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Slave Ship Ahoy, Black to Anarchy: A Spatial Lineage of Black Politics

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Abstract

This dissertation provides a socio-spatial account of black anarchism that emerges from a central concern with the practice of slaves' jumps from the slave ship. It demonstrates how a substantive theoretical attention to these jumps generates possibilities for thinking about black radical politics differently. Through death, mobility, destruction, and escape, the jump communicates criticisms of the existing anti-black world. This dissertation argues that the form of total refusal enacted in the slave jumping from the slave ship contains an anatomy of black anarchism that can be seen in other areas of challenge or interruption to colonial-racial regimes regulating the location and mobility of black populations including the voyages of the Black Star Line, the 1965 Watts Rebellion, and Assata Shakur's escape from prison. In its other forms, the jumps elaborate the collective, cataclysm, and abolition. In tracing this lineage of black anarchism through the spatial environments it contests, this dissertation also presents a different origin story of our carceral state. Each chapter illustrates the slave ship's legacy of black confinement, demonstrating how its principles have been reinscribed in various institutional forms so as to extend the state of capture. In so doing, this dissertation contends that contemporary spatialities of anti-black discipline, from enslavement to mass incarceration, are better understood when we begin with the slave ship rather than colorblind conceptions of the convict ship or the panopticon. The purpose is to examine the ways that both detention and mobility are twinned necessities in the racial regimes of the modern era as well as indicate how processes of confinement constitute racial and gendered hierarchies. In addition, this dissertation argues that while localized, exertions of spatial disruption work to institute new social relations and ways of being that exist both against the colonial-racial state and Western norms of political participation as world-questioning politics.

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For Frances, Connie, and Susan.

And for Pip.

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Introduction
Black Anarchism Past

> *just bury me in the ocean with my ancestors that jumped from the ships because they knew death was better than bondage*
>
> —N'Jadaka / Erik "Killmonger" Stevens
> *Black Panther* (2018)

Killmonger's provocative dismissal of King T'Challa's proposition to heal him instead of letting him die at the conclusion of Marvel's *Black Panther* is telling. It has indeed been the source of anguish, disdain, and celebration amongst moviegoers and critics since the film's opening in February 2018. In the film, black politics is irretrievably split between the "radicalized" kill mongering American Erik Stevens and the African royal T'Challa hell-bent against colonial encroachment. It is a juxtaposition that while lovingly nuanced at times through the work of director and co-writer Ryan Coogler, seemingly rests on a divide between the illegitimate claim of Killmonger to the throne of Wakanda and the impervious stance of the Black Panther to the outside world. By the end of the film, T'Challa decides to open Wakanda to outsiders, persuaded by both his father T'Chaka's abandonment of Killmonger in the United States as well as the wish of Nakia, a Wakandan undercover operative and his former lover, to have Wakanda assist in foreign aid. T'Challa's choice to forge a relationship between Wakanda and the world as one of benefactor and beneficiary is starkly different than his cousin Killmonger's vision of arming the oppressed to rise up and take control from the oppressors. The line drawn almost seems geographic as Killmonger, of Wakandan blood but hailing from Oakland, California, and T'Challa born and raised in Wakandan tradition are respectively marked by their African-American and African roots. They come to us as almost typically simplistic instantiations of American Black Power militancy and Afrocentrist politics, where the audience is asked to condemn the former for his attempt to arm the

masses as well as venerate the latter as a symbol of African self-determination, civilization, and technological innovation unassimilable to Western influence, as if the two orientations are discrete and opposed. Killmonger is vilified not only through his seemingly illegitimate claim to Wakanda but his military background, that is, his participation in U.S. imperialism. The regal T'Challa is equally celebrated by audiences for his fairness and resolve when confronted with the chance to kill the villain Ulysses Klau. Then there is Everett Ross, the CIA agent who is absolved of any participation in the American war machine through his bodily sacrifice to save Nakia. The West, while omniscient throughout the film as the colonizing outsider, is also signified through Agent Ross as rational, assistive, and morally astute, as the good white man. The black politics that Killmonger and T'Challa come to represent are defined by their response to those like Ross, to white supremacy, and to Western imperialism.

While conspicuously opposed in many ways, their claims to power are both fashioned through claims to a royal lineage and an ascription to centralized and hierarchized power. That is why Killmonger's last words become even more powerful and surprising, but all the more welcome. To invoke the slaves who jump the slave ship as ancestors is to place radical black politics within its lineage, that is, to name those slaves rebels and resistors of enslavement. But the invocation also offers us a different black politics, one that is animated by a different disruption of the requirements and relationships drawn by a colonial-racial terms of order. This black politics, while sharing concerns with that of Killmonger and T'Challa in terms of black life and death, does not ascribe to the centralization of power in empire, and hinges on a different substance of refusal. While Killmonger aims to usurp the Western state from an overthrown Wakanda and T'Challa represents a non-Western state in newly formed conversation with other states, the slaves who

Killmonger names signify a refusal of state by attempting to literally abandon the social order (of enslavement) embodied in the slave ship. Arguably over-simplified in Killmonger's assertion of death over slavery, the slaves who jumped the slave ship were indeed contesting a life founded on bondage through a practice of self-activated death. In this practice, they defied the very property relations that undergird state power by denying their bodies, their lives, and even their deaths as the proprietary right established and governed by white authority.

The refusal encapsulated in the slaves' jumps from the slave ship are the center of this dissertation, providing its guiding force. Centering the slave's jumps from the slave ship has meant thinking differently about how colonial-racial authority functions and, in turn, how the refusal of capture may animate an alternative black political orientation. Ironically, it may allow us to understand Killmonger as jumping the ship, violently rejecting the West as that oppressive carceral space that has governed his relation to the world. The slave's jump often appears in unlikely places, but only unlikely because we have not yet understood these places as themselves fashioning the colonial-racial relations of the world. This project's impetus was actually found on a ship that at first glance did not appear to represent this world, in the practice of a fictional young black boy whose own jump did not immediately reveal itself as a refusal. Amongst the crew and officers in Herman Melville's *Moby-Dick* is young Pip, the only African American aboard and "the most insignificant of the Pequod's crew." The story is narrated by Ishmael, the only survivor of Captain Ahab's monomaniacal quest for revenge against a giant white whale that had bitten off his lower leg during a previous encounter. At chapter ninety-three, Pip jumps twice from the whaling boat and into the ocean, and against the orders of his overseer Stubb. He survives, but his remaining days aboard the ship are marked by seemingly incoherent uttering and a designation of madness

issued by the rest of the crew. Though not a main character in Melville's opus, Pip provokes our thinking on the slave position and radical political practice on multiple occasions but is largely ignored. This has resulted in a rather conventional political horizon, one that has depoliticized his position on the ship and elided an alternative black reading of the novel's political significance by limiting what is representable based on a Western liberal democratic tradition. Standing unsteadily amidships, Pip offers us an account of the black position, and his jumps in defiance of a colonial-racial order allow for a significant discussion of black anarchism as they demonstrate both the possibilities and precarity of refusal.

Pip's jumps occur during his most famous scene in the novel, "The Castaway," when Pip takes over for an injured after-oarsman and must work in one of the fishing boats for Stubb, the second mate on the ship. The action begins when Pip "leaps, paddle in hand, out of the boat." Choked by the line and blue in the face, Pip is suspended between the boat and the chased whale, but is finally and halfheartedly cut from his entanglement. Stubb castigates Pip, "Stick to the boat, Pip, or by the Lord, I won't pick you up if you jump; mind that. We can't afford to lose whales by the likes of you; a whale would sell for thirty times what you would, Pip, in Alabama." But Pip jumps again and this time he does not get caught in the line, instead left behind after "he fell so rapidly astern," drowning in the miles of shoreless ocean, "the intense concentration of self in the middle of such a heartless immensity."[1] When he is finally rescued by the trailing ship, Pip is no longer himself, but speaking in third person, later reciting his own fugitive slave advertisement, and waxing prophetic to the ignorance of the crew. Even much later in the story when asked who he is, Pip can only respond in "ancient tongues" according to the crew, "Bell-boy, sir; ship's-crier; ding, dong, ding! Pip! Pip! Pip!."[2] Pip has been considered numerous times by scholars, albeit

fleetingly, yet dominant political interpretations of the novel have argued that Pip's fall into madness is a result of a transcendental experience where reason gives way to wisdom and that Pip foreshadows the tragic demise of the ship as a whole.[3] This limited focus has foreclosed both an analysis of the correlation between Stubb's excoriation of Pip and Pip's jumps (and subsequent insanity) as well as Pip's precarious position in relation to the rest of the crew. In these moments, Pip's place is exposed, informing us that though he sails aboard this whaling ship, his value remains calculable only in terms of his slave price.

The reference to the auction block becomes the vehicle for the specter of chattel slavery that haunts the ship and reframes the relation of second mate and after-oarsman as master and slave. It reveals Pip's precarious position no matter how far he may be from the plantation. In the elision of this relation and its connection to Pip's jumps, scholars lose sight of the colonial-racial formation of a Western social and spatial order that separates the white men of authority and those non-white men of none. In so doing, these scholars also lose sight of Pip's jumps as a political renunciation. Pip, "the lowest of the low" in 1851, caught between the statuses of free and slave, revokes the rules set forth by Stubb, and jumps. He pushes off the boat's structuration, rejecting its socio-spatial arrangement, and leaps into a deeply expansive, but altogether uncertain, ocean with no knowledge of what is to come. His jumps propose a new relation to the ship and its crew, demonstrating a new way of being that is not meant to exist, outside the confines of the ship's wooden frame. And only after his jumps does he speak of a world where the black boy is no longer beholden to the white in an idiom that the rest of the crew fails to understand. Not only are his oceanic jumps politically illegible but his discursive reaction to the jump is taken as babble. I am interested in thinking about two questions, which are raised by reading Pip in this way: What do

his jumps do so as to ostracize him from the rest of the crew? And why can no one understand him?

The jump comes to us via Ishmael's narration, where understanding of Pip's suffering and protest is suspended in return for a reflection on Ishmael himself. That is, Ishmael concludes the chapter on Pip, the proximate to black suffering as such in the novel, with his own abandonment. Ishmael turns Pip into a speculation of his own relationship to the world. In his narration, Pip's jump and ensuing self-narration are foreclosed as cowardice and babble. Ishmael's narration determines our apprehension of the jump, what Gayatri Spivak calls a "speaking for."[4] I propose that we turn our attention elsewhere when considering Pip's jumps, looking instead at the conditions and effects of his oceanic vault beyond the confines of white authority. Pip's jumps exert a racial disorder, but one that confronts a crisis of incomprehensibility established and sustained by the foreclosure of the challenge's referent, the order that is disordered. I believe that black anarchism provides that elsewhere.

A black anarchist reading breaks through the parameters of the novel's conventional reading even if the imaginaries that it proposes are disavowed via the narrator's authority. Pip's oceanic landing signifies the action's threat, its promise to exceed temporal and spatial boundaries to which the polis seeks to confine him as these boundaries set the terms of political participation. Peeling at the political resonance of Pip's jumps, I look to anarchist theory to cultivate an understanding of his act as a radical political practice. In particular, an instance of black politics that exerts a racial chaos. In terms of radical politics, the reading of Melville's tale that has been the most successful is a Marxist one, a lens that seems to fall short in properly analyzing both Pip's position and his political practice. Where a Marxian analysis centers the capitalist economic

system that produces and reproduces wage labor, which accounts for the focus on the worker, my reading requires the centrality of the racial other. Alan Heimert has argued that the first mates represent the three sections of the United States: Starbuck the New Englander, Stubb from the West, and Flask the Southerner. Their respective harpooners, on the other hand, represent the races that each American region founded their prosperity on, where Starbuck has the Pacific Islander Queequeg, Stubb's squire is the Native American Tashtego, and Flask sits squarely on the shoulders of the African Daggoo.[5] In the divisions drawn on the boat, it is the racial boundaries that serve to structure its coherence, dividing the men of authority, either as officers of the boat or of the story itself—in the case of Ishmael—from the abject. The frame of Marxism takes the pairing of labor and capital as its mode of organization, but this manner of reading maintains a number of blind spots. To render Pip a representative of the ship's working class shields his specificity from view and subsequently misreads his jump. And yet, what a Marxist analysis truly misses in the case of this whale tale is the boat. Anarchism's contestation of Marxist political philosophy has often been aimed at the latter's recuperation of state authority, that is, its embrace of the state as instrument, an instrument to be used for the benefits of working class power.[6] Thus, C.L.R. James' analysis of *Moby-Dick*, candidly Marxist in its appraisal, while taking direct aim at the totalitarianism of both Ahab and Ishmael as he lambasts capital's stranglehold on the crew, never comes to question the structure of political authority itself.[7] In other words, James never deals with the structural coherence of the boat; James, rather, aims to supplant the authority and steer the boat in an alternative direction. An anarchist politics, on the other hand, aims to abandon the boat. By revoking political authority *in toto*, without rejecting power outright, anarchism is a practice of disorder. Saul Newman's iteration of anarchism consists of a "learning to live beyond

the law and the state through the invention of new spaces and practices for freedom and autonomy." He argues that radical politics must move beyond the overturning of institutions and "[attack] the much more problematic relation through which the subject is enthralled to and dependent upon power."[8] If we take this to be true, Pip becomes the anarchist par excellence. Pip refuses a governing structure of race, the colonial processes that both establish and maintain classifications of hierarchical difference. In doing so, Pip works to move "beyond the shadow of the sovereign" and reveal the very relation that structures his and its coherence.[9]

My understanding of anarchism outlines a form of political practice that is not only in opposition to a centralized authority in a unitary state but rejects pre-figurative and fully fledged political ideology. I am offering anarchism as a method or practice. Anarchy, as a political practice, simultaneously rejects and reveals the social order's boundaries as both exploitative and imprisoning.[10] Taking an anarchist orientation means reading Pip's jumps differently, thinking about how his jumps may indeed exceed and oppose the confines of the ship's polity and the structures that establish it. Yet, Anarchist theory has largely suffered from an absence of engagement with the deep histories of the racial paradigm birthed by the West. In fact, Anarchist thought has historically denied its relationship to black politics, often instead adhering to class-based understandings of society's functions.[11] Black populations have long practiced extra-state political resistance, inflected by anarchism in centuries of struggle against white supremacy. Anarchist movements, for their part, include a long history of black militants and adhere to a philosophy of anti-authoritarianism that has strong links to black movements. Yet, as black anarchist groups have pointed out, black anarchist politics has been deceptively absent in the existing literature, rooted in classical anarchism's adherence to Western universalism which

"actively mutes" its relationship to blackness.[12] In fact, Newman's call to "affirm [power] by working with this world" and renegotiate for the purpose of new possibilities comes from a privileged position that is of this world.[13] Black anarchism, on the other hand, must always negotiate its position as *in* the world but not *of* it, as it confronts and rejects its very racial structure. By supplementing this political approach with 'black,' an anarchist orientation is altered to center an understanding of society as materially and discursively structured by colonial-racial authority, rather than simply capital.

To think about *black anarchism* is to reveal the productive intersection of anarchist modalities and black radical politics. The coupling of black and anarchism, then, is not superfluous. While radically reorienting anarchist practice, it simultaneously appeals to new geographies of black life that refuse to labor through a reconfiguration of the current order susceptible to reproducing white domination. Thus, with this accretion and substitution, the black in *black anarchism* signifies an exertion against and beyond white containment, an introduction of racial disorder that undermines the unitary state of the West and disrupts the governance of the colonial-racial order. In this way, the jump from the slave ship, read through my conceptualization of black anarchy, may indeed express "lines of flight out of Empire."[14] In this formulation, rather than a set of intentions, black anarchism exerts a mode of practice that institutes new imaginaries.

Richard Iton conceptualizes the black fantastic from a similar perspective, as the sensibilities and activities that "transcend the prevailing notions of the aesthetic and the predominance of the state as the sole frame for subject formation and progressive and transformative discourse and mobilization."[15] In *In Search of the Black Fantastic,* Iton's references to his concept the black fantastic are brief, but it is "meant to refer to the minor-key sensibilities

generated from the experiences of the underground, the vagabond, and those constituencies marked as deviant—notions of being that are inevitably aligned within, in conversation with, against, and articulated beyond the boundaries of the modern."[16] With the black fantastic, Iton provides a meditation that is meant to guide the rest of his text as it undermines the distinction and reconstructs the relationship between politics and popular culture, the book's major thrust. One can take up this concept as cogitation on black anarchism, using and extending Iton's notion to rethink those deviant and often neglected practices. Like the black fantastic, black anarchism is also what Zora Neale Hurston could term a double descriptive[17] insomuch as black politics and anarchism seem to emerge and exist in constant confrontation with the powers of the state, embodying the "spirit of revolt."[18] Furthermore, as Black Anarchist Ashanti Alston argues, black culture has always been oppositional, forced to "creatively resist oppression."[19] Black anarchist practice demonstrates a "willingness to engage time, space, and other modalities outside of the given parameters."[20] As such, the absence of prefiguration within my conceptualization of black anarchism is as much about a lack of a preemptive crystalized ideology that sets to determine the outcomes of practices of disorganization, as it is an agnosticism. Black anarchism proceeds without the alternative in view but attempts to bare new socialities. These practices suggest new visions during a time, to borrow the words of Iton, "characterized by the dismissal of any possibilities beyond the already existing."[21] So, rather than focus on the myriad reasons for Pip's jumps, which are nonetheless important, the nomination of black anarchism is meant to invoke his jumping overboard as an anticipatory opposition to the colonial-racial order that is meant to orient him.

Pip brought to me a question that is central to the rest of this dissertation: how can we better understand a politics of refusal of racial authority? In truth, the purpose of this dissertation is not

to apply big-A Anarchist theory to black practices in the hopes of defining them as black anarchism. Instead, this project seeks a theoretical understanding of black anarchism through the entanglement of black political thought and anarchism *emerging from* black practices of refusal, those nonrepresentational and nonreproductive jumps from the slave ship in other places and times. It is as much a critique of white Anarchism as it is a critique of the Western liberal tradition. It also works to intervene in discussions of black politics that privilege the state and civil rights, by taking seriously the "right to struggle for freedom by any means necessary" and reconsidering the black in black politics as not simply an indication of the race of its participants, but an "oppositional thinking" and "oppositional risks."[22] Black anarchism moves to go beyond the horizons set forth by existing Western political traditions in anticipation of something else elsewhere.

Oceanic Elsewheres

Its impetus being Pip's leap in *Moby Dick* and the jumps of those slaves held captive in Middle Passage slave ships, it comes to little surprise that this project begins on the ocean. The ocean, the Atlantic Ocean in particular, has long been central to any understanding of African and African-American history. As such, it has also been crucial to any understanding of contemporary black life and positionality. In many ways, the history that has been foreclosed to blacks is in the ocean, littered amongst its depths in debris, wood and metal, flesh and bone. Yet, to simply look to the ocean for artefacts is only to skim its surface. The sea also lends us a method, one that forces us to consider the simultaneity of past and present—the debris spanning centuries across the same oceanic floor, coming up for air across the same epipelagic zone. To look to the ocean invites us to consider across, between, and through chronological time, asking us, maybe even telling us, that

we must move beyond discrete temporal periods. It becomes imperative to think through a collection of jumps from racial ships that have long been separated from simultaneous consideration. We are moved to consider not only the longue durée of black confinement and capture, but their oceanic connections rooted in a history of slavery and its contemporary afterlives. When moving past a land bias, it becomes apparent that the ocean, rather than separating, is actually connecting. While many believed, like those captains of the *Leusden* and the *Zong* who sent their human cargo to their deaths[23], that the ocean would cleanse a violent history, this is merely an illusion. An oceanic method instead elucidates a complicated and terrifying story of white life at the expense of black death, one that must be examined with new optics that are not beholden to the West's colonizing discipline and violent temporalities.

The Chapters

This project begins by elucidating a theorization of black anarchism and contextualizing it within carceral geographies. Chapter 1 sets the frame of the dissertation through an analysis of slaves jumping the slave ship. Taking a spatial approach, the chapter introduces the concept of Western spatiality from which to understand the carceral geographies that serve as the sites for the remaining chapters as productions of space that establish and maintain the colonial-racial order. This then provides the context to appreciate the political force of practices of spatial disruption. The chapter goes on to contest any reading of the slave's jump from the slave ship as nonpolitical by demonstrating its nonreproductive thrust against racial authority as an indication of black anarchist politics. In this vein, this chapter also seeks to explain how and why the slave's jump from the slave ship is sometimes silenced as rebellion's less worthy cousin by interrogating the

pressure the jump places on our political imaginaries. In part, this includes a consideration of how race and gender simultaneously structure black anarchist possibilities as well as their popular consumption. Working through the political anatomy of the slave's jump from the slave ship, this chapter also briefly introduces three emphases that can be used to define a recapitulation of black anarchism: collectivity, cataclysm, and abolition.

The remaining chapters continue from the twinned metaphor outlined in chapter one of the slave's jump and the slave ship to understand each chapter's political practice as a disruption and refusal of (a) carceral geography. These chapters examine and expand facets of black anarchism that are briefly introduced in the first chapter. Chapter 2 considers the voyages of the Black Star Line, the shipping line of Marcus Garvey and the United Negro Improvement Association, as black anarchist practices of diaspora. The chapter uses the Black Star Line to reconceptualize the black diaspora as an anti-state modality, one that highlights the "participatory connection between the individual and the collective" in defiance of the white imperial authority that upholds the sanctity of the nation-state.[24] It demonstrates how the black diasporic movement of the Black Star Line calls attention to and refuses the segregation and sedentarization of the white West. In doing so, the chapter disrupts the overwhelming narration of the Black Star Line as an economic failure to reconsider its symbolic and collectivizing power while simultaneously questioning Anarchism's own imperialism, including how the state it contests and the state contested by black anarchism may indeed be different. In part, the motivation for beginning the series of different 'jumps from slave ships' with a focus on the Black Star Line was to consider the significance of a black ship, but it was also to trouble the assumption that any organizational extension of Garvey was beyond the reach of a black anarchist orientation.

The final two chapters take on carceral geographies more concretely, demonstrating how the ghetto and the prison by design can be understood within the carceral lineage of the slave ship. Chapter 3 examines the urban ghetto of the mid to late 20th century Watts neighborhood in Los Angeles, California as a 'concrete slave ship,' one that similarly determines black life and death through its draconian spatial architectures and heavy policing. Within this context, the chapter explores the Watts Rebellion of 1965 as a black anarchistic practice of cataclysm. Together, this spatiality and practice constitute the axis of this chapter because I wanted to think differently and productively about destruction as offering its own intellect of refusal. Resituating destruction as an anticipatory and creative act rather than a futile practice of catharsis as the Rebellion was sometimes figured, the chapter emphasizes the revolt as a direct action that critically asks questions of property, privatization, and citizenship governed by the Western spatiality of the state. By examining the moral panic immanent in countless citizen letters to the California governor as well as journalistic coverage, I argue that the revolt can be gleaned as a cataclysmic threat to whiteness' authority over black people and black spaces.

The dissertation concludes with an examination of the prison and the criminalization of black politics introduced through the example of Assata Shakur, her escape from prison, and the autobiography detailing her carceral journey. Chapter 4 returns us to the slave ship by presenting it as a third origin story of the prison that interrupts the dominant genealogies within carceral studies emerging from the work of Michel Foucault (*Discipline and Punish*) and Michelle Alexander (*The New Jim Crow)*, by centering the black imprisoned subject and the history of chattel slavery, as well as beginning to enunciate the entanglement of movement and punishment. The chapter then moves to a concern with how this carceral entanglement emerges in the

criminalization of black people and black politics through the matter of 'vagrancy,' which always already paraphrases a critique and prohibition of black political practice and movement. In looking to Assata Shakur's escape from prison and the autobiography's arguable 'absenting' of this escape, the chapter also examines how black surreptitious movement is used to contest practices and spaces of incarceration in a black anarchist politics of abolition. I argue that the absence of a section on her escape also demonstrates how an abolitionist politics interrupts the cycles of reproduction and representation, those "declarative cul-de-sacs" that Western politics and even black politics often become mired in.[25] Beginning with the slaves who jumped from the slave ship, this dissertation deliberately ends with a return to escape to think about how secrecy and ultimately abandonment may provide an alternative aperture for black liberation from this world.

Black Anarchism's Jump

In the same way that the slaves' jumps from the slave ship seem to come up for air in the unlikely place of a novel about a whaling ship, black anarchist practices bubble just below the surface of our conventional studies and observations on black politics. They introduce a new modality of black politics, a self-activated exertion of racial chaos that bridges the individual act with the collective, an anticipatory cataclysm, and a nonrepresentational abolition. They are a radicalization that often does not, or cannot, make sense within traditional Western political spheres. In this way, the slaves' jumps from the slave ship do not only embody a rejection of the existing world as a set of material relations, but also exemplify a frustration of this world's political logics, delineating their white imperialist shape. Despite Ishmael's disavowals and displacements, Pip's jumps emerge from and animate Melville's story until the very end, demanding we reckon

with this refusal qua dissolution—the deed that exceeds the demand—even though this world often fails to, and this dissertation begins to do so.

Chapter 1
Slavery

> *It requires much caution at first, in allowing them to go on deck, as it is a common practice for them to jump overboard to get quit of their misery.*
> —John Woolman[1]

> *we can and we may, as it were, jump with both feet off the ground into or towards a world of which we trust the other parts to meet our jump.*
> —William James[2]

In 1910, Emma Goldman wrote to correct the narrative of what Anarchism "Really Stands For." In the piece, she declared that "Anarchism urges man to think, to investigate, to analyze every proposition."[3] The greatest error of Goldman's anarchist contemporaries and descendants has been their failure to turn that mirror towards themselves in relation to race. In part, my exegesis of black political practices as black anarchism reflects Goldman's call as well as a critique of Anarchism's lacunae staged by challenging its intellectual imperialism. While taking up some principles shared within the Anarchist tradition, black anarchism begins at a radically different set of circumstances than that of Anarchism. These colonial-racial circumstances have meant that black anarchism differs in its emphasis because it emerges from an entirely different understanding of the foundations of society.

As Süreyyya Evren argues, the Anarchist movement is almost always thought of as "founded in nineteenth-century Europe as an idea practiced and applied in Europe and then imitated in other parts of the world."[4] This origin story not only places Europeans as central to the project of Anarchism, but defines Anarchism as a set of ideas that then flourishes into a practice, to be emulated elsewhere. This assertion implies that in the non-Western world, all anarchism is a mimicry of the (European) West and thereby a subscription to European Anarchist tenets. My own

turn away from pre-figurative politics as a basis of anarchism is rooted in both this problematic imagined lineage as well as a distrust of the claim that "revolutionary means must mirror desired ends."[5] Black anarchism stands counter to the requirement of a vision that fits within Anarchism to be considered anarchism. While Anarchism's claim of means and ends stems from a concern with egalitarian organizing practices and arguably does not presume to know how actions will exceed intentions, the certainty with which Anarchism has assumed to know the trajectory of means and ends has, in fact, shaped and displaced their engagement with black political practices on many occasions. This is indeed what spurs George Ciccariello-Maher's scathing critique of Anarchism's dismissal of black thinkers like Fanon and what has historically caused friction between Black Anarchist thinkers like Ashanti Alston, Kuwasi Balagoon, and Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin and white Anarchist camps in the latter's inattention to and contempt for black Nationalist politics. In placing such strong emphasis on pre-figurative politics, Anarchism's focus on European thinkers and the European experience has evacuated itself of any central concern with the racial foundations of the modern world. For this reason, many of the practices that I will explore in this and the following chapters contravenes the foundations of white Anarchist thought. For white Anarchism, class is both the reason and the stage on which the war with the state is waged because class is the primary hierarchy imagined to structure and determine white life. White Anarchist thought has not simply alienated the black experience but has declared itself impervious to the many invocations and provocations of black political thought borne of the lived social reality of the colonial-racial order. As such, exploring black anarchism not only aims to determine the critical content of these practiced provocations but also to trace the outline of whiteness and anti-blackness[6] within multiple strains of Western political thought, especially Anarchism. This

dissertation follows the anarchist impulse, not only in recapitulating its anticipatory and anti-authority stance within already existing black political practices, but in questioning white Anarchism itself for its adherence to a European lineage and Enlightenment rationalism which continues to propose "analytically consistent [alternatives]" that fail to account for white supremacy as *the* authority itself.[7] To prioritize the white Anarchist vision over the black anarchist practice has functioned as an assent to anarchist imperialisms and white imaginations, making those pernicious violences that shape black everyday life even more extant yet invisible by placing white supremacy under further cover. To consider black anarchism is then to decipher the points of contact and contention with the white Anarchist tradition by looking to black practices that appear to introduce their own anarchist orientations in their exertion against carceral geographies established and maintained by colonial-racial authority. I begin with the practice of slaves jumping the slave ship as an understudied subversion of this authority that reveals an "intellect of insurrection," that is, I look to the slaves' jumps from the slave ship as providing their own intellectual analysis of the world. In this way, the slaves' jumps from the slave ship is a critique, "a permanent state of questioning," that interrupts the established value of the slave's life and embodies an alternative way of being.[8] To consider Marcuse's formulation then, the slaves' jumps offer us black anarchism as a praxis that "emerges in the struggle against violence and exploitation where this struggle is waged for essentially new ways and forms of life."[9] I turn to that praxis now.

In the daily log for the British slaver <u>*Lawrance*</u>, on 4 October 1730 alongside a note about the breeze, there lies a clipped line that goes almost unnoticed in the countless yards of microfilm: "last night two of our woman slaves Jumpt overboard but being brisk loosed the boats and got them again."[10] References such as these are not easily found, often lost amongst the litany of abuses

experienced by African slaves and perpetrated by white masters. The archive of the enslaved jumping the slave ship is scattered across a variety of sources and information is generally cursory. Scholars have done quick work of naming these moments when they can be found, but across the literature on slavery they have been superseded by armed uprisings and plantation runaways in analyses related to resistance. These black slaves, oftentimes black women, launched themselves into the ocean and in doing so disarranged the constitutive colonial relationships of the slave trade. But little attention has been paid to this practice's political anatomy in comparison to allegedly more direct forms of resistance. What provokes our hesitation about the slave who jumps? The answer to this question is of course manifold. For one, it does not seem to be coincidental that the rebellious acts primarily carried out by enslaved black women have been repeatedly neglected. As it pertains to maritime slavery, black women were involved in ship takeovers and armed insurrections, often using the stereotypes of docility and submissiveness against the crewmen that held them. However, their participation in this arena has always been entangled with assumptions that such tactics were in greater part the result of enslaved men. Whether or not this assumption is factual has little bearing on the ways in which other forms of protest have been (mis)understood because of this gendered premise. The belief that armed resistance was more often than not a male enterprise meant that armed resistance was given a more sustained analysis. The forms and sites of protest that were by majority the pursuit of black women were often overlooked and understudied. In the case of "slave ship runaways," even though this sometimes included black men, the jump itself has been feminized as a surrender.[11] It would not be farfetched to consider the ways in which this feminization has also contributed to the lack of appreciation of the slaves' jumps from the slave jump. Furthermore, the difficulty of making sense of the slaves' jumps from

the slave ship for questions related to resistance has often revolved around the complicated matter of 'suicide.'[12] This is not to imply that 'suicide' lacks a political quality. In fact, its politicization is a primary reason that the term cannot account for the form of dissent that this dissertation attempts to examine. White abolitionists during the eighteenth century such as Benjamin Lundy, William Lloyd Garrison, and Lydia Maria Child depicted slave suicides as "final and peculiarly feminine capitulations to the inescapable, toxic hegemony of Slave Power," while black abolitionists like Henry Highland Garnett and Joshua Bowen Smith venerated them as acts of principled resistance to tyranny.[13] While white abolitionists used black bodies to punctuate the aberration of slavery and black abolitionists recognized the slave's desire for freedom, both camps confine the discussion to questions of morality and, possibly of greater bearing, assume knowledge of what they simply cannot know the entirety of. I choose not to use the word 'suicide' to describe slaves jumps not only in an attempt to resist the urge of assigning justifications to the practices of the enslaved but because often the term 'suicide' implies intentions that are simply beyond the scope of the known. This is not however to ignore the importance of death as an interruption of enslavement, but it is to recast it in the political without recourse to measurements of the *desire* to die, or, for that matter, to live. I consider the politicality of slaves jumps from the slave ship as a practice *of* death, mobility, and destruction that confronts, opposes, and interrupts the system of enslavement. The principal point is not to disavow the desire for resistance but that to consider how and what the jump resists offers an alternative approach to defining its political form, differing from those accounts of resistance during the Middle Passage which are sometimes animated by diagnostic descriptions of intentions. In many ways, this methodological approach is dictated by the archive of slavery itself. To even name the practice a 'suicide' or 'self-destruction' requires an

access to the interiority of those slaves who did indeed jump the slave ship that, as stated, is often unavailable. Further, 'self-destruction' bears a sense of agency that runs counter to the inhuman conditions of compulsion and coercion that structure the world of enslavement for the slave. Seen as unproductive and incidental, the resonance of struggle for black liberation that is expressed in the slaves' jumps is frequently obscured as the slaves' jumps from the slave ship stand in tension with over-determinations of efficacy, calculated along a scale overwhelmed by the simultaneous constitution of blackness and gender. To tease out this tension I will illustrate the multiple and converging ways in which the form, site, and progenitors of protest circumscribe our interpretations of what it means to practice radical politics, and consider how the threat of the unknown and the chaotic violation of white sovereign will intersect with the "production and containment of [raced and] gendered difference."[14] Enslaved black women's jumps from the seafaring architecture of colonial-racial governance not only question our raced-gendered conceptions of rebellion, but also disclose and refuse a Western liberal thrust of reproduction.

Yet, the scene of the slave jumping the slave ship has not been substantively analyzed as black politics, that which disrupts the requirements and relationships drawn by a colonial-racial terms of order. This chapter will demonstrate how slaves' jumps from the slave ship embodies a black politics by providing an account of how this oft-repeated scenario advances features of black anarchism, an instance of black politics that exerts a racial chaos in violation of the centralized authority of whiteness that structures the colonial-racial order. The slaves who jump the slave ship illume an ever-expansive white authority at the dehumanizing cost of the slave position and disruptively reinhabit the immobilizing boundaries that constitute the racial order aboard the ship. To a large degree, the slave who jumps the slave ship provides a schematic for this dissertation's

concern with black anarchism, both its critical content as well as its illumination of the white boundaries of Western liberalism and Western Anarchism alike. The jumps express an "abolition of all constraints," by interrupting the fundamental system of constraint, enslavement.[15] From an Anarchist perspective, the jump could be the ultimate expression of the "sovereignty of the individual" within the context of enslavement.[16] Yet, one might argue then that shipboard mutinies receive the attention that slaves' jumps do not because the former invokes the mass while the latter is restricted to the individual. Indeed, in some scholarship that concerns itself with slave resistance the distinction has been made between "subtle resistance," to which jumping overboard has been assigned, and "band resistance."[17] Eric Robert Taylor even defines revolt as an action that must involve at least two individuals, claiming that suicide and escape can only be considered resistance because they are personal and individual practices.[18] However, Black Anarchists have argued that black anarchism can be defined by an assumption of a "participatory connection between the individual and the collective," from which we can aver that the direct action of an individual, in its contestation of the order that defines and assembles collections of people, is always an invocation of the collective. Furthermore, it was a repeated practice, not one that could be limited to an individual if only by virtue of the fact that when one jumped, others followed.

Yet, this is not the only reason that slaves' jumps have not been given their due attention as a political practice. Like Richard Iton's black fantastic, the jump brings into "the field of play practices and ritual spaces that are often cast as beyond the reasonable and relevant—to the point, indeed, of being unrecognizable as politics."[19] Challenging the colonial-racial unitary state, but running counter to dominant definitions of political opposition, the practice of jumping the slave ship sits uncomfortably in an archive that cannot bear it, a seemingly incomprehensible practice.

However, this chapter makes no attempt to recover it as resistance for the purposes of offering a corrective, and instead aims to appreciate its unrecognizability. That is to say, it aims to comprehend the critical purchase of the jump as it enunciates the limit of our political understanding and offers one glimpse at the antagonism of black anarchistic protest to the West and Western political thought. This means reckoning with the conceptual difficulty of destruction as black politics, with cataclysm in excess of demands, with the anticipatory promise of abolition, but also the risk of death. While the countless ripples of her splash signal the extent to which the jumps from the slave ship generate a force against enslavement, the perils of the oceanic space also illustrate their precarity. The slaves' jumps from the slave ship were a point of rupture along the boundaries of a socio-spatial order of containment that depended on white rule and were also an almost certain death. In this way they indicate a tension for our understanding of radical disorganization and the possibility of new worlds. They mobilize our thinking beyond pre-figurative politics, the deed that exceeds the demand, and force us to take seriously the unknowable and unimagined as fertile ground for black politics. They simultaneously force us to take stock of our imagination's dependency on those forms of politics which may reorganize, but still reproduce, the world that we already know. The jump posits, as Fanon argues, that to "change the order of the world" requires "total disorder."[20]

How We Lose Sight of The Jump

As the vehicle of the master's truth, the life experience of the enslaved is often, if not always, lost to us. The archive is indeed "a death sentence, a tomb, a display of the violated body, an inventory of property;" it has little to say about why the slaves jump, the fortitude that must

have been required in each individual act.[21] But the practice is there, even if the jumps sit in an archive that cannot bear them. By moving the frame, a focus on practice allows us to glean not only the agency of the enslaved but how agency, as expressed in particular modes of practice, was conditioned. Hartman warns us that because of the slave's particular position as both object and subject, the question of agency requires careful consideration so as not to simply "gift" it to the enslaved in scholarly wrapping.[22] Instead, practice as a concept shifts our attention to the precarious nature of slave dissent. This precarity is twofold, not only was the agency of the slave often only recognized in terms of criminality but their agency was inadequately measured against the liberal subject's standards of autonomy. As such, not only did these dangerous practices incur gratuitous punishment, they were thrust outside of the hem of politics. This precarious position helps to further elaborate the conditions of domination that animate the production of the enslaved. Hartman calls this position a "paradoxical relation to the normative category 'person'" and claims that we must attend to it because the slaves' practices of dissent do not simply transcend the relation of domination "but rather are an index of the particular figurations of power and modes of subjection."[23] In short, focusing on practice, its transience, difficulty, and even impossibility, ushers us into a reflection on the parameters of both personhood and politics. Whether armed or non-violent, our conventional definitions of rebellion remain dependent on questions of outcomes, retroactively ascribing meaning to those practices that are deemed successful within our frame of what politics is supposed to do.[24] While at times useful, such dependence on outcomes fails to account for those political practices that fall outside the frame of 'success.' Insurance litigation provides an arguably unlikely source to explore how slaves' jumps from the slave ship can be

excised from our political landscape through a restricted attention to outcomes that come to govern the understanding of intentions, that is, the desire to be free.

Insurance litigation during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries concerning slave ships has been widely discussed by scholars interested in the dehumanization of the slave and the inherent contradictions of the slave as human cargo. Prior to 1698, the Royal African Company of England monopolized the trade in African slaves, meaning it had the ability to spread risk, making it difficult to assess whether voyages had to be insured. After 1698 however, merchants in the Atlantic slave trade became more numerous and independent insurance underwriting became much more frequent, making it easier to track and understand the constitution and effects of African slaves' commodification. Insurance litigation from this time period offers not only a history of African slaves' valuation but also provides rich source material from which one may ascertain how the language and practices of insuring slave ships has played a formative role in the intellectual lineage of slave rebellion. I argue that our conventional definitions of slave rebellion are often shaped by the same concerns that structure the work of insuring slave ships against loss in their attempt to *know* resistance.

Perhaps the most widely known and regularly cited case for the insurance of slaves aboard ships is the 1781 *Zong* massacre and its subsequent insurance litigation, a series of events in which 133 African slaves were jettisoned from a British slave ship under the auspices of 'saving' the remaining slaves from dehydration. This was done with the understanding that the ship's owners would then bring a coverage case against its insurers, which they did, claiming 'general average' and thus under the assurance that it was of absolute necessity to jettison a portion of slaves for the purposes of keeping the rest alive.[25] Along with the *Zong* case, there is considerable literature

focused on both ship owners' claims as well as insurance policies' coverage of human cargo, including claims based on losses by 'perils of the sea' and by rebellion. Even though there was no officially recognized rebellion aboard the *Zong*, scholars often refer to losses by rebellion as a counterpoint from which to understand insurance litigation concerning slaves being thrown overboard. Often amiss in these readings and recitations is the fact of slaves *jumping* overboard—as a practice of dissent. This lacuna is constructed in part by the insurance law that constitutes rebellion with a reliance on outcomes and intentionality, a calculus that cannot account for the slave's 'self-inflicted' death. As such, suicide stands awkwardly against other forms of rebellion, the excess of risk that cannot be financially accommodated.

I argue it is insurance law and litigation's dependence on an intention/outcome model that subsequently excises the jump from the political typology employed at the level of the state. While the insurance coverage of rebellion shifted throughout the 18th century—where at times death in general was not covered or rebellion was only covered if a certain mortality threshold was met—it was always marked in contradistinction to other forms of death. Slave 'suicide' also has a shifting history in the lineage of maritime and life insurance litigation. While for a time it was listed separately, British insurance policy in 1781 included suicide under the appellation 'natural death.' In Jones v Schmoll (1785) the death of slaves by suicide was narrated as an 'inherent vice,' which then determined its exclusion from the ship owners' recovery.[26] The practice of the slave jumping the slave ship, which was most often met with death in the shark-infested waters or at the hands of the crew, then bears the limits of the intentionality/outcome model of insurance litigation insomuch as coverage not only depends on if one dies and how one dies, but ties the intentionality of the slave to the outcome of their act. This bears significance insomuch as if 'unsuccessful,' the slave's

jump from the ship signifies a lack of desire for freedom. How also does this limit our understanding of 'freedom' from slavery? In the case of the enslaved black woman who jumps overboard, when the possibility of death unflinchingly demarcates a move beyond 'a life of misery,' insurance litigation equally constitutes and is constituted by a notion of rebellion that relies on a knowable future, which undermines the agnostic power of the slave's jump. By illuminating the practice of slaves jumping the slave ship not only do we throw light on the constitution of rebellion by insurance litigation, we unearth a productive tension that mobilizes political thought.

When the *Zong* set out across the Atlantic from São Tomé on 6 September 1781, it was overpopulated with African slaves. A relatively smaller ship, the *Zong* should have only carried about 193 African slaves, but instead it set out with 459 when leaving Accra—it greatly exceeded a "full complement."[27] Around 133 African slaves were thrown from the English-owned *Zong* when, allegedly running short on water, Captain Luke Collingwood ordered that they be killed in three batches in order to ensure that 'marketable' slaves would make it to their destination in Jamaica.[28] On the evening of 29 November 1781, over fifty women and children were dispatched through cabin windows; on 1 December, around forty men were cast from the quarterdeck of the ship; and afterward a third group of thirty-eight were killed.[29] The massacre would have gone relatively unnoticed had it not been for the legal case that the owners of the *Zong* raised against the ship's insurers in order to secure payment for its dead Africans. In order to turn its 'lost cargo' into profit, the ship owners attempted to claim on the ship's insurance. In a trial held in March 1783 at the Guildhall in London, a jury found in favor of the owners, thus deciding that the insurers were obligated to pay compensation under the terms of the insurance policy. This decision was

appealed, but when the Lord Chief Justice Mansfield along with Justices Buller and Willes made their decision for retrial in May 1783, they were not making a judgment on the act of killing but on whether the killing could be legally compensated, in spite of the fact that the insurers claims were rooted in a concept of humanity.[30] To this end, during the proceedings it was to be decided if the mass killing was "a matter of necessity" like the owners claimed.[31] John Lee, the Solicitor General representing the owners, argued that this was not a moral issue for the slaves were thrown overboard as property "for the preservation of the Residue…That if a hundred did not die in this way 200 must in another."[32] The insurers denied this, believing that the only legally acceptable basis for compensation of the dead African slaves would have been death due to a shipboard revolt.[33] In response, Lee claimed that had the killing not taken place, "there must have been such an insurrection,"[34] but more so that as things, the killing of the slaves "constituted a sensible jettisoning of objects."[35] Here the status of slaves as sentient beings—property that is both physically living and socially dead—emerges full force. The rationale for the killing is based not only in the fact that the slave is object, but that the slave is an active threat, illustrating the stark antagonism of black life and white preservation.

As can be seen in the case of the *Zong*, the litigation is based in the question of risk—the risk of loss by dehydration and the risk of loss by rebellion. What is not discussed in this case but serves as a somewhat obvious juxtaposition are those that rather than be thrown in response to risk, are in excess of risk because they jump. To be excessive in terms of insurance is to be "too predictable, too likely, too probable for any underwriter to promise compensation."[36] In terms of slave ships, rebellion is the most prominent example of an excess of risk in insurance underwriting. Rebellion was seen as almost guaranteed. The question becomes what differentiates 'rebellion' as

it was alluded to in insurance underwriting and law from slaves who jump overboard in self-immolation. The archive will tell you it is the difference of 'inherent vice.' In other words, it is a foreseeable circumstance of the slave trade that slaves would try to kill themselves and as such would not be covered by insurance. Yet, the regulations become murkier as they continue. In Jones v. Schmoll, those that committed suicide after a rebellion were not covered due to inherent vice, but those that attempted to escape were part of the general average. This line was drawn with the belief that the nomination 'inherent vice' did not include "the desire to be free."[37] Such a demarcation reveals the uneasy attempt to set standards on the confluence of the terms rebellion, escape, and suicide. In all cases, the slave is always considered a threat, a risk, "regarded as enemies […] enemies who might revolt."[38] However, the presupposition of a desire for freedom skews our understanding of rebellion. How and why does one differentiate between those that commit suicide and those that attempt to escape in the case of those who jump? The archive is unsettled in its dealings with this circumstance, but what does become increasingly clear is how the archive of insurance litigation and underwriting depends on outcomes that retroactively determine intentionality. Maritime insurance litigation already constitutes a definition of rebellion that requires the loss of the ship to the control of the slaves, and thus a direct and physical interaction between master and slave, by differentiating itself from escape. Yet, in its move to differentiate between suicide and escape on the terms of desire, insurance litigation further illustrates its impact on the larger narrative of rebellion. The practice of the slave jumping the slave ship reveals the limits of such a series of delineations. How does one measure the desire to be free? Especially in a system that relies purely on outcomes. The archive illustrates just how this happens and to an increasingly disorienting affect.

The terms suicide, escape and rebellion violently depoliticize the practice of jumping ship, not only because the terms are steeped in a moral calculus of both failure and honor but because the practice of jumping ship only retains its political affect with the survival of the slave. Such a reduction imagines a particular trajectory for the 'success' of 'resistance' and forecloses the slave's jump from the slave ship as always already an attack on the master, his property, his rule and his sovereignty. In so doing, to dismiss the jump eases us out of the conundrum of 'difficult data,' those acts that put pressure on our limited understanding of political practice. Maritime litigation, one of the primary archives from which we have come to study the experience of slaves aboard slave ships relies on an outcome model that restricts its understanding of rebellion to a requirement of a knowable end. How has this affected our knowledge of the extent to which jumps were occurring? How so has this archive continued to affect our inherited understandings of what dissent aboard ships looked like?

While some scholars have perceived the slave's self-inflicted death as a form of defiance,[39] they have done so in contradistinction to some historians who have downplayed its significance.[40] The jumps from the slave ship are a practice that yet has no purchase, unrecognizable in Western political discourse because it lacks a viable outcome and because it signifies a desire that eclipses the narrative of emancipation and its legal apparatuses. The jump from the slave ship is, as Hagar Kotef describes of movement outside the order of freedom, the chaotic violation of order itself.[41] As such, the slave could not be incorporated as the subject that the jump attempted to invoke. Converted from person to nonperson, from human to sentient being as property and commodity, the African slave sat at a position that Alexis de Tocqueville highlighted in his 1851 *Democracy in America*: "The Negro has lost even the ownership of his own body and cannot dispose of his

person without committing a sort of larceny."[42] As the slave was only recognizable as nonhuman, they were absented the capacity to secure a relational status to the social order that did not require her objecthood.[43] In a word, the jump became a Pyrrhic victory of 'self-sabotage.' The jumps of the enslaved not only illume that the slave's suicide was prohibited, but her nonhuman life was clarified by the gratuitous punishment that was its consequence, often taking the form of beheading or maiming the recaptured slave by the master's hand. This jump from the slave ship requires careful consideration given its relationship to the fungibility of the slave, fundamental to her position as nonhuman.[44] While the individual slave's death by jump from the slave ship was seen as negligible, it threatened white dominion to the point that its reassertion required an expression of the slave's fungibility. By beheading a dead slave, or by killing a recaptured one, the master was effectively communicating the insignificance of slave life while simultaneously marking the boundaries of their movement with violence. In the spectacle of violence performed by the master it becomes apparent that it was not the death of the slave that was antagonistic to the master's claim, but the power to kill oneself.

This antagonism extends to our liberal political horizon as the practice of jumping the slave ship sits antithetically against traditional analyses of political dissent. As such, the jump has been largely overlooked, an epistemic violence that effectively doubles the brutalization of the slave. Here, it is crucial to note that the slaves' push for 'freedom' from slavery was more often than not met with physical death even if not at the hands of the crew. Sharks were known to follow slave ships, ravaging slave bodies that went overboard, both living and already dead. These frenzies were considered public spectacles and illustrate another form of conscious degradation, as crews were sometimes known to feed the sharks in order to keep them available to terrorize the slaves.[45]

This was a method of terror that was used to particularly combat the "rage for suicide" amongst slaves. The sharks alongside other slave deaths at the hand of the ocean literalized the precarious position of the slave in what Hartman calls a "loophole of retreat"[46], a space of both freedom and captivity; or, relatedly, what Tocqueville calls a "climax of affliction" where "slavery brutalizes [the slave] and freedom leads [her] to destruction".[47] As such, the limit on the salience of the slave's oceanic leap does not end with the physical death or gratuitous violence, but rather the brutalization continues in its narration within the conventional political horizon that is unable to account for its practice. Throwing into crisis a central tenet of the colonial-racial unitary state—the containment and immobilization of its enslaved black population—the jump is subsequently immobilized; moments of rupture, however brief, obscured and suppressed as apolitical or unproductive. In truth, the jump from the slave ship "[expresses] an understanding or imagination of freedom quite at odds with bourgeois expectations;" the liberal frame simply cannot account for the seismic shift that this practice introduces.[48] Some historians and witnesses of slavery have made the mistake of neglecting self-immolation as a political practice, either equating the slave's jump with immaturity or with hysteria. Such an assertion is at best an oversight and at worst an indication of the West's specification of black political (dis)engagement in the moment of rupture, where white jurisdiction and the ablation of black political practice is normalized without any reference to slavery's structural positions. It is what Sharpe, in reference to suppressed hysteria, calls a "double repression: the repression of the traumatic event that becomes manifest through the symptom, and the repression of the symptom through which the trauma attempts to become visible."[49] So, by way of its presuppositions, the designations of insane or immature preemptively exclude any reference to social death and the positions it engenders, easing us out of the

conundrum we face when the lexicon of the colonial-racial social order cannot account for the black non-human life that endures as its foundation. In other words, by foreclosing the referent, the slave's jump from the slave ship is easily excised from our political landscape and "refused a narrative structure."[50] That is, within the confines of Western meaning making, the referent of the slaves' jumps are foreclosed; any understanding of the black anarchist practice against the colonial-racial governance of the ship as political practice is untenable because colonial-racial governance is always already disavowed as the ship's structure.

The jump from the slave ship becomes stuck in what Georges Bataille refers to as a state of mutism: if the jump "spoke it would cease to be what it wanted to be, but if it failed to speak it could only lend itself to misunderstanding."[51] Like the slave ship, Western liberalism's political horizon is orientating, keeping one "caught and impaled between the planks of long platforms."[52] The horizon is a line that allows "us to find our way" by clarifying what is possible by virtue of its presence as a point on the line. Even as it makes certain practices or ideas available, as a line it also excludes, as Ahmed has pointed out, even if these exclusions are not conscious decisions. When we follow a line, in turn it "excludes things for us, before we even get there."[53] As such, the political horizon constitutes our field of vision, establishing our view of what is and what is not in reach. Yet, as it provides our orientation, this horizon is also where we "feel at home," marking out the known and familiar.[54] The political horizon does not simply provide us with a line, it provides us with a direction in relation to that line. As a horizon, it implies an "alignment," one gets "in line" and "[faces] the direction that is already faced by others," which is to say when taking what is in front of us as given, one takes a particular perspective and moves in its direction.[55] The slave's jump from the slave ship, in a move of black fantasticism and thus black anarchism,

works to "[push] to the surface exactly those tensions and possibilities that are necessarily suppressed and denied" in the preservation of this line. Thrusting themselves off the bulwarks and into the ocean, the slaves turned their back on this horizon.

The Slave Ship as Western Spatiality

To hold the black anarchistic inflection of the slave's jump from the slave ship in sight, we must first break from a conception of the slave ship as simply a place where slavery occurred and instead appreciate the central role played by the ship as a spatial apparatus that constituted the chattel slave and, in that way, established the colonial-racial world in which the slave existed. As such, when the slaves jumped, they disrupted not only a single space, but the social order that was both constituted and maintained by its built environment.

The slave ship serves as the point of departure because it illumes one of the clearest examples of Western spatiality. It was, as Paul Gilroy argues, a "living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion."[56] The slave ship demonstrated the West's foundational necessity to govern (contain, navigate, and pilot) the movement, motion and mobility of black populations and established them as the constitutive outside to whiteness. Here, their forcible movement animated white authority over black life and death where the management and expulsion of these black populations as the fungible objects of enslavement begets the definition of the master and his geospatial dominion. In effect, the theft of black populations from Africa and transport to the West served to mark the borderlines of the colonial-racial order. Furthermore, as Marcus Rediker has argued, "the slave ship and its social relations have shaped the modern world" as it has been the linchpin of capitalism.[57] In this formulation, he points out that it was a factory of sorts, not only a

trading station for merchants and a workplace for sailors, but as a mode of production also generated the social order with the slave position at its core. The spatial arrangement of the slave ship and the relation it engenders of master/slave, colonizer/colonized, regulator/regulated are constitutive of the West and continue to orient us, that is, these colonial-racial relations continue to govern how people live in the afterlife of slavery. But the slave ship also serves as the intellectual pulse of this project because it evinces the *impossibility* of an absolute spatial governance.[58] To this end, the slave ship as a factory sailing on the sea is resonant. Philip E. Steinberg claims that on the sea "order becomes something that is dynamic and continually reconstituted, as moving forces construct unstable spaces that are continually transformed through new acts of movement."[59] The slave ship comprises an order in perpetual motion sailing across the Atlantic, which brings with it an uncertainty that is unsteadily quelled through various sedentarizing spatial practices aimed at regulating the life of the slave. The oceanic quality of the slave ship reveals how "moving matter *constitutes* places" rather than illustrate a system of "stable places that are impacted by moving forces" and in so doing not only demonstrates the anxiety of stability but also the impossibility of society.[60] The slave ship, as a lens through which to understand the West and Western spatiality, was in between seemingly coherent places and, as such, attempted to steady itself through the production and maintenance of a fixed social order. But this social order could never successfully find absolution. Western spatiality is processual, always attempting, in vain, to "institute that impossible object: society" but can never fully "manage to suture itself into a closed society."[61] In its incomplete state, Western spatiality denotes a process of continuous territorialization, attempting, but always failing, to complete itself. The system's impossibility by no means allows for a simple overthrow of power, but it does leave room for Certeau's distinction

between the strategies of institutions and structures of power that discipline and organize through space from the tactics of people whose moves are never fully determined by design.[62] As such, a look at the slave ship's various mechanisms of restraint requires a move beyond the analysis of spatial designs and into an analysis of people's experience of space. Even as Lefebvre argues that space emerges in its use in a particularly ordered way, or, rather, that while a "means of production [space] is also a means of control, and hence of domination," there remains a failure to master the space completely. In this way, the slave ship is "irreducible to a 'form' imposed" and though "seemingly static, is an alterable terrain."[63]

In the gaps or, better still, producing these gaps, were leaps that attempted to move beyond the master's firm grip—practices of rupture that existed in excess of the master's authority. As Léopold Lambert has argued, if the slave ship was meant for an optimal purpose, "any behavior or spatial configuration that would not contribute to this optimization constitutes a resistance against it."[64] As the log of the *Lawrance* can attest, slaves' jumps from the slave ship are documented in the archive, but these are dispassionate accounts, marking the deaths of slaves alongside the brief, but always more detailed, description of the weather. The archive of slavery tells us very little of slave life except to tell us it was disregarded. A single sentence across two lines is the only reference to the two women's jumps from the slave ship in the log of the *Lawrance*, easily missed in the first inspection of the microfilm, the archive as fleeting and momentary as the act of jumping itself. Unfortunately, because of the insurance laws referenced above and the common belief held by ship surgeons that it was a symptom of madness, there is little formal documentation as to the number of slaves who jumped from slave ships during the African slave trade. Yet, jumps from the slave ship were happening as long as slavers were sailing. In his narrative, Olaudah Equiano

recounts a moment when numerous slaves aboard the ship to which he was sequestered "preferred death to such a life of misery."[65] The account of British surgeon Alexander Falconbridge mentions instances of enslaved women leaping from the slave ship, noting, "circumstances of this kind are very frequent."[66] In 1714, while aboard the *Florida*, four enslaved women, one of whom was pregnant, jumped overboard while the ship was departing. In 1732, six enslaved women jumped from the slave ship of Captain James Hogg in the middle of the night.[67] And this was not only a problem for the British, as evidence shows that French and Spanish ships were also accustomed to the threat of slaves jumping ship.[68] Jumping from the slave ship was widely practiced by the enslaved and widely feared by the crew. In both their formal and informal instructions, merchants warned captains. While instructing the crew to keep a vigilant watch, captains, for their part, requisitioned numerous accouterments and alterations, all in the effort to keep the enslaved aboard and under control. However, there are cases when large groups of thirty to one hundred slaves were known to have jumped. Oftentimes, these jumps from the slaver were practiced by enslaved women who went about the deck unfettered, unlike their male counterparts who were chained to ringbolts. These jumps often occurred when enslaved women "gave [the crew] ye slip," spontaneously plunging to an almost certain death if they were able to dodge the netting and the rescue parties that sought to return them.[69] As such, these jumps from the slave ship speak to an immediacy and urgency. Faced with an almost certain death, the slave jumps anyway, exhibiting the radicalization of a desire to escape the constrictions, violence and overwhelming governance of a Western colonial-racial-spatial order encapsulated by the slave ship.

The slaves' jumps from the slave ship provide a blueprint for what Katherine McKittrick and Clyde Woods call a 'black geography,' which provide a different (read black) vantage point

from which to understand the production of segregated space as they "disclose how the racialized production of space is made possible."[70] Illustrating the classificatory spatial practices of the colonial-racial order as they transgress them, these jumps serve as examples of black tactics that not only reveal but also reconfigure the boundaries meant to maintain enslaved black life. In this formulation, the effect of the slave's jump is not only the master's possible loss of property, but also an impingement on his dominion, both ideologically and spatially. Lefebvre contends, "born in and with a space, the state may also perish with it," asserting that the state can only provide social relations with "calibrated spatial support."[71] As such, the space of the slave ship programs everyday life through "manipulated consumption," meaning that interventions can and must begin from "counter-spaces" but culminate in "a radical revolt that calls into question the entirety of interchangeable, spectacular space, with its implication of everydayness, centrality, and spatial hierarchization."[72] The transgression and destruction of physical space is a primary step in the production of a new structural relationship of power even if, or possibly only when, there is an absence of a predictable outcome. As a black geography, the slaves jumps from the slave indicate where this struggle takes place, demonstrating both the "limitations and possibilities of traditional spatial arrangements,"[73] which reveal, as I referred to above as an intellect of insurrection, their own geographic knowledges.

The intimacy of the ship brought with it an anxiety of maintaining divisions. Often the captain and officers resided in the higher quarters, but the crew and the enslaved were "neighbors in [the] space belowdecks."[74] In order to keep the ship's social order clear, the carpenter, boatswain and the gunner were in charge of spatial mechanisms by which the enslaved were kept in their place while aboard their temporary home. As historian Stephanie Camp has argued, "enslavement

was containment," and its defining characteristic aboard the slave ship was the barricado.[75] This was "a strong wooden barrier ten feet high that bisected the ship near the mainmast and extended about two feet over each side of the vessel," spiked and fitted with swivel guns at the top, as well as peep holes through which the crew could fire pistols and muskets.[76] The wall was used to keep the male from the female slaves but also as a defensive barrier behind which the crew could retreat (on to the female side) to quell insurrections. Ultimately, it was an installation added to the ship whenever the slaves were on the main deck from which the crew guarded and controlled the enslaved.[77] In addition to this, before beginning their voyage on the Middle Passage, the crew fashioned a makeshift and temporary 'house' of lattice walls that sat on the main deck in order to protect those on board from the elements, but mainly to "prevent the purchased negroes from leaping overboard."[78] Upon departure, the house was removed and netting was then hung along the ship's sides by the boatswain.[79] Before the late 18th century, when slave ships were not yet being produced for the slave trade and instead employed retrofitted vessels, alterations had to be made to the existing structures, the most crucial of which was to increase the size of the hold and modify the hatches so as to be 'fit' for human cargo.[80] First and foremost, this meant providing a means for air to reach the slaves without sacrificing security. Iron hatches or canvas funnels that were dismantled at night only begin to indicate the ways that ship captains attempted to regulate the breathing, and thus the life, of the slave. The numerous apparatuses of restraint that we see aboard the slave ship demonstrate the paramount concern of black mobility to architectures of slavery wherein these mechanisms all work in tandem to overdetermine enslaved black life, providing its shape with barricades and latticework to regulate every movement and location of the slave. Integral to the design of slave ship, these mechanisms illustrate that like any weapon,

"architecture in its inherent violence is able to kill a body subjugated by its power."[81] By managing these black bodies' positions in space and time, both life and death were violently dictated.

The enslaved inhabit a spatial position rather than a location based in a distinction made by Neil Smith and Cindi Katz who argue that location "fixes a point in space" in reference to an abstract system of coordinates, whereas position is defined by its "location vis-à-vis other locations."[82] Position is used here because it implies a relation to other positions in its very constitution, where relation emerges in the act of moving. For Steinberg, movement is the foundation of geography when we consider that "objects come into being as they move (or unfold) through space."[83] The question of movement has been intimately tied to the lived experience of black populations as long as this experience has been a matter of freedom. As Kotef has expertly shown in her work, movement "is the material substance of a long-standing concept of freedom."[84] Kotef begins her text by quoting Hannah Arendt at length on the meaning of movement in freedom and, by extension, the political. She quotes, "Being able to depart for where we will is the prototypical gesture of being free, as limitation of freedom of movement has from time immemorial been the precondition for enslavement" and that "freedom of movement is 'the substance and meaning of all things political.'"[85] Movement, the foundational concern of any spatial design, is the measure of freedom and a primary occupation of any political system. Yet Kotef also argues that for movement to have become so intimately linked to freedom required the use of myriad technologies and practices to moderate movement to the point that it became the "order of freedom rather than a chaotic violation of order itself."[86] The threat, real or perceived, of this chaotic violation is required in order to buttress the concept of movement as the order of freedom. This order of freedom is thus a sovereign move, that which "keeps (*auf-halten*) chaos

out, and prevents it from taking over."[87] Even as Arendt claims that limiting movement has always been necessary to enslavement, so too have methods of containing and slowing movement preconditioned freedom.[88] This is based in a Lockean principle that "freedom—as movement—is possible only within a system of enclosures," claiming that unconfined movement is both irrational and actually a mark of "unfreedom," which requires a particular balance of movement and containment in the service of stability that is beneficial to systems of white supremacy.[89] This freedom is shaped by a principle of movement based in land and property where ownership becomes a function of freedom, where those that do not properly cultivate the land or *are* property become the vehicles of the liberal subject's movement. Our political systems desire control over physical movement, organizing who enters a space along with the conditioning of when, how and where. Imperative to this is "determining who (or what) should be contained and constrained" and how these bodies "affect, are affected by, become the vehicle of, or the addressees of political orders, ideologies, institutions, relations, or powers."[90] This control over physical movement is a socio-spatial positioning, meaning the positioning of bodies within space also forms their structural positions in the socius. Within the system of enclosures, there are those who can self-regulate their movements, and thus *legitimately* move, and those that are "*doomed* to constant mobility," barred from settlement and effectively criminalized.[91] These others are considered *too* mobile, and threatening to the stability of the governing system of enclosure and regulation. According to Mario Gooden, the design of architecture itself facilitates identity construction insomuch as it promotes or inhibits movement and interaction.[92] He argues that identity is formed by spatial relationships, meaning the interactions that take place within and because of the design of a space. Rather than think of space as an inert and/or empty vessel that we simply occupy, both Gooden

and Kotef challenge us to consider how space produces particular bodies, identities and positions. From this perspective, space is "a medium that is constantly being made by its dynamic, constitutive elements."[93] Other scholars[94] share this concern with the interaction of bodies and space, working with and through an understanding of spatial environments as the context for everyday life but also the expression of social relations, while disbelieving that plans and structures are absolute. In his important vignette "Walking in the City," Certeau argues that the bird's eye view cannot tell the whole story for those on the ground because those walking are *enunciating* space, actualizing a selection of the possibilities that are organized by the spatial order. The walker, she who interacts with the space, "makes [these possibilities] exist as well emerge" but also remodels them, because the improvisation of walking will "privilege, transform or abandon spatial elements."[95] Like the walker, the slaves who jump the slave ship reveal that space is fundamentally social and produced as they enunciate a black geography, that is, a manipulation of the slave ship's traditional captive geography, illuminating what Certeau calls "spatial practices" that "secretly structure the determining conditions of social life."[96] Lefebvre further clarifies the use of space in this dissertation through his triad of the conceived, the perceived and the lived. By his series of definitions, the slave ship was designed and produced through labor (conceived), but its meaning and its reality as a space was formed and transformed by how it was perceived and lived by social actors. Taking up this understanding of space in relation to the slave ship means to disrupt the narrative that the ships of the Middle Passage were simply a bastardization of an otherwise respectable history of maritime architecture, by illustrating how the slave ship *comes into being* as a ship for and by the system of enslavement. As Lefebvre's argues, "physical space has no 'reality' without the energy that is deployed within it."[97] With this in mind, the "rationality of [the slave

ship] is stripped off like a veil when one realizes that, in reality, it 'regulates' and perpetuates the relations of domination."[98] The use of space is the constitution of that space; its use corresponds to the expression of a spatial practice. As such, the slave ship came into being as it shaped the slaves, regulating their movement and propagating their torture. The narrative that maintains the innocence of architecture within the history of the slave ship (i.e. that a ship was only harmful because of poor administration) is only possible because of a reliance on what Lefebvre calls the "illusion of transparency" wherein space is understood as being free of secrecy, that "everything can be taken in from a single glance from that mental eye which illuminates whatever it contemplates."[99] But stripped of this illusion, the slave ship reveals a 'social space,' a space that existed before the social (i.e. a socialized space) but one that was produced by social forces. These social forces should not be confused with, or reduced to, ideology in such a way that privileges a fully developed intentionality behind each mechanism but rather, are the practices that constitute and codify relationships in the socius insomuch as they constitute the mechanisms that produce the slave ship as an instrument of organization of bodies in space. In other words, the slave ship "occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function;" it was actuated by movement within and around it.[100] The slave ship, like the other spaces that will be discussed in the following chapters, *oriented* the bodies aboard it where orientation was a matter of *how* we dwell in space.

The barricado, netting, 'house' and hold epitomize the spatial practices of race governance, where governance is defined as territoriality, the ability to "control, guide, or facilitate economic and social activities distributed across the landscape."[101] As Lambert has argued in his series of online articles on the architectural technology of the Atlantic crossing, "every component of the

slave ship is designed to contribute to the organization of bodies in a spatial configuration optimizing its function." It is an architectural "weaponization," an operative architecture.[102] According to his line of thinking, these design elements cannot be considered additions to a regular ship, but "as a fundamental element in view of the ship's optimal function."[103] He argues that not only can architecture be in service of violent ideologies, but that implementation would be impossible without it. Yet this argument can be taken even further. Building on the way theorists have described race as being constituted by a series of practices that institute the colonial hierarchy, focusing on these examples throws light on the process of order(ing) as a series of spatial arrangements. Blackness is, as Saidiya Hartman has powerfully claimed, a social relationality rather than an identity, that is, its "givenness" requires an "extremity of force" where race is fixed through "terror and dominance."[104] By placing her claim that practices produce racial difference alongside Barnor Hesse's work that identifies race as a colonial distinction of assemblages of European whiteness over non-European otherness, the slave ship demonstrates, additionally, that these processes of hierarchized ordering inscribed on the body through force that produce blackness are made up of a series of spatial elaborations, enactments, and violences.[105] These arrangements are expressed in the imposition of spatial segregation and discipline that orders society, especially those violently sedentarizing techniques, both discursive and material, that are employed when black people are 'out of place.' In particular, we can extend Hesse's concept of the Western political, defined as the process and the system where society is divided and classified, ordered by way of its Western colonial and racial constitution, to what can be called Western spatiality, which refers to the particular ways that the colonial-racial order is created and maintained through the production of space.[106] Western spatiality is comprised of

particular practices of containment and policing, practices that, in laying out specific lines and gaps, produce space and serve to distribute, confine and altogether order those that inhabit it. The slave ship and its spatial characteristics not only served to classify and divide between colonizers and colonized through the setting down of lines and creation of containers, but in this separation they were also producing these classifications. In other words, racial and gendered categories emerged through the elaboration and inhabitation of spatial practices that divided and hierarchized. So while Lambert begins to cleave the complex relationship of the slave ship's architecture to the operation of slavery, "as a technology without which the entire principle of the slave trade would have been simply impossible," he stops short of recognizing the magnitude of architecture's role in constituting the structural positions he argues it merely implements and supports. The social world is created through the ordering of space, "space as such is produced through violent acts of appropriating, dividing and distributing the world."[107] To reiterate once more, it is not the case that the slave ship was simply a physical rendering of difference or discrimination, but an indication of how spatial arrangements that are meant to house actually *create* difference. In turn, as Katherine McKittrick has argued, "the placement of subaltern bodies deceptively hardens spatial boundaries."[108] The black subject is being constituted here through what Hortense Spillers calls "vestibular cultural formation" where the black subject/object was both made and unmade, where "these [African] bodies pass into a new self" through a spatial construction.[109] The spatial mechanisms of the slave ship serves as one of the primary sets of practices that "nautical mile after nautical mile attempted to reconfigure the African into someone—and all too often, into something—else."[110] The emergence of this position and identity occurred as these stolen bodies moved through the space in which they were housed. The concept of Western spatiality then

enumerates the spatial practices of governance that produce as much as they maintain colonial-racial classifications of hierarchical difference. It is within this spatial context of meaning-making that the slaves who jump the slave ship dared to breach the system to offer an alternative way of being.

The Jump as Black Anarchism

I turn to anarchy here because it aims to simultaneously reject and reveal the social order's boundaries as both exploitative and imprisoning.[111] In addition, anarchism provides a framework of political practice that is neither loyal to any centralizing authority nor bound to any pre-ordained alternative. To this extent, anarchism disrupts our typical ways of thinking and doing politics, inviting new perspectives of enduring contexts. As such, the use of anarchism provides the room necessary to conceptualize the jump from the slave ship politically as it allows us to think beyond the state as the architect of transformation. Like the enslaved facing the ocean, anarchism forges ahead knowing full well that the state seems insurmountable. In this vein, anarchism "struggles against the ingrained perception that there is something absurdly unworkable about the idea…of politics without a centralized hierarchical state."[112] In the preceding sections I have aimed to demonstrate how the power to dictate the place of the slave emergent in the very architectures of the slave ship was an expression of the colonial-racial order governed by white authority. As such, the slaves jumps from the slave ship, must be understood as a practice that interrupts white authority as *the* centralizing authority of enslavement. In attempting to live outside the parameters of meaning-making, that is, the production of race, the jumps from the slave ship emerged as a "living force," antithetical to the processes of enslavement that produced the African as slave, that

is, it "defies *sovereign power* over life and death."[113] Unlike an armed uprising, the jump rejected colonial-racial authority of the slave ship by literally leaving it and destroying its object, the slave. In the case of jumping ship, the slave did not take over the ship and steer it in a new direction, but abandoned the ship altogether. The slaves' jump was antagonistic to the West, represented by the slave ship, as it threatened its arrangement because the very purpose of the ship's various spatial mechanisms was to contain the slave to the vessel and regulate mobility aboard it. It embodied the threat of opening up possibilities of being that precipitated the gratuitous violence that came as punishment and the immobilizing narratives that attempted to name it a consequence of insanity. As Higgonet argues, "above all, [suicide] creates a rift in meaning" because "by cutting short the 'natural' span of life, the person who takes his or her life both turns it into a metaphoric ruin and breaks the frames that society relies upon to produce meaning." [114] In the case of the enslaved black woman, where the 'natural' span of life included the 'perils of the sea' and dying at the hands of master and his crew, the jump blew up the system of meaning on which the slave ship sails and which it served to constitute. Rather than simply an assertion of a new subject, a "new entry on the balance sheet of identities managed by empire," the slaves' jumps from the slave ship signified a "violent, practical, active desubjectivation, the rejection and betrayal of the role that has been assigned to them as subjects."[115] As such, in interrupting the very social relations that structure enslavement, the jump was an exertion "creating new conditions" of life for all those aboard the slave ship. It was indeed a rejection of enslavement in totality, further expressing a rejection of the state "machinery as a means of bringing about the great social change" by invoking oneself.[116]

If the West is the "environment that is hostile to us" deployed through various "apparatuses of capture;" then symptomatic of this are the jumps that both reveal and reject it.[117] In this way,

the jump from the slave ship, read through my conceptualization of black anarchism, reveals new cartographies "for lines of flight out of Empire," for "any transformation of the world that remains caught in the preexistent morphology will do no more than reproduce the relations of domination in a more or less disguised form." [118] Here, black anarchism does not represent a concern with liberated space for Empire does not fear delimited space, but instead, as a mode of disorganization, with liberating spaces that produce "new social relationships."[119] Yet this move beyond the boundaries of governance is not only physical, as black anarchist practices also institute new imaginaries. Unlike "other schools of thought that are composed of crystallised ideas" structured by "some imaginary boundary line beyond which the searching mind dare not penetrate,"[120] anarchism is concerned with the removal of all barriers. Richard Iton along with anarchist communist and 18th and 19th century labor organizer Lucy Parsons clarify that even black anarchism's impacts and philosophical origins are spatial (clearing out room, transgressing boundaries, the underground and the vagabond) and meaningfully incomplete. Iton purposefully calls out those "in-process notions of autonomy and emancipation" as those which do not necessarily embody the "most advanced ideas" but what Alston calls a politics of "trying to live," of "[working] it out as we go."[121] As such, the practices of black anarchism move away from pre-figurative political opposition; they are agnostic, proceeding without the alternative order in view, unlikely to adhere to "hidden imperialisms" that sometimes mark ideologies of progress and the universal.[122] In other words, the jump from the slave ship appeals to new geographies of black life that refuse to labor through a reconfiguration of the current order susceptible to reproducing white domination. This agnosticism is often the reason that anarchism generally, and black anarchism more specifically, are disregarded as inviable and unsustainable. But the nomination of black

anarchism, especially as it relates to the slave who jumps ship, invokes this inviability as a disengagement with order. This is not necessarily a claim to idealism or utopianism (it also is not necessarily not that), but a refusal of a capitalist-inflected cycle of reproduction. The Western liberal tradition proposes a linear and allegedly progressive trajectory, but this linearity only comes to mystify and dematerialize a historic cycle of violent assimilation to a Western order of things. The enslaved who jump the slave ship jump in excess of that order, refusing reproduction in a multitude of ways. While refusing to replicate black submission to white will and impeding Western liberalism's linear continuous rebirth of itself, the enslaved black woman was also absconding from her literal sexual reproduction. As the actual reproducers of the slave labor force, the black enslaved women who jumped—pregnant or not—were interrupting the West's means of production. The nomination of black anarchy is thus meant to invoke the slave's jumping overboard as a phenomenal practice in excess of the social order. If the captive body is the terrain of the master's power, then the escaping body, the body that dies at the hands of the self, was a direct threat to the master's dominion.

En-gendering Race[123]

Attempting to contest and exist outside a relation of domination, slaves' jumps are necessarily opaque; the jump's excess lends itself to the practice's historic political illegibility. But this illegibility is also buttressed by our gendered definitions of rebellion. The barricado bears significance insomuch as it shaped, and was shaped by, the tropes of the hypermasculine enslaved black man as the source of rebellion aboard slave ships as well as the docile enslaved black woman that was attributed the nomination of lesser danger. Both the barricado and netting shape our

conceptions of what rebellion looks like and who practices it. As apparatuses of subduing the enslaved, these spatial mechanisms conjured the hypervisible enslaved black man as the subject of rebellion while simultaneously invoking the enslaved black woman as simply affected. As a mechanism meant to divide the enslaved men and women in the case of armed revolt, the barricado was imbued with meaning-making power. Meant to separate the rebellious from the docile, the barricado instantaneously delineated where rebellion happened and by whom. Jumping ship as political practice was thus unaccounted for in the barricado's calculus of rebellion and the netting's ascription of self-inflected death as simply a symptom of emotional distress. Where the barricado unsees the willfulness of enslaved black women, the nettings named enslaved black women as hyperaffected and irrational. It is not a coincidence that the language used to describe the jump from the slave ship (primarily executed by women) is couched in 'giving up,' preference of death over life, and 'getting quit' of one's misery. Often absented from the nomination of rebellion, the fact of the jump was and is reduced to a suicidal *surrender* to the conditions of slavery, where 'suicide' is often coded as feminine. Descriptions of slave 'suicides' were prevalent in the nineteenth century with stories littering newspapers and autobiographies, circulating images of slave women taking their own life which would become icons in anti-slavery writing.[124] While there are examples of 'suicide' that are read as male, as Margaret Higgonet has argued, such as "self-sacrifice in war or a republican challenge to tyranny," those instances of 'suicide' that "appear to constitute surrender rather than a choice" are mapped as the practices of women.[125] Such a gendering of 'suicide' presumes a legible intentionality but more importantly, is also circumscribed by a narrative structure that names men more willful than women. Further, it

privileges engagement with the 'enemy' as the only viable form of critique and relies on outcomes to measure desires for liberation, consequently pushing the jump outside the frame.

But race and gender intersect in other much more material ways than the discursive and ideological disavowal of the enslaved black woman's political refusal. Echoing a concern of Rashad Shabazz in his book *Spatializing Blackness*, to consider the intersection of the othered black body and space is to consider how geography intersects with race and gender simultaneously.[126] Rather than privilege a de-gendered conception of blackness as the analytic from which to understand Western spatiality, the slave ship requires an approach to the techniques of confinement and surveillance enacted on the enslaved that centers race and gender's mutual constitution. Here, the governance of race is always already tied up with the governance of gender; they are "articulated categories." Neither is to be considered an addendum, but instead come into existence "in and through relation to each other."[127] The slave ship demonstrates that this twinned system of domination emerges spatially, most apparent in the hold and along the decks. Citing the Brookes Plan, Spillers has argued that while the enslaved woman and enslaved man were subject to different conditions, they were also "ungendered" as quantifiable property, whose only difference was how much space they took up in the hold. That "every man slave is to be allowed six feet by one foot four inches for room, every woman five feet ten by one foot four, every boy five feet by one foot two, and every girl four feet by one foot."[128] How slaves were configured in the hold was deliberate, arranged so that all the slaves were laying on their right, being careful, as slave trader Theodore Canot has implied, so as not to let the slaves sit aboard the ship as passengers.[129] Slave ships were consciously overpopulated, "a space where the vitality of bodies (the *bios*) has been disregarded in order to only attach importance to their physical occupancy,"

spatially rendering them nonhuman, their atmospheres "[shrunk] to their minimum, which concludes in the death of these bodies," both physical and social.[130] As such, their spatial configuration was at the heart of their structural position as non-human. To be sure, as Saidiya Hartman has argued, the experience of enslaved men and women was more similar than different due to enslavement's condition of the captive black body as absolutely exploitable, but the practices of enslavement, especially aboard the slave ship, did divergently produce the categories of enslaved black woman and enslaved black man in overwhelmingly violent ways.[131] Here I would like to briefly explore how spatial apparatuses, and specifically the barricado, imposed processes of en-gendering race through intimate violations of the body that subsequently produced the position of the enslaved black woman once past the door of no return.[132] As it was in the hold, along the decks the en-gendering of blackness hinged on the matter of space—where, when and how these enslaved populations were made to take up space. As referenced above, the barricado as a barrier between enslaved men and enslaved women and children was meant to mitigate the damage of rebellion by keeping the men to one side and violently striking them down from the side of the enslaved women and children. Coupled with the sense that enslaved women were more docile than enslaved men, the nettings then 'allowed' enslaved women to go unfettered, lending credence to McKittrick's claim that "locations of captivity initiate a different sense of place through which black women can manipulate the categories and sites that constrain them."[133] Unlike the plantation in the United States, where enslaved men had a more elastic relationship to confinement, aboard the slave ship it was enslaved women who had a greater opportunity for movement.[134] In this way, the slave ship produced different possibilities for political refusal, namely the possibility of the enslaved jumping the slave ship, that imbued the enslaved with

gendered meanings. Yet, while this separation conjured enslaved women's docility in terms of the will to rebel and the ease with which it was assumed enslaved black women could be controlled, it also maintained the space of sexual violence. The barricado gave crewmen even greater sexual access to the women who were located on the gun-deck along with them. That is, their relative liberty meant that the disciplinary production of the classification 'enslaved woman' often occurred through their illimitable sexual exploitation by white slavers. Numerous journals write of both common sailors and officers sexually abusing slave women, noting that many had unlimited license.[135] This illimitable sexual exploitation is just one example of what Christina Sharpe calls "monstrous intimacies," which are "breathed in like air" but go unacknowledged as horrors.[136] Built into enslavement was the disregard and disavowal of sexual violence as an "offense not affecting the existence of the slave."[137] Legally, the rape of the enslaved was not recognized in the same way that murder *could* be, with the rape of the slave actually impossible within the context of the law. As Hartman has shown, the law's decisions in the arena of slave personhood meant that the position of the enslaved black woman was defined by "the negation of sentience, an invulnerability to sexual violation, and the negligibility of her injuries."[138] The impossibility of rape was in part made possible by the assertion of the "rapacity of the Negro," effectively linking blackness with sexual excess.[139] For the enslaved this has meant that gender is constituted through violence. Hartman's argument is important because it delineates gender as not only differentially produced but disputes the claim that enslaved black women "existed outside the gendered universe," or, rather, that they were dispossessed of gender. Often, enslaved black women's gender is claimed as an absence whereby they are denied the proper protections of gender embodied by whiteness. Instead, the experience of the enslaved black woman illustrates how rather

than "divest the slave woman of gender," the disavowal of sexual injury enunciates the role of "the possession of the enslaved and racial subjugation" in the constitution of gender.[140] It may be more accurate then to think of how the enslaved black woman "does not possess gender as much as she is possessed by gender." On the slave ship then it is not simply that the practice of illimitable sexual violence constitutes the meaning of gender but that the disavowal of the practice *as* a criminal violence engendered black femaleness.[141] Hartman demonstrates for us how the constitution of gender, inseparable from the constitution of race, was fundamental to the securing and maintenance of the slavery enterprise as well as the colonial-racial system that it emerges from. As Simone Browne has argued about surveillance more generally, "boundary maintenance is intricately tied to knowing the black body, subjecting some to a high visibility, as Ellison put it, by way of technologies of seeing that sought to render the subject outside of the category of human, *un*-visible."[142] So rather than merely describe it, the barricado established and maintained separations to produce categorical meaning. This captivity was meant to make visible fabricated qualities such as violence and sexual lasciviousness and name them inherent to black populations, marking differences between the enslaved but also between them and their captors. As apparatuses for the processes of en-gendering race, the barricado, netting, etc. cohered around the captive body of the enslaved, as "the vehicle of the master's power and truth."[143]

To Thief the Self

With the mark of immaturity, fear, depression, and sometimes even religious belief, the jumps from the slave ship have often too been the provenance of the master's truth, sometimes understood to reflect somewhat negatively on the courage and fortitude of slaves to survive terrible

conditions. In some respects, the distress of a practice when faced with possible demise can inspire political solidarity as it focuses our attention on examples of agency where there should be none, but in others, the misery of self-destruction can be the terminus of political purchase. While strife is often used to measure the significance of a political practice, in the case of the enslaved jumping ship, where the certainty of death was almost absolute, meaning there was no viable result, the misery of the practice becomes the threshold for its exclusion from political analysis because it names an absence of choice and underscores a life of coercion. In other words, the ship jumping slave raises concern because of our increased reliance on the agentive, which is subsequently tied to questions of intention, and later still, success. For too long has the ship jumping slave been disregarded because of the pressure it places on our limited understanding of political practice and the slave's non-human life. Hartman raises this issue on multiple occasions in *Scenes of Subjection* when she outlines the problematic of naming the intimate relationship the enslaved woman Linda Brent (also known as Harriet Jacobs) has with the white Mr. Sands to get away from her master Mr. Flint, a consensual relationship. She dovetails this with an analysis of the impossible crime of raping a slave under law. What she illustrates here is that in the case of the enslaved it is not a simple matter of agency and consent, but instead a complicated nexus of survival, coercion, and the *foreclosure* of agency, for "compulsion eclipses choice, as neither right nor protection secures the line between consent and nonconsent."[144] The free-willed subject is an inadequate point of reference for the slave insomuch as it assumes both choices and rights that are unavailable. In actuality, for the enslaved black woman who jumps ship, the term self-destruction is somewhat of a misnomer, meaningfully imperfect, insomuch as this "giving of the self" presupposes autonomy. Here, as both Hartman and Tocqueville have shown, to destroy oneself is always already a theft of

oneself, for the slave's relation to the self is one of wrongful possession.[145] As such, the jump remains in the interval, in between a dissent from slavery and any possible future outside its ever-extending reach. Yet, as a practice both performed and now studied, it still represents an alternative to the frustrating and "racially bound, unproductive labor"[146] that have become commonplace within the standard liberal narrative and the political participation it calls for. Furthermore, in troubling our reliance on the 'self' for the purposes of defining politics through intents, desires, and autonomy within the confines of enslavement, the slaves' jumps from the slave ship also emphasize the difficulty of separating the individual practice from the collective slaves. This emphasis of difficulty may indeed be pointing to an erroneous delineation, a delineation that denies the inherent connection of a single black anarchist practice as an attempt to break with a system that assembles a collection of people under the marker of race *to* the collective that has been subsequently formed. What I mean by this is that a single jump exerts a new relationship that undercuts the existing relations of enslavement, namely of black life and death at the authority of the master, which conditions the existence of all the enslaved aboard the ship and thus aims to alter the life of all the enslaved. It is not simply that it was a repeated practice, but that the individual jump invoked a new collective.

Chapter 2
Collectivity

> *I know no national boundary where the Negro is concerned. The whole world is my province until Africa is free.*
>
> —Marcus Garvey[1]

When we think of the Black Star Line, we often think of failure. It has become the hallmark of Marcus Garvey's contested legacy as charlatan, which is often highlighted even amongst his many contributions to the black freedom struggle through his ideological and organizational work with the United Negro Improvement Association. His lifework is necessarily complicated, often figured within the lineage of black leaders such as Booker T. Washington, who coincidentally died one year before Garvey came to the United States in 1916, and, like Washington, has been figured as the intellectual and political opposite of W.E.B. DuBois. Unlike the inclusion that Washington called for however, Garvey pushed for separatism, a desire primarily understood through the Back-to-Africa movement. From within the Tombs prison of New York City awaiting the verdict of his appeal for bail after his conviction for mail fraud, Garvey asked "Where is the black man's government? Where is his king and kingdom? Where is his president, his country and his ambassador, his army, his navy, his men of big affairs?"[2] It was a pointed series of questions that reflected on the absence of black autonomy, the necessity of centering black men, and a politically-charged call that made his motivations clear. His aim was the creation of a "new world of black men," a "nation of sturdy men making their impress upon civilization and causing a new light to dawn upon the human race."[3] Highly gendered and grandiose, Garvey's call fomented a strong following of both men and women who believed in the mission of establishing a new black nation in Africa. Within this sometimes troubling desire to 'redeem' Africa with himself the harbinger of

restoration there was a also deep pride and celebration of African culture. Yet, his life was also marked by his deportation to Jamaica in 1926 and the financial ruin of many members of the UNIA and its related investors. In the arena of fiscal irresponsibility, the Black Star Line is offered as the prime example of Garvey and the UNIA's many missteps. Less known, but similarly encumbered in the historical record albeit partly due to Garvey's own disavowal, is the Chief Sam Back-to-Africa movement. Unlike Garvey's ships however, Chief Sam's *Liberia* did make landfall on the African coast after travelling from Texas in 1914, with most of its passengers hailing from Oklahoma. The voyages put into motion by Chief Alfred Sam, a West African merchant who ended up forging a movement of mostly former slaves seeking a new life in the Gold Coast, are even less understood than those of the Black Star Line because they are relatively unheard of.[4] While this is set to change thanks to the new work of scholars Kendra Field and Ebony Coletu, what we do know is that these emigration voyages have been similarly depoliticized as failure and fraud. And as Field and Coletu point out, the story of these voyages is much more capacious and compelling than the record has heretofore revealed. To be sure, the common retellings of Marcus Garvey's (and possibly Chief Sam's) financial failures as well as the analysis of Marcus Garvey as an Imperialist hold weight. They also however stand in the way of a greater appreciation and understanding of these voyages' political resonance. By way of a black anarchist perspective, my reading encourages a new understanding of the voyages in light of their political symbolism, effects, and possibilities as well as their foreclosures *as* a threat to white nation building and white sovereignty. Given the history of the Middle Passage as well as the fortitude and black anarchistic practices of the enslaved aboard slave ships discussed in the previous chapter, black people on ships will always bear significance. In the case of the Black Star Line, this became especially true

within, beyond, and against the physical and ideological borders of the United States, a 'nation of immigrants' that imagined and established itself as a white nation amongst the hegemonically white West. Such a reading however requires a reorientation to the Black Star Line that is divorced from Garvey's imperial intents. This is not to say that Garvey's political agenda does not matter or does not impact these voyages, but it is to argue that to remain tied to intentionalities privileges the pre-figurative in a manner that prevents deeper theoretical engagement with practices as that which can and will always exceed the best laid plans. It is further to argue that practices exceed our capacity to account for them. That is, practices are irreducible to discourse. In this way, the use of a black anarchist analytic is not to challenge Garvey's imperialist rhetoric nor is it in any way an attempt to name Garvey an anarchist. This is, however, an attention to the voyages of the Black Star Line as practices that invite a black anarchist perspective, which requires its disentanglement from Garvey's shadow. As Jeffrey Howison has argued, while Garvey and the UNIA have often been written about and understood as multidimensional, diasporic, political, and complicated, the Black Star Line has not been given the same theoretical attention and nuance.[5] In fact, the intents, if we are going to discuss intents, behind the Black Star Line have been grossly misstated according to some scholars who argue that while usually framed within "[Garvey's] nationalist desire to return to Africa," that in reality Garvey himself described his motives as diasporic, hoping to address the "great need for steamship communication among the different branches of the Negro race scattered in Africa, the Americas, and the West Indies."[6] Here, the black diaspora is paramount, inviting a new political perspective on the voyages of the Black Star Line. In turn and somewhat in response, this chapter continues to develop the use of a black anarchist analytic meant to reconceptualize the voyages of the Black Star Line as politically salient

practices that elucidate and interrupt the demand of white sovereignty borne of nation-states in the West. In particular, and for the purposes of building on the previous chapter, the turn to the Black Star Line and its invocation of the black diaspora is meant to highlight *collectivity* as a necessary facet of black anarchism. What is forgotten in the damning of the Black Star Line as failure and the bitter critiques of Garvey's nationalist agenda is often the collective.

Black Ships

The Black Star Line was a shipping line operated by Marcus Garvey and the UNIA meant to transport goods among black businesses in North America, the Caribbean, and Africa. The idea was first raised in 1919 by black seamen who were in search of job opportunities since being increasingly replaced by white soldiers returning from World War I.[7] In less than a year after the public announcement of the idea, the first ship was launched. During its short run, the Black Star Line was used for international produce trade, and under the development of Garvey and the UNIA, it was meant to become the linchpin of a global black economy. As a "revolutionary undertaking," it was also much more than that.[8] The Black Star Line consisted of three ships, the *S.S. Yarmouth*, which was to be christened the *Frederick Douglass*, the *S.S. Shadyside*, and the *Kanawha*. The ships were all in poor condition at the time of purchase and scholars have noted that Garvey was overcharged and he overpaid, reportedly spending tens of thousands more than the ships were actually worth.[9] As a business venture, the Black Star Line's collapse was marked by the loss of many investors' life savings and various mechanical disasters aboard the ships. The Black Star Line went bankrupt in 1923 and its leader was ultimately deported back to the country of his birth on charges of mail fraud for selling stocks using the U.S. postal service. Because of

this, the Black Star Line endeavor is often pinpointed as the beginning of the end for Garvey's success in the United States and is linked to the commencement of his troubles with the law which paint him as a swindler.

A popular piece of evidence for the failure of the Black Star Line was a voyage by the *S.S. Yarmouth* from Jamaica to New York that carried a seven-hundred-ton cargo of coconuts. While on the journey, Garvey ordered that the ship stop in both Philadelphia and Boston and by the time they reached port in New York, the coconuts had rotted in the hull.[10] While this is proffered as evidence of Garvey's negligence and ineptitude, and subsequently posed as a reason for its failure as a shipping line, it seems that it can be understood differently when the financial no longer embodies the central perspective. It seems that Garvey very much knew that the financial promise of the shipping line stood second fiddle to the ships' ideological import. Said another way, the financial failure of the Black Star Line cannot take away from the shipping line's symbolic value. Symbolically, the shipping line boomed with "a multivocal resonance entirely disproportionate to the condition or performance of the actual vessels."[11] The iconic image of coconuts rotting in the hull in fact says less about the failure of Garvey's mission and more about the sacrifice required for these symbolic voyages beyond the confines of white Western control. Especially in the context of increasing segregation and subsequent anti-black violence in the United States, the stops of these ships crewed and owned by black men, were illustrative of an autonomous black mobility, the first of its kind to be seen by black populations from New York to Cuba.[12] The voyages of these ships directly contested white jurisdiction. Here, it becomes increasingly apparent that the economic dimension cannot be used to measure the success of the political practice, for its economic promise was somewhat marginal to its symbolic force. That being said, this is not to

argue for the demonstration of success by new measures. It is in instead to deny the requirements made by conventional paradigms of success in the first place that are often if not always steeped in Western ideologies and traditions.

The Black Star Line directly threatened the authority of the West as it called on blacks to "guide their own destiny" and move beyond their containment.[13] And again, bearing the significance of black people aboard ships, the Black Star Line's voyages called to mind the primordial memory of the slave ship but turned it on its head. By enacting the jump from the slave ship with a ship of their own, black seamen "reverberated the sounds of an escape route from European colonialism."[14] They symbolized a new "organizational base," a "different basis of social organization" that centered on black populations mobilizing beyond and against Western colonial-racial regulation.[15] In the context of white men's countries, the Black Star Line marked a global but non-Western mobilization that directly opposed Western control and regulation. In this way, it can be productively understood as a threat to national security, the security of the nation-state and the Western project. It was a practice of black anarchism, rejecting the centralizing authority of the colonial-racial West by instituting and reflecting the power of the black collective. As an expression of the black diaspora, the Black Star Line troubled the consolidation of not only the white state, but the authority of the state itself. Yet, like the slaves who were not allowed to jump from the ship but could be thrown, Marcus Garvey's punishment for his unlicensed movement within and beyond U.S. national borders was his deportation to Jamaica. What becomes evident in this instance is the paradox of black mobility wherein it is often both the cause and penalty of criminalization, marking out black mobility as only permissible under the management of the white centralizing authority. Garvey himself noted this in one of his speeches delivered in

Philadelphia in 1919 after intercepting communications between Washington and the Panama Canal Commission. Reflecting on the request by officials for the federal government not to issue a passport to Garvey to visit Panama, Garvey stated "Some want me to go and some don't want me to go. What must I do?"[16]

The letters from J.H. Wagner, a Chief Administrative Officer for the Department of Labor, and James L. Houghteling, the Commissioner of said department, state rather plainly that the voyages of the shipping line themselves had little bearing on Garvey's deportation. Yet, as Charles Carnegie has illustrated, the U.S. government was particularly fearful of the movement's "internationally dispersed political opposition" caused by an "unregulated flow of information" and responded by "activating sedentarizing modes of containment."[17] One such mode was "to activate visa, passport and travel restrictions so as to curtail travel by the principle officers of the UNIA" fully aware that such free movement would "create feverish public interest."[18] It was a source of "deep disquiet" on the part of established state authorities in the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium but especially the United States, where the Bureau of Investigation, US Postal Service, military intelligence, Immigration and Passport officials, the State Department and the U.S. Shipping Board all carefully surveilled the Garvey movement.[19] While the correspondence between J. Edgar Hoover and his superiors reveal a plot by the U.S. government to either imprison or deport Garvey, the U.S. did not act on its own. Various governments collaborated by sharing intelligence information and coordinated their strategies of control, demonstrating the threat the movement, and its ships, posed to the West writ large as they transgressed the established socio-geographic boundaries of whiteness.

My reading of the Black Star Line focuses on the "larger symbolic significance in the project of pan-African liberation" rather than set out to determine its success based on the accumulation of capital.[20] Had the purpose of the Black Star Line been purely economical, then the threat it posed to the governments of the West would have been an empty one as, at least financially, the UNIA's Black Star Line posed little concern for the economic giant that was American capitalism. Readings of the Black Star Line that use these determinations tend to employ conceptual frameworks that privilege class and capitalism over, and at the expense of, a racial and political analysis. In the context of post-emancipation, there existed an antagonistic relationship between the Black Star Line and Western governments that illustrates the West as a project of containment, a slave ship in its own right, that is, a system of carceral processes that simultaneously depended on and established the socio-spatial 'fixing' of non-white, and especially black, others. I argue then that the threat of the Black Star Line can be best understood by taking seriously the international dispersion that government officials so seemed to fear. This chapter argues that the voyages of the Black Star Line contested white authority as a propulsion of autonomous and collective black mobility.

It is necessary to disentangle the Black Star Line from the arguably imperialist rhetoric of Garvey not simply because of its seemingly overwhelming reach, but because the voyages encapsulate something very different than Garvey's project of "social and political physical separation of all peoples to the extent that they promote their own ideals and civilization, with the privilege of trading and doing business with each other."[21] In this brief excerpt and in the words from which it was retrieved, Garvey appealed to a nationalist agenda, to 'race purity,' and to complete separation of the races. It is both masculinist and economical, citing the brotherhood of

Men, demonstrating a paternalistic relationship towards black women, and referencing business and trade. Within it lies his ultimate aspiration of raising a "strong and powerful Negro nation in Africa," wherein he and his followers aimed to redeem the continent by consolidating the "Negro race" into a national stronghold that was meant to do business with its Western counterparts.[22] I argue that while the Black Star Line emerged from this political orientation and was imagined as a financial stepping stone within it, it also exceeded this particular black political frame. That the Black Star Line came into existence because of a desire for "readjustment" must be taken in turn with its "conflict with the world."[23] Not as a business enterprise in which it was and is often imagined, but as a radical mobilization antagonistic to the comportment required by (white) nation-states. In discussing its political impact, scholar John Henrik Clarke points to the Black Star Line as an "attempt to restore to Black people a sense of worth and nationness."[24] In truth, this may indeed have been Garvey's inclination, yet the voyages of the Black Star Line can be interpreted as more diasporic than national and more anarchistic than imperialist when we consider it a racially chaotic disruption of the codification of the white West.

As a political symbol of black collective mobility, the Black Star Line functioned both broadly and specifically. Carnegie argues that on a large scale, the Black Star Line was a show of black modern power demonstrated across a collective. It also worked within what he calls Garvey's hybrid nationalism that, unlike traditional nationalism, was "decidedly ambivalent on the question of territorial integrity" and instead privileged "transterritorial claims." Garvey, according to Carnegie, coupled race and nation and decoupled nation and territory, endorsing a kind of "transnation."[25] Carnegie however is not interested in demonstrating this transnationalism of Garvey quantitatively, through the number of international UNIA branches or even the number of

followers or institutions that invoke his name, but instead chooses to represent it symbolically. Through its use of ship and other maritime iconography as well as the often-banned circulation of their *Negro World* publication, the Garvey movement reached beyond and across national boundaries to both nurture "transnational consciousness" as well as be a "catalyst for local political struggles."[26] The Black Star Line itself was the "crown jewel of frontier-crossing, border-dissolving representation" as it "served as a magnet for the ideals of peoples dispersed over four continents."[27] In some ways then, both Garvey and the Black Star Line in their coupling and decoupling, recapitulated and remodeled the very mechanisms used against non-Western peoples in the West's creation of a global whiteness.

On a different scale, Jeffrey Howison argues that the Black Star Line resonated particularly with black struggles in Africa and the Caribbean, "[superseding] national and continental boundaries", "as a vision of economic self-determination and Black liberation." The voyages of the Black Star Line as an "ideological force" threatened the "racial and economic relationships of exploitation in Atlantic capitalism." It appealed to the growing revolutionary sense abroad, often circulating through images in advertisements in the *Negro World* publication, which often marketed the shipping line under the headline "Let us guide our own destiny" in large, capitalized, and bold typeface. For Howison, this charge enunciated its political symbolism rather than its economic, and signaled "rejection of colonial capitalism and the racism with which it was intertwined" in the Caribbean in the second and third decades of the 20th century. He argues that this had a lot to do with the systematic effort by colonial powers in the Caribbean to ban the *Negro World* at a time when it was inundated with adverts for the shipping company.[28] Simultaneously, there was a strong effort by colonized peoples in the Caribbean to take up the call of economic

self-determination in the form of strikes and seditious rhetoric in local black newspapers that made reference to Garvey and the Black Star Line as models for a new basis of organization that was highly critical of colonial capitalism. Encapsulated within the Black Star Line was a new socio-economic order and a critique of the existing one, and it was felt deeply from Trinidad to West Africa. While the ships of the Black Star Line never made it to Africa, the economic destiny that was signified in the Black Star Line was useful to West African economic liberation from British colonial capitalism.[29] In this way, while the Black Star Line itself was an economic bust, Howison argues that it must be understood within "this larger framework of anti-colonial business venture."[30] Furthermore, often understood within a messianic frame, the Black Star Line was meant to be the rod of the Moses-figure Garvey, anticipating an emancipation of continental Africans from the chains of European colonialism.[31] The Black Star Line traveled even further than it literally travelled on the ocean, making landfall as a symbol in countries it never actually dropped anchor. It reflected, made use of, and functioned as a black diaspora, signaling a shared, though not identical, political ethos for black liberation.

Its anti-coloniality hinged on both the black achievement in the fields of industry and commerce, arenas that were assumed to be the sole provenance of white men believed to be the only ones capable of entrepreneurial feats, as well as how the business itself was conducted. The latter refers to its "diffuse, dispersed, collective accomplishment" where people in various countries literally bought in to the venture and no one was allowed to purchase more than two hundred shares, meaning that shareholders were coming from a variety of income brackets and often humble economic backgrounds.[32] As such, while it was an instantiation of black power that employed the capitalist tools and symbols of modernism, the Black Star Line did not wholly

imitate, but instead offered a critique of "the individualism and state-centeredness of Western modernism" by redeploying these tools as a means of assembling a collective.[33] Furthermore, while the use of the ship as a political icon pulls on modernist notions of progress and movement, we would be mistaken to ignore that it simultaneously carries with it an oppositional and subversive force as it signifies the reclamation of the slave ship redeployed in a new form, and thus embodies an autonomy from the West and the racially-outlined submission it requires.

Yet, even as the Black Star Line offered a critique of modern power and can be imagined as engendering an intervention within Garvey's own imperial rhetoric, it also converged with the "gendered hierarchies endemic to Garvey's masculine and imperial imaginary" through its employment of the ship as a symbolic reference to masculine power.[34] Indeed Garvey and Garveyism have been heavily, and often correctly, questioned and criticized for their imagination of a black empire that hinged on male leadership. However, this reuse of hierarchies of gender must be understood within the formation of the white West that depended, amongst other things, on the expulsion of non-white people from the proper confines of gender, where the constitution of white nations attempted to naturalize the link between whiteness and 'civilized' masculinity. As such, Garvey can be seen as stepping "outside the national terms in which black racial identity could be understood."[35] This does not excuse the gesturing towards a black masculine imaginary, but it does resituate it. More than that it illustrates how the ship comes to take up conceptual space within black politics as a black masculine expression, continuing to shift away from the actual history of black people and black anarchism aboard the ships of the Middle Passage discussed in the previous chapter. Michelle Ann Stephens briefly tracks this in her description of the work of scholars like Jacqueline Nassy Brown and W. Jeffrey Bolster who discuss the ways in which black

seafaring as "staunchly male" and a space for the expression of "masculine bravado," comes to shape the "gendered politics of black travel."[36] The ship was an important space from which black men in particular could disrupt nationally produced and maintained ideologies constructed around the absenting of black manhood, not only as a new place of work during industrialization where "color might be less of a determinant of [one's] daily life" but also through a reinvocation of a space that had much to do with taking away one's humanity in the first place.[37] That said, this memorialization of this reinvoked ship also circulated in ways that disavowed black women's political presence aboard the historic slave ship. That is, placed within a lineage of rebellions aboard slave ships[38] as well as the multiracial marronage of pirate ships,[39] the redeployment of the ship iconography all but erased black women's political practices aboard ships. This gendering is important to understand when thinking through the trafficking of the ship as a black political symbol, especially as it emerges from and critiques processes of white nation building, hinging simultaneously on both the excessively raced and excessively gendered.

White Nations

The Black Star Line was an embodied symbol of diffuse dispersion and collectivity. The Black Star Line, in excess of Garvey's political intentions, threatened to throw Western spatiality into crisis insomuch as the latter, especially in the United States during the first quarter of the 20th century, hinged on the constraint of black mobility. In the years following Reconstruction, the Black Codes[40] were replaced by Jim Crow laws in the southern states. Like its precursor, this new set of laws was meant to govern the spatial emplacement of black people. Formalizing segregation, Jim Crow commanded the separation of blacks and whites, restricting the former to substandard

facilities and services. In the rest of the nation, the spatial emplacement of blacks was not determined by legislation overseeing public spaces of racial 'contact,' but instead emerged through de facto segregation in residential areas. This provides the historical social and political context of the voyages of the Black Star Line. The threat of an internationally dispersed black dissent both emerged from and re-consolidated whiteness at a global level, shedding the strict nationalism of individual countries for a white nationalism—the constitution of white nations—that unified the West and demonstrated the West as a project of whiteness[41].

Racial domination in many ways constituted the white nation state through the repetitions of spatial practices that consolidated white unity. The white nation can be understood as a constitutive logic that assembles white identity as an authority over the distinctions of geographies and peoples. In other words, the spatial delineations of whites and blacks proved to be productive of hierarchical differentiation, of whites' dominion over blacks. It was not simply that blacks were restricted to other facilities and areas that were more often than not unequal to the facilities and areas of whites. These spatial environments do much more than that. While the conventional argument is that these practices emerged from an ideological discrimination against those of African descent, this argument has little to no account of the ways in which these practices were more producer than product. At the most basic level, this marked spatial differentiation actually codified white sovereignty over space generally, even beyond those spaces that were under the jurisdiction of discriminatory laws. That is, the anti-black practices of segregation established white supremacy over space on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. My brief point here is thus twofold, that segregation practices helped to establish both north and south simultaneously as part of a white nation and that to reduce segregation to simply a result of ideological racism is in bad

faith. This is not to deny the existence of ideological racism, but it is to say that such an explanation privileges a coherent and complete ideology as a precursor to each practice, forcing one to prove the existence of the racist intent. Such an assertion denies how hierarchies are produced in the very practices of differentiation and assumes that ideology is always behind practice, trapping us into a dangerously reductive model of how race is produced and operates. In the same way we cannot reduce black political practices to ideological intents, we cannot remain tied to an understanding of race that requires the evil intent of whites. To do so would be to misrecognize how practices work and to misunderstand the positional power of whiteness, which in actuality requires no personal desire or hate in order to produce anti-blackness and to facilitate black death and dehumanization. Practices are excessive. This is also, in part, why the spatial apparatuses of the south, in particular Jim Crow, also serve to produce the nation as a whole. The ideological delineation between the north and the south as progressive and backward or anti-racist and racist similarly relies on the logic of obvious and determinable ideological racism preceding discriminatory practices. It not only morphs the constitutive practices of race into racism which is subsequently figured as an aberration, but also absolves the north of their participation in its production. It disaggregates the project of the West generally from the practices of the south specifically. Jim Crow was its own beastly system of oppression, requiring its own theoretical attention, but when we consider the capaciousness of racial segregation as a colonial-racial spatial practice, it becomes easier to think of the national, and global, reach beyond the geographic locales of the Southern United States that institutes and maintains white supremacy. As it were, the production of the United States as a white nation state hinges on the consolidation of blacks into a non-home. In the establishment of white nations and consolidation of black non-homes, the nation-

state depends on the production of belonging through whiteness with blackness as its necessary opposite. It is the inclusion that is also an exclusion.

In the United States, while the Civil War, spanning from 1861 to 1865, was created by and produced intrawhite tensions, the Jim Crow laws that came shortly after its conclusion served to maintain white unity through a spatial dominion over black people. Here, where a country-wide debate over 'what to do' with black populations exacerbated division amongst whites, black people were also used to "heal" this conflict by way of their management through segregation.[42] That is, intrawhite conflict was diminished with increased control of white southerners over black populations. Furthermore, the happenings of the south greatly benefited the north economically. Segregation benefitted capital through both the employment of cheap black labor as well as the use of blacks to break work strikes amongst poor white workers.[43] Even more so, the segregation of blacks in the south bolstered white social status everywhere, increasing "cross-class white unity." [44] Post-Reconstruction, the gulf between north and south was bridged on the backs of blacks through both de jure and de facto segregation. The union of nation was a white union that hinged on a violent spatializing of black life, often faced with lynching should they cross the line. To be sure, the spatial practices of race across the north and south were not in any way identical, where the south had strict repressive policies, the north often appeared softer with its various forms of black deprivation. Yet, post-Reconstruction, the nation was consolidating as white on both sides, leading to the "nationalization of new racial regime in which blacks were reconstructed as 'anti-citizens.'"[45] Marcus Garvey's desire to reterritorialize a black nation in Africa emerged from this consolidation.

The consolidation was marked by an ascription to what DuBois had called "this new

religion of whiteness" wherein he defined whiteness as "the ownership of the earth forever and ever."[46] Australian historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds refer to this ascription as the emergence of "white men's countries."[47] For them, it is important to recognize that this was occurring globally, that the emergence of white men's countries was a phenomenon that was transnational in scale. However, as Lake and Reynolds point out, the transnational reach was enacted through national practices and had nationalist outcomes, where border protection and sovereignty became crucial. In a word, it was drawing both the "global colour line" as well as bolstering national borders.[48] Crucial to their conceptualization is the intentional linkage between race and gender, where manhood was enmeshed with whiteness. They link the emergence of these white men's countries to the democratic challenge posed against aristocracy which hinged on a feeling and demonstration of manhood, where masculinity was tied to self-government. In this, "glorious manhood" was marked as white, defined against people and nations that were marked as non-white and thus non-men.[49] It is within this context that Garvey's call for a "new world of black men" becomes so crucial to his cause. It also requires us to read the Black Star Line within the historical wake of the great white fleet that is sent out years earlier by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt as a sign of a globalized white masculinity, the proverbial big stick.

This globalized white manhood can be seen in the affiliation of countries that would assumed to be at odds in the early formation of the United States. After the American Revolution, there was a strong desire to mend fences between the U.S. and Britain which hinged on the latter's newfound push for democratic government and a "fellow feeling" based on a shared identification with whiteness at the exclusion of the racial foreigner. British democrat James Bryce, the author of *The American Commonwealth*, made it his life's mission to mend the disjuncture between

Britain and the U.S., even being appointed the Ambassador to Washington, and it required both a cultivation of anti-blackness within the nation and anti-immigration at the borders. Blacks, according to Bryce, were an "alien element, unabsorbed and unabsorbable."[50] The problem of the multi-racial democracy experienced after the Civil War in the United States and at the articulation of black and white would then pave the way for staunch protections against foreign immigration across the globe at the behest of Bryce's fondness for white Americans so depicted in his writings.[51] The emergence of white men's countries depended on the premise that "multi-racial democracy was an impossibility," with the case of the newly free black populations in the United States proffered as the primary evidence.[52] In fact, as Lake and Reynolds illustrate, the literacy tests that were used to disenfranchise blacks in the U.S., both in the south and north, would serve as a model for literacy tests used by the British in the colonies and metropole to nullify the racial equality promised to all British subjects.[53] That is, the anti-black practices of the United States would prove as a kind of testing ground for the practices to promote other white nationalisms. In fact, the rhetorical use of 'alien' by James Bryce would be recycled in the language used by J. Edgar Hoover in his correspondence with colleagues at the Bureau of Investigation[54] where he complains that there was as yet no federal grounds on which Garvey could be deported as an "undesirable alien," because of the international threat he posed in places like Panama.[55] Indeed, the proximity of different races and the global reach of the darker races would prove to be too threatening post-emancipation, and segregation would come to be the main method of hierarchization. This segregation would not only seem to support racial difference, but would produce this hierarchy and a subsequent relationship of black dependence. The case of the United States, especially that of the southern states, would also produce a "history lesson" of sorts for

places like South Africa and Australia, wherein southern segregation laws and national literacy tests would impact policy in these other countries dealing with their own 'race problems.'[56] In effect, the 'negro problem' in the States was a global problem, threatening the dominion of white democracy everywhere, and would strongly affect the production of what Lake and Reynolds refer to as a "global colour line" wherein the establishment of white men's countries occurred at once and collectively via their networks of intellectual exchange and white supremacist discourse.

Though Lake and Reynolds may be focused primarily on practices surrounding immigration as they parse out the establishment of a global project of whiteness, their brief discussion of the impact of the U.S. 'negro problem' on global whiteness evidences how practices that are used against existing citizens *within* the nation are also used to shore up these globalized racial boundaries. To clarify this, I look to Barnor Hesse's concept of white sovereignty, which he develops through a focus on what he calls racial policing, defined as the "routine racial profiling and racial problematization of the black presence, in whatever form, that is aligned with obliging or coercing black social and political assimilation and conformity."[57] Hesse's "white sovereignty" and Lake and Reynolds' "white men's countries" are linked in their conceptualizations. Though focused on different locations, the former on the inside and the latter on the outside, both are formative for understanding the establishment of white nationalism. Racial policing and the securitization of white civil society for Hesse are directly linked to the maintenance of "the order of democracy's white citizenship."[58] For both Hesse and Lake and Reynolds, the emergence of whiteness occurs at the point of racial articulation. That is, the establishment of white men's countries occurs because of the threat of multi-racial democracy and white sovereignty occurs through "liberal-democratic social control that combined racial profiling with racial hierarchy and

racial segregation," emerging through the repetition of "white domination and black subordination."[59] Together they propose a different story of political order in the West than that which we have traditionally been told is either a generally unraced history or a racial history that can be divorced from democratic ideals. In so doing, they illustrate that these histories are "white narratives," white in their very ability to deny whiteness as a constitutive force.[60]

The constitutive force that they refer to does not simply emerge in the hands of governments, political thinkers, or badged officers either, but is reflected in the interaction of common residents. White dominion can and is expressed at the most quotidian and environmental levels. This blurs the state and non-state when it comes to white citizens who were and are able to embody and enact state power over blacks. This is why it is reductive to think of Jim Crow as something only enforced by the police, and instead more accurate to think of Jim Crow as both a reflection and production of civil society that was indeed subject to the surveillance and enforcement by any white man, woman, or child. But this is also not a disavowal of police power, for as Hesse argues, the police "simply bear the impress of the institution of race."[61] That is, not only do the police and its colonial-racial history remain constitutive to the formation of race, but that race has "always had a policing function."[62] If we remember that race is always relational, then it becomes evident that the violent spatial practices of the early 20th century are an assembling of race *through* practices of segregation rather than understand segregation as a symptom of a social construction of race that comes to associate different physical and genetic markers with racial groups. This would require flipping the order of operations, wherein race is no longer theorized through an assumptive logic based in coherent ideologies and *then* discriminatory practices, but instead as produced through practices that name, often through forms of spatial

conquest. It also requires, as alluded to earlier, that we understand that this spatial conquest was not simply state-expressed in the strict sense, but that any white individual comes to embody the state, that this is the institutional and territorial power of whiteness. Not only white sovereignty over blackness, but the sovereignty of whiteness and non-sovereignty of blackness. This is what is instituted in the environmental establishment of segregation both materially and discursively engendered in an American nation-state formed and maintained by practices like Jim Crow.

What is important here is not simply the spatial policing of race in the actual places it occurs (i.e. the southern United States), but how Jim Crow *named* black people no matter where they may have taken up residence as always already subject to the dominion of whites. That is, in the north it was not that white dominion did not exist but that it existed differently. This disagrees with the assertion that segregation was merely a southern problem. One need not look much further than Washington D.C. itself under the direction of Woodrow Wilson, who on his ascension to President of the United States in 1913 segregated civil service. This was not simply a "sweeping spatial reorganization of government work to separate black and white workers," but a "limitation" to a "controlled and exploitable class of laborers" that channeled swaths of people into a "racially tiered system." According to Eric S. Yellin, the policies of Wilson and his government "nationalized a white supremacist social order" that was presumed to be the provenance of the South.[63] For Yellin, what is most provoking about the story he tells of racism in the civil service is the way in which political progressiveness was crucially joined with the racism of the state by way of "bureaucratic rationalization;" that Wilsonians were able to "claim simultaneously the mantles of progressive politics and white supremacy."[64] The demand for segregation in the North, specifically in the nation's capital, was based in efforts by progressives to make it "more efficient"

and "happier, more attractive." At the most basic of levels, "white supremacy was a necessary precondition if the United States was to be a model nation," and this supremacy invoked the necessity of segregation.[65] In either case, the black is always subject to the desires of the white, here reflected in the liberal language of state's rights, wherein the state, and in turn every state, has the right to do what they want with black people. We would be remiss to suggest that all regions of the country did not "[share] willingly, if not equally, in the profits of racial exploitation" and as such "were complicit in deed and doctrine."[66] Jim Crow was racial terror, but no more or no less than the racial terror that occurred in places like Chicago and New York, that which establishes and maintains what Christina Sharpe has called "the being out of place, and the noncitizen always available to and for death."[67]

This being out of place emerges at the institution of civil society after slavery (that is, pace Sharpe, "in the wake") wherein the "performativity of the democratic nation" is intimately and intrinsically tied to the 'negro problem,' and where white citizens created black citizens.[68] In this formulation, which is in line with much of the evidence offered by Lake and Reynolds, the very foundation of black citizenship in the United States is based in its precarity and policing where citizenship is never achieved because it is always at risk of being removed. Furthermore, Hesse's explanation illustrates how (white) democracy is constituted through the repetitious assembling and expelling of blacks. In the case of de jure and de facto segregation, blackness is hailed by the signs differentiating the locations of whites and blacks and expunged, often literally, through both the policing of these lines at the point of crossing and the inhumane conditions that parse out the borders of black spaces. They are repeatedly and repetitiously assembled and expelled. And indeed, while Hesse's major concern is the repetition of racial policing and it is clear that (white)

democracy has been established and equally depends on the constant expulsion of black citizenship through racial policing, the coherence of democracy also depends on the repeated claim of racial policing as an aberration of democracy rather than an intrinsic facet which aims to re-collect blacks under the umbrella of citizenship. This is in turn how white men's countries continue to operate *as* white men's countries while being populated by increasing numbers of non-white people who critique the growing project of whiteness, but are indeed prohibited, often by self-regulation, to critique democracy. It is also why the common solution proffered is often more democracy. Saxton argues that this is in part due to the American Creed set forth by the famous report by the Swedish Gunnar Myrdal wherein the creed—"a composite of values of liberty, equality and civility derived from the Enlightenment, from Christianity, and from English Common Law"—was a "superego for the American nation" that operated almost paradoxically for the constitution of the nation as white. First, it forbid "inequitable treatment by any human being" but second, required "dehumanization of the black victims" in order to justify inequality.[69] Yet, even as the American Creed itself is forged with this dehumanization and inequality as its basis, it is still "relied upon to right the wrongs of racism."[70] White nationalism always functions within this double space wherein it is based in the hierarchical segregation from blacks and other non-whites but also offers only itself as the horizon for any solution. In other words, white nationalism emerges as the inevitable outgrowth of processes of white democracy. This double space of white nationalism is found in the very establishment of American universalism, the same ideal that marks the American nation-state as both "exceptional" and "exemplary," as it traffics in the "civic myths about the triumph over racial injustice" while at the same time claiming that at least idealistically, America has always been a universal nation, forged in and through equality and inclusion as its core national

values. In this way, (white) American ideals become the only solution, the only horizon, for achieving racial justice.[71] It then becomes easy to understand racial segregation as only a problem if legislated, only a problem of the South, and in actuality, as only a problem that can be solved *by* liberal democracy—wherein everyone is theoretically equal with respect to nationality—rather than part and parcel *of* liberal democracy. This is however not a call to disregard Jim Crow. On the contrary, it is a call to resituate it within a wider environment of Western spatiality. While indeed Jim Crow becomes a stand-in that deflects attention from the more quotidian, de facto, democratic, and otherwise surreptitious forms of white supremacy, it is necessary to think through how spectacular and discrete forms of segregation function together for the establishment of white nationalism. It provides us with a deeper way of understanding about how race functions—that black and white structural positions emerge at the point of articulation in the practice of separation—in the remarkable and the everyday.

To reiterate my point, race is segregation. This is not to disagree with the assertion that race is policing, but to say that policing always produces and requires segregation. Not necessarily the kind of segregation that appears to us in Jim Crow, but policing is always already a function that separates through its naming of both the police and the policed. The West is produced through the delineation of citizenship and as Hesse has shown us, the creation of black citizenship has been the propriety of the white citizenry. With whiteness as the "ultimate political authority in Western polities," the West's production of whites as the police and blacks as the policed is a segregation that occurs in the impossibility of multi-racial democracies. Physical and legislated segregation of course has occurred unevenly across U.S. history, but in all ways and in all places, even for those untouched by legal language delineating place, the colonial-racial order was established and

maintained. It is the "construction of black people as subjects proscribed from participating in the social state in which they live and that part of the public whose relation to the public is always in radical doubt."[72] This segregation is however often denied within the conceptual terrains used to describe racial encounters.

At the pinnacle of this conceptual terrain is the paradigm of 'race relations.' Placing my concept of Western spatiality in terms of the idea and practice of 'race relations' proves instructive and clarifies this dissertation's use of the spatial and of segregation. The paradigm, predominantly associated with the work of sociologist Robert E. Park on the late 19th century migration of African Americans to Chicago largely hailing from the southern states, is illustrated through a cycle (of contact, conflict, accommodation and assimilation) applied to instances of migration.[73] Though linked to Park, the idea of race relations has had a historically far reach in practice, buttressing the way neighborhoods are policed, cities are planned, and populations are managed. The theory of race relations assumes that race only enters the picture with non-white peoples and that successful race relations are ones where non-whites are able to properly assimilate.[74] In practice, race relations rears its ugly head as it presupposes self-contained and separate races that should be kept apart. It is the Western specification of white and non-white sociality in spatial encounters, where white jurisdiction and the assimilation of non-whites to spaces of whiteness is normalized without any reference to the colonial. In fact, by way of its presuppositions, the race relations paradigm preemptively excludes any possible colonial referent. As such, race relations carries with it a segregated social form that forecloses any discussion of its colonial-racial form, as it normalizes social regulation and spatial segregation by way of a discourse of assimilation. At once, race relations in practice presupposes and creates race in the very act of spatially positioning

populations through separation and segregation. The concept of Western spatiality is thus meant to reveal race relations as an idea and practice that should be understood spatially—it reveals race relations, or rather race as relation, as the colonial-racial segregated social form.

Western spatiality shifts away from the paradigm of race relations and towards a colonial frame as a more accurate lens from which to understand white spatial dominion over black life. It is a reiteration of the claim that "Blacks (or Africans in America) are colonized," where black spaces and populations make up an "internal colony." This claim reconceptualizes the segregation between blacks and whites as the "very real existence of America being made up of an oppressor white nation and an oppressed Black nation."[75] This is a paradigm that functions alongside "the color line," insomuch as the colonial breathes it into existence. Together, they are a spatial establishment of race as segregation, wherein, in the words of Langston Hughes "the color-line began to be drawn tighter and tighter."[76] To take on the analytic of the colony is to recognize that the captivity and oppression of black people reflects a "colonial status" which then names its central opposition not "smashing ideological racism or denial of civil rights" but "smashing the internal colony" to prevent "a continuance of this oppression in another form."[77] It is indeed to recognize how rather than being antithetical principles, "racism and nationalism…have been articulated together in U.S. history" even as it denies this colonial relationship.[78] I return to black ships now as they "foregrounded the more disruptive elements in the story of American nationalism, that is, slavery, imperialism, revolution, and race war" and from this alternative story offer an alternative political orientation.[79] I argue that by looking at the black ships as an instantiation of a diasporic assembling of the collective, that they express a black anarchist orientation.

Black Diasporas

Black histories, and by extension, black political histories, have been historically rendered ungeographic. McKittrick explains this erasure through "rational spatial colonization and domination" at the hands of "white masculine European mappings, explorations."[80] She argues that in truth "space and place give black lives meaning" but that black populations have had to "struggle with discourses that erase and despatialize their sense of place." I would like to argue that this is in part due to the driving force of Western geography, both the "language and the physicality," as landed, fixed and owned, which is the basis for the establishment of the white West as a collection of nation-states, and that which is antithetical to black anarchistic movement.[81] To clarify my argument, I will demonstrate how the Black Star Line as a black diasporic movement threatened the geographic authorization and arrangement of (white) nationalism and (white) nations. In order to do so I will argue that black diaspora as I (re)deploy it can be understood as a black anarchist modality.

To situate the Black Star Line as a threat on (white) nationalism, I offer a radically reoriented understanding of diaspora as an analytic from which to understand the political threat of these oceanic expeditions. To be clear, I am not attempting to operationalize diaspora as it has been typified in order to do an empirical study of political participation. I am also not attempting to define a network of actors from which to understand diaspora.[82] Instead, I am reconceptualizing black diaspora as a way to think about movement beyond the nation-state. That is, I am considering how an example of black anarchist movement can be thought of as a black diasporic movement to not only further explain the concept of black anarchism but also to productively push the concept

of (black) diaspora beyond the frames of nationalism. Two moves are necessary for explaining this reading I am suggesting. They are separate but overlapping, building from diaspora as anarchism to black diaspora as black anarchism. The first requires us to break with the conventional definition of diaspora.

While diaspora is typically understood through the 'stem and seed' metaphor, this alternative approach to diaspora that I am proposing would mean to distinguish it from a necessary emphasis on a sense of origin or homeland. Not only does the 'stem and seed' conception of diaspora rely on physical dislocation from an origin, but it implies a linear and one-directional movement that does not consider the movement between. That is, within the conventional conceptual confines of diaspora, there is little to no consideration of the in-between at all, relying solely on a consideration of experience at either the point of origin (homeland) or the location to which one has been displaced (new land). What this fails to account for are the points of articulation, the "process of linking across gaps," and the expansive space in which linking occurs outside, or at least not restricted to, the social practices, norms, and expectations of a singular location.[83] To think diasporically, then, is to, as Richard Iton defines it, speak on a "spatial register" without a tie to the borders that work to delimit space;[84] thinking diasporically is to consider people and place *across* space as well as the ways in which geographic space becomes constituted and tied to certain and distinct populations.

David Graeber, a notable contemporary Anarchist closely linked to the Occupy Movement, asserts that "the main achievement of the nation-state in the last century has been the establishment of a uniform grid of heavily policed barriers across the world."[85] Diaspora's interruption of the nation-state is thus an immediately recognizable glimpse at the linkages between a diaspora and

anarchism. Neither a diaspora, nor its subjects, can be contained to the authority of a nation-state. The diasporic subject, being dislocated from their original homeland, is also understood as never truly belonging to the new land. Loyalties and the ability to fully assimilate to a new culture are always questioned, thus barring the diasporic subject from full inclusion, though one may acquire legal citizenship. This opposition to the constraints of the nation-state is distinctly foundational for anarchist thought. Classical anarchism concentrates its revolutionary energy on the state. Diaspora works against the centralizing and organizing power of the state by virtue of its inability to be completely tied to a single location. The state preserves the principle of sovereignty, a principle of "absolute authority that stands above social relations, monopolising violence, and embodying an inequality of power relations and a symbolic absolutism that is inimical to the idea of a free society."[86] A diaspora in turn disrupts the sovereign function of the state to "provide society with a unifying principle of 'representation' through which the people are submitted to political power."[87] Diaspora is categorically opposed to the monolithic; at its very core, diaspora is about dispersal and diffusion. Though diaspora is understood and named by way of a single nation-state, thus rendered legible through its consolidation, diaspora is marked by an implicit disunity. In other words, while diaspora often maintains its cogency through an ascription to the unifying force of origin, its incapacity to be strictly grouped and sorted readily sustains its anarchist inflection. Diaspora is inherently collectivist, engendering a break with vertical structure in its resistance to the top-down organization of homeland and new land that ascribes to the sovereignty of the nation-state, and in doing so enacts a more horizontal perspective. Diaspora cannot be sovereign, it does not seek to provide a coherent and fully-formed alternative structure, but serves to disturb structure. It works toward the new, providing a space that works against constraint, restrictions,

and borders in order to foster new pathways and forms of connection that stand outside the nation-state model.

The weakest conceptions of diaspora, that is, the least oppositional understandings, inevitably imprison one within the paradigm of the state. They are often bound to an emphasis on nation-state locations, that of the new land and the homeland, that express an attempt to 'know' black movement. As Sarah Jane Cervenak has argued, "black movement is, more often than not, *read* as disruptive physicality, a philosophical problem to be solved as opposed to that which resolves philosophical problems."[88] For Cervenak and the authors she cites (Denise Ferreira da Silva and André Lepecki), the white subject invented by Western Enlightenment thinkers "pervades state thinking about appropriate public (read: visible) kinesis" that arguably "inspires an antiwandering ethos targeted particularly at the nonnormative."[89] For both Western governments as well as the scholars who attempt to measure the success of its voyages, the problem with the voyages of the Black Star Line is that their navigation and movement is understood as dangerously nomadic, useless, or inappropriately directionless. It is this facet of black anarchism, its wandering beyond and without the horizon of the Western political, that is often the reason it is disregarded or deemed menacing. The voyages of the shipping line are conventionally taken up via capitalism, wherein all meaning is based on the origin and destination of goods, and all other locations are either unnecessary or unimportant. The Bureau of Investigation on the other hand was fully aware of the political danger that these voyages posed, where the meaning of the collective threat was based on which countries and populations with which they had made contact. Both interpretations, however, in being threatened by the nomadism of this black movement also deny the critical import of this roaming because of an adherence to the landed, linear, owned, and

known. This is the "state [moving] in to impose or solicit a script" because it is always already assumed that the danger of black movement is its incapacity for "rational comportment."[90] In the attempt to impose a script, the state renders black movement dangerous not necessarily because of its intents but because of its lack of legible intents, legible, that is, according to the methods and meanings of the white nation-state. My attempt to speak differently about diaspora, to render a more 'radical reading' as it were, is to question and contest the nation-state model in its entirety, that is, at its foundation. Brent Hayes Edwards argues that a politics of diaspora rejects the Western notion that knowledge production is categorically linked to the nation, but that by moving beyond nation we have the potential of running into a critique that the definition of diaspora is becoming too expansive, meaning everything and nothing simultaneously.[91] However, this reconceptualization of black diaspora maintains the major tenets of diaspora (trauma, dispersal, stigmatization, and memory) while getting beyond the restrictive frame that requires a 'successful' movement across borders. A radical reading of the black diaspora would require one to cut ties with the meaning making of the nation-state, resist consolidation, dispel a hierarchical nature, be attuned to the importance of movement itself, and understand the significance of self-determination within the confines of white spatial authority. If we can agree that the "transnational political reality" engendered by the Black Star Line "explicitly countered the national order being constructed during World War I" and afterward, then it is now our task to understand how.[92] I argue that doing so requires us to see how the Black Star Line takes on a distinctly black anarchist inflection.

Iton argues that to think diasporically would be to realize the "artificiality of national boundaries."[93] Thus, when we consider the relationship of people across the world, historically

tied to geographic locations, we have to realize the import of thinking *beyond* and *through* these borders. What is important is not necessarily the location of these geographic boundaries, but the relationship of power that allows these lines to be drawn and the separations made between populations in the first place based on the distinction of Europeanness and non-Europeanness. It is, according to Iton and to Hesse, a question of governance. In this formulation, and with the evidence provided in the previous sections, it may be more useful to consider the West, as Edouard Glissant has argued, as more a project than a place.[94] Such a consideration would move us away from these 'artificial borders' and instead realize how a national project works in concert with White supremacy in order to govern, constitute, and maintain race. Thus, a black diasporic analysis, necessarily emerging from a history of colonialism, better allows us to understand the constitution of race. It would be to impose what Iton calls "juxtapositivity" where we are able "to put together the scattered pieces of the puzzle in order that we might read modernity and coloniality together and develop our critiques accordingly."[95] To be sure, diasporic thinking does not immediately bare a definition of race, but it does open up the possibility of thinking across and between seemingly disparate geographies and people as borne from a connected history of colonial-racial domination. In fact, Iton has opened the door by illustrating how national borders have situated hierarchies of difference that structure the world. Iton argues that coloniality is "the means by which 'Europe' imagines, makes, and manages itself and its others; or, more broadly, as the shifting processes through and by which identities are ascribed, hierarchically and spatially arranged, and consequently options, choices, and life-chances, are determined and dictated."[96] This aligns well with Hesse's own remarks about the logic of race, believing "the formative signifier of *Europeanness*, [is] a defining logic of race in the process of *colonially* constituting itself and its

designations of *non-Europeanness*, materially, discursively and extra-corporeally."[97] Of course, these signifiers of difference cannot easily map onto national boundaries insomuch as they stretch across entire continents and divide countries, as the work of Lake and Reynolds has shown. The boundaries of "color coded European sameness and non-European otherness" are nationally inflected, yes, but national boundaries deny the sameness that can be seen from England to the United States to Australia in dealing with their 'colored races.'[98] It is thus necessary, as Denise Ferreira da Silva has argued, to understand "how the racial governs the contemporary global configuration."[99]

But black diaspora does not merely account for a racialized reality; black diasporic thinking also pushes us in new directions politically. Using the Black Star Line as a diasporic lens, my conceptualization of black diaspora challenges the conventional understanding of the black diaspora as merely and simplistically the geographic dispersion of people of African descent. Instead, I position black diaspora as ultimately an opposition *of* dispersion to the racial requirements that necessitate the nation-state itself established through colonial-racial practices of bordering between the West and the non-West and between white and non-white, and especially between white and black. I take up Iton's reconsideration of diaspora's potential that he names the "rediscursive albeit agonistic field of play that might denaturalize the hegemonic representations of modernity as unencumbered and self-generating and bring into clear view its repressed, colonial subscript."[100] I argue that the voyages of the Black Star Line revealed this repression as their disruptions of segregation and emplacement brought to the fore the black sedentarizing practices of the Western state as processes of white reterritorialization. Furthermore, this black diasporic revelation simultaneously marks out black citizenship within the white nation-state as undesirable.

This alternative understanding of black diaspora then inheres within it a removal of conventional diaspora's resultant camouflage, that understanding of diaspora as a dispersion of those who simply share an ethnic or geographic origin, which papers over the violent sutures that link and de-link populations across the globe. As Iton argues, "we can think of diaspora as both mapping onto and contesting racial hegemonies."[101] While a national frame poses the threat of obliterating the sites and practices of resistance emerging out of alternative links and communities, a black diasporic lens helps us to realize these moments as well as the borders and frames they contest. Black diaspora is a "means of contesting the tendency [of the nation-state] to erase and collapse locations in which deliberate activity—black thoughts—might occur."[102] Thus we can see the ways in which an epistemological policing of diaspora which privileges the nation-state and essentialist understandings of diasporic community is also a way to disrupt black activities of protest and resistance of the nationally-bounded (read colonial) world. In line with Iton, Edwards claims that a "diasporic register" can be a "remedy to the constitutive links between racism and nationalism" insomuch as it can name them *as well as* disrupt them.[103] For Iton, this can begin with black diaspora's ability to create new definitions of politics. As he states, black diaspora resists the limit of politics to "that which happens within state borders, or in the name of the nation" and thus is a means by which our normative ascriptions to this conception of politics can be denaturalized. [104] That is, by first naming these norms and then subsequently denaturalizing them, a black diasporic thinking can come to understand and then disrupt governance. For Iton, and presumably Edwards as well, this would mean delinking geography and power, a politics irreducible to the "language of citizenship," and a suspicion of narratives of homeland that aim to authenticate geographies by demanding "fixity, hierarchy, and hegemony." [105]

The nation, in this thinking, "cannot sustain nonwhite aspirations for emancipation" and so black diaspora offers an alternative assemblage of developing a political community that expresses non-state horizons.[106]As an alternative frame for the production of knowledge and the understanding of politics, specifically black politics, the black diaspora "inaugurates an ambitious and radically decentered analysis of transnational circuits of culture and politics that are resistant or exorbitant to the frames of nations and continents."[107] The invocation of diaspora is thus not meant to overdetermine the black community and assume its political affinities, interests or even its organization, but it is to claim that a black anarchist resistance to racial governance is always already a resistance to the project of nation-states.

Black Anarchism: Black Star Line as Hydrarchy

The Black Star Line can be understood as engaging in a diasporic practice, or maybe more correctly, a practice of establishing black diaspora, as it provoked black liberated zones and engendered the formation of a "transnational community."[108] Here, Western governments' marked fear of international dispersion of political opposition is a recognition of the geopolitical threat posed by the Black Star Line, the fear of a diasporic black political dissent. The threat of a black diaspora is a black anarchist practice of collectivity across and against the sovereignty of the United States and the West. Here, the black anarchism of the Black Star Line is a distinctly non-Western anarchism. Where the modifier "Western" is not necessarily demonstrative of geographic region but instead a geographical project, the voyages of the Black Star Line are an interruption, a non-Western invocation of geography that is mildly chaotic in practice (we cannot forget the rotting coconuts and the financial disruption of many families and individuals), but more

importantly, a practice of chaos itself. It is anti-order, anti-racial order, anti-nation state, and thus anti-Western. The West aims to organize the world, often through the production of discrete nation-states that render a racial hierarchy. The West, while often associated with a particular region is more than a geography, but, rather, a geographical project. That is, while still often expressing itself through geographic productions, claims, and practices, it is not simply located, but locating. In turn, the Black Star Line refused that desire to locate, to fix. This was not simply a reactionary refusal, though the refusal did come in response to the sedentarizing techniques indicative of the production of a white nation. The Black Star Line also indicates a structure of practice that was in and of itself a refusal of fixity. In the vein of black diaspora, the voyages of the Black Star Line produced "an alternative culture of location and identification to the state, which would encourage a deemphasis on the circulation and primacy of national blacknesses and suggest different and dissident maps and geographies."[109] In other words, the Black Star Line forces us to think differently about blackness that is not tied to nation but understood as an "oppositional force" responsive to its restrictive powers, responsive to colonial-racial domination.[110] As an expression of the black diaspora it, according to Iton, "[enabled] black survival."[111] Or, more specifically, it was an invocation of black anarchist politics as it reflects what Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin's Black Anarchism is anchored in, as described by Nik Heynen and Jason Rhodes: the "geography of survival."[112] This survival geography rests in the claim that at the core of human survival are matters "related to the socio-spatial processes that impede human lives by preventing people from accessing the basic stuff necessary for their continued survival: adequate food, shelter, bodily safety, etc."[113] The Black Star Line must be understood within this segregation constitutive of this Western nation as a practice of geographic survival, no matter how

minute the impact may initially seem. It is geographic because at its core it was "[aimed] at the transformation of the spaces in which we live."[114] It is black diasporic and black anarchistic because it worked to "spread the insurrection" and recognized white supremacy as a "national oppression."[115]

The nation-state issues a demand of nationalist comportment, that is, loyalty to the state and its project of white sovereignty. It additionally requires that meaning-making happen through territory and nation. But the black ship moves in the deterritorialized spaces, shaping and affecting land, rather than be overdetermined by it. The Black Star Line invokes "Garvey's imaginary of a community that transcended bounded territorial units."[116] It mobilizes "the black world's sense of itself as a global racial community."[117] And it also mobilizes a particular understanding of black freedom, the unfettered movement of black people. The importance of the ship in defiance of the nation-state is amplified in what Linebaugh and Rediker refer to as hydrarchy, a conceptualization of maritime relations that goes in two particular directions. The first, according to Linebaugh and Rediker, is the "organization of the maritime state from above" and the second is the "self-organization of sailors from below.[118]" The former can be used to understand the way white nationalism employs ships as "walls of the state," the conquering of land power through occupancies and conflicts fought on oceans.[119] In the white nationalist hydrarchy, or what Linebaugh and Rediker refer to as "imperial hydrarchy," the ship was the "engine of commerce" and the "machine of empire."[120] Yet within this form of hydrarchy grew the other form, that was both an oppositional and "subversive alternative," that "organized a social world apart from the dictates of mercantile and imperial authority and used it to attack merchants' property."[121] As they point out, this bottom-emerging hydrarchy "was the deadly enemy to hydrarchy from above."[122]

The Black Star Line can be understood as producing this hydrarchy from the bottom, a mobilization of the collective in direct contestation of white oppressive governance that aims to know the world.

Yet, as an outgrowth of the UNIA and Garvey, we cannot simply define the Black Star Line's black anarchist orientation based on its disruption of the nation-state if only because this assumes an inherent opposition between it and black nationalism. Black Anarchists have long been critical of Anarchism's dismissal of nationalism who claim that Anarchism is constitutively foreclosed to any ascription to the nation. Black Anarchists have argued in return that in the case of black radical politics, "nationalism can be anti-state."[123] In line with this clarification, I would argue that even if it emerged from Garvey's imperialist vision, the Black Star Line was the subversive alternative to white imperialism, to white nationalist authority. As its own deployment of hydrarchy from the bottom, the Black Star Line attempted to organize a different social world. Former political prisoner and current organizer and theorist of Black Anarchism writing during the 1980s, Ervin further clarifies the delineation when he recapitulates black diaspora through what he refers to as the necessity for "African intercommunalism" within his Black Anarchist frame.[124] He suggests that the history and legacy of slavery as well as "economic neocolonialism" has dispersed black people across every continent making it possible, and arguably necessary, to "speak of Black international revolutionary solidarity." At the same time, he argues that the ideals of Anarchism follow logically to "trans-nationalism," which he defines as signifying a move beyond the nation-state. The nation-state, for Ervin, is the bringer of "war, tension, and national enmity," representing and enacting "dictatorship and oppression of the many over the few" no matter if their banner reads 'revolutionary' or 'socialist.'[125] For these two reasons, Ervin argues

that Black Anarchism requires a global perspective that opposes the overbearing authority of the nation-state. To be sure, this solidarity across black struggles raises an interesting issue for those movements that do indeed seek a nationalist agenda. Ervin is clear that he is not arguing against struggles for national liberation movements, especially within the context of Africa. To do so would be to dangerously and incorrectly suggest, as argued by George Ciccariello-Maher, that "all nationalisms are the same," denying their importance and "historical capacity to generate…other struggles."[126] In this vein, the African intercommunalism that Ervin's Black Anarchism stands for indicates a support of these movements to the extent that they "struggle against a colonial or imperialist power," but warns of the dangers and is weary of the almost assured circumstance that once these movements achieve state power that they simply produce a new dictator over the masses.[127] Here, Ervin points to one of the dangers of taking up the Black Star Line as a black anarchist practice insomuch as the ships are invariably tied to Marcus Garvey's nationalist project that imagines himself as "Emperor of the Kingdom of Africa." However, Ervin's gesture also introduces an important distinction that becomes central to our analysis here, distinguishing a universal opposition to state authority from an opposition to colonial-racial authority embodied in the state.

This distinction can be placed into conversation with Georges Sorel's definition of the state proffered within his delineation of force and violence. Sorel, one of Ciccariello-Maher's major interlocutors, argues that "the object of force is to impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to the destruction of that order."[128] Ciccariello-Maher argues that Sorel's definition of the state, the wielder of force, as the "social order in which the minority governs," provides more specificity in regards to *what* about the state that is opposed,

focusing our attention on *substance* rather than the unmarked institution itself.[129] Ciccariello-Maher uses this focused attention to take Anarchism to task for its dismissal of Fanon, who can be noted as having an anarchist orientation toward violence, but is often claimed as too racially essentialist or "an apologist for nationalism" to be of value for Anarchist thought.[130] Contesting this claim, Ciccariello-Maher suggests that both Sorel and Fanon place greater significance on the "content of institutions over their mere institutional form" and what follows is a "view which is more about liberation from inequality than the literal elimination of institutions."[131] For our purposes here, this invites a refocusing of our attention toward the specificity of black anarchism that aids our reconsideration of the Black Star Line as well as a new orientation toward conventional Anarchism's Eurocentric universalism that simply disavows the state.

While acknowledging the potential, and arguably inescapable, pitfalls, of some decolonial nationalist movements, both Ervin and Ciccariello-Maher demonstrate a closer look at black nationalism than is normally permissible within an anarchist frame, suggesting that black anarchism's foundational attention towards the colonial-racial requires a different understanding of nationalist struggle, especially those examples of "radical decolonial nationalism," than that which should be given to Eurocentric movements because of a history of colonialism.[132] Though the concern of this chapter has not been to recuperate Garvey's nationalism, but instead to focus on the Black Star Line as practices beyond their given intents, I would be remiss to deny that his political agenda has been all too quickly, and possibly mistakenly, marshalled as simply imperialist in a way that fractures his movement from this colonial-racial history. In fact, there has been an attempt in places like Jamaica to "reroot" Garvey to keep him tied to conventional notions of nationalism and territorial sovereignty, displacing imaginaries and transgressions enacted by the

Black Star Line and other actions of Garvey that vehemently "[supersede] the territorialized nation-state."[133] A black anarchist frame, understood in relation to this reoriented understanding of black diaspora, solicits more nuance, requiring that the colonial-racial context from which these practices emerge and that which these practices contest remain central to any analysis. In fact, as Stephens has argued, Garvey and the UNIA's call for "the right of black subjects to Africa" within the Declaration of 1920 was more anti-imperialist than essentialist as it directly contested the Treaty of Versailles and directly inserted itself within the context of imperial warfare.[134] This is not to argue, however, that black anarchism remains tied to the state. On the contrary, in the vein of Ervin, it remains critical and ultimately concerned with its abolishment. Yet, the state confronted and contested by black anarchism is not the same state confronted by Anarchism, where the state often if not always goes unnamed.

The state that black anarchism, or what could be called in Ciccariello-Maher's words a "nonanarchist anarchism," contests is a colonial-racial one. This is not the state that I opened the previous section with, the unmarked state that is discussed by contemporary Anarchist thinker David Graeber and that which I put into contradistinction to an unmarked diaspora. That unmarking, that state that goes unnamed, is indeed part of black anarchism's necessary critique of most major white Anarchist thought. This unmarked state is in large part due to two moves on the part of big-A Anarchism; first, where it locates itself within particular traditions of thought, and second, how this affects its understanding of Western society. Ciccariello-Maher has critiqued Anarchism's anchor "firmly and irretrievably in Enlightenment rationalism" as that which simply becomes shorthand for European. His claim is that the "slip" from the already questionable reliance on the rational and progressive to Enlightenment "reveals what it attempts to conceal: the

Eurocentrism at the heart of this effort to reclaim anarchism."[135] The insistence on Enlightenment as the harbinger of Anarchist thought places the Anarchist project fully formed and within an exclusively European context for and by Europeans, and thus for and by whites. Knowing this, it becomes readily evident how class becomes the primary oppression on which this political orientation turns, as referenced in an earlier chapter. More importantly, it has forced a reductive understanding of its opposition to that of a general state, or, sometimes, all oppressions. Joel Olson has pointed out that the standard white Anarchist claim against oppression writ large belies a mistaken sense of how power functions in the U.S. He argues quite poignantly that while other forms of domination, like his examples of the abuse of children and animals, are deplorable, they do not encompass the foundation of the state in the U.S., and I would argue the West more generally, which he points out as white supremacy. It is, for Olson, the mistake of confusing a "moral condemnation" with a "political and strategic analysis."[136] Both Ciccariello-Maher and Olson explain the inabilities of white Anarchism to "deal with questions of race and colonization" as not only a limit on their theoretical analysis but as an active avoidance.[137] It is a foundational issue and a principal reason why Ervin argues that it is "not just a simple matter of Blacks just joining with white Anarchists to fight the same type of battle against the State."[138] This is, however, what white Anarchism asks for and expects. This active avoidance is also an "anarchist 'imperialism,'" a demand "that all struggles, regardless of context and conditions, assume the form it has chosen as preordained."[139] The colonial thus takes a double form, the fact of the 'missing' analysis that Olson speaks of as well as the content of that analysis.

Ervin begins to gesture towards this content in his discussion of (neo)colonialism that I briefly referenced earlier. In parsing out the need for African intercommunalism as based in

neocolonialism, Ervin bridges his analysis of Africa with his analysis of the conditions of African Americans through his use of an analytic of the colony. This colonial lens is thus necessary not only for understanding black anarchism's different understanding of the state and the Western spatiality from which the Black Star Line emerges, as I discussed in the previous section, but also its inherent connection to the black diaspora. For Ervin, a Black Anarchist politics requires the liberation of the black colony which then jettisons the socio-spatial relationship between white and black through practices of self-determination, through indeed, steering one's own destiny as the ships of the Black Star Line aim to do. This shared colonial frame is thus a new linking, one enabled by a black diasporic sense, that frames how a black anarchist politics can circulate. This circulation is further reflected in the movement(s) of the Black Star Line. It must then also be considered alongside the international networks of support of Garvey and Garveyism that stretch from the U.S. to Jamaica to Ghana as well as the international dispersion of UNIA chapters, which speak to a decentralization of power, albeit bubbling under the surface of Marcus Garvey's claims to Empire. The Black Star Line embodied a black anarchist imaginary of unfettered movement and self-determination that fueled and was fueled by a mass movement. In this way, it is the black ship that emerges from and contests the White (slave) ship of the state, invoking a black anarchist politics that interrupts the colonial-racial assemblages of white nations that aim to conquer by division through an assembling of their own—the collective of black diaspora.

Chapter 3
Cataclysm

> *I've lived with repression every moment of my life, a repression so formidable that any movement on my part can only bring relief, the respite of a small victory or the release of death. In every sense of the term, in every sense that's real, I'm a slave to, and of, property.*
>
> —George Jackson[1]

> *The government, in its simplicity, offers itself as the absolute, necessary,* sine qua non *condition for order*
>
> —Pierre-Joseph Proudhon[2]

> *The landlords must be contested through rent strikes and rather than develop strategies to pay the rent, we should develop strategies to take the buildings.*
>
> —Kuwasi Balagoon

They called it a riot. In 1965, when black residents of the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles took to the streets after a highway patrolman used excessive force while arresting a young black man, six days of violent confrontations with the state ensued. During and after the events, political officials and pundits charged "random terror and lawlessness," and they were not referring to the police.[3] This is not a new story. Then, like now, protests to state-sponsored racial violence were becoming more frequent. This is also not a new story to be told. Many scholars have taken up the Watts Rebellion to explain both its inciting conditions and continued problems, to indeed explain what happened and why it happened. This chapter will gesture towards these questions, but will shift its attention to a different set of related issues, namely, the critical content of the rebellion itself as a political practice. That is, my aim is to consider what the conflagration *does* as both revolt and 'riot.' What does it communicate and what does it incite? Looking to this political event and political practice in these two ways requires this chapter to make three moves. At once,

it considers the uprising's spatial context, its force, and the response it seems to trigger. The rebellion, I argue, was at root a spatial action. As such, I will begin by explicating the nexus of race, crime, and space as it appears in colonial-racial practices of ghettoization, focusing particularly on public housing as a way to elaborate the ghetto as a concrete slave ship. Considering how physical damage and looting came to structure the rebellion's force, this chapter argues that a black anarchist lens reveals property destruction as a political practice of cataclysm, that is, an anticipatory destruction that embodies a violently disruptive leap from white society's spatial regulation. In this, the chapter will consider what questions property destruction proposes and why it then provokes the exorbitant response that it does. Pushing past the boundary of where politics take place as well as how, the rebellion is violently policed as a 'riot,' which leads this chapter to consider the excess of the state and civil response as one of panic.

Employing the term rebellion alongside the conceptualization of cataclysm is meant to take seriously spatial destruction as a political practice rather than a symptom of what many scholars correctly name a political event. This chapter does not uncritically deploy the term 'riot' for this is the term of colonial-racial authority, but it does reckon with *what* it is that is riotous to think through why indeed the state should be fearful of black anarchism.

Concrete Slave Ship

For Kenneth B. Clark, the ghetto is the space marked by "invisible walls [that] have been erected by white society…both to confine those who have *no* power and to perpetuate their powerlessness."[4] In Los Angeles, the emergence of growing white suburbs occurred coeval with overcrowded and non-white urban ghettos.[5] Urban sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod explains that

during and after World War II, large numbers of black migrants moved into South Central and especially the poorer Watts neighborhood. Between 1940 and 1950 a large influx of black Americans arrived only to be restricted to certain small areas through "limited employment opportunities and restrictive housing covenants, block agreements, and violence."[6] João H. Costa Vargas argues that the segregation of Los Angeles was driven in large part through the early 20th century movement of white Americans, mostly American-born, away from the urban downtown centers which were defined by "congestion, poverty, dirt, immorality, transience, uncertainty, and heterogeneity." These white Americans ventured into suburbs, the beacon of "the good community," marked by affluence, single-family homes, and large tracts of space, and characterized as permanent and predictable.[7] American-born whites all over the country held these community values, according to Vargas, but in Los Angeles, they comprised a higher percentage of the population compared to all other U.S. cities.[8] With this stark juxtaposition, Los Angeles' inner cities, marked by poor living conditions, soon became synonymous with black residents. These areas were dilapidated with unpaved roads, old structures, and high risk for disease. There was also a housing shortage, which the city attempted to alleviate during the 1940s with the construction of Hacienda Village, Imperial Courts, and Jordan Downs within the Watts neighborhood. Watts was annexed by the city of Los Angeles in 1926 and as the neighborhood was developed in the mid 20th century, it became a "black island in an otherwise white sea of southeastern LA County."[9] On the east, it was bordered by a number of white cities, including Lynwood, which was known as "the friendly Caucasian city" until the 1950s, and on the south it was hemmed in by Compton, which in 1930 had only one black resident.[10] By 1960, some of Los Angeles' black neighborhoods merged, resulting in a nearly forty square-mile ghetto with few

jobs, poor mass transit, limited highway access, inadequate schools, repressive police, and little public housing.[11] Abu-Lughod argues that Los Angeles' failure to address longstanding black grievances set the scene for the massive 1965 Rebellion.[12]

As it can probably be gleaned, housing was a central issue in urban life for black Angelenos with overcrowding, discriminatory policies and practices, and a lack of resources exacerbating the already isolating experience of living in a racially sequestered area. Scholars like Rashad Shabazz have focused on the carceral nature of urban housing, paying particular attention to the liminality of kitchenettes in Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes, joining others scholars who have written about the intersection of housing and racial formation.[13] Comparatively, Los Angeles' urban housing has been considered relatively decent when juxtaposed with other cities, especially those in the Midwest or on the East Coast. While Los Angeles does not fulfill the urban nightmare of high-rise housing and congestion at increasing elevations as compared to other cities, the fantasy of L.A. as racial paradise holds little weight. All over the United States, the 1949 Housing Act was meant to provide affordable housing for workers, predominantly black, after the war. At the time, it was celebrated as blacks in the city saw a deep desire finally come to fruition, a sign that alienation would soon be a thing of the past. Yet, a white public's fear of black intrusion meant that these housing projects were often contained to particular parts of the city. At the same time, a lack of preparation for an increasing number of residents coupled with a quick decline in federal funding meant that these projects soon became synonymous with failure, a gut-wrenching blow to any chance for black livability in the city. The housing for, and of, Los Angeles' black population was a source of anxiety. The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) was in charge of building housing projects that would mostly become the residences for black Angelenos, but

would also have to deal with a larger white society's fear of increased crime and black people's justifiable complaints of poor conditions.

The approach to the housing projects in Los Angeles has long revolved around privatization as the solution. At this particular juncture in U.S. history (namely the 1960s and 1970s) as fears of crime continued to push political agendas, both liberal and conservative, architects and urban planners were also emphasizing the need for their plans and suggestions to be taken on by groups like HACLA using references to 'violence in the streets' and images of graffiti that often conflated protests and street crime. This promoted and capitalized on a fear that was equally broad and specific, broad in terms of its reach and specific in surreptitiously alluding to race and class.[14] To many, the ghetto was a symbol of the degradation of society and this often governed the uncritical response from whites, including those in charge of designing solutions. To be sure, while the poor conditions were a problem to be dealt with, it was often the ghetto's conflation with crime that drove the decision making. As Joy Knoblauch argues, there existed an economy of fear in the work of public housing design: "the existing designed environment of public housing was a source of fear, a site onto which fears were projected, and a site of intervention in an attempt to solve the problem of crime."[15]

The work of Oscar Newman and his concept 'defensible space' capitalizes on this economy of fear and has had a far reach in urban planning, continuing to buttress much of the discussion on crime prevention through design well into the 21st century.[16] Defensible space was representative of a more general push for the architectural expression and production of a law and order[17] society. Much of this has to be understood in the context of an increasing preoccupation with crime in the United States, which in turn produced a logic of governance solely focused on crime prevention.[18]

It is with this logic that the Reagan administration would later cut funding for HUD in all areas except security, which actually received an increase, a result of his 'tough on crime' attitude and policies.[19] Developing the theory of defensible space in 1969, Newman argued that higher crime rates in high-rise apartment buildings were linked to a lack of ownership and responsibility by residents and illustrated that problems surrounding social control, crime, and public health could be solved through the designing of community. Newman argued that through architectural design, he could "create thresholds and transitions between public and private realms" and through this could create "'turf' that residents can survey and defend."[20] Well into the 1990s, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) was still employing Newman's ideas, claiming that the use of technologies of defensible space "enable residents to take control of their neighborhoods, to reduce crime, and to stimulate private reinvestment." Even reports that do not directly cite Newman and his terminology use a language of privatization in their call for more structure for black populations in public housing.

Scholars of architecture and urban design argue that defensible space and the larger trend it represents has led to uneven urban development and continued urban planning based in white fear and white security. As Setha Low foretold, "public spaces will shrink as privatized social spaces expand in order to provide white citizens with immunity" from racial others.[21] I argue that with defensible space, expressed through practices of containment and fueled by a fear of black criminality, housing projects instituted the segregated spatial form, drawing deep lines in the pavement and constructing concrete slave ships[22] that served to violently regulate the life of black populations left adrift. The reference to the slave ship is not merely rhetorical but is meant to refract the socio-spatial particularities of ghettoization, and ghetto housing in particular, through the

colonial-racial shape of 'the hold.' Like the slave ship, ghettoization was meant to hold and force the movements of black populations, deliberately producing conditions that gratuitously exacerbate black mortality while simultaneously segregating them from whites. The 'concrete' modifier however brings attention to movement in place, that is, slave ships that "never move"[23], which highlights how ghettoization steers and propels black life into the direction of death by the very practices of sedentarization and containment. The concrete also of course signifies the modern elaboration of this containment, that is, how the slave ship, as a carceral geography that works to determine black life, has continued, but not unchanged. The ideology of defensible space is just one primary example of how 'the hold' continues to develop in its attempt to maintain black alienation. Intending to solve the problem of low-income public housing, the suggestions of those like Newman provide an entre into the spatial paradigms that continue to steer the design of the city, a striking example of the rhetoric and practice of Western spatiality at the urban level.

To provide an account of the 'law and order society's' spatial impact and illustrate the fraught relationship of crime, race, and space, I will begin by quoting Newman at length:

> "*Defensible space* . . . inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself . . . an environment in which latent territoriality and sense of community in the inhabitants can be translated into responsibility for ensuring a safe, productive, and well- maintained living space. The potential criminal perceives such a space as controlled by its residents, leaving him an intruder easily recognized and dealt with"

A later Newman casebook refers to introducing residents to the benefits of "mainstream life" and "upward mobility" while also placing the onus on residents to better their communities. The main technique through which this is supposedly made possible has been to individualize and thus privatize space. Newman claimed that areas were unsafe because the "grounds were common" (and thus unassigned), whereas those spaces where a landing was occupied by fewer families were

well-maintained, drawing a clear correlation between ownership and safety. By his estimation, the increasing number of people claiming a territory was proportional to a decrease in individual rights to the space, which meant a decrease in the chance for families to reach an "informal agreement" about "acceptable usage."[24] In a similar vein, the 1977 "comprehensive security plan" sponsored by HUD for Nickerson Gardens, a 1,066-unit public housing project in Watts, worked to combat residents' fears and, again, lower crime rates, and recommended the reduction and ultimate eradication of unassigned space, calling instead for the creation of "clusters" or "mini-neighborhoods." These clusters, they argue, would need to be defined architecturally through "fencing, hedging, and the presence of entryways."[25] The plan was meant to "encourage territoriality" and involve residents in the maintenance of their own environments by effectively privatizing space. For example, the authors state that:

> "front and rear yards should be defined with modest, symbolic demarcations so residents will be encouraged to take control of their yards. These improvements coupled with the others included in this plan, should reduce the amount of unassigned, anonymous space and suggest a hierarchy of space similar to that found in middle-class housing. Residents would have interior space, private open space—such as yards, semi-public space (in this case, the cluster), and finally, project or neighborhood space."[26]

Furthermore, they called for a redistribution of recreational space based on age, divided into elementary, teenage, and adult areas so as to reduce what they termed the competition over space.[27] The stated purpose of this report is to increase a *sense* of ownership, similar to that of middle and upper classes. To do so, the planners delineated spaces and established functionality, where functionality comes to signal the disruption of accessibility to public space and the eradication of ambiguity. Here, ambiguity indexes the possibility of crime.

Not to be lost in over 200 pages of text that make up the Nickerson Gardens report, the authors called for a reduction of 'penetrability of the site,' but again not of the police. In fact, their

goal was to increase the ability for "residents and police to observe on-site activities," providing "firelanes" that could serve as "an informal pathway to patrol and survey."[28] In short, the purpose of the report was not only reduce the ambiguity of the space, but to provide further sanctions on how space could be used and thus increase the opportunity for trespassing, which subsequently operates as a justification for police presence and surveillance. The HUD report proceeds to blame the increase in crime on the absence, inefficiency, and insensitivity of "police and other security-related social services." [29] While this description of police presence may be, for what it is worth, factual, it misunderstands the relationship between police and black populations. In its link of increased rates of crime to poor policing, the report relies on an assumption that the police and the housed communities are on the same side, which disavows the reality of frequent police corruption and brutality, indeed that which becomes the inciting incident for the Watts Rebellion. What this does aver is that the security project and the privatization of space go hand-in-hand, working efficiently to extend spatial confinement hidden in a language of assistance. Descriptions of functionality that are meant to delineate proper activities within space and under surveillance, while seemingly benign, belie a security state that insinuates and conjures black criminality. Newman's claim that in the projects it becomes "impossible to tell resident from intruder" reflects not only a desire for identification but details a deep distrust for low-income communities and the easy conflation of blackness and danger that is acutely normalized.[30] Shabazz's work illustrates how the housing projects of Chicago played a direct role in black subject formation, becoming a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy where "security measures in the projects that informed and shaped the project's geography played a role in producing the subjectivities they purported to eliminate."[31] For Shabazz, the projects, by design, were an indication that residents were criminals and thus its

residents often entered lives of crime.[32]

While defensible space may have been conceived as a response to high crime within the inner city and an implicit critique of urban fearmongering[33], I argue that Newman's push for internal defense operationalized privatization in a manner not dissimilar from the impetus behind white gated communities, where the fear of encroachment by the stranger drives a desire for security. Though Newman's work may appear as a justified and reciprocal response, it oversimplified the racial problem for ghettoized communities in his attempt to recycle white spatial responses to black urban encroachment. For one, unlike the gated community or wealthy white neighborhood, public housing does not exist in a territory over which black residents can claim any legitimate ownership. Secondly, while residential privatization and individualism may be fine for white residents whose social cohesion is endlessly repeated elsewhere, the absenting of community beyond the "family living unit" or "territorial zone of the cluster of family units"[34] through the eradication of public space and the interweaving of communal and police surveillance can function to disrupt the possibilities of mass political action, increase chances for anti-black state violence, and effectively mystify the antagonism of black residents' surveillance with that of the police. Furthermore, while arguably offering a critique of conservative urban fearmongering in his time, Newman's work in actuality traded in exactly that fear of crime to shore up white security from inside the black enclave.

Newman's concept of defensible space, so deployed in public housing, extends the law and order society rather than trouble it. From the inside, Newman's work was able to fortify the functions of ghettoization, producing order and disrupting disorder. While one could reasonably assume that defensible space would create community, as Newman arguably believed, it becomes

apparent that in the case of spatially privatizing ghettoized housing, he traded a particular sense of community for security. The problematic corollary of this move is indeed who's security? Security is, as Clarke calls it, a "code word of social distinction" that "elaborates social distance and that asserts social difference."[35] Security, like crime, are racially coded under the guise of an unraced lexicon, and in the case of the law and order society so promoted, "[place] the issue of inequality beyond any visible horizon."[36] Indeed, if crime really is a way of saying "we are afraid of lower-class black people"[37] then the crime that is deployed in Newman's assertion of defending against crime can be inferred to mean not the crime of anti-black racial violence from either police or white citizens but indeed asserts a policing of crime within the ghetto itself.

Importantly, self-help remains the central objective of these reports and assessments. While the point is to leave the communities less "vulnerable to government's withdrawal of support," this shifts responsibility away from the government while purporting to be in support of community control. In the case of Nickerson Gardens, the HUD report claims to encourage the community "to control its own membership," yet in the same breath it recommends that definition "be reinforced both architecturally and socially."[38] Indeed this reveals that determination of membership does not come from the residents at all, but is decided upon, employed, and enforced by outside authority. Here "physical definition" and the production of order are mutually constitutive. Given the paternalism of functionality, the recourse to self-help then reveals itself as disingenuous. It becomes increasingly clear that these recommendations adhere to a perspective that these communities are unable to steer themselves, indeed peddling the alleged impossibility of black self-regulation. So, while the suggestions of the HUD report and Newman's defensible space theory would have one assume that the point of the housing projects was self-determination,

in removing communal space, and "reinforcing the natural tendency" for private ownership, they would provide the literal and metaphoric space for "a natural phenomenon of human territoriality to resurface and solve the crime problem through self-policing."[39]

In many ways, as I have illustrated here, the undergirding purpose of Newman's text was both to police and to further naturalize and normalize private property by hanging his entire argument and suggestion on the issue of ownership. In Newman's spatial understanding of ghettoized housing, "clear partitions would produce a safe society."[40] This indeed conflated safety with security, that is, Newman proposed that the corollary of increased security is increased safety[41]. When Newman compares low-income residences to middle-class residences, he claims that the latter's success is based in being able to afford amenities that increase surveillance of common areas, such as doormen and elevator operators for the purposes of overwatch.[42] In the housing projects, where such services exceeded the budget, Newman instead aimed to "make habitable spaces open, visible" and most importantly, according to Shabazz, "cooperative to surveillance that was hidden in plain sight." [43] As Paul Clarke argues, security was a "status commodity" but it promised "isolation—separation from those deemed alien, dangerous, and even socially inferior."[44] Newman's uncritical offering of security inheres within it racialized logics of safety. Expressed through housing project design, Western spatiality has within it the exclusionary and protective efforts of white security

The constant and consistent reference to the reduction of crime peels toward the criminalization of unfettered movement across boundary lines—those that move illegitimately and are thus threatening to those that can self-regulate—and draws faint but unyielding lines that are meant to map the movement of its black denizens. The housing projects that were indeed created

for black residents, evidence that for black people surveillance is constitutive to their socio-spatial location in the city. While the rhetoric of these urban planners claim that these lines are meant to increase residents' feeling of ownership, the reports reveal that these lines in both word and practice actually perpetuate the black resident's object position, fully subject to the closures, definitions, and surveillance of a colonial-racial authority that renders them criminal and in need of proper orientation. Here, urban housing reveals itself as a case study on the merging of "urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single, comprehensive security effort."[45]

As Mike Davis has argued, the "the neo-military syntax" that runs throughout both architectural designs and its criticisms is an insinuation of violence that imagines danger. In revealing the racial inflections of urban planning as an extension of the law and order society, the call for defensible space comes across as "just about as subtle as a swaggering white cop."[46] The ghetto as a home, as a spatial environment that is recognized as owned by its residents—as a place—is emptied of meaning in Los Angeles as it is in other black urban enclaves. It is not merely that whites were able to take ownership of a black space through logics of crime prevention, but that this space's very constitution was built on anti-black practices of alienation.

Cataclysm and Anticipation

On 11 August 1965 in Los Angeles, California, a highway patrolman stopped Marquette Frye, a young black man, for speeding and arrested him for appearing intoxicated. A crowd gathered in the neighborhood of Watts after Frye's mother Rena Price was brought to the scene by Frye's brother, and was apparently struck by a police officer causing the situation to escalate quickly and for Frye to be subdued and arrested with excessive physical force.[47] Frye's brother

and mother were both subsequently arrested which caused the crowd to grow even further. This was the inciting incident for six days of violent unrest and millions of dollars in property damage.[48] Almost thirty years after the Watts Rebellion of 1965, Watts again saw massive revolt along with the other neighborhoods of the South Central region of Los Angeles. Again linked to police violence and discrimination, the ghetto uprising began on 29 April 1992 after news broke that the four officers who were caught on film brutally beating Rodney King were acquitted. The uprising and the response of four thousand soldiers from the National Guard resulted in over ten thousand arrests, more than two thousand injuries and fifty-three deaths.[49] While not identical, the events of 1965 and 1992 similarly reflect the antagonism of black communities and state forces. Affixed with claims of criminality and fastened by the spatial entrapment of the ghetto and its housing, the destructive action of South Los Angeles' black populations labored in direct action. However, media discourse alleged that the uprisings were instead made up of opportunistic rioters, which was of course buttressed by the official word from Washington that understood the response of black populations as random and terroristic. The constant media retelling of "Burn, baby, burn!" a phrase that journalists reported they heard on the ground in Watts in 1965 became an indicator of blacks' opportunism and gross negligence of a common good, effectively marking out their actions as both malicious and irrational. Participants were subsequently lambasted by media outlets and citizens across California and the country for setting fire to their own communities.

On 17 August 1965, only days after the first uprising in the Watts area of Los Angeles, Representative Adam Powell, Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee and first black representative to be elected to Congress from New York, issued a statement entitled "Anatomy of a Riot." In it he argued that the series of events that saw over 30 deaths, more than

1000 injured, and nearly 4000 arrested,[50] was caused by a deep-set anger in the black community, stemming from a denial of human rights and gratuitous violence perpetrated and condoned by the state. Yet, immediately after listing possible justifications for the urban unrest, he quickly disavows the "riots" as an "inexcusable outbreak of violence." What he deems a "sociological detonation of unbelievable proportions" he goes on to assail as "purposeless orgy," calling out the participants for wasting precious energy in "futility" citing misdirection as it was aimed "inwardly against ourselves." Powell's words illustrate many of the problems that violent urban uprisings raise for our political imaginaries structured by loyalty to the state as the authority as well as the organ and channel of change. In part, Powell was upset that black residents in Los Angeles had given up the moral high ground that was earned in the early 60s by the non-violence of the civil rights movement. During this time, reform was the dominant mode of political change and at times "galvanized multiple sectors of the Black population when it demanded full citizenship." Yet, as João Costa Vargas points out, it also often prohibited the surfacing of alternative agendas and ways of doing, "agendas that would call into question the very possibility of Black full citizenship under the ideological, moral, political, and spatial implications of the American apartheid." He goes on to argue that "reform always falls short of extricating from [anti-Black genocide's] core the fact that Blacks are not meant to survive as full citizens."[51] Vargas's eye to alternative agendas that are able to extricate this core reads in direct opposition to Powell's analysis that regarded the rebellion as a 'riot' and a cathartic attempt to garner attention. By Powell's description, the Watts rebellion is figured as almost stuck, circulating aimlessly within the community and juxtaposed against reformist visioning that images a linear and forward progression toward change. I offer an alternative reading of the riot that contests the requirements of the reformist but which declines to

read intentionality into the practices of those that participated in the rebellion in search of causation. Instead, I choose to demonstrate that the very practices are themselves important and examine "what kind of analysis revolt itself offers."[52]

The Watts Rebellion as a physically destructive revolt contains within it a "residual expectation" and "aspiration." This "unfinished business" represents not only the open-endedness of the revolt, that is, its incompleteness, but also its anticipation of more to come.[53] In this way, the destruction of revolt must also be understood as an opening up of opportunity of *more*. Here, the more signifies the generative, where more destruction makes possible creation. The popular admonishment of the urban revolt as 'riot' and anarchy deploys imagery of uncritical destruction subsequently marked as unnecessarily disruptive and generally ineffective where destruction and political efficacy are positioned as diametrically opposed. In this vein, anarchy and anarchism are categorically dismissed from political productivity in the given characterization of negation. This presumption that anarchism is merely negative has been reflected on and critiqued by self-identified Anarchist thinkers since the 19th century. In the 1970s, New Afrikan Anarchist Kuwasi Balagoon hoped, "the day when Anarchy is seen as a viable way of life rather than chaos will not be far away." While often defining anarchism as a rejection of the state or, as Emma Goldman claims "open defiance of, resistance to, all laws and restrictions, economic, social, and moral," it is equally argued as a "living force in the affairs of our life, constantly creating new conditions."[54] While conventionally understood as a political orientation driven toward death, Anarchists have in actuality almost always organized around life. In defining revolution, Italian Anarchist Errico Malatesta argues it "is the creation of new, living institutions, new groupings and new social relations. It is also the destruction of privilege and monopoly, the spirit of a new justice and

fraternity, of that liberty which should overhaul the whole life of society" naming creation and destruction as coeval to anarchist politics. He goes on to argue that the anarchist spirit prompts the masses "to look to their own future through intelligent direct action."[55] Malatesta emphasizes how in Anarchism not only do life *and* death drive revolution, but that action is the wellspring of both. In truth, the rejection and critique of the state often turns on a desire to resist "everything that hinders human growth" where resistance is indeed valued for its vitality.[56] For both Goldman and Malatesta, Anarchist vitalism is not naïve, but concerns future forming wherein practiced destruction and violence are named as its constitutive thrusts: "it is necessary to provide all with the means of life and for development, and it is therefore necessary to destroy with violence, since one cannot do otherwise, the violence which denies these means to the workers."[57] The charge to destroy violence with violence gets to the crux of urban revolt as a practice of direct action that uses destruction to anticipate alternatives.

The value of direct action within anarchist thought is conceptualized in the axiom 'the propaganda of the deed,' first asserted in 1857 by Italian revolutionary and socialist thinker Carlo Pisacane in "Political Testament" where he argued "ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around…The flash of Milano's bayonet was more effective propaganda than a thousand volumes by doctrinarians." Along these same lines thirteen years later, Mikhail Bakunin, regarded as one of the preeminent intellectuals of anarchist thought and credited as the founder of collectivist anarchism, conceptualized the importance of direct action in "Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis," wherein he asserted "we must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda." With this frame, the practices employed during the Watts Rebellion can be understood as performative

violence, that is, as communicative, what Richard Gilman-Olpasky calls "upheaval as speaking." In understanding the revolt in this way, its political value is not determined based on "what it permanently changes in the word" but instead "what it says, how it speaks." [58] In its concern with black life, the performative violence of the revolt communicates a different temporality than that which structures white society. Whereas within the temporality of white society revolts appear and exist as aberrations to social order incited by isolated, though repeated, practices of racial violence, the black anarchist revolt as cataclysm, that is, as an opening to alternative futures, inheres within it a resistance to closure. That is, "Revolts are nodal points in the elaboration of a transformative 'politics' that exceeds them. To historicize revolt by marking its beginning and its end is to cut if off from itself, to misunderstand it." As Gilman-Olpasky argues, to think of beginnings and ends is to treat the revolt as a "local aberration" rather than what is really is, an "expansive fabrics of discontent." The revolt then embodies this expanse and troubles the temporal frames that structure state perspectives of politics as practices that engage with representative and electoral politics that are assumed to move society forward in time. The cataclysm that is revolt is itself "a bifurcation, a lawless deviation, an unstable condition that opens up a new field of the possible"[59] The Watts Rebellion as cataclysm refers then not only to present disaster, but appeals to its definition within the field of Physical Geography as producing change, that is, an upheaval that alters. This clarification is important, as cataclysm is meant to encompass both presents and futures, destructions and creations, that is, it invokes ruin as a process of possible transformations. Furthermore, as an opening up of the possible by destructive means, it does not close at the impress of retaliatory violence by the hands of the state, but remains open as it continues to haunt white

society, its residue appearing in the revolts that are sure to come after it. This is indeed what Gilman-Olpasky conceptualizes as he considers the specter of revolt.

But if the Watts Rebellion as cataclysm is speaking, what is it saying? I argue that rather than a declaration, it asks a question. In the previous chapter I discussed how the state confronted by Anarchism and the state confronted by black anarchism are not the same. The state that Goldman, Malatesta, Pisacane, and Bakunin imagine is a capitalist one and its oppression is, in turn, class-based. If indeed 19th and 20th century Anarchists were concerned with the death of the state and the life of the individual, black anarchism, it could be argued, is organized toward the afterlife of race that is always already tied up with class. Black Anarchists too have been concerned with the *activity*—that is, the vitality—of political action. While in prison as a member of the Black Panther Party and Black Liberation Army, Balagoon warned that black people must take up actions because "inactivity creates a void that this police state with its reactionary press and definite goals are filling."[60] For Balagoon, black anarchist activity is needed to interrupt and prohibit the activity of white society. Anarchist Panther Ashanti Alston makes a similar emphasis arguing that "Black culture…is all about finding ways to creatively resist oppression...So, when I speak of a Black anarchism, it is not so tied to the color of my skin but who I am as a person, as someone who can resist, who can see differently when I am stuck, and thus live differently."[61] Here, creativity is emergent from the conditions of colonial-racial oppression, borne of a need to live creatively to survive and thus live differently from and in opposition to the comportments required by white authority. It is a process of getting 'unstuck' from the sedentarizing practices of the state's ghettoization and thus also a leap out. That is, it pushes towards a future that begins at the conclusion of the colonial-racial state. Here, the violent uprising against property is the "peculiar

force *of* (or, perhaps, *toward*) justice that emerges in the crisis of the system of the repressed-irrepressible, of the accepted-unacceptable"[62] that animates the colonial-racial antagonism between black populations and state authority. Within this formulation, the revolt emerges from and critiques the colonial-racial conditions laid out in the earlier section where the practices of housing black populations are in-and-of-themselves repressions. Property is "founded on shared cultural values defining who can do what with the valued resources within a community" and with civil disorder, that is, with the destruction of property, these values are broken down. This is to say that property destruction does not simply destroy physical property but the relations *of* property; it defies the rules that ensure the cooperation in institutionalized white social life.[63] Here, what was previously taken as given "becomes a matter of open dispute" and the rights to and rules of property are effectively rewritten.[64]

It is of no surprise then that property destruction is vilified in the media as ineffectual and juvenile. Yet its practitioners effectively beg the question, *whose property?* As the previous section discussed, property in the ghetto was not the property of black populations despite taking up residence there. The direct action of destroying property, primarily white-owned businesses, evidences a critique *of* property. It is an action that reveals who owns the property in the ghetto, demonstrates that impoverished conditions are in part an absence of white businesses' reinvestment into the community of black consumers, as well as effectively rejects the relations of individualized ownership evoked in the housing projects by exerting a mass assault—a *collective* direct action. If in the act of looting, "the commodity acquires significance beyond its monetary value," it "becomes a symbol of resistance."[65] In the Watts rebellion, the physical buildings themselves acquire significance beyond their actual value. For those who destroy them, their

symbolic economic value manifests as destruction performs a deprivation of value for white capitalism and thus interrupts the space of capital, but also as physical markers that mark out their impoverished non-home. In this articulation, property destruction and theft assaults the colonial-racial foundations of white society expressed through practices of ghettoization, "which depends on people accumulating [what] they don't need and desiring [what] they make but can't have."[66] So in listening to what the upheaval is speaking, the question of 'whose property?' expressed in the direct action of property destruction is a multi-layered critique, a leap *from* the ghetto, a leap *to* an alternative future, a leap *at* white sovereignty. If property is the 'right to exclude' then property destruction far from requesting inclusion, rejects its system in totality.

While looting appears opportunistic and while Powell denounces the revolt's alleged inward direction, black anarchism avers that it only appears like self-sabotage from the stand point of those whose loyalty resides with the state, that in deed "the practical rejection of capital entails the abolition of one's previous mode of life, and this self-negation always appears as suicidal." And this appearance was not restricted to the more liberal leaning or sympathetic audience like Powell. Soon after Governor Brown called for the formation of a special commission to examine the causes of the unrest in Watts and subsequent recommendations to reduce "misunderstandings" with law enforcement, white citizens from all over the surrounding areas of California and nearby states quickly wrote into Sacramento, the capital of the state. Regarded as "lawless, hate-ridden hoodlums" who have been coddled by the government, the black ghettoized population was painted as ungrateful for everything they have in Los Angeles.[67]

In these countless letters, white citizens attempt to gift rights to blacks so as to call on the state to violently seize them. Here, relations of property rear their ugly head once again. Law

enforcement was charged by Mayor Sam Yorty amongst others for failing to properly protect property and while Yorty's claim is obviously steeped in a concern for buildings and land, it is not too farfetched to consider his charge in light of a demand made on property of a human kind. One letter from "a citizen" equates the solution to the problems of the black population with "raising your children," calling for Governor Brown to "punish the child."[68] As whites assume a position of parent to black Angelenos, the latter's actions are not only seen as juvenile in their method but misguided in their alleged lack of objective. Furthermore, by invoking children, whites effectively posit punishment for blacks to both remind them of their place and to benefit them in their maturation. The practices of the rebellion must then be brought to bear on this question of property qua ownership of blackness, not only in relation to the buildings burned down but the ownership that white society exerts over the black population itself. The paradigm of white possession takes as its fulcrum black dispossession on two counts. First, that black populations as the children are rendered property of white society, be they police or average citizen. Second, that this absence of legible and legitimate standing, in self-fulfilling prophecy, allows these same black populations to be narrated as white society sees fit, in this case as rights-bearing proprietors who have mishandled their agency and thus must have these rights violently revoked. The tension here then lies between these two facets of black dispossession, a tension in which the practice of property destruction exists as much as it elucidates. While white society attempts to point out that blacks have laid waste to their home and to their autonomy, the practices of the rebels highlight that this home and autonomy was never in hand. To use the words of George Jackson again,

> "Their line is 'Ain't nobody but black folks gonna die in a revolution.' This argument completely overlooks the fact that we always have done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect, or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a

> situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we're certainly no worse off than before."[69]

Brick by brick, the urban insurrection demonstrates work to dismantle the concrete slave ship that constitutes their ghettoized position and, as Jackson's words invoke, this position is marked always already by death. The point then for Jackson is not only that black deaths not be in vain, that they fight towards a different future, but that this future must indeed come at the cost of violence against that and those who oppress, to destroy violence with violence. Jackson's words are indeed jarring and this dissonance is heard in the rebellion itself, much to the dismay of many, like Powell, who understandably seek safety rather than risk.

Powell in turn flips this discord into a claim that the 'riot' was a practice of catharsis, ironic given that it is he who is attempting to purge the rebellion of its political value. But Powell's denouncement, I argue, reveals the search for demand. My turn towards cataclysm allows me to circumnavigate the often depoliticizing request made of urban unrest, namely, 'what is the demand?' To require a demand when looking at a direct action like the Watts rebellion disavows the power of the political practice, that is, the "very content of the actions themselves, actions which go against their very ends, in turn overflowing their political forms." The cataclysmic uprising, a disruption in multiple directions against a built environment both material and discursive, pushes back on a narrative that misapprehends both the political subjectivity of blacks and their conditions of possibility. That is, as a speaking, the upheaval rejects the 'vote' as something that can properly represent black politics. It does not issue a demand because "demands are merely screens to interface between worlds of rage and worlds of law" which pull us to the perspective of the law as the effector of change rather than the rebellion. Indeed, the "force of the subjective discontent of life" under the colonial-racial authority against "a force of the objective

necessity of [the colonial-racial authority] subsuming life" are incommensurable, and often the demand requires them to exist on a level playing field that is constitutively impossible.[70] Powell's disgust with what he calls a 'riot' is buttressed by his reliance on the very proceduralism of the Western political realm, on that systematic progression through electoral representation, that while accounting for civil rights, cannot make sense of those who have been rendered socially dead. While electoral representation cannot account for it, the violent upheaval of the revolt politicizes a desire to meet it head on.

But this attention to desire does not correspond to a politics of prefiguration. As Gilman-Olpasky has argued, the content of revolt always exceeds any prefigurative desires.[71] While many Anarchists adhere to prefiguration as a necessary tenet of anarchist practice, I agree with Gilman-Olpasky that while this political orientation of "learning by doing" generates the possibility to "reveal alternative logics of life," it often overdetermines what is transformative.[72] The danger of this is that what is prefigured by definition exists within the dimensions of the known and, in turn, can only provide contestations of the world that are "compatible with the reproduction of the existing world indefinitely into the future."[73] Furthermore, prefiguration inhibits our understanding of the philosophical content of the revolt as it privileges questions of what is achieved by revolt rather than the questions that are asked by the revolt. But the revolt, like the slave who jumps the slave ship, holds no guarantees of what may come, and, thankfully, has the potential of embodying possibilities that as of yet we have no understanding. This is indeed the anticipatory power of the cataclysm as that opening up of possibility. Yet, this does not mean that I agree with Gilman-Olpasky's delineation of revolt as only "world-questioning" rather than "world-making." While the cataclysm of urban revolt does indeed bear questions, I do not think it bars it from also offering

world-making possibility even if it does not necessitate its eventuality. I do, however, think that neither we nor those who generate revolt can know, or should know, what those possibilities are. Indeed, the revolt does not remake the world, but in its interruptive questioning of our current world, it surely takes the first step in clearing ground for its anticipation.

Policing the 'Riot' and White Panic

The sheer volume of letters submitted to the Governor's office indicates a high level of alarm amongst whites, with many of their authors calling for 'rioters' and black people in general to be violently returned to their place, mass bloodshed notwithstanding. The term 'riot,' unlike the term rebellion or uprising, discloses the political event as not political and instead criminal. As such, the use of the term 'riot' deploys a "new definition of the situation" which in turn provided a "new construction of the social reality" of colonial-racial authority, that is, of the racial hierarchy within the urban arena.[74] The citizen letter writers directly oppose the reality deployed in the terms rebellion, uprising, and, indeed, self-defense. The suggestion of 'riot' would have one believe that it is white society under threat rather than black populations. In deploying this new, and altogether incorrect, reality, it both provoked and justified the exorbitantly violent response it received because it figured the black anarchist practice of these Watts residents as raging, uncontrollable, and altogether irrational. Justified by this narrative and further propagating its circulation, scores of black people were arrested, injured, or killed at the hands of the state, represented by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), the highway patrol, National Guard and related agencies. Historian Gerald Horne puts the number of people called in to quell the insurrection at 16,000.[75] He states that the turning point of the Watts rebellion was when Deputy Sherriff Robert E. Ludlow

was shot and killed, arguably on accident. With his death, Horne argues that a "community revolt against the police was transformed into a police revolt against the community."[76] While white spectators miles away envisioned a scene of carnage perpetrated by blacks in response to racial abuse, the reality was that officers of the state were moving quickly through the streets of South Los Angeles firing at will.[77] While architectural ghettoization in the form of dilapidated housing and alienated black neighborhoods was meant to keep blacks in their place under the feet and at the service of whites, once these walls were threatened the state responded in due course with more than double the strength. Here, just the perception of the threat is the function of security mobilization.[78]

The boundary line between white and black society had been crossed, security had been breached, and very quickly the markers separating state and civil society were shown to have never truly existed. Blacks people in South Central Los Angeles were being punished. Yet, to simply name the state's actions a 'police revolt' is to miss a central question invoked by the cataclysmic activity that occurred over the six days. In the act of property destruction, in the question it begs of 'who's property?' we are struck with the suggestion that this is not an aberration on behalf of the state, this is not a moment in which black rights are simply being revoked or ignored. Instead it is a moment where a non-home is revealed, physically demonstrating that even in the ghettoized locale they have been forced to call home, they can claim no ownership that cannot be interrupted by the state. This fact is indeed apparent in how and why their very residences in the projects have been built. The state belongs everywhere, dispossessing black populations of any claim to self-determination regarding how they dwell. So while the police action was in literal terms a 'response,' it would be disingenuous to consider it reactive. The very ability for the state and its

citizen letter writers to take such gratuitous action is actually an index of the black socio-spatial position, it is an extension of the state of capture. While their movement and destruction disrupt their architectural boundedness and reveal the black insecurity of white security, the revolt comes directly up against state repression.

In response to the 1965 uprising, no matter if there was sympathy with the cause or not, media outlets and their white interviewees largely placed the onus on blacks people to respond appropriately. That is, if mainstream American society was to believe that the conditions of the ghetto were as insufferable as black residents had claimed, urban upheaval was not a permissible method. Animating this reaction was the implied belief that "the need for order supersedes the need for justice."[79] This was also reflected in Powell's comments, which acknowledged the anger of the community but also called for a different method of political redress, one that adhered to the requirements drawn by law and order. Residents from all over the remainder of California for their part were a captivated audience both during and soon after the rioting made the news and were quick to share their opinions. Across the hundreds of letters sent to the Governor emerged a deep-seated fear of a black "anarchy" and "plain lawlessness," subsequently charging the state with being soft and offering unnecessary protection to Los Angeles' black residents, and by extension, black people in general. The language is rather plain that white residents saw no need for a police review board, believing the McCone Commission to be a farce, and blamed black people for their own impoverished conditions, believing that the supposed causes of the urban unrest were neither meaningful nor relevant to the actions that they saw as beyond the pale. When newspapers and letters were not calling on black residents to comport themselves differently, the focus was on celebrating the police. Mainstream white news media was not accusing or even questioning police

of excessive violence in dealing with the troubles of the inner city, and at best were concerned with too little of a police presence within the ghetto.[80] Some media coverage even goes so far as to say that the real problems are those faced by the police, claiming that expanding social problems has meant a transformation in challenges for police serving to maintain order.

Two months after the rebellion, the *Los Angeles Times* ran a seven-part series from October 10 to 17 entitled "A View from Watts" and was meant to offer to the general public "what the people of Watts have to say." In the preface to the series, *Times* Editor Nick A. Williams, while discussing why the *Times* decided to run this series, offered solace to its surely skeptical white readership by spending nine of the twelve short paragraphs "saluting the courage and devotion of its law enforcement men," naming the *Times'* support of the restoration of law and order "with whatever force was necessary," and calling for the joining of "two alien worlds" to "fight together for the basic concept of Western civilization." In a piece that was meant to introduce the readership to a "View from Watts" that "is Very Worth Taking," only two sentences refer to what "is being said in Watts."[81] In fact, a cursory glance at the *Los Angeles Times'* coverage of the Watt's Rebellion demonstrates an emerging racialized discourse about the 'riot' that makes heavy use of violent imagery and rhetoric. It is obvious that the news media's sensational reporting was meant for a white readership, one that clearly reflected the priority of white society. Before the rebellion, approximately 5% of newspaper space was dedicated to black people or black issues. During the rebellion, this number jumped to 15%, but even then it took a purposeful "nonpolitical interpretation" of the actual unrest.[82] While interpreting the unrest as a 'riot,' there was constant recourse to violence that evidences Gilman-Olpasky's claim that it seems ''Violence breaks out' whenever black people revolt against racial violence" but the violence of law and order is absolved

as if "the only violence on the scene belongs to the upheaval, as if the condemnable violence is the sole property of insurrection." Here, the discursive mapping of the rebellion as 'riot,' coupled with the exorbitant state-sponsored violence that serves to quell the unrest, indicates the emergence of a moral panic.[83] Yet, this moral panic is distinctly structured by and for an exertion of white territoriality[84] which determines its definition as a *white panic*.

Similar to the anti-black and anti-South Asian racial harassment perpetrated by white citizens in Britain which Dhanwant K. Rai and Barnor Hesse take up as their object of study, the anti-black racial violence that animates the police response to urban unrest in Los Angeles "expresses, in the eyes of its perpetrators, a sense of proprietorial relation to social space *as white territory*." Within Rai and Hesse's conceptualization, territoriality can be defined as a spatial strategy or spatial behavior "to effect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area."[85] *White* territoriality is governed by the "expressive logic of the desire for racial exclusion" characterized by "heightened anxiety about…'subordinate,' 'other' populations resisting regulation" and being out of control as well as acute unease about their threat to national identity and the right to dominate.[86] In the case of the Watts rebellion, police retaliation to the unrest can be understood as the "resistance to any diminishment in authorial claims." Here, it is not the presence of black populations that is problematic for ghettoization expressed through architecture that is already adequately policing them, but the threat of autonomy. The clash that occurs between rebels and police is an instance of the latter "defending their space against change and transformation."[87] Thus, we must understand the anti-black racial violence as not only a policing of the political and social comportment of the black population, but as an expression and constitution of white identity. That is, policing while providing security for whiteness, also gives

it "a sense of place" and "identity" which is constitutively foreclosed to the black urban populace. In turn, for black people, racial violence is the expression of "being defined as 'out of place'" in the very neighborhoods in which they reside.[88]

My claim that white territoriality comprises the content of the police response is not to reduce the problem to discrimination, but is instead meant to emphasize the constitutive production of vulnerability for black populations within the expression of the white territory. For example, what is surprising for many people in their accounts of the Watts rebellion in relation to what occurred often turns on the fact that blacks did this to their 'own community' when it was geographically surrounded by predominantly-white neighborhoods. While I have demonstrated that the ghetto could hardly be understood as 'owned' by black people, what is important here is the already vulnerable spatial position that ghettoization itself produces, which is then effectively doubled by the repressive force of racial violence exerted as the expression of a threatened white territoriality. That is, the fact that literal white geographic territories *already* surrounded the Watts neighborhood places black populations in a highly vulnerable position in terms of their movement beyond the boundaries. The fact that white territoriality was also a behavioral practice meant that its aim was always to *extend* the literal white geography by a method of authority over all geography spaces.

But more can be said about how violence organizes, rather than simply expresses, the socio-spatial location of black populations within the urban setting. Bookending the Watts rebellion are two structures of state-sponsored violence that can be said to define black (urban) life. The first is exemplified in what has come to be recognized as the inciting violence of the uprising and the second is epitomized in the retaliatory violence. The violence of both structures

is not restricted to the physical or to the discursive; types or methods are not what cut the dividing line. Instead, what delineates the two structures is that the former, the police brutality that is named the inciting violence of the uprising, is the constitutive violence of the black ghetto. This violence is not only common-place, but state violence such as this is what marks the position of ghettoized residents and the black ghetto itself. There is something to be said about the fact that both Marquette Frye and Rodney King were black motorists and that the stops at the hands of the California Highway Patrol were relatively routine. Further, the beatings and use of excessive force were also routine. Violence in the hands of the state and against racial others is always routine.[89] Violence is fundamental to policing; it is what the police represent. To be absent, inefficient, insensitive, as well as brutal and excessive in their force, is to be doing their job, and to be doing so quite effectively. As the embodiment of violence, they are the "most direct" hand of the state, how it "imposes its will on the citizenry."[90] Because of this they are almost always beyond reproach, for the state has a monopoly on violence and the police are simply its principal manifestation. Therefore, as Kristian Williams points out, it becomes difficult to decipher between force and excessive force, indeed it is even, as Gilman-Olpasky points out, sometimes impossible to call it violence at all. In monopolizing violence, they also determine the rubric for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms. Only the state can execute legitimate violence, and this violence "is used to safeguard society against 'illegitimate' uses."[91] So rather than having a difference in actual form, force and excessive force "exist as part of the same continuum" where the only difference is a discursive one.[92] For black people in Los Angeles this is especially true, where the conceptual coherence of excessive force against blacks unravels just as easily as its badged practitioners are acquitted.

In South Central Los Angeles, between 1963 and 1965, "sixty Black men were killed by patrolmen, 25 of whom were unarmed and 27 were shot in the back."[93] In many ways, while this represented a dramatic rise in police violence, it also existed within the context of an accepted antagonism between black populations and the state. In 1965, LAPD Chief of Police William Parker decried on television that "It's estimated that by 1970, 45 percent of the metropolitan area of Los Angeles will be Negro. If you want any protection for your home and family, you're going to have to get in and support a strong police department. If you don't do that, come 1970, God help you!" Here, the police reveal themselves as the principal defense of white territory, invoking the divine in a manner that not only naturalizes white authority and power, but names it God given. And under the surface of the indication that an increased black populace in Los Angeles signals danger to white security there also seems to bubble an open threat to black people that a function of the police is to keep the population as small as possible by recklessly unspecified means. Beyond its obvious linking of black presence and danger, Chief Parker's statement demonstrates not only the inherent antagonism between state forces and the black populations, but also within that inheres the threat of a growing black presence to white ways of living, reproduction, and property. This threat animates the second structure of violence that defines black (urban) life, the retaliatory or contingent violence. This is embodied in the 'police revolt,' the state endorsed and state employed militarized response to black populations that had breached the walls of ghettoization. Here, violence of the state must respond to the violence of the insurrection. The latter is the named violence, that which is labeled violence, as "the ultimate crime against property, and against the state" and thus "represents a fundamental rupture in the social order." In turn, the relaliatiory use of *legitimate* (read state) violence "marks the distinction between those who are fundamentally *of*

society and those who are *outside* it" where violence becomes "coterminous with the boundary of society itself."[94]

The spectral threat of the urban uprising was contamination, where the uncontainable approach of blackness hinged on not only a fear of racial mixing generally but of the encroachment on white women's vulnerability specifically. In 1965, letters from concerned citizens along the coast in Long Beach over 15 miles away from Watts, decried Governor Brown's public scolding of Los Angeles' Chief of Police as an invitation for blacks to invade neighboring cities. The demand for blacks to be returned and contained to their place reflects the continued fear of black sprawl[95], which can only be understood with an attention to the nexus of blackness and gender, the constitutive outside to the universal rules of gender deployed by whiteness, which often became the site and stage of white violence. While rumors of black sexual assaults on white women did not directly provoke the police revolt in the ghetto as they had in so many cases in the Jim Crow South decades prior[96], this figure did continue to shape the gratuitous violence of the state. The trope of the black rapist haunted Southern California as it did the rest of the country where the free movement of blacks was indicative of the "lurking danger" of transience.[97] White women and their pure progeny were considered the embodiment of white political power and thus in need of formidable protection. On the other hand, fear of black men's sexuality, which figured prominently in white media accounts of both the 1965 and 1992 uprisings, was deeply entangled with a fear of the power they could wield politically should their claims to manhood, and thus citizenship, be successful. As such, black gender tropes that hinged on stereotypes of excess and immaturity saturated onlookers' perspectives of the urban uprisings and were weaved throughout their responses to the threat of a black incursion on white territory.

But the black population in Los Angeles was not only subject to violence in the moment they step out of place as is clearly indicated by the police revolt, but is also constituted by violence. This is to say that the very position of the ghettoized population is one born in and of violence by the state, not only subject to its discipline. The state violence of the urban uprisings illustrate the nexus of constitutive and contingent violence in which black populations are positioned. But indeed, even within these varying types of violence there is still something to said about the degree of violence incurred in the moment of the uprising. Here, the police in their gratuitous response are meant to allay white fear and anxiety more than punish the rebels, which is apparent in the excessively militarized form of the response. It is in this discrepancy "between threat and reaction" that there is an "ideological displacement" that Hall et al. call the moral panic.[98] The moral panic was evidenced not simply by the exorbitant police response, but also the disproportionate media sensationalism, and increased attention by white residents from all over the California area. Coupled with the outward appearance that Los Angeles provided a much better environment in terms of quality of life, wealth, and 'racial climate' than cities like Harlem, which had come to signify urban plight and black suffering, officials, journalists, and white citizens framed rebels as ungrateful which was then offered as justification for tougher regulations.

I employ 'moral panic' so defined by Hall and his fellow authors in *Policing the Crisis* because there are clear similarities between how 'mugging' as a crime committed by working-class black youth comes to be responded to in 1970s British society and how the 'riot' in the US is responded to in the 1960s. Similar to Hall et al. I am concerned with why American society reacts to the 'riot' "in the extreme way it does." Like the 'mugger' in British society, the 'rioter' and the 'riot' are perceived as an "index of the disintegration of the social order" where blackness,

crime, and youth converge into a narrative of anarchic chaos that "serve as the articulator of the crisis, as its ideological conductor" and which then provides the lead up to an "authoritarian consensus."[99] In employing the concept of the moral panic to the reaction it engenders in white society, I, in turn, am asking the same questions (with some modification) asked of 'mugging' by Hall et al. Why does white society react to the uprising as it does, when it does? To what, exactly, is this a reaction? Hall et al. demonstrate that looking to these questions aims to reveal "the repressed social and historical content" of, in this case, 'the riot' and that this in turn reveals something crucial about the nature of colonial-racial control, the material and ideological linkages between crime, race, space, and politics, and the connected role of the police and the citizenry. This does not just aim to tell a different story as it were of the events, but to explain why and how the story that *is* told is told. This story reveals how the moral panic emerges from the fear of the black threat to white territorial control, and it is in this emergence that we can understand the moral panic to be a white panic.

Within the general thesis of societal reaction theory and the specific logic behind the moral panic, first coined by sociologist Stanley Cohen, is the argument that deviance is created, and its creation emerges from the interactions between narrators, audiences, and social control organizations.[100] So by bringing attention to the Watts Rebellion qua 'riot' as an emergence from the relation of these groups, rather than as factually given, one of the major purposes of this chapter has been to consider the relationship between rebellion and the reaction to rebellion as 'riot'. In positioning the rebellion as 'riot,' both the media and the police uncouple the rebellion from its colonial-racial structure (as a precursor to the events). Here, it is not the facts that matter but the "ideological constructions of reality."[101] As Cohen delineates between under-reaction and over-

reaction, it is important that the moral panic about the 'riot' exists against the "deep denial behind [the] refusal to sustain a moral panic" about anti-black violence generally and police brutality specifically. If indeed the moral panic arises because something is defined as a threat to societal values and interests, then it would be imperative to note how police brutality does *not* incite a moral panic, that it does *not* threaten white social values.[102] Cohen argues that "successful moral panics" are a result of the "ability to find points of resonance with wider anxieties."[103] In the case of the Watts Rebellion it is an obviously racial anxiety, but one that is animated by a territorial crisis. In addition to what I have explained above, this territorial anxiety is evidenced in the media and citizen letters' use of the term 'anarchy' to describe the events that unfolded on those hot August nights. Far from the way we are deploying anarchism, and specifically black anarchism, here as productively and positively interrupting colonial-racial authority, anarchy as it was deployed in journalistic accounts and by concerned citizens writing to the governor's office invoked the political practices of Watts residents as improperly encroaching on the social order. This threat to the social order is a markedly territorial claim wherein whites claim authority over both the space of Los Angeles as well as the ideological space of politics. It is both the ideological and physical territorial boundaries that are marked in the repetitious and almost ritualistic policing of the rebellion's boundary transgressions, where the material policing of state forces aims to resolve any crisis of threat to white dominion. That is, these practices of violent policing clarify the ever-expanding territorial contours of white authority. Coupled with this, the defamation of the 'body of work' in the hands of concerned citizens and journalists becomes a discursive extension of the rebels' physical defilement at the hands of the police. It is an attempt to recalibrate the boundaries after the seismic shift that is posed by the uprising's cataclysmic practices that dare

suggest anti-black violence is constitutive to ghettoization. Like the visual images of violence plastered across newspapers and flashing on television, the discursive explanations given of the people who died at the hands of the police or the narrations offered to describe black actions as riotous terrorism were doing a particular kind of work in the name of a white world. In short, the threat to white territorial control that was embodied in the revolt signaled the disintegration of the city's, state's, and nation's white character. It is the threat to white territoriality, both physically and ideologically, that defines the moral panic that emerged in and from the Watts Rebellion as a white panic.

Between the 1965 and the 1992 uprising, Mike Davis argues that the media continued to "throw up spectres of criminal underclasses and psychotic stalkers," serving as a major player in the fomenting of moral panics that "reinforce and justify urban apartheid."[104] The media, civil society, and the state combine to produce the moral panic, all playing major roles in determining the shape of the contingent violence that is expressed not only in the militarized response to the "riot" both in its discursive and material forms, but also the routine and quotidian constitutive violence that the black populace is subject to in both public and private space. Ghettoization and retaliatory racial violence can both be understood as outgrowths of the same white territoriality. Though the specific concept of 'defensible space' comes after the Watts Rebellion, the architectures of ghettoization must be understood as both emerging from and constitutive to black urban revolts. Indeed, Newman's work was simply indicative of a more general project to have "the environment itself" be "the means to produce peaceful, productive behaviour, avoiding the costs, abuses, and rebellions that come with overt policing."[105] Ghettoization can then be understood not simply as sequestering poor black populations to particular areas of the city, but as

a practice that extends the white territory and is subsequently enforced by state-sponsored violence. These two must be understood as being operationalized in tandem to not only understand, as Davis argues, how Los Angeles makes up a "disquieting catalogue of the emergent liaisons between architecture and the American police state," but, in addition, how the white panic over the black threat of revolt hinges on territorial claims.[106] However, this is not to suggest that the uprising does not put pressure on the hold of the state. As property destruction begins to cleave the paradox of black ownership and black property in white territories, its seemingly self-inflicted violence and sacrifice attempts to expose society's colonial-racial antagonism. This is black politics, the exposure of the political order in its foundational form, which continues to structure social life albeit under the guise of a mystifying liberal democratic syntax. In its active questioning of ownership in the face of civil society's claims that they are burning down their own neighborhoods, through destruction black anarchism brings to the fore the violence that founds the social-spatial position of black people in the ghetto. This exposure is threatening to the modes of meaning making for and by whiteness and a constitutive reason that black anarchism is called 'riot' rather than rebellion. I argue that this revelatory threat to meaning making, coupled with the white territorial crisis of control, may be a better way of understanding the manufacture of the white panic and its state-sanctioned violence. Urban unrest, far from being a non-political event as it is often described by citing an absence of coherent leadership or clearly expressed demand, is not silent. In action, the Watts Rebellion is both a making and unmaking of society, where the creation of new worlds requires a transformation that depends on destruction.

Chapter 4
Abolition

"What's going on?" I asked
"You're being moved."
"Where am I being moved to?"
"You'll find out when you get there."
—Assata Shakur

the claims of the revolution were indeed too radical to be formulated in advance of its deeds [...] the revolution was indeed at the limits of the thinkable
—Michel-Rolph Trouillot

The judge denies our motion for a postponement. The judge denies all our motions. I want to scream.
—Assata Shakur

Black prisoners move and are moved. But prisons have been commonly characterized as spaces that lack movement with images of hard steel and concrete evincing a carceral condition of stagnation. However, while the prison rests crucially on stationary confinement, the rationales and practices used to maintain security and order are based in movement. Confinement is not only a matter of immobilization, and this is especially true for black populations who have been disproportionately affected by mass incarceration. This chapter will continue to scratch at the surface of incarceration's complexity, the intricate linkages between the constraints of confinement and the burden of movement that emerge in the black life experience in the modern world. Here I am concerned specifically with how the carceral entanglement of fixity and movement emerges in the criminalization of black people and black politics, and how black surreptitious movement is used to contest practices and spaces of incarceration. Taking up the material and discursive practice of escape as the loudest echo of the slave's jump from the slave ship discussed within this dissertation, I argue for a formulation of escapism that I will demonstrate

is inherently an abolitionist politics. My aim is to place escape's black anarchist inflection in relief, insomuch as it embodies a rejection in totality of colonial-racial authority materially embodied in the prison institution and ideologically deployed in hegemonic processes of knowledge production, while keeping attuned to the political interval that remains shaped by carceral conditions in which the practice resides. Taking its initial direction from Assata Shakur's escape from prison as well as the escape of her escape expressed in her autobiography as a 'missing' chapter, I will begin to elucidate these carceral dynamics, opposing forces, and tensions. In this reformulation of escape as escapism, I will use the work of Barnor Hesse, Peggy Phelan, and Greg Childs amongst others to take seriously the flight towards black liberation as one that is still meaningfully incomplete and also elaborate the significance of a continual absconding from the field of representation that has been controlled and constituted by discursive and material hegemonies of race. But to even get to Shakur we must first wrestle with the multiple genealogies of the prison and mass incarceration that have been developed and have subsequently taken root in carceral studies, with the aim of displacing some of the dangerous elisions that have come as a result.

Prison Origin Stories

At least in the United States, the black person—the epitome of a racialized, sexualized and vilified body—is the primary prison subject. While others have been subject to the discriminatory presence and practices of the criminal justice system, black populations have a specific, and historically rooted, relationship to the carceral system in the United States. Since the era of chattel slavery, the term 'black criminal' has emerged as a redundancy wrought by centuries of colonial-racial practices that began with the linking of the proclivity for crime with the enslaved.[1] Today,

black people are not only who are imagined to be housed in the prison, but have become the territory on which the prison has founded itself as a technology of death, containment, repression and gratuitous violence. Undoubtedly, the recent surge in scholarly approaches to criminalization and mass incarceration can be attributed to the fact that our current political landscape is still very much shaped by the disproportionate arrest and imprisonment of huge portions of the black population, as well as the continued growth of the prison industrial complex more broadly.[2] Yet, even major texts in the field of carceral studies push origin stories for the prison and mass incarceration that either do not engage with its racial history or do so from a perspective that does not appreciate the weight of the institution itself. Two of these texts, one arguably more senior in the field than the other, illustrate the risks of this ray—the infinite trajectory from a point of origin. Michel Foucault wrote *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* in 1975 which outright aims to explain the development of the modern prison and claims Bentham's panopticon as central to its function. Some thirty-five years later, Michelle Alexander wrote *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, which is less about detailing the evolution of the prison itself and more concerned with explaining the current crisis of mass incarceration, one that she characterizes through an understanding of a (racial) caste system. Both texts, relatively speaking, have become seminal sources for those interested in explaining contemporary carceral problems. These books not only aim to make sense of the prison, but in doing so, forward a very specific imprisoned subject.

Each text tells a story that commences from a different beginning, providing an account of the contemporary prison and/or mass incarceration by pulling on history, either explaining its development over time or providing a historical analogue to current institutions. This beginning

has a direct effect on the account of both the institution and its subject. Seemingly straightforward, the theorization of the prisoner's body is rooted in the scholars' understanding of the prison system—both its purpose and its effects—and reveals the deep foundations of the wider argument. In other words, the penal state, in whichever way it is theoretically imagined, rests on who is imagined to be imprisoned. The necessity then is to bring these subjects to the fore and place the wider theoretical conceptualizations of the prison system in relief. This requires us to work almost backwards, taking their stories' respective endings and tracking them to their beginnings, parsing out their subjects, forcing us to come to terms with how our theoretical beginnings affect our analytical destinations. For Foucault, the imprisoned body is not only male, but white and heterosexual, who has engaged in non-normative action and behavior. *Discipline and Punish* reflects on the nature of the prison, presenting a thesis of the prison system as a project of normalization and control. For Alexander, the prisoners are black and brown, men and boys that have been racially profiled and overly surveilled. She focuses our attention on the racialized body, but argues that mass incarceration is at root a problem of policy that can be ameliorated through reform.

For Foucault, there is no sense in asking moral questions of the prison—the carceral institution is already immoral. Unlike Alexander's understanding of the prison system as currently flawed by racial discrimination, Foucault would contend that any disproportion (racial or otherwise) is the basis of the carceral system. Biopolitically, that is, as a project of control and power over life itself, the prison constitutes the polity. Here, the polity is constituted by the division lines created by the prison, not adulterated by it, and the prison normalizes and buttresses the divisions between the deviant and the normal. But to argue that Foucault would contend with any

racial disproportion is actually a generous reading. Even though Foucault pays considerable attention to the lines drawn between the inside and outside of the polity, that of the normal and abnormal, as he contends that "all the authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal)," he says nothing of the ways in which these designations are assembled racially as divisions that structure prison history.[3] If indeed "all the mechanisms of power" are "disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him," he does not recognize the constitution of abnormality as it is tied to the processes of race making. Foucault's examination of the prison and its origins revolves around the construction of an "unspecified body," one through which, as argued by Joy James, allows him to "sanitize state repression as he argues that manifestations of power or spectacles of violence have been extinguished."[4] Here it becomes evident that Foucault's prison subject is an effect of his entire deracialized account of the birth of the prison. This is particularly egregious given that, as Brady Heiner has argued, Foucault came to his interest in the institution of the prison and was only able to conceptualize power through the analytic of war because of his intellectual contact with black Americans theorizing the relationship between black populations and the state. Specifically, the Black Panther Party's "analyses of and mobilization against American racism" as well as political prisoners George Jackson and Angela Davis' "analyses of the prison system as a strategic mechanism in the consolidation of American governmental authority" had a strong influence on Foucault and his understanding of institutional power.[5] That he makes not a single citation of the Black Panther Party or any explicit reference to blackness given their impact on his now seminal work is indeed an "epistemic injustice."[6] Alongside this, as Heiner, James, and Davis amongst others have shown, it also just makes his

account of the prison at root highly incomplete if not inaccurate. To pose his genealogy of discipline and punishment, Foucault turned away from the racialized violence committed, or sponsored, by the state in the United States and ultimately privileged an unraced subject. Even with a generous reading that considers Foucault's account to be focused on French history, he has still turned away from the racial violence embodied in the French colonial prison. In fact, as Robert J. C. Young argues, there is an underlying paradox in Foucault's work where though his analyses would "seem particularly appropriate to the colonial area" still "colonialism itself does not figure."[7] In agreement with Young's hesitation, it is not simply that Foucault has turned his back on a history that was very much within reach or arguably even inspired his analyses, but that still Foucault's account of institutional power, especially as it relates to the prison, is taken up almost universally. The problems with the universalization of his analysis are clear even just in his imagined epochs of the prison, where he argues that the spectacular and public violence of punishment gave way to rules of management in the early 19th century as he claims the disappearance of the tortured and maimed body. We know that when it comes to black history and black bodies, the tight hold of public spectacle did not loosen as the history of the post-emancipation United States is one littered with nooses. This history is not accounted for in Foucault's timeline of carceral development. While Foucault is concerned with the deviant body to varying degrees, he is unable to account for the racialized body of the prisoner as a mark of deviance, failing to recognize that "bodies matter differently in racialized societies."[8] In his declaration that punishment will continue to become more hidden amongst the penal system, he effectively hides the black body, and the history of anti-black punishment is lost, lost because the

punishment of the black body continues to "circulate everywhere" but "resonate nowhere" in our contemporary reality.[9]

Foucault makes this claim about the disappearance of the spectacle through the twinned claim that the locus of punishment transitioned from the body to the soul. Foucault's genealogy grapples with late eighteenth century English philosopher Jeremy Bentham's panopticon and its disciplinary exercise of power and strongly emphasizes the role of architecture in the transformation of subjects, to "make it possible to know them, to alter them."[10] Bentham's panopticon aimed to be the perfect system of control wherein all inmates could be surveilled by a single watchman, which hinged on the inability of inmates to know exactly who was being observed at one time and thus were all compelled to self-police out of the knowledge that anyone was always subject to observation.[11] The architecture of the panoptical prison, dependent on unceasing surveillance, inserts individuals in a "fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised."[12] Specifically, the panopticon renders the inmate permanently visible, perfecting power so as to "render its actual exercise unnecessary."[13] By perfecting power, Foucault notes that the development of punishment towards the covert and discrete, where the fear of surveillance by one controls the actions of the many, supplants the gruesome spectacles of sovereign power. So in the shift from the spectacle to the covert, punishment became a practice of transformation, but only one that occurred at the level of the soul. As carceral scholar Angela Davis has pointed out, this account of the prison does not stand when encountering the history of black populations as black people were understood as lacking the soul that was to be "shaped and transformed by punishment."[14] The prison that Foucault tracks is for all intents and purposes a white prison, one that was emerging in Europe at the same time as chattel slavery, where the prison functioned as a

form of punishment that "acknowledged [white] equality and racialized universality of liberty."[15] Now, Foucault correctly asserts the power of surveillance and the importance of fixity, but as Simone Browne has illustrated through her deft side-by-side exploration of the Bentham's Panopticon and the slave ship *Brooks*, that in the case of black populations, the spectacular and the covert distributions of power happen together and at once. To use Foucault's genealogy to universally understand the contemporary prison is to disappear the explicit link that was drawn between slavery and punishment in the 13th Amendment in the United States as well as the material penal practices that continue to produce the link between blackness and criminality, which have produced a prison system disproportionately affecting black populations more than any other. Foucault's account of punishment cannot account for the colonial-racial practices that make up the carceral state.

On the other hand, Alexander's work aims outright to take a racial perspective, placing contemporary mass incarceration in conversation with the historical moment of Jim Crow. Employing Jim Crow as a historical analogue to the contemporary penal system, she argues that mass incarceration should be understood as "a system that locks people not only behind actual bars in actual prisons, but also behind virtual bars and virtual walls—walls that are invisible to the naked eye but function nearly as effectively as Jim Crow laws once did at locking people of color into permanent second-class citizenship."[16] For her, the salience of the analogy rests in a conception of a racial caste system and its continuance from Jim Crow to mass incarceration. In drawing out this lineage, Alexander acknowledges chattel slavery as an original sin that is then to be rectified post-emancipation, understanding Jim Crow segregation as happening during a time in which rights should have been distributed (i.e. during reconstruction) but are subsequently

withheld. Such an assertion not only places mass incarceration in a linear evolution whose distance from slavery is marked by the interval of Jim Crow but also reduces the latter to a consequence of bad (i.e. racist) ideologies and the inappropriate use of state power. In her text, Alexander is primarily concerned with the production of second-class citizenship as a result of discrimination that locks blacks into "an inferior position by law and custom."[17] With such a framing, Alexander forwards a liberal understanding of the contemporary predicament of black populations increasingly affected by incarceration, that is, she assumes the legitimacy of the law and the state as the protector of life and property. Her text actually takes on no substantive critique of any of mass incarceration's systemic issues, its foundational relationships, or even its most formative practices. It does not stand to question the police, the government, or even the prison as an institution. Alexander's account, hinging on its reference to Jim Crow, is primarily restricted to an engagement with discrimination. There is very little to be said about the caste system that Alexander invokes at multiple points throughout her book other than the fact that the prison functions more like that than a system of crime prevention or control.

Employing a similar concept, Wacquant understands the disproportionate number of blacks in prisons as a consequence of a desire to "shore up an eroding caste cleavage."[18] What is different about Wacquant's understanding of these caste divisions then is that he does not understand the black population to be "simply standing at the bottom of the rank ordering of group prestige in American society" but that "they were barred from it *ab initio*"—it is about the *maintenance* of the gap—a "symbolic gulf"—between members of the polity and their "compatriots of African descent."[19] For Wacquant, there is an understanding of the prison as a *producer*, but one that is revivifying and solidifying "the centuries-old association of blackness within criminality and

devious violence."[20] So Wacquant is able to take a step further than Foucault who while grasping that the prison produces delinquency where production is a consequence of the proper functioning of the prison, fails to account for those bodies that are always-already delinquent by privileging the contingent criminalization of action and behavior. Where Foucault's analysis cannot recognize the racial inflection of the prison's divisive function, Wacquant argues that their delinquency is tied to the constitution of the black structural position, which is proliferated and restated in their imprisonment. While Alexander for her part is able to steer us to a concern with the racialized subject, her approach to the issues of the prison system as a matter of reform ends up hindering her ability to deal honestly and appropriately with the prison as a "racialized system of control" as she claims to want to do in the introduction to her book.[21] For Alexander, her analysis of mass incarceration reasons that there is a mistaken idea of what blackness is, or who black people are, that then informs the illegitimate application of said ideology to material relations. Her solution is not to abolish prisons, but to abolish the formation and elaboration of the Prison Industrial Complex that is formed as a result of this mistaken ideology. In so doing, Alexander appeals to norms and morality and ultimately imagines an idealized political conception of the prison system as the proper institution of state punishment. In this, Alexander deals with mass incarceration as a problem separate from a colonial-racial system of governance and one that is not intrinsically tied to the production of the social. Her focus on the applications of the apparatus shield the purpose of the apparatus from view, unable to account for constitutive relationships of racialization and criminalization. This is not merely a problem of a misplaced emphasis, though indeed her understanding of mass incarceration has dangerous ramifications for black politics as it relates to reform, but in effect provides no reasoning for why abolition may be ultimately necessary. That

is, by implying a misuse of the prison, the prison itself is sheltered from an abolitionist perspective, one that takes seriously an imagination beyond this state-sponsored institution of punishment. Where Alexander's reformist perspective critiques symptoms of the prison, an abolitionist focus is "directed at all the social relations that support the permanence of the prison."[22]

Alexander's failure to see the greater problem as the carceral system itself is actually stemming from a failure to comprehend that punishment for black populations is "neither a breakdown of the strategies of containment…or an excess of entrenched power" but is indicative of "the demarcation of [modernity's] most fundamental boundary."[23] In other words, punishment of and violence towards the black body are not reactive but are constitutive of the American nation-state. As Wacquant aims to show, from slavery all the way to mass incarceration, gratuitous violence has been one of the defining features of black subjectivity that has etched the boundary line of the polity. The prison is not actually failing, as Alexander would have you believe, "on the contrary, it reaches [its target]."[24] In rendering both Jim Crow and the prison as problems of discrimination without any theoretical attention to their structural colonial-racial foundations, Alexander's origin story dangerously leaves the prison's central relationship to colonial-racial authority unquestioned and misplaces an emphasis on how to solve our contemporary carceral problem.

So where do we go from here, within Foucault's conceptual stronghold of the panopticon and with Alexander's turn to the racial steeped in liberal rhetorics of reform? This question is not posed in order to categorically dismiss the theoretical gestures of these origin stories, but to consider how an alternative origin story may get us to a different, and arguably more capacious, understanding of what the penal state is, its practices, its subject, and its purpose. One step may be

to turn to those scholars who are indeed working on the foundational entanglement of the racial and the carceral and doing so with an eye towards abolition. In *Are Prisons Obsolete?* Angela Davis corrects much of Foucault's unraced narrative by centralizing the racial history of prison's modern evolution, detailing how punishments from slavery made their way into the larger penal system and how the criminal justice system came about in order to "legally restrict the possibilities of black freedom for newly released slaves."[25] She illustrates how during chattel slavery the prison remained an institution of punishment for whites, but after emancipation, with the passage of the 13th Amendment, redeployed and reconstituted enslavement for free black people. She also anticipates the quandary of prison reform that Alexander seems to be mired in by explaining how the prison itself emerged from processes of reform, that the supermax draws directly upon eighteenth and nineteenth century penitentiary which was "then considered the most progressive form of punishment" and which are now overrepresented by black and Latino populations.[26] In the contemporary prison, unlike pre-Civil War penitentiaries, the purpose is not even to rehabilitate prisoners but instead to create horrific conditions that are the "perfect complement" for those "deemed the worst of the worst by the prison system."[27] One of Davis' major arguments is not that reform is unnecessary, citing the urgency with which we need to reckon with the current lived conditions of prisoners, but that reform cannot be the goal and that it only remains the goal when we fail to understand the purpose of the prison as a tool of colonial-racial oppression. The alternative origin story for our current carceral state that I am attempting to elucidate in this chapter begins from the foundations that Davis provides.

However, taking her cue to consider the colonial-racial foundations of carcerality in the United States and thus the connection between slavery and the prison, I look slightly ahead of the

plantation, towards Browne's instructive provocation of the slave ship. Ships are often disregarded in the study of carceral geographies. The carceral invokes the land, an invocation that often means the imprisonments of the sea are forgotten. But as much as prisons were on land, they were on the sea, and the sea has always been central to the story of the black experience. The sea invites us to consider different architectures and different subjects, ones that reorient and deepen our understanding of the carceral generally and the carceral conditions of black life specifically, because the modern world emerged because of the trade in human cargo that happened by way of the sea. The sea, as it were, moves the world. Recent scholarship in carceral studies has begun to reckon with the sea, most notably to take on an also recent shift in carceral studies to wrestle the carceral away from the conceptual hold of the fixed, that is, the slippage between carcerality and sedentarizing containment. In this vein, scholars have turned to the convict ship as a point of origin for the modern prison so as to recognize the ways in which mobility is entangled with confinement. Kimberly Peters and Jennifer Turner's work on the convict ship has impressed upon us a need to think about "movement during moments of mobility" rather than thinking of the incarcerated as "passive, as moved" in the ways that the panopticon has produced and privileged.[28] This is of course not to relegate carceral mobilities to only ships, but to push us to consider how the prison has always been a moving architecture. This has meant thinking about mobilities in different spaces and in different directions. For example, in the case of Peters and Turner's work, it means thinking beyond horizontal mobilities and considering vertical ones.[29] That is, thinking not only of movement between places or along a journey in terms of transport, but considering those movements that happen within a space, constantly and minutely. It is in these movements especially when power is exercised.

In the desire to take up mobility's entanglement with fixity, those scholars that have turned to the convict ship have also produced an alternative narrative with its own origin story, hoping to bring us to a better understanding of how our contemporary prison continues to function. This story, however, floats close but fails to come aboard a ship that existed even prior to this.[30] Attuned to the ways that the moving architecture of prisons are crucial to the institution's discipline and constitution of positions, they settle on a method of analysis that is, like Foucault, devoid of any theoretical attention to the prison's *racial* history and its *racial* mechanisms. The authors engage with colonialism as they reference the journey of the convict ship from Britain to the colonies and mention is made of those specifically othered communities disproportionately affected by the carceral state, yet the article's imprisoned subject goes unmarked. We are left to assume either that only whites were aboard these ships or that race did not matter to its constitution, to its movement within itself and between locales. We know that neither is probably true. When looking at the contemporary makeup of the prison, its disproportion of people of color, of black people in particular, it seems ill-fitting to center its lineage on a convict ship that places no substantial theoretical attention on race. Indeed, the panopticon model that Peters and Turner aim to trouble does not provide us with an accurate understanding of how punishment works. While acknowledging inmates' movements in its punitive use of surveillance, the panopticon as a model concretizes an emphasis on fixity as the crux of the prison, both the fixity of the gaze and the fixity of the prisoners in their cells. It also, often finding its way to us through Foucault, privileges an unraced or universal subject. Peters and Turner propose an analytical shift to the convict ship to better explain carcerality, yet their deeper understanding of the relationship of movement to punishment has come at the expense of how race is constitutive to this conversation. In fact, a turn

to the history of anti-black carcerality, originating with its embodiment in the slave ship, may get us to a better understanding of both the intersection of mobility and punishment as well as the colonial-racial criminalization of mobility.

Browne's analysis offers the slave ship as an alternative point of reference, opposed to both the panopticon as well as the convict ship. But what would it mean to shift our focus to the slave ship? Browne's suggestion of the *Brookes* plan instead of the panopticon does not simply pull race, and specifically blackness, into the frame, but shines a light on the very practices and relations that *constitute* race and blackness as a colonial instance, as that which is produced through the processes of chattel slavery. In his book *Slaves of the State*, Dennis Childs points us in a direction in line with that of Browne's provocation as he explains the development of the prison through the evolution of the carcerality of black life. To do so, he proposes the "Middle Passage Carceral Model" and with it, he shifts the historiography of the prison past the centering of a white subject and locates slavery's architectures in the center of European imperialism as he traces the advancement from the chain gang to the penitentiary.[31] It is both notable and important that his reference to chattel slavery as an origin of the prison calls out the Middle Passage. Childs brings the slave ship alongside the prison, bringing necessary attention to their material and conceptual links. As Eric A. Stanley has argued, "carceral life is haunted by the presence of suspended death," wherein the slave ship and the prison alike "function precisely through being overcrowded, violent places."[32] As mechanisms of containment and separation, both produce and maintain race and gender through gratuitous violence and practices of political repression. Nowhere else is the purpose of the slave ship as I so described it in Chapter 1 as the principal example of Western spatiality so directly re-purposed and re-pursued. Imprisonment like the slave ship is race-gender

violence, and like the slave ship, requires us to deal with those violences simultaneously. Nowhere else are these simultaneous violences placed in such stark relief—where black bodies have been separated from the social (often justified through fabricated excesses in gender that are constitutive to practices of racialization) and then even further separated and policed through the gendered logics of carcerality that require 'men' to be separated from 'women.' In the policing practices of gender both on the slave ship and the prison, the very categories of woman and man for the enslaved and the incarcerated have no social purchase outside of their dehumanization. That is, at the nexus of race and gender, black people are always already constituted as excessive in relation to their white citizen counterparts. Their constitutive failure to fulfill the requirements of gender so proscribed by whiteness within the categories produced by colonial-racial practices is indeed entangled with their placement outside the fold of citizen. Because of the ways in which blackness has been criminalized, which will be discussed in the following section, the categories of women and man so deployed within the prison are already racialized deployments. Furthermore, the slave ship and the prison function to keep rebellious and dissenting slaves under the control of white authority. For the slave ship, as I argued in Chapter 1, this was done through shackling, separation, nettings, and gratuitous punishment. In the case of the prison, as black political prisoners like Shakur, Davis, and notably George Jackson, have argued, the prison's function was to at once to serve "as a surrogate solution to social problems associated with poverty and racism" *and* to repress political dissidents.[33] In their respective eras, the slave ship was and the prison is, to use the words of Jackson, the "ultimate expression of the law."[34]

Not only does Childs place the hold and the cell in vibrating tension with one another, but such a juxtaposition highlights movement as a binding force, one that is possibly lost when

incarceration's origin is located on the plantation instead. Furthermore, Childs draws attention to the cyclical temporality of black life, the simultaneity of ship and prison holds wherein "past, present, and future exist in constant interface." [35]The cycle is itself a movement baring a different conception of time, one that not only marks out the recurrence of carceral geographies, constantly evolving but persisting, but also underscores the temporality of the hold's imprisonment itself. Regimented and repetitious, time for the entombed and incarcerated is intimately linked to the carcerality of space. Michael Hardt argues that "punishment is time" and in the prison this translates to not only how much time is spent in prison, but *how* one's time is spent in prison as a series of schedules and sequence of routines.[36] Time discipline[37] emerges in the prison through the destruction of "temporal autonomy" and the execution of daily time tables. Prison is a space-time, where the discipline of space and time happen simultaneously, where the incarcerated are scheduled where to be and when to be there, where the space and time of the prison equally produce the position of the prisoner. It is in movement that the matters of time and space converge. Time is measured by how we move across space. On the slave ship like in the prison, time was carefully and purposefully controlled. Time in the hold, time on the deck, time for feeding, time for cleaning, time to destination, time everywhere, time nowhere. The time was rarely if ever the time of the enslaved. Likewise, in the prison, the incarcerated have very little control over their time—time in the cell, time on the yard, time of a sentence, time everywhere, time nowhere. Prisoners and the enslaved aboard the slave ship lose track of time, consistently disoriented and constantly moved. Together, these Western spatialities illustrate how black populations have been marked by the loss of history, an absence of time, and burdened by mobility, forced to move.

Vagrancy: The Criminalization of Blackness and Black Politics

In its time-space, the prison produces and relies on the transience of its prisoners. The incarcerated are shuffled between prisons, within the prison, and from the prison to the outside and back again in cycles of 'recidivism.' Black populations have bared the brunt of this burden of transient mobility. Historically, the larger carceral state in the United States has hinged on a criminalization of blackness intimately tied to matters of locomotion, including idleness, itinerancy, and homelessness. This is directly reflected in the Slave Codes, the post-emancipation Black Codes, and segregation laws, as well as enforced through contemporary loitering laws and homelessness ordinances. Black people have always been made to move and their movements have been materially coerced and ideologically fabricated. In tracing the literal and repetitive movement of Assata Shakur within and beyond the scope of her autobiography, not only do we encounter the multiple entanglements of carcerality and movement, but we also glimpse the ways in which the carceral condition of black life hinges on this matter of movement, a criminal movement, a transience, a vagrancy. Shakur discloses herself as not simply located, but locomotive.

Assata Shakur, a former member of the Black Liberation Army, was convicted in 1977 for the killing of a state trooper during a 1973 shootout on the New Jersey turnpike. She was arrested and then found guilty for first-degree murder for aiding and abetting, and during this time she was shuffled through a variety of carceral spaces. On 2 November 1979, Shakur escaped from Clinton Correctional with the help of three members of the Black Liberation Army after commandeering a van and escaping through an unfenced area. Upon her escape, Shakur was a fugitive and subsequently fled to Cuba, seeking and acquiring political asylum in 1984. In 2005, she was

classified as a domestic terrorist by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a bounty of one million dollars was placed on her head. In 2013, the FBI named her a Most Wanted Terrorist, the first woman to be given such a designation, her bounty was doubled to two million, and overnight billboards were raised in New Jersey to advertise these developments. Since she has been in Cuba, the U.S. government has made numerous attempts to extradite her with Donald Trump most recently publicly calling for the return of the "cop killer" in June 2017. Her asylum, while always uncertain, is now made even more precarious as official relations between Cuba and the United States develop. In her autobiography, Assata Shakur constantly and consistently refers to her forced movement. I chose two excerpts of her autobiography as epigraphs which exemplify these references. The first is a common refrain throughout the text's chapters, an exchange between prison guard and inmate that bespeaks Shakur's constant disorientation, her forced movement, and the absence of knowledge concerning where she may be going. The second references motion as a term of jurisprudence, that the judge denies their motion, that he denies all their motions. The double meaning is resonant. Movement frames Assata Shakur's story as we move through her experience in the prison, as we move back and forth from her present incarceration to her past 'freedom,' and as we move from her time in the United States to her current exile in Cuba. We move across the prison; we move across time; we move across borders. What becomes increasingly apparent throughout the autobiography is not simply her motion, that is the motion itself, but that she is always moving or being moved, that until Cuba she is never still, and even in Cuba, she is never home. That her abrupt transfers between jails without any word to her lawyer or any explanation "was a scenario that would be repeated over and over again."[38]

Shakur's seemingly life-long movement is an enunciation of a transience that marks black life, especially in the United States, and may best be understood by returning to the criminalization of black movement, specifically within the concept of vagrancy. Vagrant refers somewhat innocuously to a person who wanders or roams, one who is not fixed or settled but is constantly moving with no permanent home, or to unpredictable movement and behavior. The term takes on a more prejudicial tone in its definition as a person who "lives by begging" or, as per its use relative to the law, "relating to or living the life of a vagrant."[39] Given the West's political orientation toward property, the somewhat innocuous definition lends itself to a harsher characterization than is recognized at first glance. In the second definition, the word vagrant as noun is used to define the word vagrant as adjective and renders meaning for a status or condition of life. Here, vagrant is politically and legally stressed, marked by obvious class hierarchies that hinge on ownership, employment, and domicile, and imply their proper environments (e.g. the office rather than the street). The term vagrant also marks and is marked by race, especially in the United States, where post-emancipation Black Codes were passed in southern states to restrict the lives of free black populations and whose defining feature was a broadly defined and broadly enforced vagrancy law. Under the Black Codes of 1865 and 1866, authorities would arrest free black people for minor infractions and subsequently have them committed to involuntary labor under what came to be known as the convict lease system.[40] In this, the use of vagrancy was integral to the transition from chattel slavery to more clandestine forms of racialized incarceration. In other words, policing movement was often the way in which free blacks were returned to a condition of servitude at the command of whites. Vagrancy laws were directly tied to the criminalization of blackness and black freedom, where vagrancy was always already the enunciation of black movement. As such,

vagrancy has been used as an almost catch-all to catch all blacks in the act, in the act of doing or doing nothing, and ultimately in the act of moving.

Vagrancy presumes that one is moving between or amongst coherent places that provide substantive and subjective meaning, either the place of residence, the place of employment, or the place of consumerism. To be marked vagrant is to be marked as interstitial, being in between places and thus to be nowhere that is valued in the eyes of the state. This is not to say that to be marked as interstitial is to lack meaning; on the contrary, to be vagrant is to be inundated with meaning, it is to be excessively marked in relation to one's movement. It orders and gathers one into a position of criminal no matter one's movement but also because of one's movement. Vagrancy is both a dispossession and an enunciation of dispossession that is not recognized as such. The charge of vagrancy marked out a collection of threats against property and order, and racially categorized a problem population of potential threat. That is, the vagrant not only marks out DuBois' question of being a problem to be solved, but also being a threat to be contained—the threat of rebellion and a threat to property and the security of recognized political subjects. By calling out the danger of the threat, vagrancy encompasses a futurity, one marked by the criminalization of black movement. In this, vagrancy does not require the criminal act or even criminal intent, it is simply the possibility of the criminal that is criminal. In other words, it is concerned with an unknowable future that is understood as knowable and guaranteed. The charge of vagrancy charges that the next move is known.

In the United States, while the system and methods of chattel slavery are not identical to the new carceral manifestations that come in its wake, their visual rhyme is bridged, in at least one way, by their foundational concern with regulating and coercing the movement of black people.

Here, the concept of vagrant blackness brings theoretical attention to the way in which the expansion of carceral geographies hinges on the spatial dislocations and discursive circulations of black people and the fabrication of the black criminal. In this way, while vagrancy is something that is applied to black people it is also how they are forced to move. The movement of black people is always already vagrant, it is never fulfilling the requirements set forth by whiteness because it is not supposed to. Vagrancy is not just a charge, it is the form of movement that is produced through the postbellum geography of emancipation and reconstruction. This is not to argue that the only function of black criminalization is to regulate movement or even that black criminalization only occurs through vagrancy, but it is to elucidate these connections and to argue that black criminalization actually has very little to do with actual crime and much more to do with the conditioning of black life. Angela Davis has illustrated that the conceptual distinction of blacks and whites imbricated in the criminal discourse is one of criminality versus crime. Frank Wilderson III has built on this by arguing that for black people there are only two manifestations, that of the prison slave and the prison-slave-in-waiting, which acknowledges not only the criminality that is ascribed to black people but the way in which this ascription comes to structure their very existence in the world.[41] For black people, criminality is not measured by one's physical proximity to the prison but becomes an almost inescapable condition of criminalization where any move, real or suspected, beyond the racial comportments designated by white authority is prohibited and cause for arrest or death. As such, the prison itself does not represent a separation from a discrete 'before' and 'after' of criminalization. That is, punishment is not secondary, but becomes constitutive of black existence. This is not simply a theoretical gesture away from discipline as a response to crime, but an understanding that the larger carceral system produces as much as it maintains black

criminalization. The vagrancy laws in the Black Codes begin to indicate how black people are always already a threat to national security not because they wield weapons against the Western project "but for *being* such weapons and thus always in need of containment, surveillance, sanction, deportation, elimination."[42] For black people, surveillance is constitutive, operative anywhere and anytime and not restricted to class and subsequent spatiality. This constitutive surveillance marks not only the individual, but is productive of an entire assemblage of people. As such, a crime committed by a black individual stood to obscure the entire race with a criminal shadow, not unlike the way the Wanted billboards for Assata Shakur literally stood over and cast a long shadow over low-income neighborhoods in New Jersey, a point we will return to in a forthcoming section.

The profusion of surveillance that is embodied in the charge of vagrancy also has sexual valences, where in part the danger that is ascribed to black people was the threat they posed to white morality. Specifically, the trope of black hypermasculinity fueled fears of black men's desire for white women and black women's seduction of white men. Vagrancy was a sexually charged indictment, emphasizing the imminent incursion of unbridled black sexuality when gone unchecked by white supervision and surveillance. Historically, black populations have been associated with sexual transgressions if only for the fact that in urban areas, black neighborhoods were often the ones strategically arranged as enclaves of sexual commerce and vice.[43] This immoral and sexually-charged distortion was central to the "caricatured criminal protagonists" that historian Kali Gross discusses in her work, which became a mass-produced "vehicle for white fantasies and taboo desires."[44] She argues that the shift in the perception of black women from the "ultimate submissive" of slavery to the "dangerous urban aggressor" post-emancipation was a

consequence of the subversion, at least in theory, of uninhibited white access to black women's bodies.[45] The trope of hypersexuality was crucial to the criminalization of blackness for the benefit of, and in opposition to, those holders of whiteness. Black female criminals especially spotlight the ways in which race, gender, and sexuality shape criminality. In this vein, Gross explains that press accounts of black female crime "projected illicit elements of sex and violence," even for crimes that were not explicitly sexual or passionate in nature, which created "sexual spectacles for mainstream audiences" that traveled widely.[46] Here, black women's criminality was implicitly tied to a representation of deviant and unchecked sexuality that was subsequently fetishized as compulsive and uncontrollable.

But the fascination with the spectacle of black criminality and the fabrication of the vagrant black body went beyond proper notions of sexuality and reached into questions of gender itself. According to Victoria Law, while prisons have always been a form of social control, for women they have been historically used to morally condemn behaviors that are seen as deviating from notions of proper womanhood.[47] Black women are especially subject to such gendered ideologies insomuch as they have been historically figured as sexually lascivious and dangerous, where, again, the trope of hypersexuality is always already linked to the criminalization of blackness.[48] Gross cites the studies of Cesare Lombroso, who claimed that the "lack of a clear divide between [black] men and women played a key factor in female criminality," in order to elucidate the way in which criminality became tied to the proposition that black women were not properly gendered and that black womanhood was thus inherently inferior to white womanhood.[49] In this formulation, black womanhood was rendered dangerous because it was understood to be marked by excess—excess in body type, strength, behavior, and criminal abilities and desires. The figure of the black

female criminal was constructed as aggressively on the prowl as if to demonstrate an active and oncoming threat. In effect, what was painted was the "portrait of the ferocious black woman" that was used to validate the use of violence in the suppression of black women's "disruptive activities."[50] Gross argues that while white women's criminality could always be displaced or explained away, the "depraved black woman" was always already visible as criminal, illustrating how the two were "complementary narrative constructions" that served to "[advance] the emerging social discourse of race and patriarchy."[51] These narrative constructions were dependent on the belief that black people cross lines, that they are excessive, and that they move beyond the constitutive borders of humanity's categories.

While black women often had complex reasons for criminal behavior, narrations of their crimes vilified them with simplistic racial tropes that were then disseminated and consumed in the service of white supremacy. Crime and the danger of unchecked black movement were exaggerated in such a way as to shore up traditional notions of white masculinity as well as white female morality. Moreover, these representations galvanized and justified urban policies long after emancipation and into the contemporary moment, heavily influencing white authority over black urban life. By promoting fear, the rhetoric of criminalization used against blacks, based in strategic manipulations and omissions, has often been traded upon for political power, with a 'tough on crime' attitude being the easiest and most risk-free way to secure support from any constituency while not necessarily revealing racial bias. In effect, the U.S. government, especially from Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency on, has been able to chisel out ideological boundaries of middle-class social and cultural values that normalize white dominance and black danger hinging on the imminence of their ambulation beyond their place. As Angela Davis has pointed out, blacks, then

and now, are almost always punished for practices that go unchecked when performed by whites.[52] Furthermore, the presumed level of danger posed by blacks to white dominion is often not represented in the crimes that get incarcerated black women convicted. Shakur's autobiography lists some of the crimes that black women were often 'in' for in the 1970s: "*Jostling* was pickpocketing; *boosting* was shoplifting; *juggling paper* was writing bad checks and *dragging* or *playing drag* was conning."[53] Interestingly, all the terms used to describe the criminal acts were locomotive and draw our attention to these movements as inappropriate, juvenile, or excessive, linking the itinerant to the criminal. Punished for mobility and punished with mobility, black prisoners are reduced to a state of oscillation, often disoriented to its causes and manifestations. In her autobiography, Shakur intimates that many of the acts carried out by these women were done out of sheer survival, while noting that the socio-economic conditions from which these crimes often emerge is conventionally disassociated from their practice by the courts and outside audiences. In her own case, Shakur's 'crimes' against the state revolved around survival as well as political protest and practice. But as we know about vagrancy laws, black criminalization existed at the point of black threat to white dominion. It is not by chance that Black Codes, those collections of laws with broadly defined and broadly enforced rules about vagrancy, specifically outlaw runaways, the assembly of free or enslaved blacks, the disorderly, and those who neglect their calling. Vagrancy in relation to black populations is always a declaration of permissible movements and always a repudiation of dissent. In that way, the charge of vagrancy always already paraphrases a critique and prohibition of black political practice.

The writings of black political prisoners like Shakur have brought this connection between criminalization, incarceration, and political dissent to the fore. George Jackson, one of three

incarcerated black men known as the Soledad Brothers[54] who were charged with the killing of a prison guard in retaliation for the murder of three other black prisoners during a fight in the exercise yard, is cited as one of the major imprisoned intellectuals to conceptualize this relationship, as referenced earlier. According to Heiner, the late 1960s and early 1970s prison writings of both he and Angela Davis "created a vocabulary for understanding the reciprocal social process by which radical political activism was criminalized and crime politicized."[55] The prison, according to these political prisoners and contemporaries of Assata Shakur, confined overwhelmingly and at once radical activists and racialized others.[56] James has argued that black people are not only incarcerated at the highest rate for petty or violent crime, but also constitute the highest percentage of those incarcerated "for political acts (including armed struggle) in opposition to repression."[57] The experiences and writings of these political prisoners have illustrated that not only were black people criminalized, but that black political practices were equally so. Yet, as they have shown, the U.S. government has done so in such a way so as to be able to deny the existence of the political prisoner within American prisons. Davis argues that to "explain away [their] existence" requires a double move, first to equate the "individual political act with the individual criminal act" and second to reduce the political event to the criminal event.[58] Through this double move, she argues, "the absolute invulnerability of the existing order" is affirmed.[59] Indeed the formation of the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) is evidence of the government's desire to criminalize and thus neutralize black liberation movements, in particular the Black Panther Party of which Jackson, Davis, and Shakur were all at least brief members. In a 1968 memo to FBI field offices, Director J. Edgar Hoover explained that the purpose of COINTELPRO was to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" the

political activity of those like the Black Panthers by whatever means necessary including assassinations, frame-ups, and even, or maybe especially, the disruption of their service work.[60] When the latter was executed, like in the case of convincing black community members that the free breakfast program for children was serving poisoned food, Heiner argues that the government officials worked to figure the Panthers "*as criminals* and the potential beneficiaries of the Party' program *as victims* who are in need of protection from the State."[61] This not only evidences the criminalization of the Panthers' political work, but reiterates how this criminalization is intimately tied to the policing of the larger black community.

Yet, I would be remiss to imply that black imprisoned men and women were on equal footing. Indeed, as Joy James has argued, there was a stark difference in how the men and women in the BPP were figured as politicized. While there were systemic problems with misogyny and sexism within the Party, they were also "instrumental in propelling select women into the national and international spotlight as revolutionaries."[62] Davis and Shakur along with Kathleen Cleaver and Elaine Brown are indicative of this. Yet, these women were also often assumed to have been politicized through their relationships with BPP members who were men, with men becoming the face of black militancy against state-sponsored white supremacy. James argues however that even though black men were the public face, often at the hands of COINTELPRO, many rank and file members were black women and they were also at risk of persecution by the police state while also "[baring] the brunt of party discipline," and often had to be so anonymously.[63] The difference in treatment also extended once black women became political prisoners, often hinging on the fact that masculine criminality "has always been deemed more 'normal' than feminine criminality" and the linking of female deviance more with insanity than with crime.[64] As such, the prison space is

one where black women are overdetermined as sexually accessible, made to experience severe abuse by prison guards who surveil these women at all times, where privacy even for the most intimate of practices and places is nonexistent, and where cavity searches and sexual assaults are built into the processes of discipline. This is the context in which Assata Shakur served her time and why her escape from prison becomes even more powerful. The escape of Assata Shakur is not just a moment where an individual was simply fed up with being told what to do, but a break with a regime that renders the life of the black incarcerated woman worthless and her movement as always subject to the spatial authority of whiteness.

From their unique vantage point, political prisoners also conceptualized the centrality of the prison movement to the larger struggle for black liberation, especially the black revolutionary movement of the 1960s and 1970s represented by groups like the BPP. George Jackson not only named the conditions that black communities were presently living as colonial, but, as Heiner argues, Jackson also "transformed the prison, granting it a strategic role in the decolonization of the black community."[65] Months before he was assassinated in prison in August 1971, Jackson argued that the function of the prison was to "[serve] the needs of the totalitarian state," one of which was "to isolate, eliminate, liquidate the dynamic sections of the overall movement" especially its "protagonists" like himself and Davis. In response, he called for the interruption of this function by "[turning] the prison into just another front of the struggle" by those on the inside of it.[66] Davis, for her part, in calling for community support of those like the Soledad Brothers along with the Soledad Three, also argued for this political and conceptual connection, claiming that the support would provide an occasion "to link the immediate needs of the black community with a forceful fight to break the fascist stronghold in the prisons and therefore to abolish the prison

system in its present form."[67] To her, because of the intimate ties between "poverty, police courts, and prison" as "imposed patterns" within black urban life as opposed to white life, there was an "instinctive affinity" that bound "the mass of black people to the political prisoners."[68] And because of this bind, Davis and others began to champion calls for prison abolition and not just the freedom of political prisoners.

Shakur's escape must be understood within this framework. For Shakur, no act against the state was an individualist act even it was executed by an individual. Indeed, as James argues, her support of even armed-struggle always invoked the people, the collective, as driving its need rather than simply being led by the movement.[69] That "revolutionary war was a people's war" was Shakur's understanding of both her part in the Black Panther Party as well as the Black Liberation Army.[70] Thus it may be better to understand her escape as a collective critique, one that elaborates an invocation of the black masses. Unlike Davis, Shakur has not been taken up as universally today as a political icon, in part because she represents the "unembraceable" since she is charged with killing a police officer and because she is largely "unrepentant" and remains harshly critical of the state which she continues to refer to as slavemaster.[71] According to James, while Angela Davis' 1972 legal victory marked out a just legal system for popular audiences taking up her cause, Shakur's escape "rejects the conviction that the judicial system is just."[72] Shakur's escapism, that is, the continued practice of escape, can be understood as the principal example of what Davis calls "political boldness," that is, the *persistent* challenge of the state.[73] In her escapism, she does not break with the regulating authority of the state "for one's own individual self-interest" but violates "it in the interests of a class or a people whose oppression is expressed either directly or indirectly"

through it. In this formulation, her escapism embodies a black anarchist practice as it invokes the collective and as it invokes abolition.

Reformist Visions and Black Anarchist Abolitions

Davis has argued that for "the activist become political prisoner," the contact with the criminal justice system "has occurred because [one] has lodged a protest, in one form or another, against the conditions which nail blacks to this orbit of oppression," that inevitable direct or indirect articulation with the judicial system "because he or she is black."[74] Shakur's escapism, within Davis' evocative framing, can then be understood as an attempt to shoot out of this orbit, to break with the system in its entirety. Her practice must also be understood in contradistinction to "law-abiding dissent" which often has broader social acceptance because of its "adherence to principles of non-violence, civil disobedience, widely shared moral values and, sometimes, proximity to the very 'corridors of (institutional) power' closed to the disenfranchised." In the case of Shakur what comes to be condemned by the wider public is the black anarchism of her practice, the rejection of the "validity of the nation state itself and the legitimacy of its legal and moral standing."[75] To position Shakur as a black anarchist and abolitionist then requires further explanation of its relationship to the other side of the debate within prison activism, reform.

According to Heiner, reform and abolition are distinguished by the "totality of their approach" wherein in the latter, the "positive, constructed measures must be continually accompanied (and in many cases, preceded) by negative, destructive ones."[76] Reform is also more often closely aligned with moderates and conservatives because they are "assimilable to liberal politics." In regards to the focus of this chapter, reform of the prison and even the eradication of

particular kinds of punishment, such as the death penalty, are assimilable to liberalism because they do not necessitate the full rejection of state authority embodied in an institution, that is, what Jackson has called "the ultimate expression of the law." Within the prison abolition movement lies the twinned concentration on "the structures and institutions that we need to destroy" as well as "the practices and formations we must construct to be free."[77] However, prison abolition cannot be positioned as an opposition to reform, for the prison abolition movement maintains concern with the immediate needs of those who are incarcerated. Its relationship to reform hinges on suturing "the divide (both actual and virtual) between the inside and the outside of the prison."[78] Reform is thus aligned with the liberal when it does not engage this connection and when the ascription to reform emerges from a desire not to "exceed the limits of legality" where "redress through electoral channels is the liberal's panacea."[79] Furthermore, reform becomes problematic when it becomes incessantly linked to prison development, that is, the "situation in which progress in prison reform has tended to render the prison more impermeable to change and has resulted in bigger, and what are considered 'better,' prisons."[80]

Today there is an underside to contemporary shifts in prison administration, an example of exactly what Davis is referring to as the danger of prison development through reform, that are indeed often based in a desire to reduce segregation and what *The Atlantic* recently called "genuine human concern."[81] The assumption has been that through care, made manifest in the modernizing changes of the prison, the incarcerated, especially the black incarcerated, are better off. As Christophe Mincke and Anne Lemonne point out, we have moved from a traditional model of prison as pure immobilization and into a moment governed by a "concern" to limit prison's detrimental effects.[82] This move has had direct consequences for the carceral condition. We must

then ask ourselves how have these expressions held space for new formulations of control? As Philip Hancock and Yvonne Jewkes draw out the paralleled transition of workplaces and prisons from highly aggressive and confined architectures to those promoting openness and flexibility, they illustrate that this shift has not necessarily meant ameliorating the conditions of imprisonment, but has actually introduced a more surreptitious method of controlling the imprisoned.[83] Here, control is entangled with the push for productivity. In the contemporary prison, administrators are finding new ways to encourage prisoners' positive use of time and space which work in conjunction with the deprivation of freedom.

Even between the 20th and 21st centuries there has been a strong shift in prison architecture because of pushes for reform. Where before the prison building was supposed to evoke feelings of "authority and efficiency," utilitarian and modern, the early 2000s brought an interest in creating a more "generative space."[84] As the workplace has undergone widespread development, with new startup culture and flowing floorplans, so has the prison. There is a drive to connect spatial practices and activities, encourage fluidity, and minimize the differentiation of thinking and doing.[85] This is reflected in a move from "spatial emplacement" as organizational control and toward a "strategy of enchantment," which "mobilizes design and the aesthetics of landscape" to produce "organizationally desirable actions and identities." In a word, we have reached a moment where the formats encouraged by the tech boom have found their way into prison architecture. These design shifts are indicative of a primary mission to rehabilitate, where older designs are associated with negative effects on prisoners and new architectures are meant to evidence a more beneficial life for those on the inside. But rehabilitation must be understood as a process meant to produce subjects who are deemed socially compatible. In the West this has meant designing spaces

"that encourage personal change and a reorientation to a less brutal lifestyle."[86] The purpose then is to create a new prisoner and new worker where the architecture is not just supporting this transformation, but is itself a creative production. These architectural design innovations do not however redefine the deeper social relations constituted by the existence of the prison in the first place, but simply reformat how these social relations are expressed and change how they are felt by the incarcerated. This is to say that though these changes to the prison are arguably meant to develop new citizens, these reforms do not alter the dominant relationship of creation and creator.

The calls to humanize the prison, often through an increase in mobility through the opening up of space, have also provoked a development of prison administration that stands to promote the freer circulation of prisoners. This has come in the form of huge shifts in building design, such as in the U.S. shift from the telephone pole design where rows of buildings would be connected by one or two main corridors to the more modern campus design with its many freestanding buildings surrounded by spaces of open land. While the former was known for the difficulty it caused for surveillance and riot control, the latter was originally designed for women and juveniles, which may be the reason this design increased direct supervision over the incarcerated.[87] The freer circulation of prisoners has also been born of a growing desire to move away from the use of solitary confinement, because it has unsurprisingly shown not to be helpful for the purposes of rehabilitation or modifications in behavior. As such, prison administrators have begun to employ methods that are meant to maintain control while reducing the need for isolation. The danger here is not only that these methods have meant to produce good workers and improve their "capacity to socialize and to operate normally in a liberal order," but that this may promote a comportment that has no substantive purchase on the outside for black people.[88] On the one hand these

architectural and administrative shifts may provide freer movement for incarcerated black people within the prison and on the other hand may make even less visible the pernicious acts of violence that are perpetrated on and through black bodies around corners and in back rooms.

The dangerously uncritical turn to mobility within prison reform movements disregards the fact that mobility has often been used by state forces as a means of discomfort, decreasing visibility and increasing vulnerability of the incarcerated. The examples of mobility used to punish that come to mind are often rooted in images of unremitting labor or the constant shuffling of prisoners, but this does not tell the full story. Indeed, while the advancement of prisoner mobility in contrast to confinement to the cell and hypermanagement of the prison is often seen as a move in the correct direction for reformers, in many ways the practice of affording limited freedom of mobility extends the space of confinement both within and outside of the prison. Outside of the prison, one can think of electronic monitoring that has recently seen an upsurge in use to punish those in the criminal justice system. On the inside, there is the growing use of 'step-down' or incentive programs that use increased recreation time or access to education and leisure materials to motivate the incarcerated to, in effect, be better prisoners.

Those that push for abolition do not advocate against reform in total, but against certain reforms and against a reformist framework which fails to keep the abolition of prison in focus. For Davis, the difficulty becomes "how to establish a balance between reforms that are clearly necessary to safeguard the lives of prisoners and those strategies designed to promote the eventual abolition of prisons as the dominant mode of punishment."[89] Some have called this "[exploring] the possibility of 'non-reformist reform.'"[90] Conceptually, abolition and anarchism are linked both through their rejection of reformist politics as well as their drive to dismantle institutions that

cohere by way of and embody state authority. Abolition is also inherently linked to black anarchism, first and foremost because the very invocation of the term 'abolition' or 'abolitionist' to describe the anti-prison vision and activist invokes the prison's intimate connection to slavery. That is, adoption of the term abolition "drew deliberate links between the dismantling of prisons and the abolition of slavery," that if you radically oppose one, you must also radically oppose the other.[91] In so doing, it centers colonial-racial authority as that which is behind and emerging from the prison institution as much as it stands behind chattel slavery. With this in mind, abolitionism maintains an anticipation of "a social landscape no longer dominated by the prison" while not yet having the answers to what this terrain may look like. It is in this space of striving that marks what Ernst Bloch calls the 'not yet,' and in which Shakur's escapism also floats.[92]

Escapism as Nonrepresentation

The use of escapism is used purposefully to discuss Assata Shakur's spatial interruption of the prison in order to move away from any interpretations of completion that the word escape seems to indicate. However, this move requires further elaboration as to *why escapism* is used rather than escape. It also requires an explanation of how escapism moves and how its movements both contest and are shaped by the use of mobility to punish. To be sure, while Shakur does escape prison, her exile marks her practice as more of an escapism, reflecting not only the political interval in which her practice resides, but the multi-directionality of her movements, and the necessary incompleteness of her action against the reterritorializing power of the state. To employ escapism is to take up Hesse's call to consider the complexities of black subversive freedoms, or, rather, how black anarchist practices "embody the meaning of freedom subversively." My formulation of

escapism takes seriously how "escapist pathways" work through being still subject to colonial-racial governance but "never racially assimilated to Western hegemony."[93] I choose to use escapism in order to elaborate the continued and processual nature of escape, the required repetitions to elude that Shakur continues to practice as she evades Western control in order to sustain the secrecy of her whereabouts. In this way, escapism is an exertion of non-linear trajectories of black movement beyond the dominion of white authority. Further still, in the case of Shakur, it is a spatial interruption of the prison that implies a non-sovereign practice that is neither limited in its directions nor limited by a reliance on outcomes. To argue against outcomes is to both claim an uncertainty of outcomes as well as to reject outcomes, that is, to contest the frames that a desire for an (analysis of) outcome requires. Here, my use of escapism as it pertains to Assata Shakur is to think of black anarchism as a black liberation*ist* politics, a gesture towards freedom that is not yet achieved. As an outlaw, Shakur's escape from prison cannot be an achievement of freedom because her escape is not "homologous with freedom from the rule of race,"[94] its policing, segregation, and carceral conditions. As such, it is a practice that occurs within the conceptual fields of both freedom and unfreedom. It indicts the colonial-racial geographies of unfreedom in its deed but does not, or cannot, yet imagine a free life in its claim. Thus, the description escapism is meant to represent a deed that precedes its demand, rejecting a linear trajectory with a coherent or named outcome from which we are to measure the accomplishment of her practice and realization of her claim by Western standards of success. In this configuration it is not simply the source of the standards that matter, but the standards themselves. The appeal to escapism proposes that to be held to standards is to remain beholden to a horizon that shapes and dictates the deed. In this way, Shakur's escapism disrupts the present horizons of the imaginable

by refusing its own appraisal as much as it refuses the carceral organization of the state as the governing law of race. It is an anticipatory abandonment of the prison as that ultimate expression of the law that does not yet have a destination, but is a working toward abolition, it is an anticipation of something else. Escapism forces one to reckon with the deed of flight as deed, that is, as practice—the practice of the jump rather than its destination(s). However, reckoning with this practice does not mean *knowing* this practice. This is clearest in the case of Assata Shakur's biography when we encounter the book's transition from prison to Cuba as an absent chapter, as a fugitivity of the literature.

Shakur's escapism from prison is indeed an exertion of racial chaos that calls into question the integrity of the prison. Yet, the absence of the chapter in her autobiography that specifically details her escapism places pressure on our desires for memorialization and permanence; in a word, the desire for an archive. As much as Shakur's practice is an escapism from the formal geographies of the prison, it is also an escapism from the inherent structures and stakes of that archive. As Hesse argues in relation to slave narratives as "black fugitive thought," the latter "can only be sustained through the emancipation inherent in escape from the colonial-racial foreclosure underpinning consent to Western hegemony."[95] Shakur's missing chapter signifies and indicates the escapism of her escapism from representation. In this, her escapism pushes back on the very mechanisms for and desires of Western liberal horizons, assimilations, and appropriations. In the same way that black fugitive thought during slavery elaborated and attempted an escape from the hegemonic conceptualization of Western liberty, so too does Shakur's missing chapter serve to question what 'true' freedom looks like. Furthermore, her escapism is not simply a challenge for the processes of knowledge production, but directly challenges the production of knowledge. Even

as "loss gives rise to longing," the absent chapter does not push for recognition, but questions the very desire for it.[96] The absence of the chapter, in the words of Hartman, challenges us to "respect what we cannot know."[97] It comes to us as a reflection of the unknown—that which we should not know, that which we cannot know—that marks Shakur's political practice. By not telling us how she did 'it,' she denies the pressures of the "reproductive economy" that buttress said desire for an archive and reveals that the desire to duplicate is duplicitous.[98] Performances can never be exactly duplicated even if they are repeated, they cannot be saved "or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations *of* representations."[99] Rather than calling for duplication, the absence of the escapism demonstrates a necessity to work through the unknown as a productive space of politics, the "nonreproductive" as productive.[100] It is not only that we cannot know intentionality—though we also do not know that because the autobiography gives no advance notice of what is to come—behind the practice, but that we cannot *know* the practice itself. The fugitive chapter illustrates the distance between the practitioner and the viewer, which highlights the inability to ever fully know the practice of the practitioner. It is the performance of political practice that is now beyond the reach or intentionality of the individual but has not reached our comprehension. The missing chapter then becomes the expression of the practice's ephemerality "where it eludes regulation and control."[101] It cannot be held down, contained, or made knowable.

But it is not simply the fact that her escapism cannot be appropriately or correctly spoken so it must go unspoken, but that it walks the line of the silence and the secret. Historian Greg Childs has differentiated between the two in his study of sedition in Colonial Brazil. His delineation explains the difference between silence and secret as a matter of recovery where the former is an omission that awaits revelation in order for the ascription of value, often on the part

of the historian, and the latter is more "commensurate with nonexistence."[102] That is, an attempt to keep things from the knowable. Childs pushes us to think of the secret not as an obstacle for understanding black anarchism, but as fundamental to it. It is an indication of the "possibility of revaluing that emptiness."[103] Escapism, rather than escape, then not only works against the temptation to "fill in the gaps" or "provide closure where there is none," but pushes back on our desire to know even as it provokes a necessity to study.[104] That is, her escapism requires our theorization insomuch as a new approach to such practices is necessary, but simultaneously indicates that we cannot approach these practices with an intent to know these practices with any certainty. We only know *of* Assata's deed and of that we actually know very little. The drive is instead what can we begin to learn from, rather than about, these practices when we approach them through an alternative frame? What can these practices teach us about politics and teach us about the study of politics? This concerns what Hartman details in her discussion of the archive of slavery: embracing the "impossibility that conditions our knowledge of the past" but also "animates our desire for a liberated future."[105] In the case of Assata Shakur's continuing story, we must contend with the absent chapter as the escapist necessity of that which is not yet finished, that which remains anticipatory and provisional. We must contend with the ways in which the very possibilities emergent in her escapism are also those that "clog the smooth machinery of the representation necessary to the circulation of capital."[106] Shakur's interstitial chapter is itself an interruption of the cycles of reproduction and representation.

This is of course not to traffic in romantic notions of resistance, because often conceptualizations of resistance also fall within the confines of their liberal genealogies that march toward completion and attempt closure for stories that are exceedingly and excessively beyond

closure. To employ Hartman and Stephen Best's evocative conceptualization, the absence of the chapter demarcates the fugitive space that is between the complaint and the "extralinguistic mode of black noise that exists outside the parameters of any strategy or plan for remedy." That is, Shakur's escapism is an exertion of chaos that is inaudible to Western ears and represents the "political interval" that represents an elaboration "between the destruction of the old world and the awaited hour of deliverance."[107] And as Sarah Cervenak argues, it is at "precisely those moments when it bends away from forces that attempt to translate or read" that black movement beyond the control of the state "aligns with the free."[108] It is indeed a move outside the frame of the Western order but it cannot find its completion, not only because practices of escapism always exceed legibility and encapsulate imaginings beyond our comprehension, but because they continue to be subject to the operation of archival desires and are situated within a governing order of white supremacy that is dependent on their repression. Escapism works against the "instinct for possession," that is driven by a desire for integration, where "imperialism is a search for security." The secrecy of the chapter then does not properly function with and for the bourgeois demand of "guarantees in the present against the future" because it "introduces unknowns into those solved problems" from which whiteness lives.[109] The secrecy then both announces the threat as threat but is also a threat in itself.

Repression

The threat of escapism, like any threat embodied in or practiced by black people, does not only encounter discursive repressions, but also material ones. If the entanglement of movement and punishment has been at all instructive, it has illustrated that carcerality has existed before the

prison, and is always expanding beyond it. Shakur's flight from "the modern slave ship" is arguably successful, finding her way out of a draconian penal architecture that is meant to contain her for the court-appointed duration.[110] She seeks and receives political asylum in Cuba where she is able to move not only beyond the concrete walls of Clinton Correctional Facility in New York but also beyond the borders of the United States and into a communist nation meant to represent all things beyond U.S. control and influence. Whilst her locomotion across U.S. national borders and relative freedom in Cuba mark out a new experience for Shakur that is categorically different than that of her life inside the prison institution, this change does not overcome the carceral geographies that produce her position as always already subject to the violence of the state. She had achieved her "dream;" she was elated and ecstatic, and she was also "completely disoriented" where "Everything was the same, yet everything was different."[111] In Cuba, she remains in a carceral exile, where her movements are again restricted to lands that are at once beyond the reach of the West and its American handmaidens as well as established by those very forces. With this comes the realization that "there exist no fixed sites" of freedom and that the reach of the West is hardly contained by geographic boundaries.[112] Her exile focuses our attention on the constitution of national borders by the excessive policing in and of whiteness. Her fleeing ensures a displacement and diffusion of carcerality that reveals itself in a new form that while supposedly softer in appearance, remains materially significant as it renders her movement under the incessant surveillance of the state. This surveillance not only plays on an othering *of* Cuba, but is also a subsequent demonizing of her escape that is made manifest through a constructed resonance *with* Cuba's communist, and thus un-American, subsistence. This begins to bare the construction of her identity as terrorist, which reimagines a McCarthyist trajectory that claims a confluence of any

dissent from the state with presuppositions of the un-American. In this, Shakur comes to embody both the desire for the FBI to retrieve a black fugitive as well as the United States' attempt to invade the sanctuary space for dissidents that Castro's racialized Cuba had come to represent. Its anti-imperialist commitments and public support for the struggle of black Americans, such as Shakur, has endeared it to those identifying with antiracism and black liberation while also angering the U.S. government.[113] Indeed this small nation had come to "symbolize a resistance to state constructed as an imperial behemoth."[114] Shakur's political asylum in Cuba also comes up against the Western narrative of the U.S. as that which takes in the refugees of Cuba. The U.S. imagination of the refugee in the mid to late 20th century in relation to Cuba is marked by the shift from "freedom fighters" fleeing communism in the 1960s where refugees were often middle-class professionals, racialized as white, and relatively welcome by the U.S. government to the 1980s with the Muriel boat crisis and the incoming of black Cubans who were now fleeing social and economic crisis in Cuba largely driven by the U.S. blockade. In both ways, Cuba itself was racialized as a 'dark' nation and as such, while wanted or not wanted, the refugees were always figured as needing American aid.[115] The case of Assata Shakur and other political asylum seekers looking for refuge in Cuba turns this narrative on its head. But the fact that her asylum *is* indeed critiquing the American state is actually not of importance to her construction as terrorist here as these claims go unheard as divergent noise amongst the chorus of citizens and government agencies calling for her head. While these calls name her terrorist, both domestic and most wanted, they also stake out the borders that obstruct her path and produce the nation-state. The nation-state hinges here on both its power over its dissenters as well as the racialization of its borders. While a post-9/11 consciousness would have us believe that the terrorist remains the sole provenance of

the racialized Muslim or Arab, Assata Shakur clarifies the necessary constitution of the excessively raced and gendered black woman to the production of a national security essential to the formation and organization of the West. This formation and organization makes compulsory her excessive punishment at the hand of the state that requires her presence in the U.S. for incarceration but also her existence outside of its borders in order to shore them up. Not only the borders that geographically mark the country, but the borders that geographically mark the color line that cannot be crossed.

Her vagrancy is made plain once again. Displaced and without a home, she is forced to wander, which only reiterates her criminality. But this criminalization at the hands of the state, as it did before, does not only place a target on her back. These carceral geographies overdetermine both Shakur and everyone for which she becomes a proxy. This is pronounced through the billboards that are raised in New Jersey, hundreds and hundreds of miles from the Cuban coast. The large 'WANTED' in white script on a red background, plastered with her image in black and white alongside the words 'TERRORIST JOANNE CHESIMARD A/K/A ASSATA SHAKUR, MURDER OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER' with the phone number of the FBI listed at the bottom, the billboards are loud and governmental. The use of the 'AKA' gestures toward her name as if it were a criminal alias, which seems both redundant and excessive given that the label terrorist sits above it in a large and capitalized typeface. These billboards work to announce a political and social agenda, which reflect and shape the public's perception of Shakur's criminality and link it to the intersection of her race, gender, and sexuality. They become literal signposts of black female depravity that underpin a larger cultural narrative that shames and warns those who may take up causes and practices of black dissent. For James, the accusation of 'cop killer' today

functions in the same way that the charge of rape did during the era of the lynch mob, that "irrespective of evidence or facts, mobilizes intense, punitive sentiment and racial rage that supports police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct in order to achieve swift and deadly retribution."[116] Rendered a 'cop killer,' Shakur violently crosses the liberal boundaries that place political change within the hands of the state and the bounds of the law, which then is offered to justification for the "severe punitive sanctions against anyone who offers her refuge."[117] Shakur is both a "political embarrassment" for the U.S. police state and a "political inspiration for radicals and revolutionaries" which makes her particularly dangerous for white nationalist authority.[118] In turn, the U.S. government presents a narrative of her crimes that erases white culpability while subverting black transgressions of white supremacy that are then replaced by the reinscription of myths of black female immorality. Shakur herself discusses this fabricated public image while she is still incarcerated in the United States, sarcastically amused by the surprise of many inmates upon their first meeting that she is not "bigger, blacker, and uglier" or not "six feet tall, two hundred pounds, and very dark and wild looking," the conflation of a dark complexion and criminality or danger not lost on her.[119] This conjuring of JoAnne Chesimard has also circulated now that she is in exile, most recently seen in the news coverage of her addition to the Most Wanted Terrorist list, which cover her criminal status and the charges she was convicted for. In these stories, journalists (both from conservative and liberal media) while not always portraying Shakur in an unseemly way always attempted to hinge on the public's social and civic morality—that people must be held accountable for their crimes—as well as enunciate a confidence in the proper protocols of the criminal justice system.

By placing these billboards within U.S. national borders, and within the inner-city of New Jersey especially, the signage functions as a mapping of the non-home of black people, physical signals that mark black vagrancy as both extant and exacting policing. If home denotes belonging, then the crux of blackness as a social relationality is the absence of home, a position of displacement and dispossession, and born of practices of containment and alienation. The non-home or absence of a formal safe haven formed by national belonging is constitutive to black people's position as outside the socius while remaining on its lands, demarcating a paradoxical existence as both resident insider and socio-political outsider. Assata Shakur and the billboards demonstrate this tension of home for black populations, how home is both an object of desire and a mechanism of violence, how home is both a place for dwelling and a dwelling where one is always out of place. The prison, exile, and the Western nation state are sites of home that are not only meant to house black populations, that is, to sequester, but are spatial practices that constitute as much as they maintain black life as alienated, gratuitously policed, and transient. As such, Shakur's escape to Cuba and current carceral exile must also be understood as part of the entanglement of carcerality and mobility, as part of black criminalization's expression via forced transience.

Furthermore, in naming the emergent critique that is escapism the act of a terrorist, the billboards evacuate escapism of political meaning through and by the conceptual acuity of the West's liberal lexicon. It renders the fraught conditions of black life unvisible, that is, to name Shakur a 'terrorist' is to constitutively foreclose the terror wrought by the West on black life. The billboards, flyers, and calls to action by federal forces mark out the continued and extended non-home of black populations even after their physical leap from prison. They also illustrate how the

popular consumption of political action, the consumption of escapist possibilities, is shaped by and shapes the assumption of the proper dwelling of politics. The billboards are the "state [moving] in to impose or solicit a script" on black movement to mark it *known* as dangerous and criminal.[120] In this, the billboards simultaneously signpost the borders of the Western liberal political tradition. In a 2014 statement, FBI special agent Barbara Woodruff did not shy away from the fact that Assata Shakur's addition to the Most Wanted Terrorist List was not because she posed a bigger threat than before when she held the designation of domestic terrorist, but concerned a desire to bring national attention to the case that had supposedly faded from national memory after forty years. That this, the desire to bring the "public's attention to the case" was meant to mitigate accusations that this was an extreme response illustrates both the quotidian nature of extremity for black populations as well as the colonial-racial necessity of marking out the territory. U.S. governmental authorities effectively mark out black populations from national belonging and disavow their radical political presence. In so doing, the billboards also name the threat of Assata Shakur's black anarchist practice as one that undermines the colonial-racial order as a carceral geography and simultaneously undermines the socio-spatial location—that is, the home—of politics. As Davis argues, repression does not punish the crime or even specifically threaten particular acts, but was "intended to terrorize" the movement "in general," to police black abolitionist politics.[121] The billboards are just one part of a continuum of white repression of black liberation, coming after COINTELPRO and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover named the Black Panther Party the greatest threat to U.S. security and only a few years before the Black Lives Matter movement would be labeled a "black identity extremist" group by a leaked report from the FBI's counter-terrorism division. Contemporary black politics, especially those that have not

necessarily abided by the non-violence mantra once heralded by the Civil Rights Movement or which directly question and oppose the very foundations of whiteness to state authority, has long been criminalized through the rhetoric of terrorism.

The missing chapter of course operates beneath the vantage point of these billboards. It operates in direct contention with these billboards that aim to know and formulate knowledge, that which aim to see and make meaning of black dissent. These are meanings that are antagonistic to the meaning of black politics—the challenge to racial inflections of governance and the disruption of the requirements and relationships drawn by a colonial-racial terms of order—but also antagonistic to the constitutive exertion of racial chaos in violation of the centralized authority of whiteness as the sole purveyor of meaning. The missing, silent, secret chapter itself is an abolitionist practice, a discursive manifestation of the abolitionism of Shakur's deed when she 'breaks out.' Breaking out, the escapism is both in her initial deed of escape and in her non-enunciation of that escape present in her self-authored text. The chapter is the interstice—the missing word—that exists between the U.S. and Cuba, that signifies the in-between of carceral exile and what freedom is to come, and locates the intersection of silence and secret. It is absent and absented. It is excess and nothingness. It is no state and no alternative. It is the interruption of meaning making, of the Western order of things. It is a doing. It is an intervention within Black Politics as it has come to be conventionally understood—state-centered, electoral, rights-based, tangible, structured, and appropriately representative. It is an interruption of the criminalization of black people and black politics, a refusal of what is here and an anticipation of what may come.

Conclusion
Black Anarchism Forward

> *We don't need anybody to agree with our tactics, right? We're disrupting business as usual. That is the whole idea. We're not going to stand in a corner and protest, because nobody pays attention to that. You are going to know that business as usual in America and the world is not going to continue.*
>
> —Miski Noor, Black Lives Matter Minneapolis[1]

To jump the slave ship often meant immediately seizing an unexpected opportunity, navigating through the regulative space of the boat, and laying down a new cartography by slipping through the latticework of the 'house' and finding a way past the netting. Once on the side of the slave ship, the jump was a seemingly insurmountable task. It was an escape that guaranteed nothing other than no longer being bound by the ship, pushing off the wooden structure and taking flight into a seemingly boundless ocean. The jump aroused a chaos aboard the ship as crewmen quickly struggled to reacquire the human cargo and reassert their containment, and elicited descriptions in the logs of captains and ship surgeons that attributed the behavior to madness. Linking the act to insanity was the only way of making sense of such a disarranging escape so as to maintain the discursive coherence of the existing world, but at the same time, this recourse to madness casts light on the threat of the jump to the existing colonial-racial order of the ship.

In the preceding chapters I have attempted to demonstrate how a substantive theoretical attention to the slaves' jumps from the slave ship generate possibilities for thinking about black radical politics differently. I have argued that the form of refusal enacted in the slave jumping from the slave ship contains an anatomy of black anarchism that can be seen in other areas of challenge or interruption to colonial-racial regimes regulating the location and mobility of black populations. Each of these sites exhibit a jump beyond the boundaries for where black people can and cannot

be and the ways they can and cannot live. They are methods of living beyond the "petrified zone," those immobilized spaces regulated by the colonial-racial authority.[2] These three cases are three different iterations of the jump from the slave ship—black mobility within, against, and beyond the regulating force of Western spatiality. They, like the enslaved jumping from the slave ship, enact radical lines of flight that disarrange the boundaries of regulation, but often, if not always, precipitate a depoliticizing response. They are moments of rupture that are subsequently obscured, illegible as world-questioning politics because our conventional political orientations operate within the horizons of this world. That is, our conventional political orientations which adhere to state formations and liberal progression are not intended to question worlds. As such, they can make no sense of those practices that question or, for that matter, the questions these practices pose.

Each chapter has focused on elaborating a separate tenet of a black anarchist orientation that has emerged as a consequence of coming to the study of black anarchism through the slave jumping the slave ship. The Anarchist tradition has often framed itself as an opposition to authority, as a politics of refusal, but the slaves jumps from the slave ship have provided an outline of just what that politics looks like and what it entails. The slaves' jumps from the slave ship disclose a mobilization of total refusal of colonial-racial authority, threatening its sedentarizing assemblages. Through death, mobility, destruction, and escape, the jump communicates criticisms of the existing anti-black world. In its other forms, the jumps elaborate the collective, cataclysm, and abolition. The collective emerges in black mobility as the critique of white nationalism that inheres within the project of the West; cataclysm erupts as a destructive questioning of the carcerality that works to condition everyday black life; and abolition surfaces in the escapism of

the formal carceral system that conjures the criminalization of both black people and black politics. The salience of black anarchist orientations is evident in the connectedness of these three modalities.

The other major thrust of this project has been to reconceptualize carceral geographies as productive of the colonial-racial order. To do so, I have presented a different origin story of our carceral state. Each chapter has aimed to illustrate the slave ship's legacy of black confinement, illustrating how its principles have been reinscribed in various institutional forms so as to extend the state of capture. In so doing, I have argued that contemporary spatialities of anti-black discipline, of which mass incarceration is just one, are better understood when we begin with the slave ship rather than colorblind conceptions of the convict ship or the panopticon. The purpose has been to illustrate the ways that both detention and mobility are twinned necessities in the racial regimes of the modern era as well as demonstrate how processes of confinement constitute racial and gendered hierarchies. This project thus takes part in a larger conversation of definitions of race. Rather than deploy an ideological social constructionist understanding of race, this project supplements conceptualizations of race that are rooted in colonial-racial practice by asserting that many of the practices that construct race can be understood spatially.

Furthermore, by arguing for a conceptualization of black anarchism as a spatial praxis of anti-authoritarianism and an interruption of the reproduction of white hegemonic structures, I have aimed to expand the purview of the black radical tradition by bringing theoretical attention to a unique framework of political practice revolving around acts of total refusal. This has dovetailed with a demonstration of how and why these black anarchistic practices are precariously located in our political imaginaries, which is historically structured by Western liberal traditions. Often

deemed nonpolitical or unproductive, the misrepresentation of these practices is rooted in both the overreliance on state-centered and electoral politics as well as the raced and gendered conceptions of the polity and its practices. By laying this precarity bare, I have intended to bring more theoretical insight to the relationship between black politics and the state through the lens of black spatial refusals. In emphasizing the constitutive relationships among black confinement, white nation building, and the state's political imagination, I have argued that state spaces are not neutral and not all political practices are visible. Rather, Western spatialities establish excessively raced and gendered bodies and Western politics repress the antagonisms and referents of black anarchist practices. This joint work of the Western state is elemental to the reproduction of white sovereignty, detailing the inextricable link of white place-making to global processes of race-making. Furthermore, in tracing a genealogy of black anarchism, I have shown that while localized, exertions of spatial disruption work to institute new social relations and ways of being that exist both against the state's violent hailing of racial and gender categories and Western norms of political participation.

In taking a geographical approach, I also demonstrated how this gendered racialization of carceral space meant that differentially disciplined black people disrupted the spatial expressions of white sovereignty differently. Yet, to begin with black women has not been to simply follow the archive of the slave ship, but has emerged from the intent to illustrate how different socio-spatial positions provided different cartographies of black liberationist politics and punctuate how these different cartographies lead us to different topographies of practice and to different places. To begin with black women on slave ships, to follow their jumps, has lead us to oceans rather than lands. They have made space to return to the ocean for a new perspective that turns its back on the

search for land or that place where ocean meets land, the horizon. To turn their back on land is to turn their back on property, the defining characteristic of the Enlightenment subject, the liberal subject, the white subject. It is thus to turn their back on those political orientations and schools of thought that begin with and for these subjects in mind. To turn their back on the horizon is to reject both their means and ends. To return to the ocean is to reflect what Christina Sharpe has called living "in the wake"[3] where instead of proposing solutions that imagine a closure of the gaping hole created by slavery and ever-expanding carceral geographies based in rights-based claims and state-sponsored transformations, the jump from the slave ship signifies both a floating in and creation of that "interval between the no longer and not yet."[4] Within that created interval is a rejection of the horizon set forth by a Western liberal or even Western Anarchist tradition—that which is "not [yet] an alternative but a negation"—embodied in black anarchist practices of anticipation.[5]

Such a reorientation means a new orientation towards the relationship of black politics to futurity itself. Black anarchism future then refers to not only how black anarchism functions as a force towards alternative futures, but also, a concern with how the jumps from the slave ship get taken forward. The words of Black Lives Matter activist Miski Noor indicate a black anarchist orientation, one that hinges on not only a disruption of the everydayness of anti-blackness—both its frequency and its common sense—but also to disrupt through a *direct* confrontation ("you are going to *know*") with the colonial-racial system of anti-black oppression. In its elaboration, it also turns its back on the world's appraisal of what politics is supposed to look like. Noor charges that the interruption of anti-blackness and the interruption of politics as it exists go hand-in-hand. Future research may do well to bring theoretical attention to the kinds of black anarchist questions

that the Black Lives Matter movement pose to the world. Looking to contemporary movements such as these encourages further elaboration of black anarchist orientations, especially in terms of how they connect with and come up against black politics that resonate with a black queer opposition to both racist and heteropatriarchal logics of exclusion. Turning to how they work to interrupt our political horizons as movements that cohere around the politics of the demand may provide interesting intersections and divergences with the black anarchist orientation that emerges from the slaves jumps from the slave ship.

In the case of this dissertation, by placing my emphasis on the jump, the anticipatory deed rather than the demand, is not to disavow demands, but it is to claim in Trouillot's words, that what is demanded by the deed may indeed be "too radical to be formulated in advance."[6] With this impossibility in mind, the black anarchism I reconceptualize here and which begins with the jump of the enslaved black woman is an appeal to the self-activated, collective, cataclysmic, and abolitionist invocation of the black liberated zone that does not yet claim what that zone will mean.

Notes

Notes for Introduction

[1] Mellville [1851] 1992, 468
[2] Melville [1851] 1992
[3] James 1953; Freeburg 2012; Pease 2012; Frank 2014
[4] Spivak 1988, 275
[5] Heimert, Alan, 1963. "*Moby-Dick* and American Political Symbolism," *American Quarterly*. 15: 498-534
[6] S. Newman 2000
[7] James 1953
[8] S. Newman 2010, 45
[9] S. Newman 2010, 47
[10] Proudhon 1923, 294
[11] Cicariello-Maher 2011
[12] Black Rose Anarchist Federation, "Introduction," *Black Anarchism: A Reader by Black Rose Anarchist Federation,* 2016: 1
[13] Newman 2000, 19
[14] Tiqqun 2010, 216
[15] Iton 2008, 17
[16] Iton 2008, 16
[17] Iton 2008, 290
[18] Goldman [1910] 1969, 63
[19] Alston 2004, 8
[20] Iton 2008, 289
[21] Iton 2008, 17
[22] Ervin 1993; Alston 2004
[23] The *Leusden* was a slave ship of the Dutch West India Company that after becoming caught in a terrible storm in 1738, locked the African slaves in the hold and let the ship run aground for fear that the enslaved would attempt to use the lifeboats. Over 650 enslaved Africans died by drowning or suffocation while the crew escaped. The 1781 *Zong* massacre is the second largest killing of slaves during the Atlantic slave trade wherein 132 enslaved Africans were thrown from the British-owned ship in the hopes of claiming insurance money.
[24] Alston 2004, 8
[25] Thrift 2007, 22

Notes for Chapter 1

[1] A Journal of the Life, Gospel Labours and Christian Experiences, of that Faithful Minister of Jesus Christ, John Woolman
[2] William James [1911] 1999, 230

[3] Goldman [1910] 1969
[4] Evren 2012, 301
[5] Clough and Blumberg 2012, 338
[6] See Jared Sextion "Ante-Anti-Blackness: Afterthoughts" *Lateral*, 2012
[7] Robinson [1980] 2016, 212
[8] Gilman-Olpasky 2016
[9] Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969: 25
[10] Log of slave ship Lawrance
[11] Mustakeem 2016, 107
[12] Katy Ryan, "Revolutionary Suicide in Toni Morrison's Fiction" *African American Review.* 34 (3), 2000; Antonio T. Bly "Crossing the Lake of Fire: Slave Resistance during the Middle Passage, 1720-1842, *The Journal of Negro History*, 83 (3), 1998; Lynn R. Johnson "Contesting the Myth of National Compassion: The Leap from the Long Bridge into Trans-Atlantic History in *Clotel* or the *President's Daughter* (1853)" *Journal of Pan African Studies*, 6 (8), 2014
[13] Richard Bell "Slave Suicide, Abolition and the Problem of Resistance" 2012, 526
[14] Browne 2015, 48
[15] Errico Malatesta 2005, 4
[16] Emma Goldman 67
[17] Bly 1988; Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New York, 1943)
[18] Taylor 2006, 12
[19] Iton 2008, 16
[20] Fanon 1963*,* 2
[21] Saidiya Hartman "Venus in Two Acts," *Small Axe* 12 (2), 2008: 2
[22] Hartman 1997 55
[23] Ibid. 56
[24] Gilman-Olpasky 2016
[25] James Oldham "Insurance Litigation Involving the *Zong* and Other British Slave Ships, 1780-1807," *Journal of Legal History*, 28.3, December 2007: 300.
[26] Michael Lobban "Slavery, Insurance and the Law," *The Journal of Legal History,* 28.3, December 2007: 325
[27] James Walvin, *The Zong: A Massacre, the Law, and the End of Slavery*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011: 27; Stephanie Smallwood. *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007: 72.
[28] Walvin 2011, 1
[29] The legal hearings later accepted a figure of 122 murdered, along with the ten who had jumped to their death (Walvin 98)
[30] Walvin 2011: 101
[31] Ibid 138, 147
[32] Transcript commissioned by Granville Sharpe. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: Documents Relating to the Ship Zong, 1783, REC/19. Hereafter referred to as Sharpe Transcript 1783
[33] Ibid 144.
[34] Sharpe Transcript 1783, 52.
[35] Walvin 2011, 146.

[36] Rupprecht 2007, 12
[37] Lobban 2007, 327
[38] Ibid.
[39] See Michael Gomez *Exchanging Our Country Marks*, Marcus Rediker *The Slave Ship: A Human History*, Eric Robert Taylor *If We Must Die: Shipboard Insurrections in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade*
[40] See Eugene Genovese *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* and John Blassingame *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South*
[41] Kotef 2015, 3
[42] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. Ed. J. P. Mayer. Trans. George Lawrence. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2006: 318
[43] Frank Wilderson III, "The Black Liberation Army and the Paradox of Political Engagement," *Postcoloniality-Decoloniality-Black Critique: Joints and Fissures*. Frankfurt, Germany: The Deutsche Nationalbibliotek, 2014: 183.
[44] Hartman 1997
[45] Rediker 39; William Bosman, *A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea.* London, 1705: 282.
[46] Hartman 1997, 9
[47] Tocqueville [1851] 2006, 318
[48] Hartman 1997, 13
[49] Sharpe 2010, 50
[50] Sharpe 2010, 59
[51] Georges Bataille, *The Absence of Myth: Writings on Surrealism*. Ed. and Trans. Michael Richardson. London, UK: Verso, 2006: 56
[52] Parsons [1905] 2016, 3
[53] Ahmed 2006, 14-15
[54] Ahmed 2006, 7
[55] Ahmed 2006, 15
[56] Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993: 4.
[57] Rediker 2007, 10, 43
[58] I am referring to 'the West' under the terms of Édouard Glissant where the West is a project rather than a geographic location. See Édouard Glissant, *Caribbean Discourse,* Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1999: 2, footnote 1.
[59] Steinberg 2011, 273
[60] Steinberg 2011, 272; Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. New York, NY: Verso, 1990.
[61] Laclau 1990, 92; Oliver Marchart, *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou, and Laclau.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007: 136. Laclau defines the "impossibility of society" or the "problem of the social totality" as such: "the 'totality' does not establish the limits of 'the social' by transforming the latter into a determinate object (i.e. 'society'). Rather, the social always exceeds the limits of the attempts to constitute society. At the same time, however, that 'totality' does not disappear: if the suture it attempts is ultimately impossible, it is nevertheless possible to proceed to a relative fixation of the social

through the institution of nodal points" (91).
[62] Certeau 1984, xix
[63] Lefebvre 1991, 26-27; McKittrick 2006, xvii
[64] Leopold Lambert, "The Slave Ship: An Operative Architecture Responsible for the Abysmal Atlantic Crossing," *The Funambulist*, 8 January 2016
[65] Olaudah Equiano, *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, Or Gustavus Vassa, The African,* New York, NY: Modern Library Classics, 2004.
[66] Alexander Falconbridge, *Account of the Slave Trade on the Coast of Africa*. 1788
[67] Rediker 2007
[68] George Francis Dow. *Slave Ships and Slaving.* Marine Research Society Press. 2007: xxix, 236
[69] Rediker 2007
[70] Katherine McKittrick and Clyde Woods, *Black Geographies and the Politics of Space*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2007: 4.
[71] Lefebvre 2009, 224
[72] Lefebvre 2009, 235
[73] McKittrick 2006, 6-7
[74] Smallwood 2007, 73
[75] Camp 2004, 12
[76] Rediker 2007, 70
[77] Smallwood 2007, 73; Rediker 2007, 70; Dow 1927, 133
[78] Dow 1927, 134
[79] Rediker 2007, 169
[80] Smallwood 2007, 73
[81] Lambert, 8 March 2013
[82] Smith and Katz 1993, 69
[83] Steinberg 2011, 272-3
[84] Hagar Kotef, *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances of Mobility*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015: 3
[85] Kotef 2015, 1
[86] Kotef 2015, 3
[87] Thalin Zarmanian, "*Ordnung* and *Ortung*/order and localisation," *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos.* Ed. Stephen Legg, New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2011: 292.
[88] Kotef 2015, 6
[89] Kotef 2015, 101, 9
[90] Kotef 2015, 1, 4
[91] Kotef 2015, 107, emphasis mine
[92] Mario Gooden, *Dark Space: Architecture, Representation, Black Identity*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016.
[93] Steinberg 2011, 273
[94] See Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift, *Thinking Space*. London, UK: Routledge, 2000; Doreen Massey, "Politics and Space/Time," *Place and Politics of Identity.* Eds. Michael Keith and Steve Pile, London, UK: Cohen and West, 1993; Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies.* London, UK:

Verso, 1989; Benno Werlen, *Society, Action and Space: An Alternative Human Geography*. Trans. Gayla Walls. London, UK: Routledge, 1998.
[95] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984: 98
[96] Ibid. 96
[97] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space.* Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
Blackwell, 1991: 26, 27;
[98] Henri Lefebvre, *State, Space, World*. Eds. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009: 240
[99] Lefebvre 1991, 28
[100] Certeau 1984, 117
[101] Andrew Jonas and Aidan While, "Governance," *Cultural Geography.* Ed. David Atkinson. New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2007: 72.
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[111] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*. Trans. J.B. Robinson. London, 1923: 294.
[112] Seán Sheehan, *Anarchism*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004: 54.
[113] Higgonet 2000, 229; emphasis mine
[114] Ibid.
[115] Tiqqun, *This is Not a Program* Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2011: 55
[116] Goldman 63
[117] Tiqqun. *Introduction to Civil War*. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2010: 171; James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.

[118] Tiqqun 2010, p. 216
[119] Ibid 207; Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space.* Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley-Blackwell, 1991: 59
[120] Lucy Parsons, "The Principles of Anarchism," *Black Anarchism: A Reader by Black Rose Anarchist Federation,* 2016: 3
[121] Iton 2008, 16; Alston 2004, 8
[122] Iton 16
[123] This concept is borrowed from Saidiya Hartman's conceptualization of the relationship between gender and the slave where she argues "The en-gendering of race, as it is refracted through Cobb's scale of subjective value, entails the denial of sexual violation as a form of injury while asserting the prevalence of sexual violence due to the rapacity of the Negro" (1997, 96).
[124] Bell 2012, 534
[125] Margaret Higgonet, "Frames of Female Suicide" 2000: 232.
[126] Rashad Shabazz, *Spatializing Blackness: Architectures of Confinement and Black Masculinity in Chicago*, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015.
[127] Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest.* New York: Routledge, 1995: 5.
[128] Spillers 2003, 215
[129] Simone Browne, *Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015: 47
[130] Leopold Lambert, "The Politics of Overpopulated Space," *The Funambulist*, 12 February 2015
[131] Hartman 1997, 101
[132] Spillers 2003, 215
[133] McKittrick 2006, xviii
[134] Camp 2004, 28
[135] Rediker 2007, 243
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[137] Thomas Cobb, *Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery* (Philadelphia, 1858): 90.
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[139] Hartman 1997, 96
[140] Hartman 1997, 99-100
[141] Hartman 1997, 100-101
[142] Browne 2015, 68
[143] Hartman 1997, 8
[144] Hartman 1997, 109
[145] Ibid 110
[146] Iton 2008, 17

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[2] Ibid 3
[3] Ibid.
[4] Field and Coletu 2014, 109
[5] Howison 2005, 46-47
[6] Stephens 2005, 111
[7] Bandele 2010: 748-9
[8] Howison 2005, 30
[9] Bandele 2010
[10] Stein 1986: 93
[11] Carnegie 1999, 61
[12] Mulzac 1963: 79
[13] Cronon 1969; Hill 1983
[14] Howison 2005
[15] Howison 2005: 34, 35
[16] Hill 1983, 91
[17] Carnegie 1999: 67
[18] Carnegie 1999: 68
[19] Carnegie 1999: 67
[20] Howison 2005: 31
[21] Garvey 1924
[22] Garvey 1924
[23] Garvey 1927
[24] Clarke 1974, 17
[25] Carnegie 1999, 52-53
[26] Carnegie 1999, 60
[27] Carnegie 1999, 61
[28] Howison 2005, 33-35
[29] Howison 2005, 41
[30] Howison 2005, 43
[31] Howison 2005, 46
[32] Carnegie 1999, 63
[33] Carnegie 1999, 63
[34] Stephens 2005, 110
[35] Stephens 2005, 82
[36] Brown 301; Bolster 182; Stephens 2005, 104
[37] Bolster 75
[38] Sale 1997, 6
[39] Linebaugh and Rediker 2000, 167
[40] After the Civil War, Black Codes were laws that were employed in the Southern states meant to limit the freedom of black people after slavery was formally abolished. The first Codes were instituted in 1865 in Mississippi and South Carolina and included the requirement of written evidence of employment as well as limitations on activity and movement. If Black Codes were transgressed, black people could be punished with arrests, beatings, and forced or unpaid labor.
[41] Lake and Reynolds

[42] Marx 1996, 182
[43] Marx 1996, 190
[44] Marx 1996, 191
[45] Singh 2004, 23
[46] DuBois "The Souls of White Folk" 339
[47] Lake and Reynolds 3
[48] Lake and Reynolds 4-5
[49] Lake and Reynolds 7
[50] Bryce 1891, 652
[51] Lake and Reynolds 57
[52] Lake and Reynolds 6
[53] Lake and Reynolds 63
[54] The Bureau of Investigation, later named the United States Bureau of Investigation, was the predecessor of today's Federal Bureau of Investigation.
[55] Hill 1983, 72
[56] Lake and Reynolds 72
[57] Hesse 2017, 582
[58] Hesse 2017, 583
[59] Ibid.
[60] Hesse 2017, 585
[61] Hesse 2017, 586
[62] Ibid.
[63] Yellin 114, 2
[64] Yellin 3, 7
[65] Yellin 6
[66] Saxton 387
[67] Sharpe 2016, 86
[68] Hesse 2017, 590
[69] Saxton 3
[70] Saxton 5
[71] Singh 2004
[72] Singh 2004, 22
[73] Park 1939
[74] Cox 1959
[75] Ervin 1993, 14
[76] Hughes 1940
[77] Ervin 1993, 14
[78] Singh 2004, 20
[79] Stephens 125
[80] McKittrick x
[81] McKittrick xiii
[82] Bandele 2008
[83] Edwards 2003, 11
[84] Iton 2008, 202

[85] Graeber 2002, 65
[86] Newman 2010, 261
[87] Ibid.
[88] Cervenak 5
[89] Cervenak 6
[90] Cervenak 6
[91] Edwards 2001, 56-7
[92] Stephens 2005, 113
[93] Iton 28
[94] Glissant 1999, 2
[95] Iton 2008, 202
[96] Iton 2008, 199
[97] Hesse 646
[98] Hesse 652
[99] Da Silva xxiv
[100] Iton 2008, 201
[101] Iton 203
[102] Iton 256-7
[103] Edwards 2001 57
[104] Iton 2008, 257
[105] Iton 2008, 200
[106] Iton 2008, 196
[107] Edwards 2001, 52
[108] Carnegie 1999, 61
[109] Iton 200
[110] Alston
[111] Iton 347n9
[112] Heynen and Rhodes 2012, 396
[113] Heynen 2010, 1231-2
[114] Heynen and Rhodes 2012, 409
[115] Ervin 1993, 8, 12
[116] Carnegie 1999, 54
[117] Stephens 2005, 112
[118] Linebaugh and Rediker 144
[119] Brathwaite
[120] Linebaugh and Rediker 150
[121] Linebaugh and Rediker 156
[122] Linebaugh and Rediker 172
[123] Alston 2002
[124] Ervin 1993, 40
[125] 1993, 40-41
[126] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 24
[127] Ervin 1993, 40
[128] Sorel, Reflections, 32-33

[129] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 29
[130] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 28
[131] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 29
[132] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 40
[133] Carnegie 1999, 69
[134] Stephens 2005, 115
[135] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 20
[136] Olson 2009, 37
[137] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 21-22
[138] Ervin 1993, 14
[139] Ciccariello-Maher 2011, 40

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[1] George Jackson, *Blood in My Eye,* Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press, 1971: 7.
[2] Proudhon *"The Authority Principle," 70*
[3] George H. W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Civil Disturbances in Los Angeles, California" 1 May 1992.
[4] Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power*. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1965: 11.
[5] Vargas 2010, 48
[6] Vargas 2010, 49
[7] João H. Costa Vargas, *Never Meant to Survive: Genocide and Utopias in Black Diaspora Communities*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010: 45
[8] Vargas 2010, 46
[9] Gerald Horne 1995, 26
[10] Ibid 27
[11] Clark 1965
[12] Abu-Lughod 2007
[13] Duck 2015; Lipsitz 2011
[14] Knoblauch 347
[15] Knoblauch 339
[16] Elffers and Reynald 2009; Low 1997; Clarke 2005; Knoblauch 2014
[17] The ideology of a 'law and order' society developed most prominently during the 1960s with conservatives like Richard Nixon and George Wallace (and later Ronald Reagan) drawing a direct correlation between the policing of crime and the increasing of order, developing directly out of reports of increased urban street crime and the prevalence of racial unrest figured as 'rioting'. The point was to emphasize the necessity of law and policing for the maintenance of a properly functioning social order. See Dan T. Carter *The Politics of Rage* and Michael Kazin *The Populist Persuasion: An American History.*
[18] Shabazz 2015, 64
[19] Ibid. 66
[20] Clarke 2005, 49

[21] Low 1997, 53
[22] This concept is derived from two musical references, Aswad's "Concrete Slaveship" (1976) and Ice Cube's "The N***a Trap" (2006)
[23] Ice Cube "The N***a Trap" (2006)
[24] Oscar Newman, *Creating Defensible Space*, Prepared for Department of Housing and Urban Development - Office of Policy Development and Research, Washington, DC, 1996: 17.
[25] Brill Associates, "Comprehensive Security Planning: A Program for William Nickerson Jr. Gardens, Los Angeles, CA," (Nickerson Gardens 1977), Prepared for Department of Housing and Urban Development - Office of Policy Development and Research, Washington, DC, 1977: ii.
[26] Nickerson Gardens 1977, 67
[27] Nickerson Gardens 1977, 64
[28] Nickerson Gardens 1977, ix
[29] Ibid
[30] O. Newman 1996, 12; Simone Browne, *Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015.
[31] Shabazz 2015, 70
[32] Ibid.
[33] Low 1997
[34] O. Newman 1996 51
[35] Clarke 2005, 49
[36] Clarke 2005, 49
[37] Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, quoted in David Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 293.
[38] Nickerson Gardens 1977, i
[39] Knoblauch 2014, 343
[40] Knoblauch 2014, 344
[41] While often used interchangeably or as extensions of one another, such as in the assertion that security is the process by which safety is ensured, the difference between safety and security can be defined as the difference between the absence of harm and the prohibition of threat/danger. In the assertion that security leads to safety is the implication that safety comes as a result of prohibitions, in particular those that increase distance from subjective dangers or community heterogeneity, which in this case means racial others.
[42] Newman 1996, 12
[43] Rashad Shabazz, *Spatializing Blackness: Architectures of Confinement and Black Masculinity in Chicago*, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015: 66
[44] Clarke 2005, 49
[45] Davis 2016, 214
[46] Davis 2016, 215
[47] Janet Abu-Lughod, *Race, Space, and Riots in Chicago, New York and Los Angeles*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
[48] Otto Kerner et al. *Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,* 1968
[49] Abu-Lughod 2007

[50] Gerald Horne, *Fire this Time: Watts Uprising and the 1960s*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virgina Press, 1995: 3.
[51] Vargas 2010, 56
[52] Gilman-Olpasky 2016
[53] Gilman-Olpasky 2016
[54] Emma Goldman *Anarchism and Other Essays.* New York, NY: Dover Press, 1969: 65, 63.
[55] Malatesta 2005, 4
[56] Goldman 63
[57] Malatesta
[58] Gilman-Olpasky
[59] Deleuze and Guattari 2007
[60] Balagoon, 2016, 75
[61] Alston 2004, 8
[62] Gilman-Olpasky 2016
[63] Truong
[64] Ray 130
[65] Ray 132
[66] Johann Kaspar 2009, "We Demand Nothing"
[67] Brown Papers
[68] Ibid.
[69] Jackson 1990, 6
[70] Kaspar 2009
[71] Gilman-Olpasky 2016
[72] Gilman-Olpasky 2016
[73] Ibid.
[74] Hall et al. 29
[75] Horne 1995, 3
[76] Horne 1995, 73
[77] Horne 1995, 75
[78] Davis 2016, 215
[79] Johnson 170
[80] *The Los Angeles Times* "The View From Watts Is Very Worth Taking" Nick B. Williams
[81] Ibid.
[82] *The Los Angeles Times, Understanding the Riots: Los Angeles Before and After the Rodney King Case* (Los Angeles, 1992): 150.
[83] Stuart Hall and Chas Critcher and Tony Jefferson and John Clarke and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978).
[84] "Racial victimization: an experiential analysis" Dhanwant K. Rai and Barnor Hesse *Ethnicity and Crime: A Reader* Ed. Basia Spalek Open University Press, England 2008
[85] Sack 1986, 1-2; Cited in Hesse and Rai
[86] Rai and Hesse 2008, 217
[87] Ibid
[88] Ibid 270
[89] Sharpe 2016, See Chapter 3 "The Hold"

[90] Kristian Williams, *Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power in America*, Chico, CA: AK Press, 2015: 20
[91] Hall et al. 68
[92] Williams 2015, 23
[93] Klein and Scheisl, *20th Century Los Angeles* 19, 20 cited in Vargas 2008 (61)
[94] Hall et al. 68
[95] Davis "Beyond Blade Runner: Urban Control The Ecology of Fear"; Donna Murch "The Many Meanings of Watts: Black Power, Wattstax, and the Carceral State"
[96] Johnson 1998, 271
[97] Ibid 260
[98] Hall et al. 29
[99] Hall et al. viii
[100] Cohen [1972] 2002
[101] Hall et al. 29
[102] Cohen xlii-xliii
[103] Cohen xxxvii
[104] Davis 2016, 215
[105] Knoblauch 2014, 345
[106] Mike Davis "Fortress L.A." *The City Reader, Sixth Edition*. Eds Richard T. LeGates and Frederick Stout. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016: 216.

Notes for Chapter 4

[1] Davis 2003, 28
[2] Davis 2003; Rodriguez 2006; Alexander 2010
[3] Foucault [1977] 1995, 199
[4] James 1996, 28
[5] Heiner 2007, 321
[6] Heiner 2007, 343-4
[7] Young 1995
[8] James, J. 1996, 35
[9] Sexton and Lee 2006, 1012
[10] Foucault [1977] 1995, 172
[11] Bentham 1995
[12] Foucault [1977] 1995, 197
[13] Foucault [1977] 1995, 201
[14] Davis 1998, 99
[15] Davis 1998, 99
[16] Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York, NY: The New Press, 2010): 12.
[17] Alexander 195, 12.
[18] Wacquant 2002, 44
[19] Wacquant 2002, 44, 49

[20] Wacquant 2002, 55, 56
[21] Alexander 2010, 14
[22] Davis 2003
[23] Sexton 2007, 198; See Wacquant 2002; Davis 2003; and Rodriguez 2006
[24] Foucault [1977] 1995, 277
[25] Davis 2003, 29
[26] Davis 2003, 49
[27] Davis 2003, 50
[28] Peters and Turner 2015, 849
[29] Peters and Turner 2017
[30] Peters and Turner 2015
[31] Childs, D. 2015, 28
[32] Stanley, Spade, et al. 2012, 122
[33] Jackson 1971; Davis and Rodriguez 2000
[34] Jackson 1971, 99
[35] Childs, D. 2015, 39
[36] Hardt 1997, 65
[37] Thompson 1967
[38] Shakur [1987] 2001, 80
[39] Oxford English Dictionary
[40] Convict leasing was a system of penal labor in the southern United States that was prominent after the Civil War to recruit and control black labor for private means, such as farms, plantations, or other businesses. Leasing out black prison labor was used to replace the labor that was lost in these establishments with the abolition of slavery. See Alex Lichtenstein *Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South* (1996)
[41] Wilderson 2003, 18
[42] Sexton and Lee 2006, 1014
[43] Blair 2010, 90
[44] Gross 2006, 110
[45] Gross 2006, 105
[46] Gross 2006, 115
[47] Law 2009, 10
[48] Blair 2010
[49] Gross 2006, 134
[50] Blair 2010, 96, 105
[51] Gross 2006, 118
[52] Davis 1998, 100
[53] Shakur 87; emphasis mine
[54] The Soledad Brothers consisted of George Jackson, Fleeta Drumgo, and John Clutchette, who were charged with the murder of white prison guard, John Vincent Mills, at Soledad State Prison in Northern California on January 16, 1971 in retaliation for the murder of three black prisoners at the hands of another white prison guard.
[55] Heiner 2007, 319
[56] Ibid

[57] James, J. 2004, 41
[58] Davis [1971] 1998, 43
[59] Davis [1971] 1998, 44
[60] *The COINTELPRO Papers* 1990
[61] James, J. 1999; Heiner 2007, 330
[62] James, J. 1999, 98
[63] James, J. 1999, 100
[64] Davis 2003, 66
[65] Heiner 2007, 31
[66] 'Remembering the Real Dragon—An Interview with George Jackson, May 16 and June 29, 1971'
[67] Davis [1971] 1998, 48
[68] Davis [1971] 1998, 49-50
[69] James, J. 1999, 115
[70] Shakur 2001, 242
[71] James, J. 1999, 115
[72] James, J. 1999 106
[73] Davis [1971] 1998, 42
[74] Davis [1971] 1998, 50
[75] J. James 2004, 44
[76] Heiner 2003, 99
[77] Heiner 2003, 100
[78] Ibid
[79] Davis [1971] 1988, 39
[80] Davis and Rodriguez 2000
[81] Chammah, *The Atlantic* "Stepping Down from Solitary Confinement" Jan. 7, 2016
[82] Mincke and Lemonne 2014
[83] Hancock and Jewkes 2011
[84] Hancock and Jewkes 2011, 617
[85] Hancock and Jewkes 2011, 619
[86] Hancock and Jewkes 2011, 620
[87] Morris and Worrall 1086-7
[88] Gill 2013
[89] Davis and Rodriguez 2000
[90] Oparah 2015, 387
[91] Oparah 2015, 394
[92] Ernst Bloch *The Principle of Hope vol. 1*
[93] Hesse 2014, 308
[94] Hesse 2014, 302
[95] Hesse 2014, 302
[96] Hartman 2008, 3
[97] Hartman 2008, 4
[98] Phelan 1993, 146
[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid 148
[101] Ibid
[102] Childs, G. 2015, 38
[103] Phelan 1993, 148
[104] Hartman 2008, 8
[105] Hartman 2008, 13
[106] Phelan 1993, 148
[107] Best and Hartman 2008, 3
[108] Cervenak 2014, 14
[109] Levinas 2003, 50
[110] Rediker 2013
[111] Shakur 2001, 266
[112] James, J. 1999, 113
[113] James, J. 1996, 100-102
[114] James, J. 1996, 103
[115] Ong 2003, 78-83; James, J. 1996, 84-105
[116] James, J. 1999, 113
[117] Ibid
[118] James, J. 1999, 114
[119] Shakur [1987] 2001, 87
[120] Cervenak 2014, 6
[121] Davis [1971] 1998, 42

Notes for Conclusion

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[2] Fanon 1963
[3] Sharpe 2016
[4] Best and Hartman 2005, 3
[5] Robinson [1980] 2016, 202
[6] Trouillot 1995, 88

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