, and aid agencies' officials use their powers to coerce young refugee girls and at times the most desperate for relocation to other countries into sex." To justify his claims, Musisi shared refugee testimony, including a Burundian refugee who said an OPM official demanded sex or payment of one million UGX (300USD) to obtain her refugee identity card. This is exploitation as there are no fees to claim asylum or to obtain asylum documentation. Other testimony included refugee women sleeping with aid officials to receive relief items available for free in settlements (Mutisi 2018).

In a second example, a top UNHCR official was arrested for sexually abusing a refugee girl he met at the Palabek Refugee Settlement. The UNHCR officer hired the young South Sudanese refugee, promising economic support to start a business in exchange for domestic work. However, the reports describe that he trapped her in his home and raped her. The girl was "rescued" only after Ugandan neighbors intervened and reported the abuse (Owiny 2018; Bagala 2018). In both cases, there is no evidence that victims knew their rights for protection or knew how to report their violations. Although political knowledge doesn't prevent SGBV, refugees can

potentially gain resilience after abuse by knowing how to report these crimes and by knowing that they cannot be penalized for so reporting. Knowledge can help assuage fears and empower victimized individuals to seek available support and protections rather than to suffer in isolation (Liebling, Barrett and Artz 2020).

Newspaper articles further documented instances where families resorted to alternative justice mechanisms, including cultural practices of forcing SGBV victims to marry rapists rather than report crimes to Ugandan police or settlement authorities. In Bidi Bidi Settlement, a reporter observed that families married rape victims to their abusers because they, “are ignorant about Ugandan laws, and they use their culture to make decisions.” One refugee mother named Esther agreed and advocated for education to combat this practice. Esther claimed, “our people (refugees) do not know about defilement; that is why young girls are married off by their parents once they are defiled (Unwinza 2017).” These quotes emphasize how potential harms occur when under-informed refugees turn to potentially damaging coping mechanisms that produce physical and psychological harms rather than use courts. As noted by Purkey (2020, 122-7), refugees can acquire advanced knowledge on the formal and informal justice mechanisms available to select violence redress that is both culturally appropriate and that is consistent to national and international law. Promoting this knowledge may prevent extra-legal practices that cause harm.

Other dataset cases permit me to argue that alternative, more resilient outcomes may have been possible with increased political knowledge. One article by UN Women highlighted its efforts to work collaboratively with refugees to increase knowledge of the formal and informal support mechanisms available to sexual violence victims. The article cites, “community legal education sessions, mobile legal aid clinic, mediation by cultural leaders, and community-based

paralegals,” in addition to Ugandan courts.³ UN Women clarified that the rights-based education and interventions are intended to address the barriers that limit victims from seeking legal redress. Lacking knowledge of these protective, support bodies and processes obstructs refugees from their access, resulting in adverse effects.

Beyond interventions by external NGO actors, the newspaper articles include instances where refugees themselves used their knowledge of rights, of governance actors and processes to intervene against SGBV. In several articles, refugee women demanded increased rights training and programmatic interventions to combat SGBV. Like Esther in BidiBidi, other women leaders across settlements advocated for women and girls’ empowerment, including formal education for children, adult literacy training, and livelihood programs and micro-credit groups (Unzima 2017). These interventions promote knowledge, including political knowledge, to mitigate victimization and address root causes of violence. The interventions also seek to combat harmful cultural practices and ultimately promote resiliency through legal and physical protection.

Dataset cases documented how refugees gained rights-based knowledge for interventions against SGBV through efforts by RLOs. In Kyangwali Settlement, a RLO called COBURWAS created an initiative to prevent childhood marriage and gender violence by educating at-risk girls. Their CIYOTA initiative provides housing, primary and secondary education, and partners with international efforts to secure post-secondary scholarships, support, and mentorship. Through their heightened political knowledge, CIYOTA addressed root causes that make some refugee children susceptible to abuse (Sawa 2018). Beyond the dataset scholars document other RLOs and initiatives who similarly intervened through counselling, rights promotion and sensitization,

³ UN Women supplemental reporting in the New Vision (11/25/2017).

and by providing support to abused victims (Lyytinen 2013; Edström et al 2016; Edström and Dolan 2019; Pincock et al 2020).

In part, an emergent literature affirms the largely unrecognized roles that the displaced play in providing vital social protection (Betts, Easton-Calabria and Pincock 2018). These studies uphold that many displaced view internal refugee-led responses as more legitimate, culturally appropriate, and potentially more impactful than efforts led by non-refugee actors (Global Refugee-Led Network 2019; Pincock et al 2020; Milner 2021; Asylum Access 2021). My findings echo this view and underscore the merit of refugee-led interventions, including in violence prevention and mitigation, and knowledge diffusion.

Finally, the data also consist of examples where INGOs educated and empowered settlement-based refugees to reduce SGBV. NGOs trained individuals to identify and report abuse to authorities, to counsel abuse victims, and to prevent domestic abuse through couples counselling. Two op-ed pieces published in *New Vision* describe how training refugees with political knowledge of their rights successfully mitigated violence. First, a 29-year-old refugee leader called David Motamota explained how UN Women implemented an emergency protection project with South Sudanese refugees. He recounted that through trainings, “we learnt that we are all human beings and not supposed to mistreat each other. We have equal rights and (are) supposed to respect each other.” Motamota added that from the trainings, he no longer beats his wife and now advocates for men to similarly end domestic violence. Importantly, Motamota and other project participants committed to follow Ugandan laws and pledged to report violence to the police rather than use harmful cultural practices that may fail to honor women’s rights (Motamota 2017). In the second op-ed, a Gender-Based Violence monitor called Tabu Jessica Joy expressed how her participation in the UN Women program enabled interventions against

violence. Jessica used her gained knowledge to advocate against childhood marriage, domestic violence, and survival sex through culturally appropriate rights training (Tabu 2017). In these examples, increased knowledge dissemination efforts promoted resilience through violence intervention and prevention.

Across examples, efforts within and outside of refugee communities promoted refugee empowerment, de-stigmatization of SGBV victims to report violence; interventions to holistically respond to survivors' needs, including providing educational or employment training; and refugee-led violence prevention. These efforts demonstrate how increasing political knowledge can reduce vulnerabilities and support refugee resilience for SGBV victims. These internal refugee-led and external INGO efforts powerfully represent several of my identified mechanisms, chiefly of knowledge utilization, knowledge for harm mitigation, and knowledge diffusion through refugee advocacy.

Refugee Responses to Resettlement and Other Schemes:

Refugees' needs for protection coupled with a dearth of durable solutions has created a 'black market' where actors financially exploit refugees with false promises of expedited resettlement (Thomson 2018). Underexplored, however, is whether and to what extent political knowledge informs refugee responses to resettlement or other schemes?

To evidence the forms that resettlement schemes may take, data documented instances when governance actors and refugee community leaders sometimes purported as individuals empowered to influence resettlement decision-making and charged steep fees for their services. In 2019, a refugee HRD from Nakivale Settlement travelled to Kampala to participate in one such suspected resettlement scheme. He described his motivation for participation as to collect

evidence and implicate refugee leaders he believed were falsely selling resettlement to Sweden. In two letters, the author claimed an RLO charged desperate refugees a 15,000UGX (4.05USD) registration fee, a 20,000UGX (5.40USD) resettlement interview coaching fee, and between 500,000 to 5 million UGX (135 to 1351USD) for resettlement consideration (Refugee letter July 4, 2019). In a separate letter, another refugee documented instances where refugees paid between 5,000-7,000USD for resettlement in other schemes (Refugee letter February 15, 2018).

In the letters written by this HRD, the author expressed only limited knowledge on formal resettlement processes, including uncertainty whether refugees were eligible for resettlement to Sweden. However, he made targeted actions to overcome knowledge gaps. He requested UNHCR and the Swedish Embassy conduct, “investigation and analysis whether it's true that the Congolese refugees will go.” He also requested UNHCR to intervene in the perceived scandal and to hold a multi-stakeholder meeting with refugee leaders to provide relevant information on resettlement to prevent future scandals.

Despite his low knowledge on *de facto* resettlement procedures, he demonstrated higher political knowledge on refugee governance actors and thus knew how to differentiate refugee rights and processes. Among his knowledge was a reiteration that resettlement, like all UNHCR services, is free. The author stated his efforts were to, “stand for fighting the abuse of refugees rights, doing what is supposed to be done according to the law leading refugees missioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.” Throughout letters, the author’s interventions represent efforts to increase political knowledge on resettlement to reduce refugee vulnerability to exploitative resettlement schemes. His uncertainty about refugees’ rights for resettlement and the decision-making processes for resettlement selection epitomize the mechanism of knowledge differentiate and demonstrates the need for refugees to have adequate knowledge.

Other letters affirmed how refugees are at an adverse risk of unnecessarily paying large sums for resettlement schemes when they lack political knowledge. A second HRD wrote in another letter, “the (UNHCR) resettlement department is the most kept in secrete (sic) and this facilitates the bribe culture, no one knows the criteria for resettlement and many refugees are left wondering which criteria does UNHCR base on to resettle those who have managed to go through.” Like the first, this author stated his motivation as to obtain information about resettlement decision-making and then disseminate his findings to individuals seeking resettlement. He further sought advice to counsel the victims of resettlement schemes (Refugee letter February 15, 2018). Although the author was unclear on many details of resettlement procedures, he clearly explicated the linkages of how lacking knowledge can make refugees in need of resettlement more liable to scandals.

Finally, in a three-part investigative series on alleged corruption schemes for resettlement in Kenya and Uganda, Hayden (2019) documented financial, emotional, and physical harms for victimized refugees. Hayden described how vulnerability resulted when refugees engaged in negative coping strategies to secure the required funds. She documented refugees selling vital food rations, livestock, or other household items—items that are difficult to recuperate if the scheme fails and they remain. A report by Maza (2018) likewise found refugees engaged in sex work to influence resettlement decisions. Refugee attempts to secure protection and stability through third-country resettlement paradoxically created both short- and long-term harms.

In refugee letters, drafters repeatedly demonstrated how refugees’ precarity, need for protection, and their desperation made them targets for exploitation by actors who charge weighty sums for resettlement schemes. The letters stressed that inadequate knowledge on resettlement criteria and decision-making intensified these risks. In one letter, a Congolese HRD

encouraged UNHCR to swiftly punish any staff or affiliate who sold resettlement. Further, he encouraged UNHCR to, “ensure that resettlement department adheres to the principles of transparency and minimize the existing secrecy by putting in place and making public the very basic steps a refugee can follow up in order to seek for resettlement (Refugee letter February 15, 2018). The author implored UNHCR and other stakeholders to engage in risk mitigation and provide refugees processual and rights-based knowledge they need to avoid exploitation.

Resettlement, however, is not the only area where refugees without knowledge fell victim to exploitative attempts. A 2020 article uncovered that landlords in Kampala demanded refugees provide “certificates of good conduct” for leasing consideration. A Ugandan legal group lamented that there is no legal basis for this document (Musiime 2020). The lawyers cited that certificates cost upwards of 75,000UGX (20.33USD)—a hefty sum for most refugees (REACH 2018, 94-95; Betts et al 2017b, 88-92).

In two other cases, Ugandan host community members allegedly charged asylum seekers fees to enter their communities. Refugees reported paying between 20-30,000UGX (5-8USD) for each asylum applicant. A district councilor registered occurrences where families paid upwards of 400USD to remain (Tumuhimbise 2018; Kasooha 2018). Like the certificates of good conduct, there is no legal basis to charge asylum seekers these fees. In these examples, the articles didn’t indicate the targeted refugees held any political knowledge to protect themselves from paying these baseless fees or held knowledge how to report these extortions.

As a final example, other articles documented how Ugandans defrauded refugees through illegal land sales in Amuru District. Ugandans bypassed proper land sale procedures, did not inform authorities of the transactions, and did not provide refugees with valid ownership documents. Per the district chairperson, “Refugees are owning land without the knowledge of the

district leaders. This may cause insecurity in the long run (Makumbi 2018).” A REACH report (2019: 2-3) contextualizes how refugees can experience eviction or property confiscation when they enter into informal land owing or leasing agreements. Their study found that only 15% of 2811 refugees surveyed in settlements who reported owning or renting land had a formal land tenure agreement. Similarly, only 24% of the 354 refugees surveyed in Kampala had documentation to prove their tenancy. The study attributed refugees’ entrance into these insecure property agreements because of their lack of knowledge, stating, “refugees reported being unaware about their rights and rules around land ownership, with some purchasing land in informal, often illegal ways.” By extension, I infer that increased knowledge helps refugees enter into more secure, legal property and leasing arrangements as aligns with their rights. Knowledge helps the displaced avoid financial exploitation that occurs with illegal land or property sales.

Throughout examples, there is support for each of my four mechanisms: differentiation between rights and not rights, utilization of knowledge to take advantage of rights, mitigation to avoid harms and scams, and knowledge diffusion through advocacy. Data supports how refugees with no or low rights-based and political knowledge were more likely to fall victim to exploitative attempts. In some instances, refugees with heightened knowledge avoided scams and mitigated harms when they knew about the actors and processes involved in complex decision-making, including about resettlement decisions. To reduce vulnerability, refugee leaders and HRDs requested meetings to confirm knowledge, and then actively promoted obtained knowledge to bolster resilience against exploitative attempts. These knowledge-based interventions enabled others to avoid short and long-term financial, emotional, and physical risks associated with scandals.

6.5 Political Knowledge and Host Country Decision-making:

Finally, refugees must simultaneously make many critical decisions about their lives and livelihoods while navigating like anew in exile. These decisions include quotidian experiences of enrolling child in school; pursuing income-generating activities through formal or informal economic activities; seeking medical attention for physical or psychological traumas incurred during exilic journeys; to securing lodging, food, and other basic needs. How does political knowledge influence how refugees make these decisions? The following two sub-sections explore how rights-based political knowledge alternately contributed to either refugee resilience or vulnerability in these critical areas.

6.5.1. Political Knowledge and Strategies that Produce Vulnerability:

In considering refugee responses to areas of daily life in their Ugandan host country, the data contains several cases where refugees' insufficient rights-based knowledge resulted in harms that may have otherwise been avoided. Among the most common vulnerability outcomes were refugees' food, housing, physical, and economic insecurity, as well as legal precarity. Vulnerability resulted from refugees selling humanitarian and relief items, such as food rations, to secure other necessities that aid organizations do not provide. Refugees also experienced legal precarity from crossing Uganda's porous border to return to their home country for economic livelihoods. Although the sale of rations is not illegal, the GoU, UNHCR, and implementing NGOs discourage the practice. However, it is illegal for refugees to return to their countries of origin without authorization. Refugees who engaged in these coping strategies often lacked knowledge to choose an alternative strategy. I explore whether and how having political knowledge may have bolstered refugees' outcomes and impacted their decision-making.

To begin, newspaper articles empirically situate how refugees who lack political knowledge on their economic rights sometimes engaged in negative livelihood and coping strategies that produced short- and long-term vulnerabilities. Articles documented when refugees sold their food rations and humanitarian aid in exchange for funding to pay medical, educational, or other expenses. Scholars have debated whether selling relief items is a positive or a negative coping strategy. On the one hand, scholars argue that refugees experience more resilient outcomes when they sell or barter excess or unwanted items to secure items that humanitarian organizations do not provide (Jacobsen 2006; Werker 2007; Oka 2011; Newhouse 2015). On the other hand, scholars document these sales more frequently represent a negative strategy when refugees sell items that are desperately needed (Reed and Habicht 1998; World Bank 2020). A REACH (2018, 56) report found that nearly 38% of refugee respondents in their Ugandan study reported selling humanitarian aid. They found that for the majority, this was a negative coping strategy that reduced the household's short and long-term resiliency. Similarly, a study by Pathways Development (2020) determined that selling rations is frequently a negative strategy because rations are already insufficient to support refugees' basic caloric and health needs.

Drawing from my archival dataset, how did political knowledge inform refugees' decision whether to sell humanitarian rations? Specifically, was there evidence that political knowledge of economic rights allowed refugees to avoid the frequently negative outcomes of selling relief items they need for other subsistence? To make a distinction whether sales produced vulnerability or resilience, consideration is given the conditions under which sales were made. Four cases suggested refugees did not want to sell these items but did so only to secure other immediate survival needs. One article cited a South Sudanese mother who said, "It was not my wish to sell part of the relief aid, but because we escaped without anything, I have

decided to sell part of the food ration for buying clothes for my children.” Another woman described selling the items as necessary, stating, “it’s the only way for us to get some money to buy some personal items which UN does not provide (Okudi 2014).”

Perhaps more telling, however, is that beyond demonstrating the difficulties to secure minimum requirements for a life of dignity, refugees repeated that they sold the humanitarian items because they didn’t know of other ways to earn income. Per one South Sudanese refugee in Impevi Refugee Settlement, “It’s not easy for refugees to even get money... They sell their own things like beans, then pay you with (cooking) oil... What can we do? It’s the condition we are in (BBC 2017).” Another refugee mother of five described, “You have to sell part of your sorghum so that you can have money for grinding the remaining seeds... There is nothing we can do because we are refugees (The Observer 2016).”

Across cases, refugees did not demonstrate political knowledge of their rights for wage-earning employment. The data suggests some of refugees might have avoided these sales if they knew of or could access their economic rights to become entrepreneurs, to grow and sell crops, and to leave the settlements to pursue expanded formal or informal economic opportunities in cities—all rights that Uganda affords refugees. Although many refugees choose to sell relief items to secure their immediate needs, it is possible that having expanded knowledge of economic rights may empowered some to pursue alternative livelihood or coping strategies.

Finally, other cases suggested that refugees experienced vulnerability when they didn’t know their restrictions. In four cases, refugees experienced vulnerability when they violated Ugandan law and returned to a home country for agricultural or commercial activities (Emorut 2017; Makumbi 2017; Daily Monitor August 8, 2019; Independent 2020). The articles underscore the legal and protection risks of border crossings as unauthorized crossing may

violate the Cessation Clause of the Refugees Act, 2006 (Section 6 (1)a). The articles suggested refugees who returned to their home countries lacked knowledge of the legal and protection risks associated with this prohibited activity.

6.5.2. Political Knowledge and Strategies that Produce Resiliency:

The preceding demonstrated how refugees sometimes experienced physical, food, and economic insecurities, as well as greater legal precarity, in part, because they lacked rights-based knowledge required to pursue alternative livelihood or coping strategies. The dataset supports a counterclaim that more knowledge can enable refugees to achieve more resilient outcomes.

One way to evidence how having more knowledge bolstered refugees' resilience is found in newspaper articles when refugees used their higher knowledge of associational rights to form RLOs and in turn fill gaps in refugee protection and provision. RLOs identified underlying conditions which made refugees vulnerable and enacted targeted, meaningful interventions to mitigate these conditions. Refugee leaders and RLOs provided rights-based trainings; provided livelihood, skills, and language training to enable refugees to secure their rights; and provided rights-based counsel to promote resilience in important areas of daily life including banking, education and healthcare, and women and child protection. These interventions occurred both during 'normal' times and during the global COVID-19 pandemic—an 'abnormal' time where individuals throughout the globe, including refugees, encountered lockdown restrictions that disrupted their life and livelihoods. RLOs' activities significantly demonstrate multiple mechanisms through which knowledge promotion can enhance refugees' outcomes.

First, several articles described how refugees used enhanced rights and protection knowledge to respond to known community deficiencies. Four articles highlighted the work of

one RLO named Young African Refugees for Integral Development (YARID). In one article, YARID founder Robert Hakiza explained that his organization provides English language instruction, vocational training, and broader educational support for refugee youth and adults because, “education is a basic human right, enshrined in both the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1989 convention on the rights of the child (Mutegeki 2017).” The articles reaffirms that the organization’s work is not only facilitated by its founder’s extensive political knowledge on refugee rights and protections, but also demonstrates how Hakiza utilizes his knowledge to support others.

Articles additionally highlighted the work of outstanding refugee leaders and RLOs who used their higher political knowledge to benefit refugees and host community members in tangible ways. For instance, a Daily Monitor article lauded the work of Aisha Ali, a Somali refugee whose rights-based interventions promote financial literacy to Ugandan citizens and to refugees through her employment with Bank of Uganda and through her philanthropic work at her social enterprise IProfile Foundation (Batte 2020). A second article documented that Ali uses her political knowledge to foster youth refugee resilience through integration support and leadership training so that they can flourish in Uganda (Emorut 2018). Similarly, a 2019 article extolled the work of Pastor Bolingo Ntahira, a Congolese refugee and founder of the RLO Hope for Children and Women Victims of Violence, for “changing lives of disadvantaged Ugandans.” Ntahira’s RLO trains Ugandans and vulnerable refugees in English language, tailoring, hair dressing, and in computer and business studies (Wright 2019). Each article captures how crafted initiatives for knowledge diffusion and intervention. Their initiatives mitigated vulnerability by promoting critical rights-based knowledge and by filling gaps so refugees can obtain their rights.

Four articles also highlighted when NGOs bestowed accolades to recognize the rights-based and protection work of exceptional refugee women. In 2012, Uganda's Office of the Prime Minister selected Somali refugee Halima Ainte as Uganda's "Refugee Woman of the Year" for her successes counseling refugee women on their rights, her translation work for refugees to access their rights to healthcare, and her work with SGBV survivors in Nakivale Settlement (NV 05/31/2012, "Somali Woman Transforms Refugees' Lives in Ugandan Camp"). In 2017, Plan International recognized Halima Mustafa, a refugee caregiver and child educator in Ayillo II as "Plan International Global Volunteer of the Year." Through her work with Plan International, Mustafa learned about children's rights and protections and in turn educated refugee parents on these important topics (Masinde 2017). These female refugee leaders used their knowledge to promote resilience through empowering disadvantaged refugees on their rights.

In 2017, the Finnish Refugee Council, UNHCR, and OPM awarded Burundian refugee Bella Nshimirimana as "Refugee Woman of the Year." Nshimirimana has advocated for refugees to obtain their rights to healthcare without discrimination. She also promotes refugee and host-community coexistence and integration through cultural programming through her RLO Mirror Group (Fallon 2017). Finally, in 2017, the WRC awarded Mugisha Willent its "Voices of Courage Award." Willent was recognized for her initiative "Girls out of School Association" that provides vocational training and education to young women who left school because of child marriage and pregnancy. Her work is facilitated by her advanced knowledge gained through her experience as a UNHCR Youth Ambassador (Momodou 2018; UNHCR 2018 "GYAC Profiles"). Nshimirimana and Willent bridge gaps so that refugees are not only aware of their rights to healthcare and education, but also provide programming so refugees can achieve these

rights. Their efforts promoted resiliency by ensuring that refugees get healthcare services and by ensuring that refugee children avoid life-long consequences engendered by lacking education.

Finally, Ugandan and international press sources praised refugee leaders and RLOs as they combated false health information during the COVID-19 crisis, promoted information on Ugandan lockdown and quarantine procedures, and responded through humanitarian provision towards other vulnerable refugees (Hakiza et al 2020; Hovil and Capici 2020; Chandiga Justine 2020; Maloba 2020). RLOs demonstrated high political knowledge of rights and of the shifting political environment during the pandemic. Refugees translated lockdown restrictions and used social media to spread awareness so refugees could avoid arrest, fines, or other punitive responses for violating restrictions imposed to prevent COVID's spread. One refugee leader, Joyeux Mugisho, a HRD and RLO director, educated refugees on pandemic restrictions. He offered legal support and counselling to avoid evictions, as well as advised how to secure safe housing if eviction occurred (Hayden 09/21/2020). In examples, refugees reduced vulnerability by educating on rights and restrictions during the pandemic.

Articles on RLOs and award-winning refugee leaders underscore how refugees' efforts to reduce vulnerability are often grounded in their knowledge of the generous rights Uganda affords them. Refugees intervened through knowledge diffusion and advocacy to promote rights awareness, educated on the actors who support rights and protections, and on the governance processes that allow refugees to claim rights. Refugees and RLOs further created programmatic trainings and interventions to support refugee resilience to achieve their rights and promote resilience by providing English-language instruction, vocational training and banking advise.

6.6 Political Knowledge and Home-Country Decision making:

How does political knowledge influence refugee decision-making as it relates to their home country, including decision-making whether and when to return? In the dataset, limited cases demonstrate how lacking political knowledge about return processes produced vulnerabilities. Other cases demonstrate that refugees with higher knowledge engaged in peacebuilding and prepared their fellow displaced for an eventual return. However, the number of cases where political knowledge influenced home country decision-making were low. Despite this limitation, findings demonstrate a potential significance of political knowledge in these decision-making processes.

From the data, four cases emphasized how a lack of political knowledge produced vulnerability as refugees made decisions about leaving Uganda. In three cases, journalists described refugees as “fleeing their settlement,” or “escaping” from Uganda to seek asylum elsewhere. There is no evidence that refugees had political knowledge how to pursue any durable solution, including voluntary repatriation. Refugees experienced vulnerability because they were arrested, held by police, and sometimes returned to the settlements they had fled (Enuinu 2017; Wanyama 2017; Tumuhimbise 2017). There are not comparable cases of different responses by refugees with higher knowledge to demonstrate that the outcomes might have been different with more knowledge.

A fourth case from 2014 details how lacking knowledge produced extreme vulnerability. Driven by rumors of improved home country conditions, Congolese refugees fled Nakivale Settlement (Mugerwa 2014). Over 250 refugees perished as their overcrowded boats sank while crossing Lake Albert. In response to the drownings, UNHCR stated they hadn’t initiated routine processes for voluntary repatriation or verified home country conditions (Katusabe and Tumusiime 2014; BBC 2014). The refugees made a difficult decision whether to stay in exile or

return home based on rumors. With more knowledge about their right to voluntary repatriation through UNHCR facilitation, the tragic loss of life might have been avoided.

In contrast to cases that resulted in arrest, physical harm, and even death, nine cases documented when South Sudanese refugees with higher knowledge promoted peacebuilding; educated others about South Sudanese peace processes; and motivated refugees on their rights and roles as civil society members to implement the negotiated peace agreements. Many articles highlighted the work of the Network of South Sudanese Civil Society Organizations in Uganda (NOSSCOU)—a coordinating network of 30+ South Sudanese NGOs. NoSSCOU staged community events to sensitize refugees on the cited topics across settlements and urban areas. NOSSCOU also held a one-day workshop for South Sudanese student leaders in Kampala (Hell 2019; Sudan Tribune 07/11/2019 "South Sudanese Students Equipped on Peace Agreement "; Gatkuoth and Leter 2020) and held trainings on the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan of 2018 (R-ARCSS). Per Ter Manyang, a HRD, RLO founder, and NoSSCOU member, the sessions educated on R-ARCSS because, "if they (refugees) properly understand it, they can own it." Manyang continued, "Disseminating the peace agreement is regarded as a platform for advocacy and policy reform to influence laws that govern and guide government's actions on conflict management (Radio Tamaiuz 2019)." The NoSSCOU members used their high political knowledge to enable refugees' eventual return to South Sudan.

NoSSCOU members additionally requested and held a stakeholder meeting with Hon. Betty Bigombe, Uganda's envoy to the South Sudan Peace Process to discuss "the importance of opening up civil space to facilitate smooth dissemination of the (Peace) Agreement." NoSSCOU described the meeting strengthening peacebuilding and R-ARCSS implementation. Ms. Bigombe lauded the group's efforts and expressed support for future meetings and collaboration

(ATABOSS 2018). Through their high-level meeting with Ms. Bigombe, NoSSCOU members advocated for international collaboration to address the underlying structural insecurities that resulted in their displacement.

These cases suggest a relationship between refugee political knowledge and decision-making processes of whether to return to their home country, as well as decisions how to prepare for this return. The work of NoSSCOU demonstrates the mechanisms of knowledge diffusion through advocacy and of utilization. It powerfully signified the impact of knowledgeable refugee peacebuilders and RLO leaders who transform refugee hosting locations into productive spaces of empowerment and education. In contrast, the cases of refugee arrests, physical harm and death demonstrate that refugees in already precarious situations can experience profound vulnerability when they lack knowledge how to pursue repatriation. In some cases, refugees may have mitigated their risks with increased knowledge.

6.7 Conclusion:

Political knowledge can enable refugees to secure overall more resilient outcomes as they respond to challenges and opportunities in their daily lives. Archival data demonstrates how refugees employ their knowledge as a resource to secure rights and achieve available legal and social protections when rights are violated. For instance, refugees sometimes achieved more resilient outcomes after experiencing gender and sexual-based violence because they had processual knowledge of how to report their harms. In the dataset, political knowledge additionally allowed refugees to mitigate common risks and harms, including exploitative schemes that falsely promise third-country resettlement. Finally, by comparing instances when refugees held overall lower and higher knowledge illuminates the ways in which knowledge

engenders resilience in livelihood and coping strategies. Research captured how refugees with heightened understanding disseminated knowledge to bolster outcomes in their communities. The data demonstrates knowledge can reduce vulnerabilities even in situations of legal precarity within a resource and institutionally constrained hosting environment.

Furthermore, this chapter's findings contribute to three broader dissertation arguments. First, data supports an argument that Uganda's heterogeneous refugee populations unequally hold political knowledge. Data analysis allows me to identify not only individual factors of who holds knowledge, but also identify the types of knowledge held. For example, newspaper articles demonstrated a gendered discrimination when women and girls experienced sexual and human trafficking, domestic abuse, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. Risks were also unequal across refugee hosting locations. In urban areas, refugees experienced unique risks not typically observed in settlements, such as tenancy exploitation, housing discrimination, and heightened risks of eviction from informal leasing arrangements. In settlements, refugees experienced risks associated with livelihood practices of selling food and humanitarian relief items, and from illegally crossing the porous borders to routinely return to their home country.

However, regardless their hosting locations, refugees experienced financial exploitation to register as a refugee, to obtain material provision, or to receive appointments with implementing partners and governance actors. Refugees in both settlements and urban areas were overall under-informed about resettlement processes and decision-making, and further lacked knowledge that could enable their selection of livelihood and coping strategies to promote resilience. The lack of knowledge in these critical areas resulted in financial, physical, sexual, and other forms of exploitation that reduced refugees' resilience.

Second, the data permits me to argue that refugees have uneven access to learn political knowledge about their rights. Although RLOs and refugee leaders play a significant role in knowledge dissemination, many refugees were shown to struggle to access rights-based trainings. In chapter one, I reviewed three theories of how individuals in a new political context acquire political knowledge: first, that exogenous state or non-state actors socialize new members on relevant knowledge; second, that individuals endogenously acquire and transmit political information; and third, that individuals fail to acquire new political information because of trauma or lack of interest, among other reasons. The dataset provides compelling examples of the first two theories. Like most negative cases, however, the dataset cannot prove or disprove why some individuals failed to gain political knowledge.

Finally, I argue that along with their recognized roles as service providers and roles in integration support, refugee-led initiatives also play a vital role in rights promotion. The reviewed articles and refugee letters provide only limited examples of governance actors partnering with refugee actors for rights sensitization. Refugees as promoters of political knowledge is currently under-explored in existing literature but is of timely relevance with current global initiatives for direct refugee inclusion in refugee policy, provision, and decision-making. These efforts include the U.N.'s 2016 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, and the Global Compact on refugee. Yet these global frameworks focus on areas where refugees in my dataset are already contributing—including in vital areas of peacebuilding, decision-making for return home, and in-host country service and protection provision.

Governance actors, policy makers, and humanitarian organizations can build from my findings as they develop and implement rights-promotion efforts. Despite the limitations of

political knowledge to reduce all forms of exploitation, refugees with more knowledge overall were able to avoid certain harms and minimize the negative effects after harms. My findings demonstrate that livelihood and educational interventions may in some cases be further augmented by explicit inclusion of rights-based knowledge.

Chapter Seven. Conclusion and Policy Implications

“The determining factor in assessing, ensuring, or improving the quality of life of refugees is neither merely the rights granted under international law... but the capacity of refugees and of refugee communities to access and to use their rights in practice to realize a life that they value.”

- Purkey (2020: 3)

7.1 Introduction:

No matter in which state refugees are hosted, all displaced persons hold minimum rights and protection, including vital protection from being returned to a state where an individual is likely to experience persecution. However, beyond protection against *refoulement*, states largely retain autonomy to decide what rights, opportunities, and protections to afford the displaced, as well as retain authority to determine who qualifies for legal protection as a refugee or asylum seeker. Some states, including many in the Middle East, are limited in the rights they offer displaced persons while other states, like Uganda, are more generous in their rights conferral. Yet even the most robust refugee rights regime is to no effect if refugees lack political knowledge of their rights, restrictions, responsibilities and lack knowledge of the governance actors and processes who decide and uphold these. Thus, throughout this dissertation, I have repositioned the analytical lens from a “top-down” assessment of Uganda’s perceived generosity in refugee hosting to instead engage a “bottom-up” assessment of rights, protections, and opportunities through refugees’ lived experiences.

To conduct this assessment, my research had three complementary and interconnected aims. The first aim was to establish what urban refugees throughout the country knew about their

rights, including how they distinguished between rights for refugees within and outside of the settlements. Original survey data reveals that rather than perceiving Uganda as a generous host, most refugees experienced their rights as limited. On average, respondents listed fewer than two rights and over one in ten (15%) couldn't list any rights. Nearly one quarter of respondents denied that refugees have any rights at all. Without political knowledge, many refugees felt unsupported and alone to secure employment, vital social services, or provisions required for a dignified life. Refugees also largely didn't know processes to activate their rights and didn't know how to pursue assistance for violated rights. Attention to how refugees understand their rights is of critical importance because holding this knowledge may empower refugees forward to achieve available rights and protection. Lacking this knowledge can produce barriers to achieving rights or protection and thus compound their legal and physical vulnerabilities in exile.

To engage a study of refugees' political knowledge required a fundamental reconceptualization of what political knowledge is and does for non-citizens. While political knowledge can be a resource, a tool, and a form of protection for everyone in a territory, the stakes of holding this knowledge are amplified for refugees. Unlike citizens, refugees have a precarious legal status and only have temporary permission to remain in a hosting state. Moreover, many refugees experience unique challenges and even discrimination to activate their rights. Thus, examining variation in held political knowledge provides nuance to understand how refugees engage rights, laws, and legal structures to navigate precarity.

The second research aim was to address why variation in political knowledge outcomes occurred, and to consider barriers for knowledge formation. Analyzing survey data revealed that refugees of different gender and nationality held uneven political knowledge. However, trends in survey responses became sharpened when findings were disaggregated by location. Chiefly,

survey analysis revealed variation based on refugees' exclusive residence in urban areas versus residence split between a city and a settlement ("quasi-urban" refugees), as well as variation across cities. Most succinctly, a refugee's *de facto* expectation of rights and of who should provide them was mediated by different exposure to material provision, to different configurations of governance actors, and to inconsistent presence of refugee-led rights supports. These findings suggest that inconsistent rights implementation across locations is powerful to influence how refugees understand their rights.

Next, I drew from survey, focus group, and key expert interviews to understand the barriers refugees encounter to acquire political knowledge. As aligns with existing studies of refugee political integration—which includes how refugees acquire political knowledge—surveyed urban refugees described learning about their rights as difficult when they didn't speak the same language as their host community, when rights instruction was limited, and when refugees distrusted governance actors who provide this instruction. However, my original findings also diverge from expectations set out in existing theories of non-citizen political integration. In my sample, refugees experienced enduring barriers to learn their rights even after achieving marginal economic integration and after developing social ties to their hosts. Furthermore, rights learning did not become easier over time. To explain this, I found refugees' understanding of 'politics' and of which potentially political behaviors are permissible resulted in persistent barriers to learn about their rights. To wit, refugees' pervasive and enduring political aversion as a powerful force that pushes many refugees away from seeking political knowledge.

The third research aim was to contribute towards an evidence-base of why it matters whether refugees hold or lack political knowledge. Although I planned to pursue this inquiry through extended fieldwork, this was not possible due to the global Covid-19 pandemic. Instead,

I adopted archival methods and engaged Ugandan and international press sources alongside refugee-drafted letters to explore a relationship of how political knowledge influenced refugees' decision-making and outcomes. Chapter five analyzed trends in how having or lacking knowledge influenced key outcomes of how refugees make rights-based demands. These trends include refugee tactic choice, their demand precision in how they articulate and justify demands, and the governance actors who refugees targeted to make their demands. For example, refugees with lower knowledge selected tactics that frequently evoked a punitive response or that strained refugee-host community relations. Refugees with higher knowledge selected tactics that evaded these negative responses. Similarly, refugees with higher knowledge were more adept to justify and root their demands in law, and to address their claims to actors able to help.

In chapter six, four mechanisms of differentiation, utilization, mitigation, and diffusion through advocacy underscore processes in how having or lacking knowledge produced vulnerability or resilience. In general, analysis reveals that as refugees acquired more rights-based and protective political knowledge, they were able to achieve more resilient outcomes to commonly experienced shocks, risks, exploitations, and harms, such as resettlement schemes and sexual and gender-based violence. Refugees were better positioned to claim rights and protections when they were aware of them. Conversely, the archival review identified instances whereby refugees may have been able to avoid harms or mitigate harms' effects with increased political knowledge.

This conclusion chapters proceeds in two sections. First, I position my unique findings and academic contributions alongside scholarly literatures. In the second half of this chapter, I discuss my research's limitations and discuss implications for policy and future research. In concluding, I hope that I honor my commitments made and reaffirmed to my refugee colleagues

and friends to create research that brings attention to how stakeholders can more proactively commit to, defend, and uphold refugee rights; as well as to honor my promise to create research the displaced can use for their own rights-based advocacy and knowledge promotion.

7.2 Contributions: Assessing my Three Research Goals:

Among the primary academic contributions of this dissertation is to adopt a definition of political knowledge that is appropriate for refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless individuals, and other non-citizen categories. To establish definitional clarity of political knowledge was not only paramount to this study, but also necessitated a careful adaptation of existing definitions that largely focus on pertinent knowledge that citizens acquire to engage in routinized, formal political behaviors of voting, running for office, or joining a political party (Converse 1964, Grönlund and Miler 2006, Hoffman 2012). As clarified in chapter one, in the Ugandan case, refugees cannot avail themselves to any of these formal political behaviors and risk strong punitive responses for these behaviors, as well as for any perceived interference in Ugandan politics. Moreover, political exclusion and denial of these political behaviors is the norm for the majority of the world's refugees.

Thus, rather than emphasize the linkages between knowledge and political behaviors reserved for citizens, I define refugees' political knowledge as one's understanding of rights, restrictions, responsibilities, and understanding of the governance actors and processes that secure these. This definition is built upon contemporary understandings that consider political knowledge as the information through which individuals make sense of and subsequently navigate their political surroundings through political and non-political behaviors (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993 and Rapeli 2014). These behaviors include refugee quotidian interactions vis-à-vis the Ugandan state and its bureaucracies for child school enrollment, healthcare obtainment,

formal sector employment, and business or non-profit registration. Further, and as aligns with Adman and Strömblad (2018), this definition underscores that individuals require knowledge of the political system in which they live to promote and achieve their self-interest. This definition broadly captures political knowledge components commonly recognized in academic literature, including clarifying which actions are or are not permissible (White 1984, 90, Grabska and Mehta 2008, 12, Tafoya 2014), identifying state and non-state actors involved in governance (Thomson 2018, Ozkul and Jarrous 2020), and processual descriptions of how to claim rights or secure redress for violated rights (McConnachie 2014, Tipler and Gates 2019).

The reconceptualization and adaptation of political knowledge allows several analytical advances. First, the definition acknowledges the relevance of political knowledge for vast global population segments that are often under-acknowledged if not overlooked entirely. Refugees particularly require this vital knowledge because of their heightened legal precarity, structural disadvantages, and numerous challenges in daily life. Political knowledge may be invaluable to help individuals, families, and communities secure better outcomes against these challenges. Second, and as responds to Purkey's quote which opens this chapter, a focus on how people understand their rights matters because this understanding influences how individuals pursue a dignified life. At heart, the definition acknowledges the *de jure* and *de facto* constraints and opportunities refugees encounter in their host country. A third contribution is that this definition can be transferred to study political knowledge in other refugee hosting states and to other categories of non-citizens beyond refugees.

Next, beyond investigating both *what* refugees know and *how* refugees engage this knowledge, my research makes significant theoretical contributions to why refugees acquire inconsistent knowledge. As documented in chapter three, despite a uniform *de jure* legal

structure of rights and protections that apply to all recognized refugees hosted in Uganda, refugees varied both in the number of rights they could enumerate and varied greatly in naming the content of these rights. However, overall knowledge was low, importantly suggesting that many refugees are uninformed of their rights, opportunities, and protections. Nearly one quarter of the 209 survey respondents denied that refugees held any rights and an additional quarter of respondents failed to name a single right they hold. Only 28 respondents were able to name four or more rights. Among responses, refugees cited rights afforded by their Ugandan hosts, such as rights to education, employment, and to free movement. Yet many also listed perceived rights to material distribution, food, and to third-country resettlement—all of which are not afforded under Ugandan law.

Although research found differences in rights-based understanding across refugees' country of origin, gender, sexual identity, and other demographic considerations, knowledge variation was most pronounced across two dimensions: in comparing refugees who lived in and outside the capital Kampala, and in comparing those who live strictly in urban settings and those who split time in city and settlement as what I term "quasi-urban" refugees. In general, refugees who stay strictly in urban areas were more likely to mention rights to education and rights to identity cards than were their counterparts who split time between a city and a settlement. Strictly urban refugees were also more likely to respond they don't know if refugees have rights or to deny that refugees have any rights. Likewise, refugees who are quasi-urban and split time between locations were more likely to say that refugees have rights to food and to go to settlements. In comparing responses among those in or outside of the capital, refugees in Kampala were more likely to state rights to education, to work, to remain, to have an identity card, to receive material assistance, and to be treated like Ugandans. Those in Gulu and Mbarara

were more likely to cite rights to food and to free movement, as well as to say that refugees do not have any rights. Each of these reported differences is statistically significant.

Beyond consideration of which rights refugees believed they have (or didn't have), surveys reveal variation in which state or non-state governance actors who refugees hold responsible to provide their rights. Attention was given to six governance areas pertinent to refugee daily life: education, healthcare, material provision, financial assistance, response to victims of crime, and who is responsible to clarify refugee rights. As with other political knowledge considerations, responses varied depending on refugee's location and by one's status as fully or quasi-urban refugees. Overall, quasi-urban refugees were more likely to identify governance actors to assist in all areas while strictly urban refugees frequently expressed no one helps refugees. Additionally, quasi-urban refugees identified refugee leaders and RLOs as chiefly responsible to assist in all areas save for healthcare provision, while strictly urban refugees identify refugee-led actors as responsible only to assist in rights clarification. Results further varied in comparing refugees who stay in and outside of Kampala. In each category, refugees who stay in Kampala stated they either did not know who assists or stated that no one assists. In areas of rights clarification, healthcare, education, and provision of material goods, refugees in Mbarara and Gulu identified UNHCR as more responsible to assist at higher rates than did those who stay in Kampala.

To explain observed variation in knowledge outcomes chapter three offered a sub-national analysis. Analysis reveals that political knowledge outcomes were mediated by two considerations: (1) the "governance mode" which captured how knowledge is mediated by features unique to each of Uganda's two distinct modes of refugee governance (rural settlements or urban residence); and (2) by "urbanity" which captured distinctions across these modes. These

considerations illuminate how refugees' *de facto* interactions with formal safety nets of material provision, different compositions of intervening state and non-state actors to provide rights-based guidance, and unequal exposure to refugee-led rights support in turn engender different expectations of rights, of who provides rights, and of how to secure rights. Consideration to a governance mode and urbanity cumulatively underscore how refugees' lived experiences can produce distinctions in how refugees understand their rights, opportunities, and restrictions.

The model of sub-national analysis builds upon limited studies of sub-national variation in refugees' outcomes, including Kaplan and Omata (2013), Betts et al (2017) study of refugee economics and REACH's (2018) comparative study of refugee and host community's economic and educational outcomes. My research compliments and add to these studies by positing an additional causal factor—political knowledge—explaining variation in outcomes for refugees. I hope that my consideration of urban and quasi-urban refugees in Gulu and Mbarara are contributions that can stand alone as researchers rarely study urban refugee populations beyond the capital Kampala.

In addition to variation in political knowledge outcomes caused by a refugees' location or urban status, chapter four questioned why knowledge outcomes for many survey respondents were low. This chapter again turned to survey data and identified among the barriers and opportunities refugees named for gaining their political knowledge. Findings corresponded to three models of knowledge formation identified in chapter one: (1) a resistance model in which trauma, lack of interest, and other factors impeded knowledge learning; (2) an exogenous exposure model where refugees gain knowledge through external interventions by state, non-state INGO, and UN actors; and (3) an endogenous model where individuals learn about their rights through refugee-led efforts.

Related to the resistance model, refugees listed numerous language and logistics challenges, as well as a lack of trust towards external governance actors, as preventing their knowledge learning. Some refugees further cited a barrier that governance actors actively block them from acquiring rights-based knowledge to prevent empowered refugees from advocating for rights. Respondents additionally labeled those who seek their rights as “bad” refugees who are a nuisance to their Ugandan hosts. As a result, even if some know how to seek political knowledge, they were disempowered from so doing to avoid upsetting their hosts. In contrast, some refugees acknowledged both the exogenous and endogenous models of learning, with many crediting RLOs as chiefly responsible for their obtained knowledge.

More significantly, chapter four argues that many refugees fail to gain rights-based and protective knowledge because they associate this knowledge with “politics” itself—an often totalizing and negative referent to many of the globally displaced. Building from past research by Lyytinen (2013) and Hyndman and Giles (2017), it argues that due to their previous negative political experiences, refugees find politics as a taboo concept. They deem politics as irrelevant, unimportant, or off limits in their daily lives. Regardless refugee nationality or research location within Uganda, most survey respondents demonstrated a strong and enduring political aversion. They reiterated that politics—whether considered as elections, voting, making rules for a country, or as a system of rights and governance—are not for refugees. Rather, respondents clarified only citizens can engage in or benefit from politics, including a frequent reiteration that only citizens have rights. Many expressed a view that they forfeited their ‘right to have rights’ when they left their country of citizenship to seek asylum.

On the one hand, and as argued by Haddad (2008) and Betts and Loescher (2011), refugees have fled their country specifically because of politics, political persecution, or because

their home government was unable or unwilling to provide for their rights and protections, including during conflict that disrupted their security. Yet, on the other hand, I argue that an under-explored consequence of refugees' contentious relationship to politics includes that many displaced consider even knowing or seeking rights as taboo political behaviors to which they are excluded. The coming section expands the implications of this political aversion/exclusion for those who wish to promote rights-based knowledge. For now, I underscore that many refugees deny they have rights directly because they are refugees.

Finally, this research contributes theoretically and empirically to the question of *why* it matters whether refugees hold political knowledge. In building from Garcia-Castañon (2013), this dissertation argues that knowledge influences many quotidian actions and decision-making processes related to how refugees secure essential material goods, develop livelihood or coping strategies, and more generally exercise their rights while pursuing life anew in exile. This research also builds from Sandvik (2011), Carlson et al (2018a and b), and Ozkul and Jarrous (2020) who demonstrate how information deficits, misinformation, and rumors can engender harm for refugees. A focus on non-citizen refugees' political knowledge is ethically important and may hold utilitarian value to reveal whether and to what extent rights-based and protection knowledge helps the displaced mitigate challenges in daily life.

To make these arguments, chapters five and six draw from original archival datasets to propose how having knowledge influences decision-making processes for refugees in Uganda. The datasets are predominantly comprised of Ugandan newspaper articles from *the New Vision* and *the Daily Monitor*, and are supplemented with international press sources, as well as refugee-drafted letters shared through public WhatsApp chat groups, Facebook and other social media sources, and refugee-owned websites. The datasets resulted from extensive in-country archival

work conducted at the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) beginning in 2016 and continued through Northwestern University's Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies. As most Ugandan newspaper articles are not accessible online, I manually flipped through CBR's archival room of binders organized thematically on topics related to refugees and migration in Uganda and manually scanned each page of each Ugandan newspaper held in Northwestern's collections. Though tedious to compile, these datasets allow me additional methods to test the theory developed in chapter one.

Chapter five operationalizes the archival dataset to observe how political knowledge influences outcomes associated with rights-based, political, and non-political grievance expression. First, the chapter introduces and demonstrates an argument that refugees' political knowledge affects the tactics they choose for grievance response. Compare refugees' use of different tactics in response to the same underlying grievance demonstrates that, overall, refugees with lower observable political knowledge were more likely to engage in disruptive and dangerous grievance expression tactics than did refugees with higher knowledge. The chapter also demonstrates an argument that one's level of political knowledge influences both the demand specificity, which compares the level of clarity in how refugees articulate their demands; and variation in target precision, which compares to whom refugees make these demands.

Chapter six theorizes a relationship between political knowledge towards either refugees' vulnerability or resilience. Clear trends emerged of individuals who lacked knowledge sometimes experienced compounded precarity, as well as enhanced negative physical, psychological, financial, and other harms. These outcomes were reduced with increased knowledge. In the data, harms occurred when refugees didn't know how or from whom to seek assistance or redress for violated rights. Harms also occurred when refugees lacked knowledge to

differentiate between the rights, protections, and opportunities they have versus those from which they are excluded. When refugees lacked political knowledge, they more frequently fell victim to exploitation, scams, and harms, including pervasive scams that falsely promise third country resettlement. In severe cases, refugees unknowingly violated Ugandan hosting law by crossing international borders for family or economic reasons—violations that can jeopardize their refugee status. In other cases, refugees employed their political knowledge to avoid exploitation and harms; to seek available rights-based redress and protection; to take advantage of available opportunities and rights, including associational rights to form RLOs or businesses; and to mitigate precarity through compliance with local hosting laws.

By focusing on daily life areas that are relevant for refugee populations within and outside of Uganda, my analysis illuminates the *stakes* of holding this knowledge. These findings hold relevance for scholars, practitioners, policy- and decision-makers, and for refugees themselves.

7.3 Limitations and Implications for Policy and Research:

7.3.1. Limitations:

In concluding this chapter, I focus on two limitations of the dissertation: external validity and the applicability of my findings beyond the Ugandan case study; and secondly, a limitation in evidence of what could change with increased refugee political knowledge. In examining each, avenues for future research are proposed.

First, and as argued in chapter one, Uganda is an ideal test case to study refugees' knowledge of their rights because of its unique generosity in refugee hosting. As a signatory to many regional and international rights-based treaties and through codification and enactment of

its own progressive national Refugees Act, 2006, Uganda offers refugees extensive social-cultural, economic, and associational rights. However, the majority of the world's refugees are hosted in states with restrictive *de jure* and *de facto* rights infrastructure. Indeed, significant displaced populations are hosted in states that have not acceded to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Non-signatory states that host vast refugee populations include Lebanon, Jordan, Thailand, and Bangladesh, alongside other states throughout the Middle East, Northern African, and Asia Pacific regions. In these states, refugees often enjoy only ad hoc protection contingent upon the generosity of their hosts. They are bearers of human rights at the international level. These rights, though significant, are hard to actualize at the local and national levels. In considering the effects of holding or lacking knowledge, future research should expand to consider how rights influence action and decision-making in these more restrictive rights environments. Future research in these hosting states may also reveal how restrictive rights-supporting infrastructures influence refugee understandings of their rights, restrictions, and opportunities, as well as influence the state, non-state, or UN actors who refugees hold responsible for their rights and material provision.

A second limitation of this study is my reliance on archival data rather than incorporation of ethnographic data, including interviews and focus groups, to discern the effects of having or lacking rights-based and political knowledge. In part, this consideration was necessitated by an inability to return to Uganda and conduct further research during the global Covid-19 pandemic. However, this data nonetheless revealed trends that when refugees hold more knowledge, they generally experienced more resilient (positive) outcomes. Similarly, when refugees held less knowledge, they experienced more vulnerable (negative) outcomes. Future research may allow a

more nuanced understanding of the relationship between knowledge and outcomes, as well as bolstered understanding of the mechanisms that inform this relationship.

Finally, I was unable to directly study the effects of knowledge dissemination among Ugandan urban refugees, including limitations of this instruction. Tipler and Gates (2019) caution that knowledge may not deterministically change an outcome but find that knowledge instruction serves to make the law and legal processes more predictable rather than opaque. Legal empowerment through knowledge instruction may in turn may alleviate fear and anxiety. Tipler and Gates additionally found rights-based instruction can become a source of dignity and empowerment because legal knowledge can increase a sense of self-control over one's life and livelihood trajectory. Pavlish and Ho (2009) and Purkey (2020) similarly noted the empowering potential of rights-based education. They contend refugees are marginalized individuals who stand to gain the most from legal protections, and advocate for refugees to thus be informed specifically of their rights and protections.

Future research will be instrumental to document the range of effects from rights-based instruction, as well as document limitations to produce outcomes for displaced communities. This research may also evaluate best practices of how to promote political knowledge.

7.3.2. Policy Implications:

The concluding section offers three interrelated practical and policy implications.

First, my research suggests normative and practical arguments for instructing refugees with political knowledge that is relevant to the context in which they are hosted. On one hand, there is a moral imperative because all displaced persons have rights. One's displacement across an international border does not reduce or deny their innate deservingness as human beings with

internationally codified civil, social, and human rights. Additionally, their status as refugees may confer additional rights and protections through the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, alongside other regional and international treaties. As described above, rights education can reaffirm one's sense of dignity and serve to empower displaced persons.

Additionally, scholarship identifies that even when rights-based trainings cannot guarantee that individuals can access all their rights, there are secondary benefits of education. For example, Bajaj et al (2017) propose that rights trainings can empower individuals to make sense of the world they inhabit, to make sense of their experiences, and empower them to name their past rights violations. Trainings may further empower individuals to take steps to redress these harms. Moreover, these scholars along with Tipler and Gates (2019) find trainings bring individuals together and can allow community building among vulnerable populations. Knowing they are not alone and benefiting from mutual encouragement may in turn provide emotional and psychological support.

On the other hand, my research demonstrates among the potential and positive outcomes that may arise when refugees are provided with legal empowerment to know and claim their rights. As noted, refugees require accurate information to assess their environment, to know their options and opportunities, and to also know their restrictions to avoid unknowingly violating local laws. Education can allow refugees to adjudicate the rights, protections, and services to which they are entitled and importantly identify those they are not. For example, knowing that third-country resettlement is not a right can allow refugees to avoid costly and emotionally harmful scams that threaten their short- and long-term security. Broadened understanding of rights may allow refugees to advocate for their rights more successfully. Finally, providing processual knowledge can allow refugees to identify exploitations when governance actors

demand unsanctioned fees. Processual knowledge can enable the displaced to actualize their rights and to report rights' violations.

Given the high stakes of having or lacking political knowledge, there is justification to not only make this knowledge available but to actively promote it through targeted knowledge dissemination. My second focus for implications identifies *how* such trainings can be conducted. As a starting point, all government and non-government actors can evaluate their programming to assess whether and how their efforts for knowledge promotion occur. I propose rights training should be done through partnership with refugee leaders and RLOs. In my research, refugees often trusted their community and religious leaders and RLOs more than they trusted external state actors and INGOs. Refugees frequently turn inwards to these sources of refugee-led support for help, assistance, and guidance in daily life. Partnership to refugee leaders and RLOs may result in training design that refugee communities view as legitimate, trustworthy, and more culturally relevant than trainings that are designed without refugees' input.

As a secondary consideration, knowledge instruction must walk a delicate line to decouple rights from the language of citizen-based politics. Trainings must emphasize that refugees have and are entitled to enjoy numerous rights, protections, and opportunities that are not contingent upon their citizenship status. Although these topics are inherently political by nature, instruction can be effectively depoliticized to reduce refugees' anxiety about politics and political actors. Purkey's (2020) seminal work instructively identifies among the contemporary global efforts for rights instructions. There is also compelling work currently being done globally by refugee-led consortium, including by the Global Refugee-Led Network, to create "train the trainer" modules of refugee-led rights instruction. Asylum Access, Independent Diplomat, and Oxfam International have been among the institutional partners to support these rights trainings

and to conduct comparative analyses of refugee rights. Other institutional actors, including host states and United Nations agencies can further support these efforts.

Third, my research contributes practically towards identification of *which* rights-based and political knowledge can be prioritized. For example, in my Ugandan case study, I leverage my context-specific knowledge to identify targeted knowledge to promote to urban refugee populations in and outside the capital Kampala. This knowledge includes multi-stakeholder instruction for how refugees can secure their formal and informal economic rights; can secure social service access in healthcare and education, particularly outside the capital; and enhanced knowledge on resettlement and distribution to help refugees avoid scams and exploitation. Scholars, humanitarian organizations, state agencies, refugee leaders and RLOS can similarly use their on-the-ground expertise to identify which rights and protective knowledge to prioritize to immediately reduce vulnerability and promote refugee resilience.

In all knowledge intervention efforts, refugees should be consulted. They not only intimately know the rights-based challenges their communities face, but also know the strengths and capacities of their communities. Interventions can reinforce what currently works well and combat weaknesses of what isn't working well. Finally, refugees' expansive lived knowledge and expertise can identify potential complementary mechanisms or interventions are required for refugees to both know and claim their rights.

Even with expanded rights-based instruction and rights-based and political knowledge, many refugees globally will continue to experience risks, exploitations, harms, and vulnerabilities in ways often disproportionate to otherwise marginalized citizen groups. I hope, however, that my moral and practical arguments will provoke thoughtful consideration on the

merit for rights instruction to continually empower displaced populations in a dignified life. Rights-education is not a panacea but may nonetheless be a good place to start.

It cannot be overstated that all refugees, regardless of where hosted, have rights. This applies even for refugees hosted in economically and institutionally developing nations, and for refugees hosted in states that have yet to ratify international refugee conventions. Persons with lived experience of displacement are often victims of circumstance but they are individuals who retain their humanity and dignity even when crossing an international border. As such, it is incumbent upon all of us to consider how to promote and ensure their rights so they can achieve the lives and outcomes that they desire—whether they remain in their host or home country.

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Appendix One. Biographical Data for Surveyed Refugees

Interview ID	Interview Date	Interview Location	Home Country	Ethnicity (optional)	Gender	Age	Years in UG
aN2KS	7/26/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Non-binary	33	2
AnIIF	7/26/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Muvira	Male	26	2
an33	7/26/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Non-binary	32	7
aNAA3107	8/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	27	3
rK0801#1	8/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	19	6
Rh080118#2	8/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Kasaï central	Male	40	2
aN2A3107	8/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	27	6
Y30802	8/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Male	40	2
Y40802	8/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Kongo	Female	32	8
Y50802	8/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Tetela	Female	46	7
H1080519	8/5/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	raga	Female	24	7
H30805	8/5/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	23	2
H60805	8/5/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	32	6
H40805	8/5/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	36	8
2Y30806	8/6/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Mai mai	Female	27	7
H50806	8/6/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Nyanga	Male	27	7
2Y10806	8/6/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	48	7
2Y40806	8/6/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	37	7
2Y50806	8/6/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	46	6
3Aa30807	8/7/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Non-binary	22	8
4Y50808	8/8/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Luba	Female	38	2
4Y30808	8/8/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Luba	Female	19	2

4Y10808	8/8/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Havu	Male	34	6
3Aa1	8/8/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Female	25	6
3Aa2	8/8/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Non-binary	24	3
4Y40809	8/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Hutu	Male	29	3
4Y20809	8/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Ngala	Female	51	6
3H30812	8/12/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Bahavu Kalehe sud Kivu	Male	47	7
2H20812	8/12/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Male	35	12
2Ha20812	8/12/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Nyanga	Female	23	8
Y08135	8/13/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Havu	Male	19	11
Y08134	8/13/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Havu	Male	29	7
Y08133	8/13/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	24	6
Y08132	8/13/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Male	20	7
Y08131	8/13/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Havu	Male	18	8
Y08155	8/15/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	35	4
Y08153	8/15/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	28	5
Y08152	8/15/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	30	2
Y08151	8/15/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	20	5
Y08154	8/16/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	35	3
Mb1	8/19/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Luba	Female	44	3
Mbarara2	8/19/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Kongo s Kivu	Male	48	2
Mb3	8/19/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mufulero	Female	40	3
Mb4	8/19/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	30	3
Mb5	8/19/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mubembe	Female	32	5
Mb6	8/19/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	60	7
Mb7	8/20/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	42	2
Mb8	8/20/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	29	3
Hr9	8/20/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	53	9

Mb10	8/20/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Kongo	Male	20	4
Mb11	8/20/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenga	Male	43	4
Mb12	8/21/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	38	5
Mb14	8/21/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Murega	Female	38	5
Mb15	8/21/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	50	18
Mb16	8/21/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mukusu	Female	35	2
Mb18	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	41	8
Mb20	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	26	8
Mb21	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mutetela	Female	59	4
Mb17	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	31	8
Mb13	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	47	3
2Ya2	8/22/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Luba	Male	23	7
H2822	8/22/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	24	7
3H822	8/22/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Nande	Female	26	7
An3107dd	8/22/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	24	7
Mb19	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mufulero	Female	37	2
Mb22	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mubembe	Male	70	2
Mb23	8/22/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	42	3
Mb30	8/23/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	49	3
Mb31	8/23/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	38	3
Mb32	8/23/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	33	2
Mb33	8/23/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	33	3
Mb34	8/23/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mukongo	Male	38	3
Mb35	8/23/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	33	5
Mb40	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mutembo	Male	48	3

Mb41	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Munyabwisha	Female	34	4
Mb42	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	45	5
Mb43	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Nande	Female	49	8
Mb44	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	41	2
Mb45	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	40	4
Mb46	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Luba	Male	32	3
Mb47	8/26/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	35	12
Mb50	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	56	3
Mb51	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Female	50	8
Mb52	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	50	3
Mb53	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mubembe	Male	35	12
Mb54	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Banyamulenge	Male	23	8
Mb55	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mubangubangu	Female	49	3
Mb56	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Mutetela	Male	29	3
Mb57	8/27/2019	Mbarara	D. R. Congo	Munyabwisha	Female	18	3
H09027	9/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	39	11
H09026	9/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	N/A	Male	59	14
H09025	9/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Mutetela	Male	21	2
H09024	9/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Male	46	2
H09023	9/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Mutetela	Male	42	4
H09022	9/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Mutembo	Female	20	7
H09021	9/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Nyanga	Male	30	3
Y09035	9/3/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	35	13
Y09034	9/3/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	21	7
Y09033	9/3/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	22	6
Y09032	9/3/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	25	2
Y09031	9/3/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	22	5

Aa09043	9/4/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Non-binary	30	2
Aa09042	9/4/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Munyabwisha	Non-binary	41	9
Aa09041	9/4/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Rega	Non-binary	49	12
Y09055	9/5/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Male	29	4
Y09054	9/5/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Male	35	2
Y09053	9/5/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	26	2
Y09052	9/5/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	29	4
Y09051	9/5/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	27	7
H0909196	9/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Mushi	Male	34	3
H0909195	9/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Mushi	Male	45	12
H0909194	9/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Male	18	2
H09093	9/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	37	17
Hra090919	9/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Bavira	Male	50	10
H0909197	9/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Bembe	Male	21	3
H0909192	9/9/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	22	3
Ss30910	9/10/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	39	8
Ss40910	9/10/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	36	8
Ss40910	9/10/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	18	2
Ss20910	9/10/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	20	8
ss70910	9/10/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	49	9
Ss80910	9/10/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	38	9
Ss09116	9/11/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	38	10
Ss09115	9/11/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	20	2
Ss09114	9/11/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	32	12
Ss09113	9/11/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	34	10
Ss09112	9/11/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	19	2
Ss09112019	9/11/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	18	6
Ss09121	9/12/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	21	10
Ss09122	9/12/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	26	10
Ss09123	9/12/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	19	6
Ss09124	9/12/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	29	10
Ss09125	9/12/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	25	9
Ss09126	9/12/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Female	19	10
Ss09127	9/12/2019	Kampala	Somalia	N/A	Male	19	19

0917194	9/17/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Male	20	4
0917193	9/17/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	30	12
0917192	9/17/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Male	24	2
0917191	9/17/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Male	25	6
0918196	9/18/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	29	2
091819-4	9/18/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	33	6
0918192	9/18/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	46	3
Ss09181	9/18/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	60	2
180919-3	9/18/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	29	3
0918195	9/18/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	29	2
091919-f	9/19/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	29	5
091919-5	9/19/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	22	2
091919-4	9/19/2019	Kampala	Sudan	N/A	Female	28	3
091919-2	9/19/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	50	3
091919a	9/19/2019	Kampala	Sudan	N/A	Male	29	3
0919193	9/19/2019	Kampala	Sudan	N/A	Female	24	2
Gulu0923198	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	42	12
Gulu0923197	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	42	5
09236	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	40	3
Gulu0923195	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	40	5
Gulu0923194	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	35	7
Gulu0923193	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	44	5
Gulu0923192	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	45	10
Gulu0923191	9/23/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	29	13
Gulu092419-8	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	42	6
Gulu092419-7	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	24	10

Gulu0924196	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	49	8
Gulu0924-5	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	35	3
Gulu092419-4	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	34	4
Gulu092419-3	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	38	6
Gulu0924192	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	35	12
Guku0924191	9/24/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	30	6
Gulu092519-6	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	35	5
Gulu092519-5	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	41	10
Gulu0925194	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	28	6
Gulu092519-3	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	20	5
Gulu092519-2	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	28	8
Gulu092519-1	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	30	6
Gulu092519-8	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	26	3
Gulu092519-7	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	24	9
Gulu092519-9	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	30	11
Guku092519-10	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	33	12
Gulu092519-11	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	35	3
Gulu092519-12	9/25/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	28	6
Gulu092619-5	9/26/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	18	3
Gulu092619-7	9/26/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	18	12
Gulu092619-6	9/26/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	40	12
Gulu092619-4	9/26/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	40	12
Gulu092619-3	9/26/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	20	4
Gulu092619-2	9/26/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	35	4
Gulu092619-1	9/26/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	38	10

Gulu092719-1	9/27/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	28	5
Gulu092719-2	9/27/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	24	3
Gulu092719-3	9/27/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Male	36	4
Gulu092719-4	9/27/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	38	5
Gulu092719-5	9/27/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	30	6
Gulu092719-6	9/27/2019	Gulu	South Sudan	N/A	Female	35	6
011019-6	10/1/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	32	6
Y011019-5	10/1/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	33	6
Y011019-4	10/1/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	31	2
11019-3	10/1/2019	Kampala	Sudan	N/A	Female	30	6
11019-2	10/1/2019	Kampala	South Sudan	N/A	Female	35	3
100119-1	10/1/2019	Kampala	Sudan	N/A	Male	31	2
021019-6	10/2/2019	Kampala	D. R. Congo	Shi	Female	19	2
021019-4	10/2/2019	Kampala	Eritrea	N/A	Female	19	2
021019-3	10/2/2019	Kampala	Eritrea	N/A	Female	18	2
021019-2	10/2/2019	Kampala	Eritrea	N/A	Female	18	2
021019-1	10/2/2019	Kampala	Eritrea	N/A	Female	32	2
031019-6	10/3/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Male	18	3
031019-5	10/3/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	22	2
031019-4	10/3/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Male	20	3
031019-3	10/3/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	22	4
031019-2	10/3/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Female	25	4
031019-1	10/3/2019	Kampala	Burundi	N/A	Male	27	4