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Becoming a Normal Democracy: Israeli Public Opinion, Civil-Military Relations, and the Second Lebanon War

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Abstract

During the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Israel's government applied a capital- and firepower-intensive military doctrine poorly suited for its ambitious, and publicly declared, goals. The paper explains this apparently non-strategic behavior with a theory of democratic militarism, arguing that a capitalized military doctrine results in a condition of moral hazard by shifting the costs away from the median voter, leading to support of a capital-intensive doctrine in conflicts where its effectiveness is low because the decreased likelihood of winning is outweighed by the lower costs of fighting. I claim the theory better explains the case than its principal competitors—elite capture of the state and military myopia—by examining Israeli public opinion before the war, and reviewing civil-military deliberation over the war's conduct during its prosecution.

Jonathan Caverley's research examines the distribution of the costs of security within democracies, and its contribution to military aggressiveness. This working paper is part of book manuscript entitled *Death and Taxes: The Political Economy of Democratic Militarism.* He co-chairs the Working Group on Security Studies at the Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies.

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DRAFT. DO NOT CIRCULATE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

What are the consequences for Israel's security of the many changes occurring in its society, its threat spectrum, and its military doctrine? How did these changes contribute to the flawed reconciliation of Israel's strategic ends and means in its fight against Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War of 2006? What can we learn about the democratic way of war from Israel's recent experience?

Although most observers agree that Israel and its military have changed considerably over the past two decades, less agreement exists on the implications. In this paper I argue that much of these changes amount to Israel evolving into a relatively more normal democracy—that is, one that IR theorists would recognize as meeting the criteria for the democratic peace and its related findings—due to reductions in threat levels, increases in liberalism and economic inequality among its citizens, and an increasingly professionalized military. This paper uses the Israel case to disagree with conventional wisdom in International Relations on the foreign policy capability of democracies, a consensus that makes optimistic claims for the security implications of these changes. The paper focuses on the preferences of the average voter (more specifically the voter with median income) to explain many of these changes and the consequences thereof. It presents a theory of military cost distribution suggesting that to reduce the costs of conflict for this relatively less wealthy voter, democratic leaders shift the burden of providing the nation's defense onto the rich by employing capital as a substitute for military labor. Because the costs of fighting unconventional conflicts with firepower are relatively low for the median voter compared to a more effective but labor-intensive approach, she will favor its use despite diminished prospects of victory. This condition of moral hazard makes supporting a capital-intensive military doctrine and ambitious wars of choice rational policies for the median voter.

Cost distribution theory contrasts with two other explanations for faulty grand strategy found in the literature on Israel in particular and democracies in general: capture of the government by elites and an intrinsic, myopic bias inherent to the military. In fact, electoral accountability and civilian supremacy are prerequisites for the type of democratic militarism described in this paper.

This paper will use the case of contemporary Israel to test this theory in two steps. After first stipulating that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are sufficiently capital-intensive to allow for arming and war to have elements of cost redistribution, the first empirical section explores the role that socio-economic status (SES, a proxy for individual income) plays in shaping attitudes towards the use of force, defense spending and territorial concessions. If redistributive potential exists in IDF military doctrine, the less well off in Israeli society will be more prone to view military force as a viable option. In turn this increased willingness to use force should result in more ambitious strategic goals. This analysis will not only test cost distribution theory but will assess the competing claims of military myopia and threat inflation by elites. The second empirical section identifies the Second Lebanon War as a clear example of flawed grand strategy, and uses the conflict as an illustrative case of the effects of this cost distribution process. The paper finds that civilian leaders, more sensitive to public opinion than the IDF, set ambitious war aims and yet were unwilling to employ the military in the labor-intensive manner likely to make attaining them feasible. What is more, the civilians did so with a sound understanding of the tradeoffs involved. This section also undermines explanations for poor grand strategy that rest on an overly-influential, myopic IDF.

1 Democratic Exceptionalism and Flawed Grand Strategy

Grand strategies are political-military, means-ends chains by which a state seeks to provide security for itself.[2] A poor performance in war by a democracy challenges the liberal IR consensus that democracies tend to pursue exceptionally moderate and successful grand strategies, that is choosing appropriate ends to increase their security and appropriate ends to achieve them.[3] Many of this research program's findings rest on the assumption that in democracies the costs of war are internalized; all costs and benefits of a strategic decision are accounted for by the actor responsible for setting policy. Fred Chernoff describes the difference between democracies and other regimes in this regard, "Citizens and subjects-rather than presidents and monarchs-fight in wars, die in wars, and pay taxes to finance wars. In most cases, it is not in the citizen's self-interest for the state to go to war."[4] Conversely, shielding the decision maker from the costs of war can lead to aggressive behavior. The most comprehensive

[2] Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13.

[3]Alexander B. Downes, "How Smart and Tough are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring 2009), pp. 9-51 lays out a general empirical critique of this program.

[4] Fred Chernoff, "The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2004), p. 54. See also Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 121; and Randolph M. Siverson, "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 483. This mechanism is used to explain why democracies: 1) Fight shorter wars--see D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 1998) pp. 344-366; and Branislav L. Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 813-829. 2) Prefer to negotiate—see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003); and Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 296-313. 3) Win the wars they do initiate—see Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, chap. 6; Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*; and Siverson, "Democracies and War Participation." 4) Spend less money on defense in peacetime but devote more to the effort in wartime—see Benjamin O. Fordham and Thomas C. Walker, "Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 141-157; and Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "Defense Effort and Institutional Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory: Why Try Harder?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April-June 2007), pp. 189-222.

statement of this cost internalization mechanism suggests that democratic leaders respond to the voters' cost-benefit calculation by providing public goods, including security and military victory, both efficiently and in abundance.[5]

1.1 Explanations for Flawed Grand Strategy in Democracies

When explaining aggressive or foolish behavior by democracies, liberal IR theory focuses on democratic deficits, the capturing of the state by interest groups who disproportionately gain benefits from a policy while distributing the costs throughout society.[6] This approach updates the classical liberal tenet that the poor have little value for arming and war, which only serve the interests of the rich. Militarism and imperialism are, in John Hobson's words, "Irrational from the standpoint of the whole nation" but "rational enough from the standpoint of certain classes," and thus would be absent in "an intelligent laissez-faire democracy which gave duly proportionate weight in its policy to all economic interests alike."[7] Many self-indentified realists agree. For example, Jack Snyder claims that while democracies tend to experience fewer of these problems due to their governments' reflection of a broader social interest, they can still pursue overexpansion due to a poorly informed electorate or logrolling by narrow special interest groups.[8]

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[5] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 627-649; and Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*. See also David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.

[6] Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information : Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997).

[7] J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism; a Study* (New York,: J. Pott & Company, 1902), 52.

[8] Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation

Of all the elites that can capture foreign policy, the military is often identified as the principal culprit. Organizational and cultural theories suggest that without sufficient pressure from political leaders, elements of the national security structure will pursue their own ends with little regard for grand strategy.[9] These approaches agree with the claim of Robert Komer, Johnson's principal counterinsurgency adviser, that allowing the military to "do its thing" during wartime is a mistake.[10] Focusing on military culture is prominent in work addressing U.S. conduct of small wars; Eliot Cohen for example states that "the most substantial constraints on America's ability to conduct small wars result from the resistance of the American defense establishment to the very notion of engaging in such conflicts, and from the unsuitability of that establishment for fighting such wars."[11]

2 A Theory of Redistribution and Grand Strategy

Like democratic exceptionalists and political economists, I assume that the government's provision of security, its grand strategy, is as much a public good as unemployment insurance or a health care system.[12] However, I relax the claim that costs are always internalized within

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and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (2004).

[9] Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War : French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*; Jack L. Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive : Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press, 1984).

[10] Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1973).

[11] Eliot A. Cohen, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall, 1984), p. 165. John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).

[12] John Hudson and Philip Jones, "``Public Goods": An Exercise in Calibration," *Public Choice* 124, no. 3-4 (2005), Ethan B. Kapstein, *The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1992).A public good is both nonrival—one's

democracies, arguing that they may be much lower for the median voter than the state's per capita costs. When the median voter has little skin in the game, the incentives for aggression that exceptionalism associates with autocracies exist in democracies.

Even in democracies, wealth is not distributed equally within any given state; the person with median income is less well off than someone with the mean. Political economists have argued that if this median voter can set a tax rate and spend the revenue on a service available to all citizens, she will take advantage of the potential for redistribution, a result known as the "Meltzer-Richard hypothesis."[13] Even with a flat tax on income, the wealthy will pay a larger portion of the costs for a public good enjoyed by all. This lowering of the median voter's costs relative to the benefits of a public good, leads to increased demand.[14] Using similar logic, the median voter will prefer a heavier tax on capital, rather than labor, since labor income is distributed more equally than capital income.[15] In general the financial burden of government rarely rests on the person of median income.

I simply apply the Meltzer-Richard logic to a classic public good provided by states: defense.[16] *Given a non-trivial level of inequality, the more military coercion becomes an exercise in fiscal rather than social mobilization, the more prone a democracy will be towards funding an aggressive foreign policy.* While inequality is an essential prerequisite for security to

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enjoyment does not diminish the value for others—and nonexcludable—everyone within the state enjoys it regardless of contribution. Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 36, no. 4 (1954).

[13] Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," *Journal of Political Economy* 89, no. 5 (1981). A. Alesina and D. Rodrik, "Distributive Politics and Economic-Growth," *Quarterly Journal Of Economics* 109, no. 2 (1994), Torsten Persson and Guido Enrico Tabellini, *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). For a recent use of median voter theory and redistribution, see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge UP, 2005).

[14] Persson and Tabellini, *Political Economics*, 49.

[15] Ibid., 117-122.

[16] E. B. Kapstein, "Allies and Armaments," *Survival* 44, no. 2 (2002).

contain a redistributive element, it is not necessarily the portion of the theory with the most explanatory power. Since every state has a skewed distribution of wealth, how taxes are spent plays a most important role.

2.1.1 Capitalization

Military doctrine, the means by which military power is developed and exercised, can be stylized as a production function consisting of the two factors of capital (tanks, planes, ammunition, even training) and labor (soldiers, sailors, etc.). One factor of production can serve as a substitute for the other, but capital and labor are imperfect replacements and show diminishing returns. Given a hundred tanks and ten soldiers, adding another tank will not produce as much capability as another soldier.

Tax revenue can pay for both the capital and labor inputs. Personnel can also be supplied from an alternate type of tax: conscription, a tax on labor rather than capital. Assuming the possibility of a draft, even if the odds of being conscripted are equally distributed, suggests that the median voter will demand that a larger amount of the military budget go towards the purchase of capital to reduce the risk of conscription.[17] Casualties are also a public bad; no one wants to see their fellow citizens to die. The less wealthy are more likely to be drafted and to join an all-volunteer force, may gain jobs from domestic weapons manufacturing, and often regard military service as a means of acquiring human capital. I therefore argue that the median

[17] In cases where existing threats do not currently justify resorting to conscription, military capitalization will still to a large degree determine a draft's future likelihood. The median voter normally will be happy with an expensive, all-volunteer military; but once the level of threat creates a demand for labor that reaches into the middle class, the voter will support a military staffed through a fair draft whose conscripts are protected by large amounts of capital. Joseph Paul Vasquez, III, "Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and Military Casualties," *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 6 (2005).

voter will accept a higher tax, what the British socialist Sidney Webb called "the conscription of riches," to build highly capitalized militaries in both peace and in war, since such militaries redistribute money and skills through jobs and training as well as reduce the risk of conscription and casualties. In short a capitalized military not only results in the median voter doing less of the fighting herself, but also will allow someone else's resources to fund the costs of war.

2.1.2 Substitutability through Doctrine and War Type

The ability to replace military labor with capital is constrained by substitutability, which is determined partly by the available technology. The right tools and techniques can increase the output of military power with the same amount of inputs, or increase the effectiveness of one's favored factor of production. However, while a bulldozer makes one person much more effective at moving earth, for the purposes of archaeology it is a disastrous substitute for several individuals wielding small chisels and brushes.[18]

War type, the interaction of the weak state's strategy and the strong state's military doctrine, is of equal if not greater influence on substitutability as technology.[19] A capitalized military will be much more effective against a conventional opponent than an unconventional one. Such a force dispatched the Iraqi conventional forces with ruthless efficiency in both 1991 and 2003, but is poorly suited for conducting counterinsurgency. Improved doctrine, while crucial, only goes so far when faced with labor constraints. Indeed the ratio of personnel per

[18] Because improved labor productivity in one industry raises the wages for the entire economy, industries where the labor share remains constant (such as counterinsurgency) are likely to exhibit soaring costs, a phenomenon known as "Baumol's cost disease." This is one reason counterinsurgency is likely to be fiscally draining. William J Baumol and William G. Bowen, *Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma; a Study of Problems Common to Theater, Opera, Music, and Dance* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1966).

[19] Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win."

population in order to conduct "nation-building" has stayed roughly stable at twenty per thousand since the end of World War II.[20] Little can be accomplished without boots on the ground. The paper explains why a strong, democratic power would pursue a conventional, capital-intensive military strategy against an unconventional opponent anyway.

2.2 Moral Hazard

Because of its redistributive nature, a capitalized military doctrine can lead to moral hazard, a perverse incentive for risky behavior. Often associated with insurance provision, moral hazard encourages the insured "to change their behavior in a way that increases claims against the insurance company."[21] For example, rivers with auto theft coverage will more likely park on the street than pay for secure parking. Many domestic government programs merge the Meltzer-Richard effect with moral hazard. Deposit insurance uses backing by federal funds to insure any bank deposits up to a certain limit, a redistributive public good. Because the insurance applies regardless of the bank, an individual has little motivation to consider the bank's solvency. Indeed, she is likely to choose the higher interest provided by a bank making risky investments. I extend these concepts to building and employing a military.

No matter how redistributive the military, voters will not support conflicts with a vanishing chance of victory. Since conflict remains costly for the median voter who still pays some taxes and may be conscripted (a deductible of sorts). Rather, moral hazard increases the likelihood of entering conflicts whose expected value in increased security is outweighed by the

[20] James T. Quinlan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," *RAND Review*, Summer 2003.

[21] Robert Rauchhaus, "Conflict Management and the Misapplication of Moral Hazard Theory," in *Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion, and Internal War*, ed. Timothy Crawford and Alan J. Kuperman (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).

likely total costs for the state, which are borne inordinately by the wealthy. The median voter's risky behavior is in effect being subsidized.

This moral hazard leads the median voter to favor two flawed combination of ends and means; she will choose wars using an efficient strategy against a conventional foe for low gains that a cost internalized actor would eschew. The strong state's success may be assured, but the stakes are trivial. More importantly and visibly, the lack of cost internalization creates an incentive for her to use the capital-intensive military in conflicts where substitutability is low because *the decreased likelihood of winning is outweighed by the lower costs of fighting in such a manner*. Democracies will pursue a doctrine making success less likely even in relatively important conflicts. Indeed, the median voter will continue to support building the "wrong" type of capitalized military in anticipation of fighting small wars.

3 Why Study Israel?

In the study of democratic grand strategy and civil-military relations, Israel is often treated as an exceptional case because of its "large compulsory draft, a large reserve military with great involvement in wars and the preparation for them, a war industry and a war economy, and a national culture that sanctifies the military solution to political problems and that places the military and the soldiers at society's center."[22] Israel is, however, undergoing profound and related shifts in its society, politics, and military. These shifts appear to draw it closer in line

[22] Yehuda Ben-Meir and Merkaz le-me*h*karim as*tra*tegiyim *al shem Yafeh., *Civil-Military Relations in Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

with other, Western democracies.[23] It therefore provides a useful opportunity for cost distribution theory to assess what these changes' grand strategic effects might be.

Moreover, Israel's perceived security problems have changed, even as those of many other democracies such as the United States have come to more closely resemble Israel's. Israel currently faces ballistic missile threats from several neighboring actors (both states and non-state actors alike) as well as a potentially nuclear Iran in the future. It has suffered from sporadic terrorism, rocket fire and insurgency in the occupied Palestinian territories. The combination of conventional and unconventional elements in the 2006 fight against Hezbollah in Lebanon appears to epitomize the sort of "hybrid war," that many observers believe will typify international conflict in the coming years.

This section briefly explores the evolution of post-Cold War Israeli grand strategy and civil military relations in response to developments both within Israeli society and the Israel Defense Force (IDF) itself.[24] These changes are largely interrelated and teasing out the causes of them all is beyond the scope of this paper. For example, the shift towards the capital-intensive revolution in military affairs is over-determined in Israel due to regional demographics, the structure of the Israeli economy, and Israel's status as an American client. The principal goal is to show the relevance of the paper's theory in understanding these changes' implications.

3.1 Changes in Threat and Doctrine

[23] For one overview, see Uri Bar-Joseph, *Israel's National Security Towards the 21st Century* (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001).

[24] This analysis relies only on English-language sources, supplemented by interviews with 23 Israeli policymakers, retired military officers, academics, and other representatives of the country's strategic community.

Since the Cold War's end, the conventional threat from Israel's Arab neighbors has been mitigated by these states' loss of their main conventional weapons supplier, the Soviet Union.[25] More recently Israel has focused on threats from its "second circle" (Iran, Libya and Iraq) rather than the first (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, etc). Terrorism has grown in salience as conventional threats receded, although even this sort of activity has receded considerably since the Second Intifada's peak in 2001.[26] This, coupled with the obvious supremacy of American (and thus Israeli) weapons and tactics in conventional maneuver warfare demonstrated in the Gulf War, led former IDF Chief of the General Staff (CGS) and then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to observe in 1994, "The traditional doctrine, based on territory, is proven inefficient when it is facing the knife and the missile."[27]

In addition to a large drop in military spending following the Cold War's end and the Oslo Accords, these changes have led to a dramatic retooling of the IDF and its doctrine, a process of becoming, in the words of Ehud Barak, CGS and future prime minister, "slimmer and smarter."[28] The means of fighting any enemy, conventional or otherwise, have also evolved into an avoidance of taking territory in favor of standoff fire, airpower and "effects-based operations." This firepower targets not only enemy command and control systems, but also the very "will" of opposing fighters, leadership, and population. The IDF has become one of the world's foremost adopters of the doctrine, equipment and personnel policy of the so-called

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[25] Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 38.

[26] Gerard Alexander, "International Relations Theory Meets World Politics: The Neoconservative Vs. Realism Debate " in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, ed. Stanley Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (London: Routledge, 2007). http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Fatalities/Pages/default.aspx, accessed March 2, 2011.

[27] Shimon Peres, interview on Israeli television April 14, 1994. Quoted in Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room*, 39.

[28] Uri Ben-Eliezer, *The Making of Israeli Militarism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).

Revolution in Military Affairs.[29] Figure 2 shows that since the end of the Cold War, the percentage of the defense budget going to non-labor costs has risen steadily.

The resulting capital-intensive military also entails a much more professional orientation. The IDF's air force and intelligence branches, the backbone of an RMA military, largely consists of long-service professionals. In terms of conscription and national service, many middle class youths no longer participate. A 12.1% non-enlistment rate among eligible males in 1980 had climbed to 25% in 2007, largely due to the IDF's decision on these conscripts' superfluousness.[30] Moreover, up through 2006 reservists were increasingly excluded from conventional warfare planning.[31]

Again, this paper agrees that there are many reasons why Israel should pursue a capital-intensive way of war. Nonetheless, the incentives this presents to the median voter should still be present regardless of the sources of change. Furthermore, the IDF has evolved, at least in part, due to changes in its understanding of what is acceptable to the public. As Dan Halutz, CGS at the time of the Second Lebanon War, testified to a post-war investigative committee, "the military system is deeply influenced by long term processes," including "interrelated socio-cultural, budgetary and doctrinaire processes."[32]

3.2 Changes in Israeli Society

[29] Bar-Joseph, *Israel's National Security Towards the 21st Century*.

[30] Stuart A. Cohen, "Changing Civil-Military Relations in Israel: Towards an over-Subordinate Idf?," *Israel Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2006): 135.

[31] To the point of not being trained sufficiently, as the Second Lebanon War demonstrated.

[32] Gil Merom, "The Second Lebanon War: Democratic Lessons Imperfectly Applied," *Democracy and Security* 4, no. 1 (2008): 2.

Like much of the world, Israel has profited from and has been changed by the process of globalization in its most broad sense. In particular, reduced trade barriers, transportation costs, and communication delays have enabled Israel to shift from a more autarkic country in which the state influenced and even ran large swaths of the economy to a more neoliberal, capitalistic, and high technology society. A concurrent rise in self-professed individualism has also emerged. In a 2006 survey, only 27% of Israeli respondents thought that the interests of the country were more important than the individual's personal ones, compared to 69% in 1981.[33] Relatedly, the burden of taxation has shifted to the wealthiest segment of Israeli society (Figure 1) even as economic inequality had risen steadily over time (Figure 2).

These factors have enhanced class cleavages amongst Israeli Jews, particularly that between the elite, "European" *Ashkenazi* Jews and the relatively poorer and less powerful "Oriental" or *Mizrachi* Jews. This divide has now been coupled to a rise in influence of two important sections of Israeli society, the *Haredim*, ultra-orthodox (making up about 10% of the Israeli electorate) whose full-time devotion to study is largely subsidized by the Israeli government, and the massive (a 12% increase in Israel's population) influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who tend to be well-educated but poor, secular yet quite hawkish in their approach to foreign policy. Together, these forces have contributed to a striking increase in economic inequality in Israel and, this paper argues, a hawkish shift in its foreign policy.[34]

3.3 Who Shapes Israeli Grand Strategy?

[33] Brian C. Schmidt and Michael C. Williams, "The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists," *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008).

[34] Yagil Levy, *Israel's Materialist Militarism*, Innovations in the Study of World Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 7.

These changes have preoccupied a large part of Israeli social science. While almost all observers believe that civil-military relations are changing along with many other elements of Israeli society, there is little agreement about the direction. However, much of this research examining the formation of grand strategy falls along the military myopia and elite capture arguments laid out above. Rarely do observers claim that Israeli grand strategy takes its form because of voter preferences.

While the formal supremacy of the civilian government has never been questioned, many authors argue that the IDF has myriad ways to "call the shots behind the scenes."[35] The IDF has historically been largely autonomous in strategic matters and indeed exercises tremendous influence on Israeli politics and society in general. Its massive advantage in planning staff relative to civilian counterparts as well as its monopoly on intelligence gives the IDF tremendous bureaucratic and epistemic power relative to any other Israeli institution.[36] This is further enhanced by the high prestige of the IDF within Israel that, while not at the exalted heights of previous decades, remains far higher than any that of any other Israeli entity.[37]

While the CGS has always played a politically visible role, often running for office upon retiring, many observers have identified the increased prominence of high-ranking military officers, both retired and active duty, in political life.[38] Even while serving as CGS from 1998-2002, Shaul Mofaz was often described as a "politician in uniform" and almost immediately entered the Cabinet upon his retirement. The CGS has at times appealed to the public when

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[35] Ben-Meir and Merkaz le-me*h*karim as*tra*tegiyim *al shem Yafeh., *Civil-Military Relations in Israel*, xii.

[36] Charles Freilich, "Back Again: The Second Lebanon War," unpublished manuscript. Kobi Michael, "The Israel Defense Forces as an Epistemic Authority: An Intellectual Challenge in the Reality of the Israeli – palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 3 (2007).

[37] Levy, *Israel's Materialist Militarism*.

[38] Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room*.

disagreeing with civilian leaders, leading one observer to note that, "It seemed as if they [the IDF] claimed the right to conduct direct discourse with the public, as if it were their duty to report to society at large and not to the political echelon."[39] Moshe Ya'alon, Mofaz's successor, quite infamously described himself as "the CGS of the people of Israel, and not just of the political echelon."[40]

One branch of analysis takes a military myopia approach to these developments, observing that letting the generals have their way has generally been perceived as resulting in a more aggressive grand strategy. Built on the perception of Israel's historic vulnerability and past IDF successes Zeev Maoz describes an almost "Pavlovian" tendency by the IDF to use force when the opportunity arises.[41] The shift towards a firepower intensive military is used as evidence for this tendency.

Not all scholars regard the IDF as continuing to grow in power and influence; others point out the emergence of "civil society," as a counterweight to IDF supremacy.[42] The increasing influx of generals into the cabinet no doubt influences their potential successors still in uniform to not rock the boat.[43] Knesset committees appear more willing to scrutinize budget

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[39] Ibid., 111.

[40] Ibid., 139. Peri attributes this growing military involvement in politics largely to the IDF's increasing attention to counterinsurgency and other low intensity conflicts, where the attitude of the polity is essential to success against the adversary Yoram Peri argues that the IDF has grown in influence mostly because civilian leadership is fragmented, weak and unwilling to make decisions. Peri Yoram, "The Political-Military Complex: The Idfs Influence over Policy Towards the Palestinians since 1987," *Israel Affairs* 11(2005). Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room*, 127. See also Michael, "The Idf as an Epistemic Authority."; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Present at the Re-Creation: A Neocosnervative Moves On," *Foreign Affairs* (2008).

[41] Cited in Cohen, "Towards an over-Subordinate Idf?," 771; Bacevich, "Present at the Re-Creation: A Neocosnervative Moves On."

[42] Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, *Being Israeli : The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship*, Cambridge Middle East Studies ; (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[43] Cohen, "Towards an over-Subordinate Idf?.". One problem with this debate is that much of the evidence is used by both camps to support their claims.

requests.[44] The Supreme Court has recently exercised considerable influence over the nation's security policy on such matters as the "security fence" designed to seal off Israel from Palestinian attacks. The "Four Mothers" movement centered on bereaved parents during the occupation of Southern Lebanon is often viewed as a watershed event where civilian preferences trumped those of the military.[45] The media has developed an increasingly skeptical view of IDF operations.[46] Stuart Cohen argues that these various activist groups represent "a process of increasing civilian intrusion into the military domain."[47] Where Peri sees low intensity conflict resulting in increased military influence in society, Cohen argues for the opposite effect: civilians are increasingly involved in unconventional military operations due to their politically sensitive nature.

Regardless of who has the upper hand in civil-military relations, this debate over the role of new actors—the media, the courts system and bereaved, well-connected *Ashkenazi* parents—focuses on Israel elites.[48] Perhaps there is little difference between these groups and the military they seek to influence; Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer simply label the entire system of elites as a potent "Security Network," made up of actors who have "worked against the systemic differentiation and professionalism of the IDF and the other security agencies and the efficiency of the state's relevant civilian spheres." This network directly impedes the emergence of "an

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[44] Ibid.

[45] Avraham Sela, "Civil Society, the Military, and Naitonal Security: The Case of Israel's Secu- rity Zone in South Lebanon," *Israel Studies* 12.1 (Spring 2007): 73. Sara Helman, "From Soldiering and Motherhood to Citizenship: A Study of Four Israeli Peace Protest Movements," *Social Politics* 6, 3 (Fall 1999): 292–313.

[46] Udi Lebel, "Civil Society versus Military Sovereignty: Cultural, Political, and Operational Aspects," *Armed Forces & Society* 34, 1 (October 2007): 67-89.

[47] Cohen, "Towards an over-Subordinate Idf?," 771.

[48] Lebel, "Civilian Society vs. Military Sovereignty"

effective democracy in Israel."[49] Empowered by a continuous existential threat, this network prevents the emergence of truly democratic governance in Israel.

Over a series of works, Yagil Levy develops an ambitious theory tying many of these social and strategic developments together arguing that the citizenship rewards and security gains stemming from serving in the IDF and fighting in war have declined for much of the middle class and elites due to globalization, market liberalism, reduction in threat, and advances in military technology.[50] The resulting "democratization of war" was only temporary, and the IDF responded by attempting to reestablish its autonomy from society. The current revised arrangement allows the lower classes in Israel to willingly offer a "blood sacrifice" by serving in the military in exchange for social advancement, hawkish policies or ideological satisfaction; and the upper classes are happy to make a "gold sacrifice" to pay for a high tech military that reflects Israel's new economy and minimizes the demand for military labor. This "post-materialist militarism" results in an aggressive military seeking to improve its status by fighting fast, violent conflicts in pursuit of overly ambitious war aims.[51] For Levy, the flawed warfighting of the Second Lebanon War resulted from a "gap of legitimacies," where the use of force is seen as legitimate and desirable but the need for sacrifice by powerful members of society is not seen as necessary or justifiable.

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[49] Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, "Continuous Existential Threats, Civil-Security Relations, and Democracy: A Comparative Exploration of Five Small States," in *Existential Threats and Civil-Security Relations*, ed. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer (Lanham, MD: Lexington books, 2009), 137. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, "Israel's 'Security Network' and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38, no. 02 (2006). See also Ben-Eliezer, *The Making of Israeli Militarism*.

[50] Levy, Yagil. "The Second Lebanon War: Examining 'Democratization of War' Theory," Levy, *Israel's Materialist Militarism*. Yagil Levy, "An Unbearable Price: War Casualties and Warring Democracies," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 22, no. 1 (2009); Yagil Levy, "The Linkage between Israel's Military Policies and the Military's Social Composition: The Case of the Al-Aqsa Intifada," *American Behavioral Scientist* 51, no. 11 (2008).

[51] Levy, *Israel's Materialist Militarism*, 25-26. Levy, "Linkage between Israel's Military Policies and the Military's Social Composition."

This paper agrees with Levy that large military budgets and civilian control need not be mutually exclusive, "The more the militarization of Israeli society and politics gradually increased, the more politicians were successful in institutionalizing effective control over the IDF."[52] However, where Levy argues that the IDF ultimately reestablished its autonomy through building a heavily capitalized military, this paper reverses Levy's causal arrow.[53] I claim that increased civilian control of the IDF has led to a more militarized politics and the use of force is a becoming a more readily available option. And while like Levy this paper concurs that the costs of service, arming, and war are important, the paper also argues that the cost of going to war in terms of blood and gold is often not high for the median voter. Those who identify a growing imbalance in military influence over society point to the appeal to public opinion by military leaders in the face of a recalcitrant cabinet. This paper suggests that if both the government elites and IDF look to the people as the final arbiter in political conflicts, then public preferences must be taken into consideration, something rarely done in Israeli social science.[54]

Cost distribution theory suggests three stages connecting Israel's median voter to grand strategy. First, voters should exhibit the theorized preferences. Second, civilian leaders should acknowledge and take these preferences into consideration when developing grand strategy. Third, civilians should instruct the IDF to perform accordingly. This paper will focus on testing two of the three, by examining public opinion data and the civil-military deliberation during the Second Lebanon War. While the case study presents some evidence that public preferences play

[52] Levy *Israel's Materialist Militarism*, 58.

[53] Elliott Abrams, *Security and Sacrifice : Isolation, Intervention, and American Foreign Policy* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hudson Institute, 1995).

[54] Amir Bar-Or and Karl W. Haltiner, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Israel and Switzerland in Times of Security Threats," in *Existential Threats and Civil-Security Relations*, ed. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer (Lanham, MD: Lexington books, 2009).

a role in civilian decision-making this is unlikely to be authoritative. However, the theory explains more aspects of the cases than its competitors.

4 Public opinion on defense budget, use of force, and grand strategy

This paper first focuses on public opinion for several reasons. First, it determines if individuals respond to incentives in the way predicted by the theory, thus showing the argument to be based on strong microfoundations. Equally important, it helps referee between alternate explanations for the link between inequality and grand strategy. Showing that one's attitude on these matters varies with one's relative, self-reported socio-economic status (SES, a proxy for one's median income) is a prediction that cannot be explained by either military myopia or elite capture approaches. To show that SES does *not* affect one's perception of threat undermines an explanation based on elite threat-inflation targeted at the less sophisticated (i.e. less wealthy). Finally, public opinion data allows the testing of two links of the theory's causal chain: relative wealth shapes perceptions of the utility of force, which in turn affects the willingness to fund the military and unwillingness to make concessions for peace. Figure 3 illustrates the direct and indirect causal pathways to be tested.

This section tests the following hypotheses:

H_0: Relative SES has no effect on one's assessment of threats

Failing to reject this null hypothesis removes consideration of threat inflation as a possible causal mechanism. The remaining hypotheses provide positive tests of cost distribution theory's predictions:

H_1: Respondents with a lower SES are more disposed to support the use of military force over diplomacy

H_2: Respondents with a lower SES are more disposed to support an increase in the defense budget.

H_{2a}: Respondents' attitude towards the use of military force mediates the effect of SES on one's attitude towards defense spending.

H_3: Respondents with a lower SES are less disposed to give territorial concessions to opponents to maintain peace

H_{3a}: Respondents' attitude towards the use of military force mediates the effect of SES on one's attitude towards territorial concessions.

4.1 Description of the data

All data is taken from the 2006 Israeli Election Study, which consists of a pre-election survey conducted between February 28 and March 23, 2006, prior to the Israel's March 28 Knesset elections. The telephone interviews of eligible Israeli voters were carried out in Hebrew, Russian, and Arabic.[55] These polls, taken *before* the Second Lebanon War, give a sense of public opinion prior to the kidnappings that sparked the conflict. This paper analyzed only respondents who identified themselves as Jews (poorer Arabs are likely to have a far different attitude towards the fairness of military force).

4.1.1 Dependent Variables

[55] Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, "2006 Israeli National Election Study," Tel Aviv University, http://www.ines.tau.ac.il/2006.html, accessed March 2, 2011.

The theory's dependent variables are operationalized by a series of responses to questions on military policy and its relative effectiveness. The first dependent variable is inclination towards military force. The theory predicts that as the cost of a capital-intensive campaign drops, one becomes more likely to employ it as a tool of grand strategy. The paper therefore uses responses to the question, "What should Israel stress in order to avoid war with an Arab state?" Respondents could choose "peace talks," "military might," or the combination "peace talks and military might." A higher value for this variable, *might*, indicates a more hawkish approach. While this does not precisely capture a respondent's predilection to use force in all cases of foreign policy, no other question comes closer. No survey question assesses Israeli attitudes towards firepower or military capital.[56] Nor does the preference for military might in order to "avoid war" perfectly capture the respondent's predilection for the use of force, particularly for offensive (rather than deterrent) operations. Nonetheless, encouraging the respondent to choose between two tools, only one of which is likely to have redistributive implications, does allow testing of changes to the marginal rate of substitution of diplomacy and military might if the cost of the latter declines.

An obvious means of analyzing defense's redistributive nature is through examining individuals' assessment of the need to spend more on security (*security spending*). The second dependent variable is the response to the question, "Should the country spend more money, less money or the same as it does today on security?" Again, higher values indicate more hawkish preferences. Finally I examine beliefs regarding questions of grand strategy and the willingness to make concessions. If the cost of an aggressive, militarized grand strategy is lower compared to a diplomatic compromise, then a respondent will favor a less conciliatory approach on

[56] It should be noted that the voter does not have to be aware that a capitalized military reduces her costs; politicians might seek to reduce the costs and maximize the benefits provided to the public by building such a military.

providing territorial concessions in exchange for peace. I therefore include two dependent variables that posit the exchange of land for peace in two strategically and culturally important areas, the Golan Heights (claimed by Syria) and the Occupied Territories (claimed by Palestinians). The former question reads "Should Israel return to Syria territories in the Golan in return for a peace treaty and security arrangements acceptable to the IDF?" and the latter "In a peace agreement with the Palestinians, should Israel agree or disagree to a territorial compromise and to the evacuation of settlements in Judea and Samaria?" Higher values of *Golan* and *Palestine* indicate a more conciliatory approach.

Given the categorical nature of the dependent variables in H_1-H_3, all analyses were performed using ordered logistic regression, and provide strong support for cost distribution theory. While the tables of regression results capture variation across all possible values of these variables, in order to make the results amenable to graphical interpretation, I transformed these categorical dependent variables into binary measurements. Table 1 shows the questions, responses, and the binary transformations of the various dependent variables.

4.1.2 Explanatory and Mediating Variables

I use the respondent's assessment of his or her family's monthly *expenditure* relative to the average for Israel as a whole (9,300 shekels). The responses are in descending order, from high expenditure to low; a larger value for both *expenditure* and *class* indicates lower expenditure. As explained above, one's willingness to use force will affect how one approaches grand strategy. As well as a dependent variable, *might* is therefore an explanatory variable. The causal chain linking, SES, inclination towards force (*might*), and grand strategy preferences is illustrated in Figure 3. Because SES shifts one's preference for force over diplomacy, including

both variables in a regression will reduce the effects of the former. That is, *might* mediates the role of SES, but this does not imply that SES has no causal role in grand strategy even if it is no longer significant. Rather, SES could have both a direct and indirect effect on the ultimate dependent variable. This can be illustrated in the following three equations.

$$Might = \alpha_1 + a\ SES + e_1, \qquad (1)$$

$$Grand\ Strategy = \alpha_2 + c\ SES + e_2, \qquad (2)$$

$$Grand\ Strategy = \alpha_3 + d\ SES + b\ Might + e_3, \qquad (3)$$

Mediation is a thorny empirical problem, and no clear means of identifying, testing, and measuring it exists, even when one has the ability to experimentally manipulate the mediator. The most common procedure for identifying and measuring mediation effects, advocated by Baron and Kenny, is to analyze all three equations above; the combined effect of the treatment (SES) would then be: $d+ab$. Because of *might*'s mediating effect, the level and significance of d will likely drop in Equation 3.[57] Such a procedure almost certainly leads to biased results; if preference for military force (*might*) covaries with an unobserved variable that affects *grand strategic preferences* (i.e. $\text{cov}(e_1, e_3) \neq 0$), standard estimators of b and d will not produce accurate estimates. The potential for bias is sufficiently grave to provoke the claim that "increasing use of the Baron-Kenny method is not a good thing."[58]

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[57] Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). "The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51*, 1173-1182

[58] Bullock, John G., and Shang E. Ha. 2011. "Mediation Analysis Is Harder than It Looks." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science,* ed. James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. New York: Cambridge University Pres. Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill,

Acknowledging these limitations, this paper is content to accomplish the following tasks:

- Measure the effects of SES on attitudes towards military might (coefficient *a* in Equation 1)
- Measure the *direct effects* of SES on attitudes towards defense spending and territorial concessions (coefficient *c* in Equation 2)
- Measure the *direct effects* of attitudes towards force on attitudes towards defense spending and territorial concessions (coefficient *b* in Equation 3)
- Observe the changes to SES coefficients on defense spending and territorial concessions upon including attitudes towards force (coefficient *d* in Equation 3)

Put another way, while identifying with certainty the magnitude and significance of the total effects is not possible, this paper can still show that a statistically interesting direct effect exists after identifying and controlling for a mediating variable, thereby putting a lower bound on the influence of SES. All other tests included in the paper should be taken as suggestive.

4.1.3 Control Variables

The statistical models also identify and include potential confounding variables, that is ones that competing explanations (i.e. elite capture and military myopia) suggest can cause a predilection for force or an aggressive grand strategy. Respondent's assessment of threat (independent of one's response to that threat) may not only mediate the effect of SES but can be attributed to elite myth-making. I therefore incorporate a measure of the threat-based demand for military power, the expectation of conflict (if there was no expectation of conflict, there should be little demand for defense regardless of how cheap it is). *War likelihood* is the

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Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 192.

respondent's assessment of the probability of a war with an Arab state in the next three years. Failing to reject the null that SES has no effect on *war likelihood* (i.e. H_0) undermines threat inflation as a competing explanation for my findings. I also included responses to another question that assesses Israel's "*security situation*," or "where the country might be in terms of national security," where a 9 represents "the best possible situation that [the respondent] can think of" and 1 the worst. War likelihood appears less subjective, whereas assessing Israel's security situation does not necessarily measure threat but also assess government actions which are endogenous to the theory.

Given that the *family expenditure* question asks respondents to compare themselves to an "average" Israeli family, I included the number of people in the respondent's household, or *household size* (larger households correlate to higher household expenditure). Not surprisingly, respondent *education* and *news consumption* tend to correlate with income and may also exert an independent influence on one's assessment of international politics and the need for defense spending. Again, since income and education correlate highly, including education in the analysis reduces the effect of SES. One's self-placement on a *political spectrum* (from right to left) likely correlates with SES and the dependent variables. Many argue that the army and the Israeli politics increasingly reflect the hawkish preferences of religious Jews (who tend to be lower income, especially the *haredim*); I therefore include dummy variables for religious status (secular, *traditional, orthodox*, and *haredim*). Because gender and age may well shape one's approach to security and correlate to SES, respondent *age* as well as a *male* categorical variable are included. Perhaps the most important control variable to assess is whether the respondent emigrated from the former Soviet Union. This group tends to be relatively poor but well-educated and secular in outlook, and my theory suggests that this group would have a more

hawkish view than others. However, this group might have hawkish views for other reasons entirely due to their origin from a distinct culture and political regime. Acknowledging the potential for multicollinearity I therefore include regressions with and without a former Soviet Union dummy variable (*FSU*).

4.2 Results

The theory argues that inequality influences one's willingness to use military force, but not one's assessment of the need for it. In other words, the perceived benefits of force are constant (or distributed randomly) across the population with respect to household expenditure, but the perceived costs of its use appear to decline with lower SES. This section tests this assumption about benefits by examining the role that the explanatory variable SES and accompanying control variables play on assessing the probability of war with an Arab state. Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 show that one's SES plays no significant role in influencing one's assessment of the likelihood of a war; we cannot reject H_0. However, the lower a respondent's status the more likely she will look to military might as the means of maintaining peace with Arab states (Models 3 and 4). While Table 2 also shows that SES correlates with a more negative outlook of Israel's security situation (at $p<0.1$), the substantive effect is very small, and loses significance once FSU is included (Model 4).

On the other hand, Table 3 shows a strong correlation between SES and one's preferred tool for addressing (rather than assessing) threats. Taken together the results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the preference for military might cannot be caused by a wealth-induced biased perception of the likelihood of war. In other words, poorer respondents do not inherently regard

the world as a more dangerous place, yet still prefer military might, suggesting a cost redistributive component. Figure 4 shows a more intuitive graphical depiction of the effects of SES on one's preference for using military force.[59] The first leg of the triangle in Figure 3 finds support.

Looking at the control variables in Tables 2 and 3, one's location along the political spectrum does affect one's perception of war likelihood and Israel's security situation. More right-leaning respondents are more inclined to look to military might as the guarantor of peace. Education appears to have little effect, but those who identify themselves as *haredim* are more likely to assess the chances of war as high and prefer military force to peace talks. Men tend to think war is less likely and are optimistic about security, but still seem to prefer military force. As expected, FSU respondents are more hawkish, and introducing a FSU dummy variable reduced the size and significance of the SES variable, but only by a small amount.

Table 4 depicts the influences on government security spending. All the coefficients for SES are positive, although they vary in significance. Models 9, 11, 13, and 15 do not contain the FSU dummy, and the direct relationship between SES and government spending is positive and significant. As expected, SES's effect is reduced when predilection for force is included in models 13 through 16; the coefficient remains positive, but drops in significance. Not surprisingly, one is more likely to support security spending if one prefers military force over peace talks. The results support the remaining two legs of the causal triangle in Figure 3; because Models 13-16 show a positive and significant effect of predilection for force on government spending, the series of regressions shows that SES does have a significant and substantive relationship to government spending, mediated by predilection for force.

[59] All graphs made through simulations using the software Clarify. Gary King, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000). "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2 (April 2000): 347−61.

The inclusion of FSU in Table 4 has remarkable effects. Respondents from the former Soviet Union are remarkably hawkish on defense spending, and this effect comes at the expense of SES. Other variables that correlate to SES also have the effect predicted theoretically: the more educated are more dovish, whereas larger households are more hawkish. Unsurprisingly, if one believes war is more likely, one favors more military spending. Those on the political right as well as older respondents were more hawkish. Interestingly, males appear to be less likely to support increased security spending, although the effect is not always significant at conventional levels.

Looking at respondent opinions on exchanging land for peace with Syria (Table 5) and the Palestinians (Table 6), we see that family expenditure appears to have the effect on grand strategic aims suggested by the theory, and indeed the results are stronger than those for security spending. Positive coefficients for both Tables 5 and 6 indicate a greater willingness to trade land for peace; in all cases, the effect of SES is *negative*. As expected, once one controls for predilection towards force, the results remain negative but drop in significance and magnitude. Again and unsurprisingly, inclination towards military might is strongly associated with increased unwillingness to give up territory. Inclusion of the FSU dummy (which has a large hawkish coefficient) also reduces the effect and significance of SES.

Analyzing the dichotomous dependent variables (see Table 1) allows for a more intuitive, graphical depiction of the explanatory variables' effects. Figures 6-8 give a sense of the effect's magnitude but at the cost of depicting only the direct effect of SES. That is, even if no mediation effect exists, and *might* acts merely as a control variable, SES has considerable impact on grand strategy. Each figure plots two lines to look at predicted probabilities for respondents that favor

military force versus those that favor at least some measure of diplomacy (recall that lower SES respondents are more likely to be in the former category).

Given the support for all the hypotheses, we have strong reason to suspect that SES affects grand strategy both directly and through its influence on the preference for military might. However one's SES does not seem to affect one's assessment of the likelihood of conflict. Less wealthy people appear more willing to use the military instrument to ensure Israel's security. Moreover, SES affects respondents' attitudes towards defense spending. This is done both directly and indirectly through a heightened willingness to use force. This same relationship exists for foreign policy goals; people who regard themselves as relatively less well off are less inclined to exchange territory for peace in Palestine and the Golan Heights. The evidence is consistent with the theory's claim that the public good of grand strategy has a redistributive component.

5 Whose "Fault" is the Second Lebanon War?

Are these public preferences translated into government security policy? This section attempts to show that Israeli grand strategy conforms to cost distribution theory's expectations, suggested by the microfoundational evidence presented above. That is, the theory predicts that a government of a state with a capital-intensive military will engage in small wars in pursuit of ambitious goals while employing a strategy that makes obtaining these goals less likely. To do this, this paper looks at civilian-military interactions during the Second Lebanon War. Israel pursued a campaign plan that failed to accomplish most of its stated goals. Indeed the war was fought in such a manner that made achieving these goals less likely. This paper takes no position

on whether Israel "lost" the war, only that it the conflict represents a clear case of disintegrated grand strategy, in which the military means and the political ends were not well connected.

This failure occurred in spite of a massive, capital-intensive effort—flying 15,500 air sorties against 7,000 targets, and expending over 100,000 tank and artillery rounds, more ordnance than employed in the conventional 1973 war. By the very end (and only at the very end) about 15,000 Israeli soldiers were operating in Lebanon. Supplemental costs of the conflict are estimated to be about 6.5 billion U.S. dollars (the IDF's entire 2006 budget was $8 billion). Hezbollah was well-prepared for the capital-intensive onslaught; disabling 45 *Merkavah* 4 main battle tanks (10% of the armor deployed), knocking the Israeli Navy's most advanced destroyer out of service, causing 119 IDF deaths (some through friendly fire), and launching a seemingly endless series of *Katyusha* rockets against civilian targets in northern Israel.[60]

Despite the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) revamped military doctrine limiting ground operations, favoring stand-off fire over maneuver, and giving a central role to air warfare, civilians in the cabinet rejected the uniformed leadership's initial campaign plan. Objecting to "exposing 40,000 troops to the Lebanese reality," the cabinet ordered an extended air operation. By the fourth day of fighting the IDF Deputy Chief of Staff recommended stopping, "We have exhausted the [aerial] effort; we have reached the peak; from now on we can only descend."[61] Civilians again disagreed and fighting continued.[62] Israel activated only a single reserve division

[60] Freilich, "Back Again."

[61] Quoted in Avi Kober, "The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 1 (2008): 4.

[62] Daniel Byman and Steven Simon, "The No-Win Zone: An after-Action Report from Lebanon," *The National Interest*, no. 86 (2006).

in the conflict's first eleven days, and did not employ significant ground forces until a month after hostilities started (just hours before the signing of the August 11 cease-fire).[63]

Despite the decision to avoid a ground war, the Israeli government publicly declared ambitious goals far beyond the release of hostages and the deterrence of further rocket attacks. A subsequent government commission on the conduct of the war describes the strategic conundrum: "declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement."[64] The report acknowledges the government's bind: no "other effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation" existed, but this "would have a high 'cost' and did not enjoy broad support."

Space precludes a thorough process-tracing effort, much less a dissection of the many potential causes of poor war-fighting in the 2006 conflict.[65] While cost distribution theory helps explain many of these shortcomings, this paper instead concentrates on what many consider the primary cause of failure: a breakdown in civil-military leadership at the highest levels and the unwillingness to connect preferred means to preferred ends. Many observers assign much of the blame for this disconnect on a myopic military, given the IDF's bureaucratic or epistemic advantages.[66] In this explanation, prime minister Ehud Olmert and defense minister Amir Peretz, neither with much military or defense background, were no match for the IDF's predispositions,

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[63] Kober, "Why the Poor Performance?," 24.

[64] Haaretz Staff, "The Main Findings of the Winograd Partial Report on the Second Lebanon War," *Ha'aretz* 2007.

[65] For a thorough overview in English, with an emphasis on a ground force ill-prepared for small unit operations due to a preoccupation with counterinsurgency in the Occupied Territories, see Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, "The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 2008).

[66] Freilich, "Back Again"

"The war brought home more than anything else the shortcomings that had developed over the years in all facts of the political level's supervision of the senior military command."[67]

This section disagrees with this finding. I locate the sources of this means-ends disconnect within the Israeli cabinet, and the prime minister in particular, who "escalated beyond the air campaign in ways that could not have a decisive strategic effect and dithered for weeks in a land battle that seems to have been designed largely to minimize casualties and avoid creating a lasting IDF presence in Lebanon."[68] Yagil Levy argues that the civilian government "gave the IDF unprecedented freedom of operation," but civilian control of the military had never been higher than on the eve of the war.[69] Throughout the war, the prime minister clearly was in charge. All major decisions—"avoiding a ceasefire after the first 48 hours of Israeli retaliation, and again after 96 hours (we feel the actual military response was necessary), sticking to air attacks in the next 3 and a half weeks, although it was already clear by then that this will not stop the Katyusha rockets; the delay in calling and training the reserve units; and - perhaps most of all: on August 11, 2006, the futile attempt to start a wide ground operation, when it was plain to see that it's much too late."—were made by the prime minister in cabinet.[70]

5.1 Civilians Leaders Set the Ends and the Means

Throughout the deliberations over the conduct of the war, the military consistently briefed civilians on what goals could and could not be accomplished. While no official, uniformed or otherwise, relished sending ground forces into Lebanon, the military consistently

[67] Bar-Or and Haltiner, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Israel," 169.
[68] Cordesman, 54.
[69] Levy, "The Second Lebanon War"
[70] Rosner, Shmuel, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerGuest.jhtml?itemNo=984608

acknowledged and stated the limitations of a campaign without ground forces. Furthermore, the military recommended ground forces earlier in the conflict than civilians were willing to consider, and advocated larger numbers of ground forces than the civilians desired or authorized.

At the opening of hostilities, prompted by the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers by Hezbollah, CGS Halutz advocated a strong response that included ground operations and bulldozers on the border, and air strikes against civilian infrastructure to visit costs upon the Beirut government. Halutz did not think the return of the kidnapped soldiers was a realistic objective, nor did he think that the short range *Katyushas* could be mopped up by anything other than a massive ground campaign.[71] Halutz briefed the entire cabinet accordingly, "Don't expect victory or knockouts. I think that what we should do is react harshly enough to cause the international community to intervene by putting pressures [on the Lebanese government]."[72]

In one large meeting, Halutz, accompanied by the other IDF chiefs and intelligence agency heads, presented three options to the Defense Minister: a large aerial campaign against Hezbollah and civilian infrastructures, but not on the rocket sites due to the inability to find short and medium range rockets and the likelihood of barrages against northern Israel as a response; an attack focusing only on the rockets; or a major ground operation.[73] While Halutz recommended the first option, the head of the Mossad recommended the second. The Ministry of Defense's Director of Policy and Political-Military Affairs (a retired general), while not recommending option 3, emphasized that a major ground operation would be required to take on the shorter range rockets. At the same meeting, the IDF operations chief made it clear to Olmert that no

[71] Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 78-81.

[72] Winograd Report quoted in Levy. "The Second Lebanon War."

[73] Freilich, "Back Again" 8.

military operation would likely bring about the return of hostages or the decisive defeat of Hezbollah.[74]

The air campaign against Hezbollah's long range *Fajr* missiles in the first hours of the attack was quite successful, and Halutz again demonstrated awareness of the proper goals given the means available when he informed Olmert on July 12, "all the long-range rockets have been destroyed. We've won the war." On July 15 the research unit of Israel's military intelligence branch presented a report to senior Israeli officials that questioned the war plan's ability to achieve the government's goals. The analysis, according to senior Foreign Ministry officials who read it, concluded that the heavy bombing campaign and small ground offensive then underway would show "diminishing returns" within days. It stated that the plan would neither win the release of the two Israeli soldiers in Hezbollah's hands nor reduce the militia's rocket attacks on Israel to fewer than 100 a day.

Despite these briefs, Olmert delivered a "Churchillian" speech on July 17 to the Knesset that advanced ambitious goals in addition to return of the hostages, "a complete cease fire; deployment of the Lebanese army in all of Southern Lebanon; expulsion of Hezbollah from the area; and fulfillment of United Nations Resolution 1559."[75] Olmert actually added a Palestinian dimension to the speech, "On the Palestinian front, we will conduct a tireless battle until terror ceases, Gilad Shalit [an IDF soldier kidnapped in Gaza] is returned home safely and the shooting of Qassam missiles stops."[76]

5.2 Late Ground Operations

[74] Ibid.,10

[75] Shai Feldman, "The Hezbollah-Israel War: A Preliminary Assessment," in *Middle East Brief* (Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis Universtiy, 2006), 3.

[76] Ehud Olmert, "Address to the Knesset by PM Ehud Olmert" July 17, 2006. http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/olmertspeech2006_eng.htm

When explaining the absence of ground operations to disgruntled uniformed colleagues, Halutz noted the influence underlying these decisions, "it is not in our interest in the context of the Israeli public."[77] Despite this hesitation, the continued push to use ground forces came from the IDF and met with resistance from civilians. The dangers of a limited ground operation were also made clear; according to one investigation, "when the IDF became committed to ground action, a number of senior offices warned that a campaign limited to the Hezbollah positions near the Israeli-Lebanese broader [sic] would be fought on terms relatively advantageous to Hezbollah, would tie IDF forces down in warfare in built-up areas and close-range fighting, and could not be decisive in sealing off Hezbollah forces and defeating them."[78]

The cabinet committee approved mobilizing and training reserve forces for the first time only on July 27, but did not give Halutz any authorization to use them. Halutz would push for the ground operation with increasing vigor up through August 5; Olmert and Peretz remained "opposed but had an increasingly difficult time withstanding IDF pressure."[79] The ground operation was finally approved a week later, if only "in principle." Olmert delayed the operation for another two days. When asked in cabinet if a shorter operation was possible, Halutz insisted "no such animal existed. If the objectives set by the cabinet were to be achieved, it was the full operation or nothing."[80]

Olmert ended up deliberating between two versions of the ground campaign (similar to the attack to the Litani River of the original plan), the principal difference being the number of soldiers to be employed. The plan from Halutz and the IDF asked for four divisions, while the

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[77] *Winograd Report* quoted in Levy. "The Second Lebanon War"

[78] Cordesman, 8

[79] Freilich, "Back Again," 12

[80] Ibid., 24

one favored by transport minister and former CGS Shaul Mofaz used two divisions and two brigades and a much shorter timeline. Olmert ultimately decided on the larger operation. The reason appears to be a reluctance to disagree with the military's recommendation in case it leaked to the media. Mofaz later testified "according to the public's point of view, you can't vote against the security establishment in the middle of a war."[81] But while the pre-war IDF plan was slated to take 2-4 weeks (with most fighting in the first five days), the cabinet approved only three days of ground operations, and in practice lasted for only one.[82]

In summary, while both the civilian leadership and the IDF advocated a firepower-intensive strategy that used few soldiers, the civilian leadership was especially reluctant to send troops into combat. However, simple casualty aversion is not a sufficient explanation for the Israeli shortcomings of the Second Lebanon War. Despite copious advice from senior military leaders on the limited goals that could be accomplished with the prevailing strategy, Olmert publicly set highly ambitious goals for the operation, and continued the air campaign long after his uniformed advisors thought that anything of value would result.

6 Conclusion

This paper has sought to show that during the Second Lebanon War, Israel embarked on a firepower-, air-, and capital-intensive campaign in pursuit of overly-ambitious goals in an unconventional conflict, a singularly counterproductive combination. Civilians embarked on this course of action—publicly announcing goals, advocating air strikes, and delaying reserve mobilization and ground combat—despite having been briefed by military officers that these tactics would not achieve the stated goals. The paper also shows that among Israeli citizens,

[81] Harel and Isacharoff, *34 Days*, 198.

[82] Freilich, "Back Again," 13

one's socio-economic status affects one's approach to grand strategy; relatively less well off individuals are more likely to favor military force over negotiations. Less well off respondents are also more likely to favor increased defense spending as well as a lower willingness to make territorial concessions in pursuit of peace.

I explain this behavior with a theory starting with four major assumptions: security is a public good; voters weigh security benefits against their personal costs in taxes, conscription and casualties; the median voter gets her way in a democracy; and that economic inequality exists. From these assumptions I derive a voter preference for a capitalized military doctrine limited by substitutability due to war type and technology. When substitutability is low, as it is against unconventional opponents, a high degree of capitalization can result in the prosecution of wars using ill-suited doctrine in pursuit of (apparently) poorly chosen goals. While this paper cannot conclusively address every link in the causal chain empirically, cost distribution theory nonetheless explains more aspects of Israeli security policy than competing explanations resting on elite capture or military myopia.

In the end, the finding may not be so surprising; Israel could be considered an easy case for this theory. Indeed, this paper helps reconcile the case of Israel with current political economic findings regarding redistribution. Research has shown that a multiparty, proportional representation electoral system (like that of Israel) tends to produce center-left coalitions. Such coalitions should redistribute more than the center-right governments of majoritarian systems.[83] Israel has generally been described as trending rightwards in the makeup of its governments even as it grows more democratic in its politics and unequal in its economy, but this anomaly is solved when one considers that "left" and "right" in Israel politics are generally associated with dovish

[83] Torben Iverson and David Soskice, "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others," *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 02 (2006).

versus hawkish approaches to the provision of security. Security is the overwhelming public good that the government provides in Israel and it contains a redistributive element.

More work, on Israel and elsewhere, remains to be done. While this paper's theory assigns a pivotal role to the median voter's analysis of the costs of grand strategy, it does not address how grand strategy's benefits are assessed. If security is not seen as a pressing need, the urge to advocate for more will be dampened even if defense does have a redistributive element. This paper's theory only suggests that, all other things equal, economic inequality and capitalized militaries will make increased arming and even conflict more attractive to the median voter. Thus there remains room for research examining how the country as a whole construes threats, and thus work on the assessment of benefits such as the the influence of Israel's "security network" can shed more light on this process.[84] The paper's theory also has less to say on the relative attractiveness of offensive and defensive uses of military might. At least in Israel's case, the cost of both have declined for the median voter; Israel engaged in offensive wars in 2006 and 2008 even as it envisions spending several billion dollars on anti-terrorism barriers separating Israelis from Palestinians and on the Iron Dome missile defense system.

Since 2006, the Israeli academic and strategic communities have listed the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, such as the need to focus on improving the IDF's conventional ground capabilities. This paper concludes that these lessons are unlikely to be truly learned because the median voter tends to support an aggressive grand strategy vis-à-vis small wars and a military doctrine that fights them ineffectively. In keeping with the assumptions and findings of the democratic exceptionalist research program, this paper finds evidence that the Israel public weighs the political benefits of limited war against the costs. However, exceptionalism's cost internalization mechanism makes overly optimistic predictions regarding democracies' discretion

[84] Barak and Sheffer, "Israel's 'Security Network' ".

in choosing war. Cost-benefit calculations are likely to be distorted given the type of military preferred by voters. Because of the heavily capitalized nature of its armed forces, Israel, and other countries like it, is likely to fight small wars badly, but will continue to fight them all the same. For a democracy's average voter, building a military to fight these wars of choice inefficiently but often is not a bug; it is a feature.

Figure 1. Israeli Tax Revenue by Income Decile

Source (Israeli Ministry of Finance)



Figure 2. Israeli Income Inequality and Non-Labor Defense Spending, 1979-2007

(Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics)



Figure 3. Direct and Mediated Causal Path Linking Economic Status to Grand Strategy



Table 1. Summary Table of Dependent Variables from the 2006 Israeli National Election Survey

Chances of war in next 3 years

Response	Number	Percent
Very low	175	28
Low	225	36
Medium	154	25
Great	73	12

To avoid war with an Arab state

Response	Number	Percent	Binary Coding	Number	Percent
Peace talks	300	48	Any peace talks	338	54
Talk and Might	38	6	Only Military Might	293	46
Strengthen military might	293	46			

Country spending on Security

Response	Number	Percent	Binary Coding	Number	Percent
Less	99	15	Same or less	259	41
Same as today	160	25	More	380	59
More	380	59			

Returning Golan territory

Response	Number	Percent	Binary Coding	Number	Percent
No	348	55	No	348	55
Small part	141	22	Yes	286	45
Significant part	76	12			
All	69	11			

Exchange land for peace with Palestinians

Response	Number	Percent	Binary Coding	Number	Percent
Definitely disagree	408	22	Disagree	750	40
Disagree	342	18	Agree	1,135	60
Agree	604	32			
Definitely agree	531	28			

Table 2. Effect of Socio-Economic Status on Threat Assessment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	War Chances		Security (worst to best)	
Family Expenditure	0.06	0.07	-0.13+	-0.08
(High to Low)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Male	-0.41*	-0.40*	0.30+	0.32+
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.175)
Education Years	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age	-0.02**	-0.02**	0.00	0.00
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ex. Soviet Union		-0.19		-0.61*
		(0.249)		(0.248)
"Traditional"	0.10	0.06	0.63**	0.49*
	(0.218)	(0.225)	(0.217)	(0.223)
"Religious"	-0.02	-0.07	0.15	-0.03
	(0.311)	(0.320)	(0.309)	(0.316)
"Haredi"	0.84*	0.77*	-0.78*	-0.97*
	(0.379)	(0.388)	(0.372)	(0.378)
Politics	-0.14*	-0.14*	0.15**	0.13*
(Right to Left)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Household Size	0.03	0.04	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Constant 1	-2.19**	-2.14**	5.39***	5.24***
	(0.675)	(0.679)	(0.660)	(0.659)
Constant 2	-0.56	-0.50		
	(0.666)	(0.670)		
Constant 3	1.12+	1.17+		
	(0.674)	(0.678)		
Observations	446	446	455	455
Log Likelihood	-559.91	-559.60		
Wald Chi-squared	40.93	41.55		
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.10

Models 1 and 2: ordered logit; Models 3 and 4: OLS regression; Models 5 and 6: logit.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 3: Effect of Socio-Economic Status on Perceived Utility of Military Might

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Family Expenditure (High to Low)	0.31***	0.26**	0.25**	0.22*
	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.087)
War Chances	0.57***	0.58***		
	(0.120)	(0.122)		
Security Situation			-0.22***	-0.21***
			(0.060)	(0.060)
Male	0.76***	0.74***	0.71***	0.68**
	(0.219)	(0.221)	(0.213)	(0.214)
Education Years	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Former Soviet Union		0.65*		0.50+
		(0.284)		(0.284)
"Traditional"	0.20	0.33	0.43+	0.53*
	(0.255)	(0.261)	(0.252)	(0.259)
"Religious"	0.87*	1.05*	1.00*	1.14**
	(0.408)	(0.415)	(0.398)	(0.404)
"Haredi"	1.29*	1.46*	1.15*	1.29*
	(0.582)	(0.583)	(0.538)	(0.542)
Politics (Right to Left)	-0.47***	-0.45***	-0.44***	-0.43***
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Number in Household	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Constant 1	0.24	0.04	-1.91*	-1.98*
	(0.812)	(0.818)	(0.851)	(0.853)
Constant 2	0.59	0.39	-1.58+	-1.65+
	(0.812)	(0.819)	(0.850)	(0.852)
Observations	440	440	448	448
Log Likelihood	-326.84	-324.16	-339.50	-337.94
Wald Chi-squared	120.77	126.13	105.30	108.41
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.14

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities of a Preference for Military Force as a Function of Family Income



Table 4. Effect of Socio-Economic Status on Preferences for Increased Security Spending

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Family Expenditure	0.24**	0.13	0.24**	0.15+	0.20*	0.10	0.19*	0.10
(High to Low)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.083)
War Chances	0.31**	0.36**			0.26*	0.33**		
	(0.109)	(0.113)			(0.113)	(0.117)		
Security Situation			-0.09+	-0.06			-0.05	-0.02
			(0.053)	(0.054)			(0.055)	(0.056)
Military over Peace					0.27*	0.19	0.32**	0.27*
					(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.116)
Male	-0.22	-0.31	-0.25	-0.36+	-0.30	-0.39+	-0.36+	-0.47*
	(0.194)	(0.199)	(0.191)	(0.196)	(0.200)	(0.205)	(0.197)	(0.203)
Education Years	-0.06+	-0.07*	-0.05	-0.07*	-0.05	-0.07*	-0.05+	-0.07*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Age	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ex. Soviet Union		1.72***		1.61***		1.67***		1.58***
		(0.327)		(0.323)		(0.329)		(0.325)
"Traditional"	0.39	0.72**	0.50*	0.81**	0.37	0.69**	0.45+	0.75**
	(0.246)	(0.258)	(0.246)	(0.256)	(0.247)	(0.258)	(0.248)	(0.258)
"Religious"	-0.20	0.22	-0.20	0.19	-0.30	0.14	-0.27	0.14
	(0.343)	(0.353)	(0.328)	(0.336)	(0.356)	(0.366)	(0.345)	(0.353)
"Haredi"	-0.27	0.20	-0.08	0.39	-0.27	0.21	-0.09	0.40
	(0.418)	(0.427)	(0.399)	(0.409)	(0.438)	(0.448)	(0.420)	(0.432)
Politics	-0.17**	-0.13+	-0.17**	-0.14*	-0.13+	-0.10	-0.11+	-0.09
(Right to Left)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Household Size	0.11+	0.09	0.11+	0.09	0.10+	0.08	0.10	0.08
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Constant 1	-0.64	-1.01	-1.48+	-1.69*	-0.49	-0.91	-1.03	-1.31
	(0.745)	(0.763)	(0.775)	(0.786)	(0.755)	(0.777)	(0.799)	(0.816)
Constant 2	0.90	0.62	0.03	-0.11	1.05	0.71	0.49	0.28
	(0.745)	(0.762)	(0.772)	(0.781)	(0.757)	(0.777)	(0.798)	(0.813)
Observations	443	443	452	452	437	437	445	445
Log Likelihood	-400.99	-384.75	-413.70	-399.35	-393.09	-378.05	-403.49	-389.93
Wald Chi-squared	58.70	91.20	53.98	82.67	63.31	93.39	59.54	86.67
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.07	0.11	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5. Effect of Socio-Economic Status on Preferences for Golan Territorial Concessions

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
		Direct Effects Only				Mediated Effects Included		
Family Expenditure	-0.28**	-0.21*	-0.26**	-0.19*	-0.23**	-0.17+	-0.20*	-0.14
(High to Low)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.087)	(0.090)
War Chances	-0.34**	-0.37**			-0.25+	-0.29*		
	(0.122)	(0.125)			(0.127)	(0.129)		
Security Situation			0.06	0.03			0.02	-0.01
			(0.062)	(0.062)			(0.063)	(0.063)
Military vs. Peace					-0.39**	-0.34**	-0.45***	-0.42***
					(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.124)
Male	-0.10	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.09	0.16
	(0.219)	(0.222)	(0.215)	(0.218)	(0.223)	(0.226)	(0.220)	(0.223)
Education Years	0.08*	0.10**	0.08*	0.09**	0.08*	0.10**	0.08*	0.09**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Age	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ex. Soviet Union		-1.13***		-1.00**		-1.03**		-0.93**
		(0.318)		(0.319)		(0.321)		(0.322)
"Traditional"	0.02	-0.21	-0.02	-0.21	0.05	-0.16	0.05	-0.13
	(0.247)	(0.256)	(0.248)	(0.256)	(0.250)	(0.257)	(0.251)	(0.258)
"Religious"	-1.50**	-1.82***	-1.10*	-1.36**	-1.42**	-1.72**	-1.09*	-1.34**
	(0.531)	(0.539)	(0.457)	(0.462)	(0.539)	(0.547)	(0.494)	(0.500)
"Haredi"	-1.63*	-1.91*	-1.13+	-1.41*	-1.47+	-1.74*	-0.95	-1.23+
	(0.800)	(0.799)	(0.677)	(0.679)	(0.811)	(0.809)	(0.693)	(0.695)
Politics	0.42***	0.38***	0.42***	0.40***	0.34***	0.32***	0.34***	0.32***
(Right to Left)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Household Size	-0.06	-0.05	-0.10	-0.09	-0.05	-0.04	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Constant 1	1.59+	1.85*	2.41**	2.52**	1.29	1.57+	1.70+	1.86*
	(0.834)	(0.846)	(0.870)	(0.872)	(0.846)	(0.859)	(0.894)	(0.900)
Constant 2	3.03***	3.34***	3.85***	3.99***	2.75**	3.07***	3.17***	3.35***
	(0.844)	(0.858)	(0.883)	(0.887)	(0.855)	(0.870)	(0.905)	(0.913)
Constant 3	4.50***	4.84***	5.21***	5.37***	4.24***	4.59***	4.54***	4.75***
	(0.872)	(0.887)	(0.909)	(0.914)	(0.882)	(0.898)	(0.929)	(0.937)
Observations	441	441	449	449	436	436	443	443
Log Likelihood	-357.88	-350.97	-370.15	-364.90	-352.63	-347.04	-361.60	-357.15
Wald Chi^2	100.86	114.68	87.53	98.02	107.37	118.56	97.48	106.38
(Pseudo) R^2	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.13

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 6: Effect of Socio-Economic Status on Preferences for Territorial Concessions to Palestinians

	(25)	(25)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)
		Direct Effect Only			Mediated Effects Included			
Family Expenditure	-0.25**	-0.15+	-0.21**	-0.12	-0.17*	-0.08	-0.15*	-0.08
(High to Low)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.078)
War Chances	-0.41***	-0.43***			-0.32**	-0.34**		
	(0.102)	(0.103)			(0.105)	(0.106)		
Security Situation			0.22***	0.20***			0.19***	0.16**
			(0.050)	(0.050)			(0.051)	(0.051)
Military vs. Peace					-0.50***	-0.45***	-0.51***	-0.48***
					(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Male	-0.13	-0.08	-0.16	-0.10	0.03	0.06	-0.03	0.01
	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.184)	(0.185)
Education Years	0.04	0.05+	0.06+	0.07*	0.04	0.06+	0.05+	0.06*
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Age	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ex. Soviet Union		-1.18***		-1.05***		-1.10***		-0.97***
		(0.257)		(0.258)		(0.259)		(0.261)
"Traditional"	-0.22	-0.50*	-0.44*	-0.69**	-0.21	-0.47*	-0.39+	-0.62**
	(0.220)	(0.230)	(0.222)	(0.232)	(0.221)	(0.231)	(0.224)	(0.233)
"Religious"	-1.83***	-2.22***	-1.87***	-2.21***	-1.70***	-2.07***	-1.63***	-1.95***
	(0.343)	(0.356)	(0.331)	(0.342)	(0.355)	(0.367)	(0.344)	(0.354)
"Haredi"	-1.72***	-2.14***	-1.54***	-1.94***	-1.61***	-2.02***	-1.32**	-1.69***
	(0.438)	(0.449)	(0.416)	(0.429)	(0.455)	(0.467)	(0.433)	(0.447)
Politics	0.41***	0.39***	0.40***	0.39***	0.33***	0.32***	0.34***	0.33***
(Right to Left)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Household Size	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Constant 1	-1.84**	-1.49*	0.21	0.36	-2.15**	-1.77*	-0.61	-0.42
	(0.706)	(0.712)	(0.718)	(0.722)	(0.716)	(0.722)	(0.739)	(0.744)
Constant 2	-0.45	-0.07	1.60*	1.77*	-0.72	-0.32	0.81	1.03
	(0.705)	(0.712)	(0.725)	(0.730)	(0.714)	(0.722)	(0.745)	(0.750)
Constant 3	1.52*	1.99**	3.55***	3.79***	1.34+	1.83*	2.88***	3.16***
	(0.706)	(0.717)	(0.738)	(0.745)	(0.713)	(0.726)	(0.752)	(0.760)
Observations	438	438	447	447	433	433	441	441
Log Likelihood	-512.92	-502.02	-524.41	-515.90	-498.73	-489.59	-508.05	-501.03
Wald Chi^2	169.27	191.08	171.73	188.75	182.80	201.08	186.68	200.72
(Pseudo) R^2	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.17

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities for Support of Increased Defense Spending as a *Direct Effect* of Family Income, Given Preferences for Military Strength



Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities for Support of Golan Concessions as a *Direct Effect* of Family Income, Given Preferences for Military Strength



Figure 7. Predicted Probabilities for Support of Golan Concessions as a *Direct Effect* of Family Income, Given Preferences for Military Strength